Kirk Pruitt v. Charter Communications, Inc., et al

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-10049
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
KIRK PRUITT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
d.b.a. Spectrum Communications Inc,
GAGANDEEP S. DHALIWAL,
M.D., Psychiatrist,
Defendants-Appellees,
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-10049
THOMAS M. RUTLEDGE,
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 5:17-cv-01764-LCB
____________________
Before N EWSOM , L UCK , and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER C URIAM :
Kirk Pruitt appeals the district court’s decision not to ap-
point him counsel in his employment discrimination case.1 Pruitt
1 In his notice of appeal, Pruitt said he wanted us to review the district court’s
order granting summary judgment and closing the case, but he does not pre-
sent sufficient explanation or legal authority regarding anything other than the
appointment of counsel issue in his appellant brief, so that is the only issue we
consider.
See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) (“The appellant’s brief must contain
. . . appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the au-
thorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies.”);
Sapuppo v.
Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (“We have long
held that an appellant abandons a claim when he either makes only passing
references to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting argu-
ments and authority.”).
See also Big Top Koolers, Inc. v. Circus-Man Snacks,
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21-10049 Opinion of the Court 3
argues that the district court abused its discretion because his case
presented novel and complex issues and exceptional circumstances
warranting the appointment of counsel.
We review a district court’s decision not to appoint counsel
in a civil case for abuse of discretion.
See Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d
1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999). “Court appointed counsel in civil cases
is warranted only in ‘exceptional circumstances,’ and whether such
circumstances exist is also committed to district court discretion.”
Steele v. Shah, 87 F.3d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir. 1996),
as amended
(Sept. 6, 1996).
Pruitt maintains that the district court abused its discretion
by not appointing him counsel because his case presented excep-
tional circumstances—both because his claims were novel and
complex, and because he was a member of various protected clas-
ses, as well as indigent, “mentally anguished, legally beleaguered,
and financially overmatched” against “corporations, executives[,]
and medical professionals.” He further contends that the district
court “completely disregarded” his requests for appointment of
counsel and showed “anti-pro se bias” in denying his requests, and
that it was “unconstitutional and unethical” to allow him to pro-
ceed in the case without “proper legal counsel” given his need for
help.
Inc., 528 F.3d 839, 844 (11th Cir. 2008) (“We decline to address an argument
advanced by an appellant for the first time in a reply brief.”).
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-10049
We “look[] to the factors outlined in
Ulmer v. Chancellor,
691 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1982) for guidance in determining if excep-
tional circumstances warrant appointment of counsel.”
Smith v.
Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 713 F.3d 1059, 1065 n.11 (11th Cir. 2013). These
factors include: (1) “the type and complexity of the case”; (2)
“whether the indigent is capable of adequately presenting his case”;
(3) “whether the indigent is in a position to investigate adequately
the case”; (4) “whether the evidence will consist in large part of
conflicting testimony so as to require skill in the presentation of
evidence and in cross examination”; and (5) “whether the appoint-
ment of counsel would be a service to [the plaintiff] and, perhaps,
the court and defendant as well, by sharpening the issues in the
case, shaping the examination of witnesses, and thus shortening the
trial and assisting in a just determination.”
Ulmer, 691 F.2d at 213.
Overall, “[t]he key is whether the
pro se litigant needs help in pre-
senting the essential merits of his or her position to the court.”
Kilgo v. Ricks, 983 F.2d 189, 193 (11th Cir. 1993).
Applying the
Ulmer factors here, we conclude that the dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion. First, Pruitt’s case was not
complex. We have held that 42 U.S.C. section 1983 claims brought
by indigent pro se prisoners are not novel or complex,
see, e.g.,
Bass, 170 F.3d at 1320, and the run-of-the-mill employment dis-
crimination (and related) claims that Pruitt alleged are no more
complicated than those.
Second, Pruitt was capable of adequately presenting his case.
He had prior experiences with pro se employment suits and a
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21-10049 Opinion of the Court 5
paralegal degree to aid him. He filed his own motions (including
motions for entry of default and default judgment), responded to
the defendants’ motions, amended his complaint twice, sought dis-
covery, and submitted pretrial papers. And he was able to survive
the defendants’ motions to dismiss.
Third, Pruitt was in a position to investigate adequately his
employment discrimination case because he was present for the
key events about which he complained.
Fourth, Pruitt’s case did not require skills relating to witness
testimony like the presentation of evidence and cross examination.
Because Pruitt’s claims did not survive summary judgment, he did
not reach the point of examining witnesses or dealing with other
trial matters.
And fifth, the district court didn’t need the appointment of
counsel to sharpen the issues, shape witness examinations, shorten
the trial, or reach a just determination. Motion practice sharpened
the issues. And summary judgment meant that a just determina-
tion was reached without witness examinations and, indeed, with-
out a trial.
Overall, Pruitt did not need help presenting the merits of his
case to the district court. He presented the merits adequately by
himself. The fact that he lost his case is not to the contrary. After
all, counseled parties lose cases, too. All the factors weighed
against a finding of exceptional circumstances. Thus, the district
court did not abuse its discretion by not appointing counsel for
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-10049
Pruitt.
See Fowler v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1088, 1096 (11th Cir. 1990)
(finding that the plaintiff’s request for counsel was properly denied
because there were no exceptional circumstances when the claims
were “relatively straightforward,” the plaintiff himself witnessed
most of the incidents on which he based his claims, and he “was
capable of representing himself adequately”).
Pruitt argues that his membership in protected classes, as
well as economic and other disparities between him and the de-
fendants, created exceptional circumstances. Memberships in pro-
tected classes and disparities between parties could produce excep-
tional circumstances if they prevented a pro se litigant from ade-
quately investigating or presenting his case. But here, they didn’t.
Pruitt was able to investigate and present his case adequately.
Pruitt also argues that it was unconstitutional not to appoint
counsel for him and that the district court disregarded his requests
for counsel and exhibited bias against him because he was pro se.
But no civil plaintiff has a constitutional right to counsel.
Id. (“Ap-
pointment of counsel in a civil case is not a constitutional right. It
is a privilege that is justified only by exceptional circum-
stances . . . .”).
And the district court did not disregard Pruitt’s motions to
appoint counsel. The district court denied Pruitt’s first request for
counsel because “[his] claims [we]re not so novel or complex that
he require[d] assistance presenting [them] to the [c]ourt at th[at]
stage in the litigation.” But the district court made the denial “with-
out prejudice to [Pruitt] renewing the motion at a later stage of
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21-10049 Opinion of the Court 7
th[e] litigation,” allowing him to raise the issue again if the situation
changed. When Pruitt requested counsel again, the district court
denied his requests, presumably because the situation had not
changed. The fact that the district court denied Pruitt’s requests
does not mean—and in fact disproves—that it ignored them.
Finally, the district court did not display anti-pro se bias.
The district court took pains to explain what Pruitt needed to do to
come up with a procedurally adequate pleading, gave him multiple
opportunities to do it, and showed him leniency in the process. We
see no bias here.
AFFIRMED.
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