Christopher A. Parker v. Cynthia Thurman, et al

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-12998
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
CHRISTOPHER A. PARKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CYNTHIA THURMAN,
SUMMER RALEY,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cv-00080-TWT
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-12998
Before J ILL PRYOR , NEWSOM , and B RANCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff Christopher A. Parker appeals the district court’s
order granting defendant Cynthia Thurman’s motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings and dismissing Parker’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claim for malicious prosecution. After careful consideration, we
affirm.
I.
In 2018, Parker lived with his partner, Hannah Sharp. Both
Parker and Sharp worked nights. One morning, after their shifts
ended, Parker picked Sharp up from work. They ran some er-
rands and then returned home to eat breakfast. After finishing
their meals, they went into their shared bedroom to sleep. Ac-
cording to Sharp, she fell asleep and woke up to Parker raping
her. Parker admits that he had sexual intercourse with Sharp but
claims that the encounter was consensual; he denies raping her.
Immediately after the sexual encounter, Sharp was crying
and upset. She locked herself in the bathroom. Sharp tried to call
her mother but was unable to reach her. Parker claims that he
was confused by Sharp’s distress and tried to comfort her. He
contacted her sister, Summer Raley, and asked her to check on
Sharp.
Raley, who worked as a deputy for the Dade County Sher-
iff’s Office, called Sharp and convinced her to meet. Raley then
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21-12998 Opinion of the Court 3
called Thurman, an investigator with the Dade County Sheriff’s
Office, and reported that Parker had raped Sharp. Raley said that
she was taking Sharp to a sexual assault center to have a rape ex-
amination conducted.
Thurman, who knew Sharp because they had previously
worked together and remained friends, met Sharp and Raley at
the sexual assault center. At the sexual assault center, Thurman
interviewed Sharp. Sharp cried throughout the interview, which
lasted about 15 minutes. Raley, Sharp’s mother, the director of
the sexual assault center, and a victim’s advocate from the district
attorney’s office all were present during the interview.
During the interview, Sharp told Thurman about the sexu-
al assault. Sharp said that when she went to bed, she was exhaust-
ed and quickly fell asleep. She woke up approximately 30 minutes
later to find Parker “on top of her and inside of her.” Doc 1-2 at
7.1 She reported that Parker twice ejaculated inside her. Accord-
ing to Sharp, although she had fallen asleep in pajamas, she was
naked when she woke. Thurman asked her whether she had said
anything to Parker during the assault. She shook her head no and
indicated that she was in shock when she woke up to being raped.
Sharp described to Thurman what happened after the as-
sault. She said she went into the bathroom because it was the on-
ly room in the house with a working lock. While she was locked
1 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-12998
in the bathroom, Parker was on the other side of the door crying
and screaming at her. According to Sharp, Parker begged her not
to leave, apologized, and claimed that she had agreed to have sex
with him. She responded that she had never agreed to have sex
and that he was lying. During the interview, Sharp told Thurman
that Parker would claim she had agreed to have sex with him.
Also during the interview, Sharp admitted to Thurman that
she had recently become angry with Parker and decided to end
their relationship. She reported that Parker was aware she was
going to leave him and the night before had begged her to stay
with him.
There was no evidence of abrasions, bruises, or marks on
Sharp’s body. Thurman did not document any physical injuries
that Sharp had suffered.
Based on the interview, Thurman appeared before a magis-
trate court judge and applied for an arrest warrant. Before apply-
ing for the warrant, Thurman made no attempt to contact Parker,
visit the crime scene, talk to additional witnesses present at the
sexual assault center, or obtain any additional evidence. To sup-
port the warrant application, Thurman signed an affidavit stating
that Parker had committed the offense of rape under Georgia law
when he “willingly and knowingly[] penetrated the vagina of
Hannah Sharp with his penis without her permission or consent
and against her will.” Doc. 6 at ¶ 37. The magistrate court judge
issued a warrant for Parker’s arrest.
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21-12998 Opinion of the Court 5
A few hours later, officers arrested Parker. He was taken to
the sheriff’s office and questioned by Thurman and another of-
ficer. During the interview, Parker denied raping Sharp and
claimed that they had engaged in consensual sex. He also denied
knowing that she wanted to end their relationship. When the of-
ficers told him that Sharp had wanted to end the relationship,
Parker suggested that she had made up the rape accusation as a
way to end their relationship. Parker also reported that she had
claimed to have been sexually assaulted by other men in the past.
Parker was transported to the local jail and held there for
several days. After posting bond, he was released from custody.
As a condition of his release, Parker had to submit to electronic
ankle monitoring and was allowed to leave his residence only for
limited purposes. Parker was required to wear the ankle monitor
for approximately six months.
Eventually, the district attorney moved to dismiss the ar-
rest warrant based on “insufficient evidence to warrant a reasona-
ble probability of conviction.”
Id. at ¶ 58 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The magistrate court granted the district attor-
ney’s motion. Parker was never indicted for any offense in con-
nection with the alleged rape.
Parker later filed this lawsuit against Thurman, bringing a
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for malicious prosecution.2 After fil-
2 Parker also brought a malicious prosecution claim against Raley. The dis-
trict court dismissed this claim. Because Parker does not challenge on appeal
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-12998
ing an answer, Thurman filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, arguing that she was entitled to qualified immunity.
The district court granted Thurman’s motion. The court
concluded that Thurman was entitled to qualified immunity be-
cause the information Sharp provided in the interview about the
sexual assault gave Thurman at least arguable probable cause to
believe that Parker had committed a crime.
This is Parker’s appeal.
II.
We review
de novo a district court order granting judg-
ment on the pleadings.
Cannon v. City of W. Palm Beach,
250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001). “Judgment on the pleadings
is appropriate where there are no material facts in dispute and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Id. “In
determining whether a party is entitled to judgment on the plead-
ings, we accept as true all material facts alleged in the non-moving
party’s pleading, and we view those facts in the light most favora-
ble to the non-moving party.”
Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d
1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2014).3
the district court’s dismissal of his claim against Raley, we do not discuss the
claim further.
3 Parker attached various documents to his complaint including Thurman’s
arrest affidavit and her investigation summary, which detailed the statements
that Sharp and Parker made during their interviews. Because these docu-
ments were attached as exhibits to Parker’s complaint, we treat them as part
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21-12998 Opinion of the Court 7
III.
“Qualified immunity shields public officials from liability
for civil damages when their conduct does not violate a constitu-
tional right that was clearly established at the time of the chal-
lenged action.”
Echols v. Lawton, 913 F.3d 1313, 1319 (11th Cir.
2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). To receive qualified
immunity, an officer “bears the initial burden to prove that [s]he
acted within [her] discretionary authority.”
Dukes v. Deaton,
852 F.3d 1035, 1041 (11th Cir. 2017). The plaintiff then bears the
burden of proving that “the defendant violated a constitutional
right” and “the right was clearly established at the time of the vio-
lation.”
Barnes v. Zaccari, 669 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2012).
Because Parker does not dispute that Thurman was engaged in a
discretionary function, he bears the burden of proving that she
was not entitled to qualified immunity.
Parker claims that Thurman is liable under the Fourth
Amendment for malicious prosecution, “which is shorthand for a
claim of deprivation of liberty pursuant to legal process.”
Luke v.
Gulley, 975 F.3d 1140, 1143 (11th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation
marks omitted). To succeed on this claim, Parker must prove that
(1) Thurman “violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free
from seizures pursuant to legal process” and (2) “the criminal pro-
of that pleading for purposes of Thurman’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings.
See Gill ex rel. K.C.R. v. Judd, 941 F.3d 504, 511–12 (11th Cir.
2019).
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8 Opinion of the Court 21-12998
ceedings against him terminated in his favor.”
Id. at 1144. To es-
tablish that Thurman violated his Fourth Amendment right to be
free from seizures pursuant to legal process, Parker must establish
“that the legal process justifying his seizure was constitutionally
infirm and that his seizure would not otherwise be justified with-
out legal process.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Be-
cause the existence of “[p]robable cause renders a seizure pursu-
ant to legal process reasonable under the Fourth Amendment[,]
. . . the presence of probable cause defeats a claim that an individ-
ual was seized pursuant to legal process in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.”
Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 898 (11th
Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In the context of an arrest, probable cause exists “when the
facts, considering the totality of the circumstances and viewed
from the perspective of a reasonable officer, establish ‘a probabil-
ity or substantial chance of criminal activity.’”
Id. (quoting
Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018)). In as-
sessing whether there was probable cause for an arrest, we “ask
whether a reasonable officer could conclude that there was a sub-
stantial chance of criminal activity.”
Id. at 902 (alteration adopted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Probable cause does not re-
quire conclusive evidence and is not a high bar.”
Id. at 899 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
To determine whether there was probable cause for Par-
ker’s arrest, we ask whether a reasonable officer could have con-
cluded that there was a substantial chance that he had committed
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21-12998 Opinion of the Court 9
the crime of rape. Under Georgia law, a person commits the of-
fense of rape “when he has carnal knowledge of . . . [a] female
forcibly and against her will.” O.C.G.A. § 16-6-1(a)(1). Under
Georgia law, “carnal knowledge” occurs “when there is any pene-
tration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ.”
Id. Geor-
gia courts have recognized that “sexual intercourse with a woman
who is temporarily without will, due to unconsciousness arising
from sleep, is rape.”
Johnson v. State, 369 S.E.2d 48, 49 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1988);
see Cook v. State, 790 S.E.2d 283, 287 (Ga. Ct. App.
2016) (explaining that victim’s statement that she was in and out
of consciousness when defendant had sexual intercourse with her
was sufficient to establish that defendant had used “constructive
force” and committed the crime of rape).
Here, a reasonable officer could conclude there was a sub-
stantial chance that Parker had committed the crime of rape. An
officer could draw this conclusion based on Sharp’s statements
during the interview that she woke from sleeping to find Parker
“on top of her and inside of her.” Doc. 1-2 at 7. Although Parker
argues that there was no probable cause because there was no
physical evidence to corroborate Sharp’s rape allegation, we have
recognized that an officer generally “is entitled to rely on a vic-
tim’s criminal complaint as support for probable cause.”
Rankin v.
Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1441 (11th Cir. 1998);
see Huebner v. Brad-
shaw, 935 F.3d 1183, 1188 (11th Cir. 2019) (explaining that officer
had probable cause to arrest suspect for battery based on victim’s
statements).
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10 Opinion of the Court 21-12998
Parker nevertheless argues that Thurman lacked probable
cause because she conducted an “unreasonable investigation.”
Appellant’s Br. at 7. Parker says that Thurman’s investigation was
insufficient because she should have interviewed him before ob-
taining an arrest warrant. If Thurman had interviewed Parker be-
fore obtaining the arrest warrant, she would have heard him dis-
pute Sharp’s account of the events and claim that Sharp had en-
gaged in consensual sexual intercourse.
Even with the interview, however, Thurman still would
have had probable cause to arrest Parker. When an officer initially
uncovers facts showing probable cause, she is not “required to
forego arresting” a suspect simply because the defendant “offered
a different explanation.”
Huebner, 935 F.3d at 1188 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). As we have explained, when deciding
whether there is probable cause for an arrest, an officer is not “re-
quired to sift through conflicting evidence or resolve issues of
credibility, so long as the totality of the circumstances presented a
sufficient basis for believing that an offense had been committed.”
Id. (alterations adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
totality of the evidence here was sufficient to give a reasonable
officer a basis to conclude that Parker had committed the crime of
rape under Georgia law.
Parker also argues that Thurman’s investigation was un-
reasonable because Thurman was “bias[ed]” due to her friendship
with Sharp. Appellant’s Br. at 17. To support this argument, Par-
ker relies on our decision in
Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d
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21-12998 Opinion of the Court 11
1220 (11th Cir. 2004). After considering
Kingsland, we cannot say
that Thurman’s investigation was unreasonable.
In
Kinsgland, Misty Kingsland was involved in a car acci-
dent with an off-duty police officer.
Id. at 1223. After the accident,
Kingsland climbed out of her wrecked vehicle and “sat down in a
pile of shattered glass.”
Id. Although a large number of officers
responded to the scene, ultimately as many as 20, none of them
approached Kingsland for a full 30 minutes, either to ask for her
version of events or to inquire about her well-being.
Id. When of-
ficers finally spoke to Kingsland, she told them that she “had sus-
tained injuries to her head” and “was dizzy and could not stand
up.”
Id. Still, no one offered Kingsland any medical care.
Id. Alt-
hough one officer claimed to have detected an odor of marijuana
emanating from Kingsland and her vehicle, nobody searched her
truck, summoned drug-sniffing dogs, or ever found any marijua-
na.
Id. at 1223–24. When Kingsland (presumably still dizzy and
sick) failed field sobriety tests, officers put her in a vehicle and told
her “she was being transported to the hospital for treatment and
more tests.”
Id. at 1224. In fact, the officers took Kingsland into
custody and drove her to “a DUI testing facility.”
Id. Once there,
officers administered multiple breathalyzer tests, all of which
came back negative.
Id. Given Kingsland’s clean results, the of-
ficer completing paperwork for the arrest asked a colleague “what
he should . . . write.”
Id. He was told “to write that Kingsland had
a strong odor of cannabis emitting from her breath.”
Id. The of-
ficer then “threw away the form he was writing on and started
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12 Opinion of the Court 21-12998
writing on a new form.”
Id. After taking additional tests and
providing a urine sample, which later came back clean, Kingsland
was handcuffed, transported to jail, and charged with driving un-
der the influence.
Id. at 1225. Several months later, the charges
were dropped.
Id.
Kingsland sued the officers for false arrest.
Id. We reversed
the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the officers,
holding that there were genuine issues of material fact as to
whether the officers had conducted a reasonable investigation.
Id.
at 1223, 1225. We explained that officers cannot ignore “exculpa-
tory information that is available to them” and may not “conduct
an investigation in a biased fashion or elect not to obtain easily
discoverable facts, such as whether there was cannabis in the
truck or whether witnesses were available to attest to who was at
fault in the accident.”
Id. at 1228–29. We concluded that a jury
could find the officers’ investigation was “deficient in that the of-
ficers consciously and deliberately did not make an effort to un-
cover reasonably discoverable, material information.”
Id. at 1230.
Furthermore, we concluded that a reasonable jury could have
found that the officers “fabricated” evidence to establish probable
cause.
Id. at 1233.
Parker argues that the investigation was unreasonable un-
der
Kingsland because it was tainted by bias: “Thurman chose to
base her investigation on allegations . . . by a complaining witness
with whom she had a pre-existing relationship.” Appellant’s Br. at
17. But we did not conclude in
Kingsland that the officers per-
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21-12998 Opinion of the Court 13
formed an unreasonable investigation simply because they had a
pre-existing relationship with the officer who hit Kingsland’s car.
Instead, we reversed the grant of summary judgment because a
reasonable jury could have found that the officers consciously ig-
nored information they already possessed that cast significant
doubt on whether Kingsland was guilty of driving under the in-
fluence and that the officers fabricated evidence against Kings-
land.
See Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1226–28, 1233–34. Because there
is no allegation in this case that Thurman consciously and delib-
erately ignored information that she already possessed or that she
fabricated evidence, we cannot say that
Kingsland controls here.
IV.
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district
court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of Thurman.
AFFIRMED.
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