Emory L. Rickerson v. Rodney Scott Jeter

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-12563
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
EMORY L. RICKERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
RODNEY SCOTT JETER,
individually,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 3:19-cv-00130-TCB
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-12563
Before J ORDAN, NEWSOM , and BRASHER , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This Section 1983 appeal turns on whether Rodney Scott
Jeter, a Georgia State Patrol Officer, is entitled to qualified immun-
ity based on his arrest of Emory Rickerson for obstruction of a law
enforcement officer. Rickerson disobeyed multiple lawful orders to
move a truck from the scene of an accident, resulting in his arrest.
After careful consideration, we hold that Jeter was entitled to qual-
ified immunity and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 10, 2017, Rebecca Buchanan was involved in a
serious accident after losing control of her vehicle on a Georgia
highway. When the dust settled, Buchanan’s vehicle laid at rest on
the highway’s shoulder, and she was sprawled across its front seats.
Several civilians came to Buchanan’s aid, including retired fire-
fighter Emory Rickerson. As the only person initially on the scene
with experience responding to accidents, Rickerson parked his
truck on the shoulder behind the debris field, turned on his hazard
lights, and took charge of the effort to keep Buchanan alive. Specif-
ically, Rickerson and two other civilians took turns caring for Bu-
chanan, with two of the three kneeling and squatting to hold her
head in position and keep her airway open while the third stood to
the side and rested. When Rickerson wasn’t holding Buchanan, he
was instructing the other two civilians on how to do so properly.
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21-12563 Opinion of the Court 3
Minutes after the crash, Rodney Scott Jeter, a Georgia State
patrol officer, arrived at the scene. After he called 911, Jeter became
concerned that emergency vehicles would not be able to access the
scene. In an attempt to clear the way for emergency vehicles, Jeter
identified Rickerson as the owner of the truck parked behind the
crash site and ordered him to move his vehicle. He directed Rick-
erson to move the truck at least twice. When Jeter issued the or-
ders, Rickerson was not actively holding Buchanan. Instead, he was
standing beside the other two civilians, who were holding her, and
continuing to issue instructions.
Rickerson disobeyed Jeter’s orders to move the truck, ex-
plaining that it would force him to leave Buchanan, who he de-
scribed as his patient. After Rickerson’s last refusal, one of the other
civilians asked for and received permission to move the truck for
him. That civilian proceeded to move the truck herself about thirty
seconds after being given permission. In the aftermath of Ricker-
son’s refusals and the civilian intervention, Jeter told Rickerson that
he would speak to him later.
Eventually, additional first responders arrived on the scene
and a local Sherriff’s Deputy interviewed Rickerson in Jeter’s pres-
ence. Rickerson harshly critiqued Jeter, saying “I hope I never run
into anybody like you again, you’re a bad name to the fire service.”
Rickerson continued, telling Jeter that “I don’t care about your
background, I care about what happened right here. You’re mad at
me because I don’t care about your background. I don’t give a rat’s
ass about your background.” Finally, Rickerson repeatedly asked
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-12563
that he be returned his drivers’ license (which the officers had taken
to file a report) or taken to jail. Jeter then arrested Rickerson for
misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer based on
his refusal to move the truck. The charges were eventually dis-
missed.
Rickerson sued Jeter in the Northern District of Georgia,
bringing a false arrest claim under the Fourth Amendment and a
retaliatory arrest claim under the First Amendment. Jeter answered
the complaint and moved for summary judgment after discovery,
arguing that he was protected by qualified immunity. The district
court granted Jeter’s motion and entered judgment in his favor.
Rickerson timely appealed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
based on qualified immunity
de novo, construing the facts and
drawing all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-mov-
ing party.
Cantu v. City of Dothan, Al., 974 F.3d 1217, 1228 (11th
Cir. 2020).
III. DISCUSSION
This appeal turns on the doctrine of qualified immunity.
That doctrine “protects government officials performing discre-
tionary functions from civil liability unless their conduct violates
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a rea-
sonable person would have known.”
Johnson v. City of Miami
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21-12563 Opinion of the Court 5
Beach, 18 F.4th 1267, 1272 (11th Cir. 2021). Where, as here, it is
undisputed that the officer acted within the scope of his discretion-
ary authority, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that quali-
fied immunity is not appropriate.”
Id. (quoting
Vinyard v. Wilson,
311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002)). Because a plaintiff must show
both a statutory or constitutional violation on the merits and that
the right violated was “clearly established” at the time of the chal-
lenged conduct, we may begin our analysis with either element on
appeal.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
A. Rickerson’s False Arrest Claim
To survive summary judgment on a false arrest claim where
qualified immunity is at issue, a plaintiff must create a genuine dis-
pute of material fact concerning whether the arresting officer had
arguable probable cause.
Alston v. Swarbrick, 954 F.3d 1312, 1318
(11th Cir. 2020). Arguable probable cause exists if “reasonable of-
ficers in the same circumstances and possessing the same
knowledge as the defendants could have believed that probable
cause existed to arrest the plaintiff.”
Id. (cleaned up). Thus, the
standard “allows for the possibility that an officer might reasonably
but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present.”
Gates v.
Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1298 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted).
Jeter arrested Rickerson for allegedly violating Georgia’s ob-
struction statute, which criminalizes “knowingly and willfully ob-
struct[ing] or hinder[ing] any law enforcement officer . . . in the
lawful discharge of his or her official duties . . . .” O.G.C.A. § 16-10-
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-12563
24(a) (2017). Rickerson makes three arguments that Jeter lacked ar-
guable probable cause to arrest him for obstruction. We address
each argument in turn.
1. Jeter’s Orders Were Lawful
Rickerson begins with a threshold contention that Jeter’s or-
ders to move the truck were unlawful, and thus incapable of sup-
porting probable cause for an arrest. Rickerson’s argument on this
point is rooted in Georgia Code Section 16-10-24.2, which criminal-
izes “knowingly and willfully obstruct[ing] or hinder[ing] any
emergency medical technician, any emergency medical profes-
sional, or any properly identified person working under the direc-
tion of an emergency medical professional in the lawful discharge
of [their] official duties . . . .” O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24.2(b) (2017). The
statute defines “emergency medical technician,” in relevant part,
to mean “any person who has been certified as a[] . . . first re-
sponder.”
Id. § 16-10-24.2(a)(2). Rickerson stated in a declaration
that he “was certified as a first responder in the 1990s” and that he
worked for a local fire department from 1985 until 2012, when he
retired. Thus, Rickerson argues that his conduct at the time of
Jeter’s orders—standing behind two civilians who were holding
Buchanan and giving them instructions—was an exercise of an of-
ficial duty that Jeter’s order to move illegally obstructed.
Assuming for the sake of argument that this statute has some
bearing on the legality of a law enforcement officer’s orders to a
first responder, we disagree that Jeter’s order to Rickerson violated
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21-12563 Opinion of the Court 7
the statute. Rickerson was not an “emergency medical technician”
exercising an official duty at the time of the accident. Although he
was once certified as a first responder and served as a firefighter for
nearly three decades, Rickerson retired from that position in 2012,
five years before the events resulting in this appeal. In the absence
of any record evidence establishing that Rickerson was a certified
first responder at the time of his arrest or that he was exercising an
official duty while assisting Buchanan, we conclude that there is no
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Jeter’s orders vio-
lated Section 16-10-24.2.
2. Disobeying Jeter’s Orders Created Arguable Probable
Cause to Arrest Rickerson for Obstruction
Rickerson argues in the alternative that even if Jeter’s orders
were lawful, his response to those orders—repeatedly and ex-
pressly disobeying—did not create arguable probable cause for
Jeter to arrest him for obstruction. Again, we disagree.
Rickerson argues that, because Jeter ultimately achieved his
objective of moving the truck, there can be no obstruction. He says
that Georgia law provides that “probable cause [for an arrest under
the obstruction statute] exists only where a person’s statements
prevent an officer from achieving the purpose of his lawful com-
mand.” Georgia law, however, does not impose this requirement.
Instead, actions like “refus[ing] to comply with an officer’s directive
or command,”
Harris v. State, 726 S.E. 2d 455, 458 (Ga. Ct. App.
2012), or “affirmatively interfer[ing] with [an] officer’s actions,”
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8 Opinion of the Court 21-12563
Lebis v. State, 808 S.E. 2d 724, 761 (Ga. 2017), are sufficient to es-
tablish obstruction. It is undisputed that Rickerson repeatedly re-
fused to comply with Jeter’s orders to move his truck. Those refus-
als “affirmatively interfere[ed]” with Jeter’s intended action, mov-
ing the truck out of the way as soon as possible to clear the way for
emergency vehicles.
Lebis, 808 S.E. 2d at 761. At the very least, a
“reasonable officer[] in the same circumstances and possessing the
same knowledge as [Jeter] could have believed that probable cause
existed to arrest [Rickerson for obstruction.]”
Alston, 954 F.3d at
1318.
3. The Affirmative Defense of Justification Did Not Negate
Arguable Probable Cause
Finally, Rickerson argues Jeter did not have at least arguable
probable cause because Jeter had access to information that estab-
lished that Rickerson possessed the affirmative defense of justifica-
tion. Specifically, Rickerson cites Georgia’s justification and “good
Samaritan” statutes as operating together to provide an absolute
defense to criminal liability for obstruction on the facts of this ap-
peal.
See O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-20, 51-1-29 (2017).
Even assuming for the sake of argument that Rickerson’s ac-
tions were justified under Georgia law, the existence of an affirma-
tive defense does not negate arguable probable cause for purposes
of qualified immunity. We have repeatedly held that the existence
of facts that give rise to an affirmative defense does not defeat prob-
able cause, actual
or arguable.
See Jordan v. Mosley, 487 F.3d 1350,
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21-12563 Opinion of the Court 9
1356–57 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Under the law of probable cause, no po-
lice officer had a duty to resolve [the] legal question [of whether an
arrested plaintiff had an apparent authority defense under Georgia
law] before seeking out Plaintiff’s arrest.”);
Morris v. Town of Lex-
ington, 748 F.3d 1316, 1325 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Morris could plead
the use of . . . force as a defense to a charge of assault; in fact, he
prevailed when he was tried on that charge. But the fact remains
that once Morris punched [a police officer,] the officers had proba-
ble cause, or at the very least arguable probable cause, to believe
that Morris had committed an assault.”);
Manners v. Cannella, 891
F.3d 959, 971–72 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Moreover, the argument that [a
statute criminalizing flight from law enforcement] is unconstitu-
tional is an affirmative defense, not one the officer was required to
consider at the outset of this encounter.”);
Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d
1276, 1286 (explaining that “an affirmative defense to an alleged
crime does not necessarily vitiate probable cause” because “police
officers aren’t lawyers; we do not expect them to resolve legal ques-
tions or to weigh the viability of most affirmative defenses”).
B. Rickerson’s Retaliatory Arrest Claim
Rickerson also argues that the district court improperly
granted summary judgment to Jeter on his retaliatory arrest claim
under the First Amendment. That is, Rickerson argues that Jeter
unconstitutionally arrested him in retaliation for his speech. We
disagree.
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10 Opinion of the Court 21-12563
We begin and end our analysis of this claim with the clearly
established law element of qualified immunity. Under that ele-
ment, we look to whether the officer’s challenged conduct violated
clearly established law at the time of the conduct. On October 10,
2017, when Rickerson was arrested, our precedents established that
probable cause was an absolute bar to a retaliatory arrest claim.
See, e.g.,
Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002),
ab-
rogated by Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945 (2018).
The upshot is that, for an arrest in 2017, arguable probable cause
gives an officer qualified immunity from a First Amendment claim
for retaliatory arrest.
See, e.g.,
Redd v. City of Enterprise, 140 F.3d
1378, 1383 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Because we hold that the officers had
arguable probable cause to arrest Anderson for disorderly conduct,
we must hold that the officers are also entitled to qualified immun-
ity from the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims.”). The Supreme
Court has since carved out exceptions to the rule that we expressed
in
Dahl and its progeny.
See Lozman, 138 S. Ct. 1945;
Nieves v.
Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019). Clearly established law, however,
is evaluated “at the time of the officer’s supposedly wrongful act,”
not at the time of appellate review.
See Powell v. Snook, 25 F.4th
912, 920 (11th Cir. 2022). So because Jeter had arguable probable
cause to arrest Rickerson in 2017, he could not have violated Rick-
erson’s clearly established First Amendment rights at the time of
arrest. Because Jeter is entitled to qualified immunity as to Ricker-
son’s false arrest claim under the Fourth Amendment, we likewise
hold that he is entitled to qualified immunity as to the accompany-
ing retaliatory arrest claim under the First Amendment.
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21-12563 Opinion of the Court 11
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s order granting
summary judgment is AFFIRMED.
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