USA v. Raiza Del Carmen De Leon

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 20-14566
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-20436-RNS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RAIZA DEL CARMEN DE LEON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(August 9, 2021)
Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Raiza De Leon, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of her expedited motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). On appeal, she argues that the district court erred in determining
that she failed to demonstrate extraordinary and compelling circumstances and that
she met the other relevant criteria for compassionate release. After review, we
affirm.
I. Background
In 2018, De Leon pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit health care fraud
and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, and she was sentenced to 42
months’ imprisonment. She did not file a direct appeal.
In October 2020, De Leon filed an expedited § 3582(c) motion for
compassionate release, arguing that the “global pandemic” of COVID-19 had
spread through the Bureau of Prisons’ (“BOP”) facilities, which when combined
with her hypertension, chronic anemia, obesity, and “a blood disorder” increased
her vulnerability to the disease and constituted an extraordinary and compelling
reason for relief. The government opposed her motion, arguing that she failed to
demonstrate extraordinary or compelling circumstances based on her health
conditions because her medical records demonstrated that her conditions were well
controlled by medications, and there was no evidence that her conditions
substantially diminished her ability for self-care. The government maintained that
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district courts and this Court have denied compassionate release motions for
similarly situated defendants, and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weighed against
her release.
Two days after receiving the government’s response, the district court
denied her motion. The district court explained that under the applicable
framework, if it found that De Leon established extraordinary and compelling
circumstances that warrant a reduction, it had to also consider the § 3553(a) factors
and determine whether she posed a danger to any person or the community before
granting her motion for compassionate release. The district court noted that “if an
inmate has a chronic medical condition that has been identified by the [CDC] as
elevating an inmate’s risk of becoming seriously ill from COVID-19, that
condition may constitute ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons.’” Nevertheless,
the district court determined that she failed to articulate extraordinary and
compelling circumstances because she did “not allege that she suffers from any
serious respiratory, cardiac or other medical conditions that would compromise her
if she were to contract the coronavirus.” The district court further noted that there
had been very few COVID-19 cases at the facility in question. The district court
explained that because De Leon failed to establish extraordinary and compelling
circumstances, it did not need to address the remainder of the relevant criteria.
Accordingly, the district court denied her motion. De Leon appealed.
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II. Discussion
De Leon argues her hypertension and obesity put her at an increased risk if
she were to contract COVID-19, and the district court erred in determining that her
health conditions combined with the pandemic did not constitute extraordinary and
compelling circumstances. She maintains that the district court is not limited to the
Sentencing Commission’s definition of extraordinary and compelling
circumstances and that the district court has the discretion to determine what
constitutes an extraordinary and compelling circumstance. Finally, she argues that
the § 3553(a) factors support her request.1 The government argues that the district
court properly denied her motion because she failed to demonstrate extraordinary
or compelling reasons, and, in any event, the § 3553(a) factors supported the denial
of her motion.
We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for an 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c) sentence reduction. United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1251 (11th
Cir. 2021). If a defendant is eligible for relief, we review the district court’s
1 To the extent De Leon argues that the district court procedurally erred in ruling on her
motion before she filed a reply to the government’s response in opposition to her motion, no
reversible error has been shown. De Leon cites no authority that provides that a district court
must wait for the filing of a reply before ruling on an expedited motion and research has revealed
none. Furthermore, she fails to identify any arguments that she would have raised in her reply
brief or how she was otherwise prejudiced by the district court ruling on her expedited motion
without giving her the opportunity to file a reply brief.
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decision to grant or deny relief for an abuse of discretion. Id.; see also United
States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021).
Generally, a court “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been
imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Section 3582(c)(1)(A), however, provides the
following limited exception:
the court, upon motion of the Director of the [BOP], or upon motion
of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all
administrative rights . . . may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . ,
after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent
that they are applicable, if it finds that . . . extraordinary and
compelling reasons warrant such a reduction . . . and that such a
reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission.
Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Thus, De Leon was eligible for a sentence reduction only if
the district court found that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
reduction” and “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements
issued by the Sentencing Commission.” See id. And if she met this eligibility
criteria, the district court had to consider the § 3553(a) factors in deciding whether
to grant a reduction. Id. In other words, the district court may deny relief because
the defendant is not eligible, or because relief would be inappropriate under the
Section 3553(a) factors, or for both reasons. In this case, the district court denied
relief because it determined that De Leon was not eligible as she had not
demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons that warrant a sentence
reduction.
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The Sentencing Commission defines “extraordinary and compelling
reasons” for purposes of § 3582(c)(1)(A) in Application Note 1 to U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13 of the Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. (n.1); see also
Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1247, 1262–63. Pursuant to this definition, there are four
circumstances under which “extraordinary and compelling reasons exist”: (A) the
defendant suffers from (i) “a terminal illness,” or (ii) a permanent health condition
“that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care
within the environment of a correctional facility from which he or she is not
expected to recover”; (B) the defendant is “at least 65 years old,” “is experiencing
a serious [age-related] deterioration in physical or mental health,” and “has served
at least 10 years or 75 percent of his or her term of imprisonment, whichever is
less”; (C) the defendant’s assistance is needed in caring for the defendant’s minor
child, spouse, or registered partner due to (i) “[t]he death or incapacitation of the
caregiver of the defendant’s minor child or minor children” or (ii) “[t]he
incapacitation of the defendant’s spouse or registered partner”; and (D) there exist
“other” extraordinary and compelling reasons “[a]s determined by the Director of
the Bureau of Prisons.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. (n.1 (A)–(D)).
Contrary to De Leon’s argument on appeal, we have held that “district courts
are bound by the Commission’s definition of ‘extraordinary and compelling
reasons’ found in 1B1.13.” Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1262. Furthermore, we have held
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that although the catchall “other” extraordinary and compelling reasons provision
set forth in Application Note 1(D) gives discretion to the Director of the BOP to
identify other qualifying reasons, it “does not grant discretion to courts to develop
‘other reasons’ that might justify a reduction in a defendant’s sentence.” Id. at
1248. Accordingly, because the BOP did not determine that other extraordinary
and compelling reasons existed in De Leon’s case, she was eligible for relief only
if her asserted reasons fell within the reasons identified as “extraordinary and
compelling” in subsections (A) through (C) of Application Note 1 to U.S.S.G
§ 1B1.13. See Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1264–65.
Although De Leon suffers from obesity and hypertension, those medical
problems do not establish eligibility for a reduced sentence, even in light of the
COVID-19 pandemic.2 See, e.g., Harris, 989 F.3d at 912 (holding that a district
court does not err in refusing to reduce a prisoner’s sentence because his
hypertension might increase the risk of a severe illness from COVID-19). In order
to show that her medical conditions were “extraordinary and compelling” reasons
2 The government informed us that since the filing of this appeal, De Leon has refused
vaccination against COVID-19, which it maintains further undermines her extraordinary and
compelling reason argument. But that fact was not before the district court and, therefore, does
not affect our analysis. The government also informed us that, since the filing of this appeal, the
CDC has updated its lists of what medical conditions present a greater risk of severe illness from
COVID-19 and that the list now includes obesity. Nevertheless, the government maintains that
“the district court correctly found[] that [De Leon’s] obesity and well-controlled hypertension
were not extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting compassionate release.”
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to warrant a reduction, De Leon had to show either that they were terminal or that
they diminished her ability to provide self-care in prison and that she is not
expected to recover from those conditions. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. (n.1(A)).
She did not make that showing. Accordingly, she was not eligible for relief under
§ 3582(c)(1)(A), and the district court did not err in denying her motion.3
AFFIRMED.
3 Because the district court lacked the authority to reduce De Leon’s sentence and did not
reach the § 3553(a) factors, we have no occasion to address those factors. Thus, De Leon’s case
is different from our recent decision in United States v. Cook, 998 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir. 2021), in
which the government conceded that extraordinary and compelling reasons existed, and we
vacated and remanded the case because the district court’s order did not indicate that it had
considered the § 3553(a) factors, which precluded meaningful appellate review.
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