USA v. Jamie Williams

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 20-13388
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JAMIE WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:97-cr-00061-SCB-AAS-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 20-13388
Before N EWSOM , L UCK , and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In 1997, a jury convicted Jamie Williams of possession with
intent to distribute cocaine base and marijuana. Neither the indict-
ment nor the jury instructions included specific quantities of co-
caine. The sentencing judge adopted the pre-sentencing report’s
attribution of 982.9 grams of cocaine to Williams. Because of his
two prior convictions, anything more than 50 grams triggered
mandatory life imprisonment.
In 2019, Williams moved for a reduced sentence under the
First Step Act. Pub. L. No. 115-391 § 404 (2018). Williams’s eligi-
bility for relief turns on which drug quantity and prior-felony defi-
nition are used to determine his new statutory sentencing range.
Because the district court correctly held that its earlier judge-found
drug quantity and the 1997 definition of prior felonies apply, we
affirm.
I
When Williams filed his First Step Act motion in 2019, our
Circuit had not decided how to treat judge-found drug quantities.
But while his motion was pending, we decided
United States v.
Jones, in which we held that district courts are “bound by a previ-
ous finding of drug quantity that could have been used to deter-
mine the movant’s statutory penalty at the time of sentencing.”
962 F.3d 1290, 1303 (11th Cir. 2020). The district court relied on
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20-13388 Opinion of the Court 3
Jones to use Williams’s judge-found drug quantity. Williams ap-
pealed, arguing that
Jones was wrongly decided.
Litigation in
Jones continued—giving Williams a prospect of
success. The
Jones opinion consolidated four defendants’ cases;
one of the other defendants—Warren Jackson—sought rehearing
en banc, which we denied.
United States v. Jackson, 995 F.3d 1308,
1309 (11th Cir. 2021). Jackson sought certiorari, which the Su-
preme Court granted—vacating the judgment and remanding the
case in light of the intervening decision in
Concepcion v. United
States, 142 S. Ct. 2389 (2022). But on remand, the panel reinstated
its prior opinion.
United States v. Jackson, 58 F.4th 1331, 2023 WL
1501638, at *1 (11th Cir. 2023).
The upshot:
Jones’s holding that a “district court is bound
by a previous finding of drug quantity that could have been used
to determine the movant’s statutory penalty at the time of sentenc-
ing” remains good law.
Id. at *3 (citing
Jones, 962 F.3d at 1303).
The district court correctly used Williams’s judge-found drug
quantity.
II
Williams also seeks the benefit of a different section of the
First Step Act which
prospectively redefined which prior felony of-
fenses trigger heightened statutory penalties. Pub. L. No. 115-391
§ 401 (2018). But Williams concedes that the statute does not apply
retroactively to him.
See id. § 404(c).
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4 Opinion of the Court 20-13388
Instead, Williams argues that a district court can apply cur-
rent law—rather than the law applicable at the time of sentenc-
ing—when calculating his revised sentencing range. This misreads
the First Step Act and is foreclosed by both
Jones and
Concepcion.
The First Step Act allows—in certain circumstances—a dis-
trict court to “impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of
the Fair Sentencing Act . . . were in effect at the time the covered
offense was committed.” First Step Act § 404(b). The text focuses
on the law in effect at the time of the offense. That’s why—again
in
Jones—we held that “[i]f the movant’s sentence would have nec-
essarily remained the same had the Fair Sentencing Act been in ef-
fect, then the district court lacks the authority to reduce the mo-
vant’s sentence.”
Jones, 962 F.3d at 1303.
Concepcion does not change that conclusion. First, as we
observed when reinstating the
Jones opinion,
Concepcion “ad-
dressed an issue that arises only after . . . the . . . statutory penalties
have been established: which factors the district court may con-
sider in deciding an appropriate sentence.”
Jackson, 58 F.4th 1331,
2023 WL 1501638, at *4. Second,
Concepcion explicitly forbids
changing the guidelines range for any reason other than the retro-
active application of the Fair Sentencing Act. 142 S. Ct. at 2402 n.6.
The statutory sentencing range operates the same as the guidelines
range in this respect.
We therefore reiterate the conclusion from
Jones that dis-
trict courts do not have authority to apply current law to calculate
the applicable statutory sentencing range under the First Step Act.
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20-13388 Opinion of the Court 5
The district court correctly used the prior-felony definition from
Williams’s original sentencing.
III
Because the district court properly determined the statutory
sentencing range that would apply to Williams’s First Step Act mo-
tion, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.1
1 This case was originally scheduled for oral argument, but under 11th Cir. R.
34–3(f) it was removed from the oral argument calendar by unanimous con-
sent of the panel.
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