USA v. Kareem Jamal Young

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-11907
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
KAREEM JAMAL YOUNG,
a.k.a. Kareem Al Jamal Young,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 7:17-cr-00522-LSC-HNJ-1
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-11907
____________________
Before J ORDAN, NEWSOM , and J ULIE C ARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant appeals the 188-month sentence he received after
pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In support of his appeal, Defendant
argues the district court erred by denying his retained counsel’s re-
quest at sentencing to withdraw from the case. Having carefully
reviewed the record and the briefs submitted by the parties, we find
no error, and thus AFFIRM.
BACKGROUND
Defendant was indicted in November 2017 on one charge of
possessing a firearm as a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). Based on the undisputed facts set out in his presen-
tence investigation report (“PSR”), officers responding to a traffic
accident in Tuscaloosa, Alabama in March 2017 encountered De-
fendant unconscious in the driver’s seat of a vehicle that was resting
against a utility pole. When awakened by the officers, Defendant
appeared confused, had slurred speech, and needed assistance to
exit the vehicle. He admitted he had been drinking and had taken
a few Lortabs, and a search of his person uncovered a 9mm pistol
in his waistband. Defendant was arrested for driving under the in-
fluence and violating Alabama’s firearms law, and later determined
to be a convicted felon at the time of his arrest.
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21-11907 Opinion of the Court 3
Federal defender Allison Case entered an appearance on be-
half of Defendant and represented him in an April 2018 detention
hearing. After the hearing, Defendant was released from custody
on an unsecured bond with several conditions, including the con-
dition that he refrain from using any illegal narcotic or controlled
substance. Shortly thereafter, Defendant tested positive for am-
phetamines, cocaine, and opiates in a urine sample he submitted
pursuant to his conditions of release.
Defendant subsequently agreed to plead guilty to the
§ 922(g)(1) charge pursuant to a plea agreement. Under this agree-
ment, Defendant acknowledged that his offense carried an impris-
onment term of up to 10 years that could be increased to an impris-
onment term of “not less than 15 years and not more than life”
should Defendant qualify for such a sentence under the Armed Ca-
reer Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
On May 15, 2018, the district court held a change-of-plea
hearing during which Defendant was represented by federal de-
fender Case and at which Defendant entered a plea of guilty. De-
fendant stated during the hearing that he was satisfied with Case
and had no complaints about her representation. He also con-
firmed that he was competent, that his plea was voluntary, and that
he was not at that time suffering an impairment or under the influ-
ence of any drugs that could affect his ability to understand the pro-
ceeding, although he admitted he had used heroin and cocaine
about a week prior. The court advised Defendant of the potential
sentencing ranges he faced, including the enhanced sentence that
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-11907
would be applicable if Defendant qualified for sentencing under the
ACCA. Given his admitted drug use while previously out on bond,
the court ordered Defendant to self-report to the US Marshals Ser-
vice while awaiting sentencing.
The court set Defendant’s sentencing for September 2018.
Prior to that date, the federal defender’s office advised the district
court that it had a potential conflict involving Defendant and asked
for permission to withdraw from his case. The court granted the
request to withdraw and reset Defendant’s sentencing for Decem-
ber 2018. It then appointed Jason Neff, a member of the district’s
Criminal Justice Act (“CJA”) panel, to represent Defendant.
Defendant subsequently moved pro se to withdraw his guilty
plea. Contrary to the representations he made at the change-of-
plea hearing, Defendant claimed he was coerced into pleading
guilty by family members who threatened him and that his former
attorney, Case, had induced him to enter the plea by promising him
a reduced sentence. Defendant also argued in his motion that Case
had provided ineffective assistance of counsel as to the plea, and
that his new attorney Neff likewise had been ineffective by refusing
to file various motions and objections proposed by Defendant.
Based on the allegations in Defendant’s motion, and per Neff’s own
motion, the district court permitted Neff to withdraw from the
case, appointed CJA attorney Stuart Albea to represent Defendant,
and reset Defendant’s sentencing hearing for March 2019.
With the assistance of his newly appointed counsel, Defend-
ant moved for a hearing on his pro se motion to withdraw his guilty
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21-11907 Opinion of the Court 5
plea, and he also filed a motion to determine his competency both
currently and at the time he entered the plea. Counsel stated in the
competency motion that Defendant suffered from mental and
emotional problems, and that he was not taking his medications
but rather under the influence of illegal drugs while out on bond
just prior to the change-of-plea hearing, such that he was unable to
understand the nature of that proceeding and the consequence of
entering a guilty plea. As part of the relief requested in the motion,
counsel asked the court to order a psychological evaluation of De-
fendant. At the same time as counsel was pursuing the competency
issue, Defendant filed various pro se motions critiquing his former
attorneys and seeking discovery of documents to which he alleg-
edly was denied access. Given the pending motions, the district
court continued Defendant’s March 2019 sentencing and referred
the case to a magistrate judge.
The magistrate judge granted Defendant’s motion for a
competency evaluation and ordered that he be examined by Dr.
Kimberly Ackerson, a forensic psychologist. Dr. Ackerson subse-
quently interviewed Defendant and recommended that he un-
dergo a comprehensive psychiatric evaluation to assess his mental
health issues. Defendant was then committed to the federal deten-
tion center at SeaTac, Washington for a more complete psycholog-
ical evaluation.
Defendant was evaluated at SeaTac by forensic psychologist
Cynthia Low. Dr. Low found no evidence to indicate Defendant
suffered from a mental disorder that impaired his present ability to
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-11907
understand the proceedings and charges against him and to assist
in his defense, and likewise no evidence to suggest he was incom-
petent when he entered his guilty plea in May 2018. According to
Dr. Low, Defendant’s described mental health symptoms were ex-
plained by antisocial personality disorder, a non-specific substance-
related disorder, and malingering. With respect to malingering,
Dr. Low observed that Defendant displayed symptoms rarely ex-
perienced by those with genuine psychopathology, that his phone
calls and emails outside the evaluation process contraindicated a
mental health issue, and that he appeared to be deliberately dis-
torting his symptoms to avoid criminal prosecution. Dr. Low
reached the same conclusion in a separate report addressing De-
fendant’s criminal responsibility for his charges, finding no evi-
dence to indicate Defendant suffered from a mental disorder that
rendered him unable to appreciate the nature, quality, or wrong-
fulness of his actions when he committed the alleged offense.
While awaiting the results of Dr. Low’s evaluation, defense
counsel Albea—Defendant’s third attorney—filed a motion asking
the district court to schedule a hearing to address his status as coun-
sel in the case. Albea stated in his motion that Defendant had fired
him and requested that he withdraw from the case. Albea stated
that while he knew of no reason why he should withdraw from
representing Defendant, it would be prudent for the court to ad-
dress Defendant’s concerns. Around the same time, Defendant
filed a pro se motion to “recuse” Albea, citing ineffectiveness, ethics
violations, dishonesty, and discrimination, among other things.
Defendant advised the court in his pro se motion that he had filed a
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21-11907 Opinion of the Court 7
bar complaint against Albea and that their relationship was “dam-
aged beyond repair.”
Once he received a copy of Dr. Low’s report, Defendant
filed another pro se motion, this time asking the court to make an
“ethical assessment” and to order a second psychological evalua-
tion. In his motion, Defendant broadly accused Dr. Low of racism,
discrimination, ethics violations, and criminal activity. Defendant
included as attachments to his motion complaints he claims to have
filed with an oversight board in which he alleged that Dr. Low had
told Defendant she supported white supremacy, had frequently dis-
cussed sex with him, had shown him pictures of her vagina stored
on her cell phone, and had told Defendant she had sex with white
inmates for money.
Defendant subsequently filed two additional pro se motions
seeking the removal of Albea as his counsel. In the first motion,
filed in January 2020, Defendant reiterated his claim that counsel
was ineffective and that their relationship was “damaged beyond
repair.” In the second motion, filed in February 2020, Defendant
claimed among other things that Albea and his prior lawyers had
refused to seek records relevant to his defense.
The magistrate judge held a hearing in March 2020 to deter-
mine Defendant’s competency and to rule on his pending motions.
Dr. Low testified at the hearing, consistent with her written report,
that Defendant had an average ability to understand the nature and
consequences of his criminal proceeding and to assist counsel in his
defense both currently and at the time he pled guilty in May 2018.
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8 Opinion of the Court 21-11907
That is, Dr. Low testified that Defendant was competent. She ex-
plained that she reached this conclusion after interviewing Defend-
ant for approximately 8 hours, administering numerous tests to
him, reviewing his health records, monitoring his phone calls and
emails with family members, and speaking with SeaTac staff and
other individuals who had recently interacted with Defendant,
such as his probation officer and his former attorney, Case. Based
on the information she obtained from all those sources and numer-
ous examples of Defendant’s dishonesty during his evaluation, Dr.
Low concluded Defendant was deliberately distorting mental
health symptoms and that he was not suffering from a mental dis-
order either currently or at the time he pled guilty.1
Following the hearing, the magistrate judge issued a lengthy
written order addressing Defendant’s competency and denying his
multiple competency-related pro se motions.2 Based on Dr. Low’s
testimony, documentary evidence presented at the competency
hearing, and other evidence in the record, the magistrate judge
concluded in the order that Defendant was competent both cur-
rently and when he pled guilty. The judge noted in the order
1 Dr. Low explained that while one test did not indicate malingering, she be-
lieved that test was an outlier because two other tests showed deliberate dis-
tortion by Defendant of his symptoms, as well as over-endorsing symptoms
that could not be reconciled with SeaTac staff observations and Defendant’s
interactions with other individuals, including his mother and his former attor-
ney.
2 The magistrate judge issued a separate order denying Defendant’s numerous
discovery-related pro se motions.
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21-11907 Opinion of the Court 9
Defendant’s dishonesty, suspected malingering, and “history of re-
lational problems with his attorneys” as well as his tendency to
“lash out at his attorneys when the proceedings do not go his way.”
Despite the magistrate judge’s competency findings, the dis-
trict court permitted Defendant to withdraw his guilty plea in July
2020 based on the Supreme Court’s then recent decision in Rehaif
v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019) holding that § 922(g)
requires the Government to prove “both that the defendant knew
he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the rele-
vant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm”—in De-
fendant’s case, convicted felons. As the court pointed out, Defend-
ant’s indictment did not allege that Defendant knew he was a con-
victed felon, prohibited from possessing a firearm under § 922(g),
at the time of his offense. The grand jury subsequently issued a
superseding indictment charging Defendant with being a felon in
possession of a firearm in violation of § 922(g)(1) and alleging, in
accordance with Rehaif, that Defendant knew he was a convicted
felon when he possessed the firearm. Defendant pled not guilty to
the superseding indictment, and his case was set for trial on August
31, 2020.
Two days after Defendant entered his not guilty plea, ap-
pointed counsel Albea moved to withdraw from the case and re-
tained counsel Wilson Myers entered a notice of appearance as
counsel for Defendant. The district court granted Albea’s motion
to withdraw. Further, the court specifically instructed Defendant
that as he had been permitted to dismiss multiple attorneys—even
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10 Opinion of the Court 21-11907
though these attorneys were competent—any additional motions
to withdraw would have to be justified by a very good reason,
given Defendant’s history of demanding new attorneys. The court
observed that Defendant appeared to be “playing a game with the
system.”
On August 28, 2020, three days before Defendant’s sched-
uled trial, defense counsel advised the court in a pretrial hearing
that Defendant wanted to plead not guilty by reason of insanity,
and he concurrently moved for a second psychological evaluation.
The court denied the motion, noting that: (1) Defendant had al-
ready been evaluated, (2) the first psychologist who evaluated De-
fendant concluded he was malingering, (3) the new motion was
filed well after the deadline for pretrial motions, and (4) Defendant
did not give proper notice of his intent to pursue an insanity de-
fense. The court stated further that the motion was “clearly an ef-
fort . . . to delay [the] proceedings.”
Defendant responded by seeking to change his plea to guilty.
The court briefly recessed the hearing so Defendant could eat
lunch and take time to consider his plea. When the hearing re-
sumed, Defendant began arguing again about Dr. Low, claiming
that her report was inaccurate and that she had falsified her evalu-
ation. The court found Defendant’s claims to be further support of
the fact that he was “trying to play the system.” When Defendant
again attempted to plead not guilty by reason of insanity and ac-
cused the prosecutor and other officials of bias and prejudice, the
court ended the hearing.
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21-11907 Opinion of the Court 11
On September 1, 2020, the day after Defendant’s trial was
scheduled to begin, Defendant filed a notice pursuant to Rule 12.2
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that he intended to rely
on a defense of insanity at the time of his offense. The district court
again continued Defendant’s trial and referred the issues raised by
Defendant’s notice to the magistrate judge. The magistrate judge
held a hearing on September 9, 2020, after which he granted De-
fendant’s request for a second psychological evaluation and ap-
proved funding for the evaluation. While awaiting the second eval-
uation, attorney Myers asked the district court to release Defend-
ant on bond, arguing he had been incarcerated too long and that
the COVID pandemic could delay his trial. The court denied coun-
sel’s request, citing Defendant’s use of illegal drugs while on bond,
his extensive criminal history spanning 20 years—which the court
found significant given that Defendant was only 37 years old—and
his history of failing to appear and of running from law enforce-
ment.3 Trial was again reset, this time for April 19, 2021.
Defendant subsequently was reevaluated by Dr. Ackerson,
who concluded he did not suffer from a mental disorder at the time
he committed his offense. Specifically, Dr. Ackerson determined
that Defendant was not at the time of the offense “suffering from a
severe mental disease or defect that could have rendered him
3 Defendant appealed the denial of bond to this Court, but the magistrate judge
denied his motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis and this Court dismissed
the appeal for want of prosecution after Defendant failed to pay the required
filing and docketing fees.
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12 Opinion of the Court 21-11907
unable to discern between right or wrong and/or both understand
and appreciate the nature and quality o[f] . . . his actions.” Never-
theless, Defendant instructed his attorney Myers to pursue a men-
tal disorder defense at trial and to subpoena various mental health
witnesses and records to present to the district court.
On April 9, 2021, the Government asked the district court to
hold a hearing to determine whether Defendant could present a
prima facie case that he suffered from a mental disorder at the time
of his offense. The Government noted in its motion that Defend-
ant had advised the court that he intended to persist in his mental
health defense even though he had not produced an expert who
would validate his claim to suffer from a serious mental disorder.
It cited authority for the proposition that evidence of a mental dis-
order short of insanity at the time of the offense is inadmissible dur-
ing a trial involving a general intent crime such as possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon. As such, the Government argued,
Defendant should be required, prior to trial, to make a specific prof-
fer of any testimony or evidence regarding his alleged mental dis-
order at the time of the offense.
The court granted the Government’s motion, noting that
Defendant had not identified any expert witness who could support
a mental disorder defense and that he was required to disclose any
such witnesses in advance of trial. The court then stated its con-
cern that Defendant was once again attempting to delay the pro-
ceedings. Citing Dr. Ackerson’s recent evaluation, the court
pointed out that Defendant’s second psychological evaluation, like
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21-11907 Opinion of the Court 13
his first, indicated not only that he was free from any mental disor-
der but also that he was continuing to feign mental health symp-
toms to deflect responsibility for his crime. Nevertheless, the court
set a hearing for April 15, 2021, to give Defendant an opportunity
to bring in any mental health professionals who could support a
mental disorder defense.
Defendant did not produce any mental health experts at the
April 15 hearing. Defense counsel acknowledged during the hear-
ing that he failed to subpoena any doctors who could testify in sup-
port of Defendant’s mental health claim and that no such doctors
were available to attend the hearing. The court noted that there
was no evidence in the record to support Defendant’s claim to have
had a severe mental disorder at the time of the offense and that two
psychological evaluations, including the recent evaluation con-
ducted by Dr. Ackerson, indicated that Defendant did not suffer
from a mental disorder that could have rendered him unable to dis-
cern between right or wrong and/or understand and appreciate the
nature of his actions at the time of his offense. When Defendant
protested that he had taken drugs around the time of his arrest at-
tempting to commit suicide, the court pointed to a portion of Dr.
Ackerson’s report suggesting that was not true based on police
body camera recordings and Defendant’s own statements to med-
ical personnel at the time. The court concluded the mental health
discussion by advising Defendant that he needed evidence to pre-
sent the mental health claim to a jury and that he was lacking such
evidence.
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When the court confirmed during the hearing that Defend-
ant’s trial would begin the following Monday, defense counsel in-
dicated that Defendant wished to enter a “blind” guilty plea; that
is, a plea of guilty without a plea agreement between Defendant
and the Government. The court then explained to Defendant that
a plea would result in a waiver of his trial rights, to which Defend-
ant responded that he thought he understood but his mind was
“fuzzy.” The court informed Defendant that it did not want to take
his plea unless it was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intention-
ally, and it recessed to give Defendant time to think about his deci-
sion. Prior to recessing, the court advised Defendant about the sen-
tencing possibilities for his offense, including the 15-year minimum
sentence that could apply under the ACCA. Finally, in response to
Defendant’s question whether he would be eligible for a down-
ward departure based on his cooperation, the court made clear that
there could be no departure based on substantial assistance absent
a motion from the Government asking for such a departure.
Upon his return to court, Defendant again stated that he
wanted to enter a blind guilty plea, at which time the court re-
viewed the rights he would be waiving by pleading guilty and con-
firmed he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, that his
mental status had not changed since he was evaluated by Dr. Ack-
erson, and that he had no complaints about his counsel Myers. The
court also reviewed the elements of the offense Defendant was
charged with committing and the evidence the Government would
have to present to prevail at trial, and Defendant stated that he un-
derstood that information. The court then again explained the
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21-11907 Opinion of the Court 15
range of punishment for Defendant’s offense with and without an
ACCA enhancement, and Defendant advised the court that he un-
derstood the sentencing possibilities in his case and, more specifi-
cally, that he understood he could be subject to a 15-year manda-
tory minimum sentence pursuant to the ACCA. At this point in
the colloquy, Defendant briefly backtracked, stating that he wanted
to plead guilty without admitting he was guilty, whereupon the
court observed that the case had involved “too much gamesman-
ship” and that it appeared Defendant was “playing games.” The
court advised Defendant that if he did not want to plead guilty,
they should try the case, to which Defendant responded that he
wanted to plead guilty because he was guilty, and that a plea was
in his best interest. The court then accepted Defendant’s plea and
set his sentencing for May 25, 2021.
A PSR was prepared, which was materially the same as the
PSR prepared after Defendant’s first guilty plea. The PSR calcu-
lated Defendant’s base offense level as 24 pursuant to USSG
§ 2K2.1(a)(2). As a result of a prior serious drug offense and two
violent felonies (Alabama robberies), Defendant was determined to
be an armed career criminal and thus subject to an enhanced sen-
tence pursuant to under the ACCA, resulting in an adjusted offense
level of 33. Two levels were deducted for Defendant’s acceptance
of responsibility, yielding a total offense level of 31. The PSR de-
scribed Defendant’s lengthy and extensive criminal history, begin-
ning with a burglary at the age of 12. With a total offense level of
31 and a criminal history category of VI, the PSR calculated De-
fendant’s recommended guidelines range to be 188 to 235 months
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16 Opinion of the Court 21-11907
in prison, with a mandatory minimum of 180 months pursuant to
the ACCA.
Defendant subsequently filed several pro se objections to the
PSR and numerous motions addressing his upcoming sentencing.
In these objections and motions, Defendant accused the probation
officer who had conducted his PSR interview, a Pickens County jail
officer, and a prosecutor, among other officials, of racism, bias, dis-
honesty, harassment, sexual misconduct, ethical violations, and
various other crimes. Defendant also challenged his base offense
level calculation and the use of his prior convictions as qualifying
offenses under the ACCA.
In none of the above filings did Defendant seek to terminate
Myers as counsel, to withdraw his guilty plea, or to postpone the
sentencing hearing. Nevertheless, at the beginning of Defendant’s
sentencing hearing on May 25, 2021, Myers verbally sought to
withdraw from the case and asked that the hearing be continued.
When asked about the withdrawal, Defendant stated that he was
not pleased with Myers, that he had not pleaded guilty to any pen-
alties associated with his crime, and that he was not subject to the
ACCA enhancement recommended in the PSR. Defendant as-
serted further that Myers had lied to him and promised he would
receive a new PSR without the ACCA enhancement if he pled
guilty. He also accused Myers of other omissions and errors, in-
cluding failing to subpoena witnesses, file suppression motions,
and retrieve mental health records, among other things.
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21-11907 Opinion of the Court 17
The district court denied Myers’s motion to withdraw, not-
ing that Defendant had pled guilty to the original indictment and
acknowledged during the plea hearing that the ACCA enhance-
ment could apply to him, and that he had later, when represented
by Myers, pled guilty to the superseding indictment after acknowl-
edging that he understood the ACCA enhancement. The court
also denied Defendant’s other pro se motions and rejected his argu-
ment that he did not have three prior convictions for crimes of vi-
olence or serious drug offenses for purposes of the ACCA. Specifi-
cally, the court found that Defendant’s two Alabama robbery con-
victions and his conviction for unlawful distribution of a controlled
substance qualified as predicate offenses under the ACCA. Accord-
ingly, the court held that the ACCA enhancement applied in De-
fendant’s case.
Defendant subsequently asked to withdraw his plea, arguing
that he had never intended to plead guilty to the ACCA enhance-
ment. When the district court denied the request, Defendant ac-
cused Myers of coercing him into pleading guilty. The court re-
jected that argument, and sentenced Defendant to 188 months in
prison, the low end of his guidelines range, to be followed by 60
months of supervised release. In an oral order, the court denied
the rest of Defendant’s outstanding pro se motions.
Two days after Defendant’s sentencing, Myers filed a mo-
tion to withdraw from his representation of Defendant and a re-
quest for a different attorney to represent Defendant on appeal.
Defendant subsequently filed a pro se motion requesting an
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18 Opinion of the Court 21-11907
appellate attorney “for good cause.” Myers filed a timely notice of
appeal on behalf of Defendant and again asked for permission to
withdraw from the case. The motions to withdraw and appoint an
appellate attorney were referred to the magistrate judge, who
granted the motions and appointed attorney John Lloyd to repre-
sent Defendant on appeal.
Defendant does not challenge any aspect of his conviction
on appeal, nor does he argue that he does not qualify for sentencing
under the ACCA, as he argued below. Instead, Defendant raises
only one issue on appeal: whether the district court erred when it
refused to let retained counsel Myers withdraw prior to sentencing.
According to Defendant, the district court abused its discretion and
violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by requiring him to
proceed to sentencing with Myers given Defendant’s apparent frus-
tration with and legitimate concerns about his representation. We
are unpersuaded by Defendant’s arguments and, as discussed be-
low, we conclude that the district court acted consistently with De-
fendant’s Sixth Amendment rights and within its discretion when
it denied Myers’s motion to withdraw. Accordingly, we affirm De-
fendant’s judgment of conviction and sentence.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
We review the district court’s denial of an attorney’s motion
to withdraw as counsel for an abuse of discretion. See United States
v. Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d 1267, 1270 (11th Cir. 2016). “A district
court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard,
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21-11907 Opinion of the Court 19
applies the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner, follows
improper procedures in making a determination, or makes findings
of fact that are clearly erroneous.” Id. (quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted).
II. Analysis
“Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant who does not re-
quire appointed counsel enjoys both the right to effective assis-
tance of counsel and the right to choose who will represent him.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted). The latter of those rights encom-
passes the right both “to hire and fire retained counsel” without the
need to show good cause4 and without regard to whether the de-
fendant will subsequently need appointed counsel. Id. at 1271 (em-
phasis in original). As this Court explained in Jimenez-Antunez,
“[t]he right to choose counsel is incomplete if it does not include
the right to discharge counsel that one no longer chooses.” Id. Fur-
thermore, the erroneous deprivation of a criminal defendant’s right
to choose his counsel is a structural error that is not subject to
harmless error review. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S.
140, 150 (2006).
4 This is different from the rule that applies to an indigent criminal defendant
with appointed counsel. In that case, the defendant “does not have a right to
have a particular lawyer represent him nor to demand a different appointed
lawyer except for good cause.” Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d at 1271 (explaining
that good cause in this context “exists where there is a fundamental problem,
such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in communication or an
irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict” (quotation
marks omitted)).
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20 Opinion of the Court 21-11907
Nevertheless, a defendant’s right to his counsel of choice “is
not absolute” and “must bend before countervailing interests in-
volving effective administration” of the courts. Jimenez-Antunez,
820 F.3d at 1270 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, a
court can deny a defendant’s motion to remove retained counsel if
such removal would “interfere with the fair, orderly and effective
administration of justice” in the case. Id. at 1271 (quotation marks
and citation omitted). For example, denial of a defendant’s motion
to remove retained counsel is appropriate if the court determines
the motion was filed to delay court proceedings or if granting the
motion would prejudice the parties. See id. at 1271–72. This stand-
ard enables the court to “prevent potential manipulation” of court
proceedings via strategically motivated motions to remove coun-
sel. Id. at 1272.
Applying the above standards to this case, we note as an ini-
tial matter that it is unclear from the record whether Defendant
sought to exercise his right to terminate Myers’s representation. As
mentioned, Defendant filed numerous pro se motions prior to his
sentencing, but he did not in any of those motions ask for Myers to
be removed as counsel. Moreover, although Myers verbally
moved at the beginning of Defendant’s sentencing hearing to with-
draw from the case and asked that the hearing be continued for that
purpose, Myers did not expressly state that Defendant had asked
for his withdrawal. Defendant initially advised the court that he
wanted Myers removed from the case because he was dissatisfied
with his representation, but he later explained to the court that
withdrawal was Myers’s idea and that Defendant in fact wanted to
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21-11907 Opinion of the Court 21
keep Myers as his attorney. Based on the record, it is thus ques-
tionable whether the court was required to consider whether My-
ers’s withdrawal from the case was required under the Sixth
Amendment. See id. at 1271 (noting that a defendant exercises his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice when he “moves to
dismiss his retained counsel”).
But even if Defendant’s complaints about Myers can be con-
sidered a tacit motion by Defendant to terminate Myers’s represen-
tation, the district court acted within its discretion when it denied
the motion. Again, a criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment
right to terminate retained counsel so long as the termination does
not “interfere with the fair, orderly, and effective administration”
of justice in the case. Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d at 1272 (quotation
marks and citation omitted). Under that standard, a district court
may deny a motion to terminate retained counsel to prevent the
defendant’s manipulation of the case. See id. Further, a district
court has “wide latitude” in balancing a defendant’s right to choose
his own counsel “against the needs of fairness” in the case and “the
demands of its calendar.” Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 152.
The district court denied Myers’s request to withdraw from
the case because it determined the request was the latest of numer-
ous attempts by Defendant to delay and obstruct his criminal pro-
ceeding and that denial was necessary to prevent any further
gamesmanship on the part of Defendant and to ensure the orderly
and effective administration of the case. Defendant argues this
finding cannot be reconciled with the record, but we disagree.
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22 Opinion of the Court 21-11907
Indeed, there is ample evidence in the record to support the district
court’s determination on this issue.
As noted, Defendant was indicted on the one charge asserted
against him in the case in 2017. In the ensuing four years, Defend-
ant: (1) violated the conditions of his pretrial bond, (2) entered two
guilty pleas, both of which he subsequently moved to retract,5
(3) insisted on two competency evaluations, both of which indi-
cated he was malingering mental illness, and (4) raised a mental
illness defense on the eve of two trials that were scheduled and sub-
sequently continued, without supporting evidence and in contra-
diction to the results of the mental health evaluations in the record.
In the meantime, Defendant cycled through four attorneys and, as
the Government points out, filed over 25 pro se motions, objec-
tions, and notices—most of them frivolous and several of them as-
serting unsubstantiated and frequently outlandish attacks against
his counsel and evaluating psychologists, the prosecutor, and court
personnel.
Ultimately, Defendant’s unduly protracted criminal pro-
ceeding culminated in a May 2021 sentencing hearing during which
5 As noted supra, the district court allowed Defendant to withdraw his first
guilty plea, not because Defendant’s grounds for doing so were meritorious,
but because the Government had superseded the indictment in response to
the Supreme Court’s Rehaif decision, which held that § 922(g) requires the
Government to prove that a defendant knew he was prohibited from pos-
sessing a firearm. Defendant ultimately pled guilty to the superseded indict-
ment before then trying to retract that plea, after which he ultimately decided
that he preferred a guilty plea to a trial.
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21-11907 Opinion of the Court 23
Myers belatedly asked to be removed from the case. As Myers
acknowledged, his withdrawal at that point would have necessi-
tated yet another continuance. Given the numerous continuances
that had already occurred due to Defendant’s dilatory and obstruc-
tive tactics to that point, the court was well within its discretion to
deny Myers’s request to withdraw and to proceed with Defend-
ant’s sentencing. See Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d at 1272.
Defendant argues the district court nevertheless erred when
it denied the request because there was evidence that Myers was
not providing competent representation and that his relationship
with Defendant had broken down. In support of the former, De-
fendant cites counsel’s failure to produce witnesses at the April 15,
2021, hearing to support his mental health defense and his objec-
tion to being sentenced under the ACCA. Contrary to Defendant’s
argument, neither of these circumstances is evidence of ineffective-
ness on the part of Myers. The evidence in the record suggests that
Myers was not able to locate any witnesses who could provide tes-
timony at the April 2021 hearing to support a mental health de-
fense, which is not surprising given the results of two mental health
evaluations completed during the relevant time and indicating that
Defendant was malingering and that he did not suffer from a seri-
ous mental disorder. As to being sentenced under the ACCA, De-
fendant confirmed before he pled guilty that his attorney had ex-
plained this possibility and the court explained it to Defendant
again during the hearing. Finally, Defendant’s claim that his rela-
tionship with Myers had broken down was, like the similar claims
he made with respect to three previous attorneys, unsubstantiated.
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24 Opinion of the Court 21-11907
Moreover, Defendant equivocated on this point later in the sen-
tencing hearing and ultimately confirmed that he did in fact want
Myers to remain as his attorney.
In short, there is no basis in the record upon which to over-
turn the district court’s conclusion that Defendant’s request to re-
move Myers from the case should be denied in order to prevent
further manipulation of the proceedings by Defendant and because
allowing Myers to withdraw and substituting alternate counsel—
who at that point would have been Defendant’s fifth attorney—
would “interfere with the fair, orderly, and effective administra-
tion” of the case. See Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d at 1272 (quotation
marks and citation omitted). As such, the court’s denial of Myers’s
motion to withdraw was within its discretion and consistent with
the Sixth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Defendant’s judg-
ment of conviction and sentence.
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