David Sosa v. Martin County, Florida, et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 20-12781
____________________
DAVID SOSA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MARTIN COUNTY, FLORIDA,
SHERIFF WILLIAM SNYDER,
of Martin County, Florida in an official capacity,
DEPUTY M. KILLOUGH,
individually,
DEPUTY SANCHEZ,
individually,
JOHN DOE MARTIN COUNTY DEPUTIES,
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2 Opinion of the Court 20-12781
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cv-14455-DMM
____________________
Before R OSENBAUM and L UCK , Circuit Judges.∗
PER CURIAM:
In November 2014, David Sosa was pulled over for a routine
traffic stop by a Martin County Sheriff’s deputy. But when the of-
ficer ran Sosa’s name, the computer indicated an outstanding Har-
ris County, Texas, warrant from 1992 for a different David Sosa
(the “wanted Sosa”). Though some of the identifying details for
the wanted Sosa and Sosa differed, the deputy arrested Sosa and
took him back to the station. There, deputies fingerprinted Sosa,
and he spent three hours in jail before they determined that he was
not the wanted Sosa.
Three-and-a-half years later, Sosa was arrested and detained
again on the same outstanding warrant for the wanted Sosa. On
April 20, 2018, a different deputy with the Martin County Sheriff’s
∗Due to the retirement of Judge Beverly B. Martin, we decide this case by a
quorum.
See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d); 11th Cir. R. 34-2.
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20-12781 Opinion of the Court 3
Department stopped Sosa as he drove. Once again, the deputy
checked Sosa’s name in the computer system and found the same
outstanding warrant for the wanted David Sosa. Sosa told the dep-
uty about his mistaken 2014 arrest on that warrant and advised the
deputy of differences between himself and the wanted Sosa. But
Sosa was still arrested and taken back to the station. This time,
though, Sosa had to spend three days and nights in jail before the
Department acknowledged that he was not the wanted Sosa and
finally released him.
Trying to avoid a third stay at the county jail for someone
else’s misdeeds, Plaintiff-Appellant Sosa filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983
suit against the Defendants-Appellees Martin County Sheriff’s De-
partment and the deputies involved in his second arrest. Sosa al-
leged that the Defendants-Appellees violated his Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendment rights by falsely arresting him, overdetaining
him, and failing to institute policies and train deputies to prevent
these things from happening (the “
Monell claim”1). The district
court dismissed the case with prejudice for failure to state a claim.
Sosa v. Snyder, No. 19-CV-14455, 2020 WL 6385696, at *1 (S.D. Fla.
June 25, 2020) (“
Sosa I”). After oral argument, this panel affirmed
the dismissal of Sosa’s false-arrest and
Monell claims.
Sosa v. Mar-
tin County, 13 F.4th 1254, 1264–66, 1276–79 (11th Cir. 2021) (“
Sosa
II”),
vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 21 F.4th 1362 (11th Cir.
2022). But as to Sosa’s Fourteenth Amendment claim based on
1
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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4 Opinion of the Court 20-12781
overdetention, the panel vacated the district court’s order dismiss-
ing the overdetention claim and remanded for further proceedings.
Id. at 1266–76.
Before the mandate issued, though, the en banc Court va-
cated the opinion and granted en banc rehearing on the overdeten-
tion claim only.
Sosa v. Martin County, 21 F.4th 1362 (11th Cir.
2022). This Court sitting en banc held that Sosa’s detention for
three days and nights in jail based on mistaken identity did not give
rise to a substantive-due-process claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Sosa v. Martin County, No. 20-12781, 2023 WL
328389, at *4 (11th Cir. Jan. 20, 2023) (“
Sosa III”) (“[U]nder
Baker,
Sosa’s complaint did not state a claim for a violation of his due-
process rights.”). The en banc Court remanded the case to the
panel for further proceedings so that we could reconsider Sosa’s
Fourth Amendment and
Monell claims.
See id. Our judgment on
those claims remains unaffected by the en banc Court’s decision
and reasoning in
Sosa III. So for the same reasons we explained in
Sosa II, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Sosa’s Fourth
Amendment and
Monell claims.
I.
This is an appeal of an order dismissing Sosa’s case for failure
to state a claim, so for purposes of our analysis, we accept as true
the factual allegations from Sosa’s First Amended Complaint.
See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
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20-12781 Opinion of the Court 5
According to that filing, while Sosa was driving in Martin
County, in November 2014, a Martin County Sheriff’s deputy
pulled him over for a routine traffic stop. During the encounter,
the deputy reviewed Sosa’s driver’s license. After running Sosa’s
name through the Department’s computer system, the deputy
learned that an outstanding warrant for a David Sosa had been is-
sued out of Harris County, Texas, in connection with the wanted
Sosa’s conviction for selling crack cocaine in 1992. The warrant set
forth identifying characteristics for the wanted Sosa, including his
date of birth, height, weight, tattoo information (he had at least
one), and other details. Plaintiff-Appellant Sosa pointed out to the
officer that his own date of birth, height, and weight—a 40-pound
difference between himself and the wanted Sosa existed—did not
match the information for the wanted Sosa and that, unlike the
wanted Sosa, he had no tattoos. The deputies arrested Sosa, any-
way, and took him to the station.
There, they fingerprinted and detained him. After about
three hours, a deputy determined that Sosa was not the wanted
Sosa and released him. No one created a file or otherwise docu-
mented that Sosa was not the wanted Sosa. Nor did the Sheriff’s
Department have any system to prevent Sosa’s future mistaken ar-
rest on the wanted Sosa’s warrant.
Not too long after Sosa’s 2014 incident, he was again ar-
rested and detained on the same warrant in 2018. On April 20,
2018, a different deputy of the Martin County Sheriff’s Depart-
ment, Deputy Killough, pulled Sosa over for a traffic stop. Sosa
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6 Opinion of the Court 20-12781
provided Deputy Killough with his license, and when Deputy Kil-
lough ran it, he discovered the open warrant for the wanted Sosa.
Sosa explained that he was not the wanted Sosa and told Deputy
Killough he had previously been incorrectly arrested on that war-
rant and released when deputies realized the error. Sosa also noted
that he and the wanted Sosa did not share the same birthdate, So-
cial Security number, or other identifying information. Sosa was
arrested anyway.
When Deputy Killough took Sosa to the Martin County jail,
Sosa “repeatedly explained to many Martin County employees . . .
that his date of birth and other identifying information was differ-
ent than the information on the warrant for the wanted . . . Sosa.”
Doc. No. 18, at 8 ¶ 43. In particular, Sosa so advised Deputy
Sanchez and some other Martin County deputies in the booking
area, who wrote down Sosa’s information and told him they would
follow up on the matter. The next day, Sosa appeared by video
before a magistrate judge. Though Sosa attempted to explain the
mistaken identity, “several Martin County jailers threatened him
and told him not to talk to the judge during his hearing.”
Id. at 8 ¶
44. As a result, Sosa believed it was a crime to talk to the judge.
Finally, on April 23, deputies fingerprinted Sosa and then re-
leased him at about 3:00 p.m. Again, the Sheriff’s Department did
not create a file or other documentation to prevent Sosa from being
re-arrested on the same warrant.
Sosa filed suit against Martin County and the individual dep-
uties. In his Amended Complaint, he brought a single count under
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20-12781 Opinion of the Court 7
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights. The
claim asserted that Martin County, the Sheriff’s Department, and
the individual deputies violated Sosa’s Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights by arresting and detaining him without proba-
ble cause or reasonable suspicion. It also alleged that the Sheriff
and the County lacked adequate written policies and failed to train
and supervise the deputies properly concerning arrests on out-
standing warrants.
Sosa’s complaint sought injunctive relief precluding the
Martin County Sheriff’s Department from arresting and detaining
Sosa on the wanted Sosa’s warrant, requiring the Sheriff and the
County to maintain a file on Sosa as it relates to the wanted Sosa’s
warrant, and directing the Sheriff and the County to implement
policies and train employees to avoid arresting and detaining indi-
viduals who are not wanted but who have the same names as those
for whom a warrant is outstanding. The complaint also demanded
compensatory and punitive damages and attorney’s fees and costs.
Martin County moved to dismiss and separately, the Sheriff,
Deputy Killough, and Deputy Sanchez filed their own motion to
dismiss. The County first asserted that it could not be held respon-
sible for the Sheriff’s actions. In the alternative, it, along with the
Sheriff, contended Sosa failed to make out a
Monell claim because
he did not establish that they had a policy or custom that caused
the deprivation of his rights. Deputies Killough and Sanchez as-
serted that they were entitled to qualified immunity.
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8 Opinion of the Court 20-12781
The district court granted the motions to dismiss. It con-
cluded that the deputies did not violate Sosa’s constitutional rights
with either their arrest or detention of Sosa, so it did not reach the
question of qualified immunity on either issue. As for Sosa’s
Mo-
nell claim against Martin County and the Sheriff in his official ca-
pacity, the court determined that Sosa could not succeed on it be-
cause he failed to show that the deputies had violated his constitu-
tional rights.
As we have mentioned, the en banc Court agreed with the
district court on the overdetention claim and concluded that Sosa
could not show a constitutional violation. On remand from the en
banc Court, then, we address only Sosa’s Fourth Amendment and
Monell claims.
See Sosa III, 2023 WL 328389, at *4.
II.
We review
de novo an order dismissing a case under Rule
12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., for failure to state a claim.
Lanfear v.
Home Depot, Inc., 679 F.3d 1267, 1275 (11th Cir. 2012). In so do-
ing, for purposes of our analysis, we accept the factual allegations
in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favor-
able to the plaintiff.
Id. To survive a motion to dismiss, the com-
plaint must include enough factual matter “to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007).
III.
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20-12781 Opinion of the Court 9
Our discussion proceeds in two parts. In Part A, we address
Sosa’s claims of false arrest and conclude that Deputy Killough is
entitled to qualified immunity. In Part B, we consider Sosa’s
Mo-
nell claim and conclude that Sosa has failed to allege enough facts
to make out a plausible
Monell claim.
A. Deputy Killough is entitled to qualified immunity
on Sosa’s false-arrest claim.
Turning to Sosa’s claim of false arrest, we first explain our
jurisprudence on qualified immunity and then determine whether
Deputy Killough is entitled to qualified immunity.
1. The Doctrine of Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity exists in part “to prevent public officials
from being intimidated—by the threat of lawsuits . . . —from doing
their jobs.”
Foy v. Holston, 94 F.3d 1528, 1534 (11th Cir. 1996). In
the course of their jobs, officers must sometimes rely on imperfect
information to make quick decisions.
See,
e.g.,
Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989). Nevertheless, those decisions must be
reasonable to fall within qualified immunity’s ambit.
See id. at 396;
see also Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2014). So
when we consider whether an officer is entitled to qualified im-
munity, we balance “the need to hold [officers] accountable when
they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield [them]
from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their
duties reasonably.”
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
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10 Opinion of the Court 20-12781
Qualified immunity shields from liability “all but the plainly
incompetent or one who is knowingly violating the federal law.”
Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation omit-
ted). But it does not extend to an officer who “knew or reasonably
should have known that the action he took within his sphere of
official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the
[plaintiff].”
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (citation
and emphasis omitted) (alteration in original).
To invoke qualified immunity, a public official must first es-
tablish that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary au-
thority when the challenged action occurred.
Maddox v. Stephens,
727 F.3d 1109, 1120 (11th Cir. 2013). When we speak of “discre-
tionary authority,” we mean all actions the official took (1) in per-
forming his duties and (2) in the scope of his authority.
Jordan v.
Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1566 (11th Cir. 1994). Here, the deputies satis-
fied this requirement, as they arrested and detained Sosa while per-
forming their official duties.
Because Deputy Killough was acting within the scope of his
discretionary authority, the burden shifts to Sosa to demonstrate
that qualified immunity is inappropriate.
See id. To do that, the
factual allegations in Sosa’s complaint must establish two things:
(1) Deputy Killough violated Sosa’s constitutional rights not to be
arrested on a warrant for a different David Sosa; and (2) those rights
were “clearly established . . . in light of the specific context of the
case, not as a broad general proposition,” at the time of Deputy
Killough’s actions, so as to have provided fair notice to the deputy
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20-12781 Opinion of the Court 11
that his actions violated Sosa’s rights.
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,
201 (2001),
overruled in part on other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S.
223;
Perez v. Suszczynski, 809 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir. 2016).
We next consider whether Deputy Killough is entitled to
qualified immunity on Sosa’s false-arrest claim.
2. Deputy Killough’s mistaken arrest of Sosa because of misi-
dentification was a reasonable mistake under our jurispru-
dence.
As relevant here, the Fourth Amendment, incorporated to
apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment,
see Baker
v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979), protects individuals against
unreasonable seizures, U.S. C ONST. amend. IV. Because they in-
volve unreasonable seizures, constitutional claims for false arrest
against state public officials arise under the Fourth Amendment.
See Carter v. Butts County, 821 F.3d 1310, 1319 (11th Cir. 2016)
(“An arrest is a seizure . . . .”).
An arrest complies with the Fourth Amendment if it is sup-
ported by probable cause.
Barnett v. MacArthur, 956 F.3d 1291,
1296–97 (11th Cir. 2020). But when the arresting officer raises a
qualified-immunity defense, a § 1983 plaintiff must allege sufficient
facts to establish that the deputies did not have even arguable prob-
able cause to arrest him.
Cozzi v. City of Birmingham, 892 F.3d
1288, 1293–94 (11th Cir. 2018). Probable cause for an arrest exists
when the totality of the circumstances renders the arrest objec-
tively reasonable.
Barnett, 956 F.3d at 1296–97. And “a probability
or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of
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12 Opinion of the Court 20-12781
such activity,” satisfies that standard.
D.C. v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct.
577, 586 (2018) (citation omitted). As for arguable probable cause,
that exists when “reasonable officers in the same circumstances and
possessing the same knowledge” as the arresting officer could have
thought there was probable cause to arrest the plaintiff.
Brown v.
City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omit-
ted).
Where, as here, a warrant has issued, that warrant repre-
sents a determination of probable cause.
See United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 921 (1984). But because the warrant involved here
was for a different David Sosa than Plaintiff-Appellant Sosa, we
must engage in an extra layer of analysis to determine whether
Deputy Killough’s arrest of Sosa on the wanted Sosa’s warrant vi-
olated Sosa’s Fourth Amendment rights.
See Rodriguez v. Farrell,
280 F.3d 1341, 1345–46 (11th Cir. 2002).
When a valid warrant underlies an arrest, but law-enforce-
ment officers mistakenly arrest the wrong person because of a mis-
identification, a “reasonable mistake” standard governs the consti-
tutionality of the arrest.
Id. at 1346. To assess whether a misiden-
tification mistake is “reasonable,” we consider the totality of the
circumstances concerning the arrest.
Id. at 1347.
Rodriguez aptly illustrates how we have applied this test in
practice. There, Joe John Rodriguez was riding as a passenger in a
car that an officer pulled over for a traffic stop.
Id. at 1343. During
the stop, the officer asked Rodriguez for identification.
Id. Rodri-
guez responded with more than ten pieces of identification,
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20-12781 Opinion of the Court 13
including his Florida driver’s license, birth certificate, military-dis-
charge papers, Social Security card, credit card, and V.A. patient-
data card.
Id. Upon receiving these items, the officer ran a check
on Rodriguez’s driver’s license information.
Id. at 1344. At some
point, he was advised that three warrants existed for a Victor Here-
dia who used the alias “Joe Rodriguez.”
Id. Among these, a six-
year-old warrant out of St. Johns County, Florida, sought Heredia
for driver’s license-related charges and possession of cocaine.
Id.;
see also id. at 1344 nn.6 & 7. After considering the warrant’s iden-
tifying information for Heredia, the officer believed Rodriguez was
Heredia and arrested him.
Id. at 1345.
We held the officer’s misidentification of Rodriguez to be a
“reasonable mistake,” though we recognized that merely matching
the name on the warrant with the arrestee’s name, with nothing
more, would not have been reasonable.
See id. at 1346–48. First,
we found that “four critical” identifiers for both men were the
same: name, sex, age, and race.
Id. at 1347. We also observed that
“[s]ignificant other information was similar,” including similar So-
cial Security numbers, addresses in neighboring Florida towns, the
same birth state, and similarities in tattoos.
Id. And even with re-
spect to the different towns for each man’s address, we thought “it
would not be surprising” for a person who uses an alias to also use
a false address and birthdate.
Id. at 1347 n.13 (citation omitted).
We did not find differences in eye color or in scars to be meaning-
ful, considering the availability of contact lenses and cosmetic sur-
gery.
Id. at 1347 n.14. And we were similarly unimpressed with
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14 Opinion of the Court 20-12781
weight differences, since weight varies, “especially over six years.”
Id. In contrast, we found only one material difference in the iden-
tifying information for the two men: Rodriguez said he was 5’11”,
and Heredia was 5’6”.
Id. at 1347.
But considering all the other similarities and the officer’s on-
the-fly assessment of Rodriguez’s height, we concluded that the of-
ficer’s arrest of Rodriguez was “a reasonable mistake.”
Id. at 1347–
49. As we explained, “[t]he question is not whether the police
could have done more; but whether they did just enough.”
Id. at
1347 n.15. And “small difference[s]” between the person arrested
and the person listed on the warrant—especially ones that can eas-
ily be explained—are not enough to render an arrest on a valid war-
rant unreasonable.
Id. at 1347–48.
Applying
Rodriguez here, we conclude that Deputy Kil-
lough’s mistaken arrest of Sosa on the wanted Sosa’s warrant was
“reasonable” within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment, under
our jurisprudence. We begin by recognizing that the arrest oc-
curred during a roadside stop, which limited Deputy Killough’s
ability to investigate Sosa’s claims of mistaken identity.
See id. at
1347 n.15 (“Trials of guilt or innocence cannot be undertaken by
police officers on the side of the road in the middle of the night
before an officer can effect a lawful arrest pursuant to a valid war-
rant.”);
cf. Tillman v. Coley, 886 F.2d 317, 321 (11th Cir. 1989)
(“This is not a case where time was of the essence in making the
arrest. [The defendant] had at least three months to resolve his
doubts about [the plaintiff’s] identity.” (citation omitted)).
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20-12781 Opinion of the Court 15
Next, we look at the similarities and discrepancies between
the warrant information and Sosa’s descriptive information. Sosa’s
name and sex were the same as the wanted Sosa’s. Sosa also did
not allege any difference between his and the wanted Sosa’s race.
And while Sosa alleged that the two men’s birthdates were “en-
tirely different,”2 he did not assert that there was any significant
difference in the men’s ages. We have previously described the
name, sex, race, and age characteristics as “critical.”
Rodriguez,
280 F.3d at 1347. As for differences, Sosa identified a forty-pound
weight difference and the fact that the wanted Sosa had a tattoo
2 Sosa’s First Amended Complaint averred that, in contrast to the wanted
Sosa, Sosa “had an entirely different date of birth, substantial height difference,
. . . and other identifying characteristics easily viewed on the warrant, [Sosa]’s
driver license[,] and [Sosa] himself.” Doc. No. 18, at 4 ¶ 22. These allegations
are conclusory and do not impart meaningful factual information that allows
us to evaluate whether, in fact, the differences between the two men’s dates
of birth, heights, and “other identifying characteristics” not otherwise speci-
fied would qualify as material under the reasonable-mistake test.
Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678–79 (a plaintiff “does not unlock the doors of discovery . . . armed
with nothing more than conclusions”). For instance, though the two
birthdates are “entirely different,” we do not know whether that means a one-
year or a 25-year difference between the ages of Sosa and the wanted Sosa
exists. Nor do we know whether the height difference between the two was
three inches, five inches (as in
Rodriguez), or a foot, so we cannot assess
whether that difference is legally “substantial,” for purposes of our analysis.
For that reason, these allegations “are not entitled to the assumption of truth”
that generally attaches to factual allegations in a complaint on a motion to
dismiss, and we cannot consider them.
Id. at 679.
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16 Opinion of the Court 20-12781
while Sosa had none. We also note that the warrant was out of
Texas, while Sosa was a Florida resident.
These differences Sosa alleged were not material, viewed in
the totality of the circumstances. Significantly, 26 years had passed
between when Harris County issued the warrant for the wanted
Sosa and when Sosa was arrested. That figures heavily into our
analysis. We have previously observed that weight is “easily vari-
able,” particularly over a number of years, so that is a difference of
not “much importance.”
Id. at 1347 n.14.
We have also characterized as a difference of not “much im-
portance,” in view of the passage of time, an arrestee’s lack of a scar
where the wanted individual had one, since cosmetic surgery al-
lows for changes in skin appearance.
Id. Tattoos can likewise be
removed using similar procedures. And here, not only had 26 years
elapsed, but also Sosa did not allege the location of the tattoo, so
we do not know whether the area where the tattoo was supposed
to have been was readily observable at the time of the arrest. Fi-
nally, the passage of time also renders insignificant the fact that the
warrant issued out of Texas, while Sosa lived in Florida. Sosa could
have relocated from Texas to Florida in the intervening 26 years.
When we consider all these circumstances, keeping in mind
that Deputy Killough compared the warrant information to Sosa’s
information on the side of the road during a traffic stop, we must
conclude that his error in arresting Sosa on the wanted Sosa’s war-
rant was not unreasonable by Fourth Amendment standards under
our jurisprudence.
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20-12781 Opinion of the Court 17
B. Sosa’s Monell claim fails to allege a plausible pol-
icy, custom, or practice that caused Sosa’s alleged
constitutional injury.
Finally, we consider Sosa’s Fourteenth Amendment sub-
stantive-due-process
Monell claim against Martin County and the
Sheriff. Under
Monell, a plaintiff may maintain a § 1983 action
against a municipal government when it has a policy, custom, or
practice that causes a constitutional injury. 436 U.S. at 690–91. But
a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of
vicarious liability.
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997).
To succeed on a
Monell claim, a plaintiff must prove that (1)
something that qualifies as an official local-government policy (2)
was the “moving force” that “actually caused” (3) the plaintiff’s
constitutional injury.
See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 59
n.5 (2011) (citations omitted);
see also McDowell v. Brown, 392
F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004).
An official local-government policy can be a decision by a
municipality’s lawmaking body, an act by a policymaking official,
or a municipal custom—that is, a “practice[] so persistent and wide-
spread as to practically have the force of law.”
Connick, 535 U.S.
at 61. Besides these things, a municipality’s decision not to train
employees on their legal duty not to violate citizens’ rights can also
constitute an official government policy subjecting the municipal-
ity to liability under § 1983.
Id.;
see also Lewis v. City of W. Palm
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18 Opinion of the Court 20-12781
Beach, 561 F.3d 1288, 1293 (11th Cir. 2009). But to qualify as a pol-
icy, the municipality’s failure to train must “evidence[] a deliberate
indifference to the rights of its inhabitants.”
Lewis, 561 F.3d at 1293
(citation omitted).
Establishing deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to
“present some evidence that the municipality knew of a need to
train and/or supervise in a particular area and . . . made a deliberate
choice not to take any action.”
Id. (citation omitted). A plaintiff
may do this by pointing to evidence that municipal policymakers
“are on actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in
their training program causes city employees to violate citizens’
constitutional rights.”
Connick, 563 U.S. at 61.
Generally, to satisfy this notice requirement, a plaintiff must
prove a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained
employees.
Id. at 62. But “in a narrow range of circumstances,” a
plaintiff may avoid the need to show a pattern of similar violations
to prove deliberate indifference.
Id. at 63 (citation omitted). That
is so when “the unconstitutional consequences of failing to train
[are] . . . patently obvious,”
id. at 64, meaning that a high likelihood
exists that the situation will recur frequently and that the officer’s
lack of specific tools to respond to that situation will predictably
violate citizens’ constitutional rights,
Brown, 520 U.S. at 409. The
Supreme Court has identified but a single example of this situation:
a municipality’s failure to train officers about the constitutional
limits on the use of deadly force though arming the officers with
guns and expecting to use them in the course of their duties.
See
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20-12781 Opinion of the Court 19
Connick, 563 U.S. at 63;
see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378, 390 n.10 (1989).
As for
Monell’s causation prong, when it comes to a failure-
to-train claim, the plaintiff must establish that a hypothetically
well-trained officer would have acted in a way that would have pre-
vented the injury to the plaintiff.
See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at
391.
Sosa argues that two of the County’s and Sheriff’s alleged
“policies” caused him constitutional injury: (1) the failure to train
deputies to properly verify that an individual arrested based on an
outstanding warrant is, in fact, the subject of that warrant, and (2)
the lack of a policy or custom of keeping records to identify those
who have previously been arrested because of misidentification on
outstanding charges for another person with the same or similar
name.
Here, the first alleged policy Sosa challenges—the Sheriff
and Martin County’s (“County Defendants”) alleged failure to train
deputies to correctly identify a person as a wanted person—cannot
support a
Monell claim. For starters, Martin County cannot be lia-
ble for Sosa’s arrest because Sosa did not suffer a constitutional in-
jury when he was arrested. As we have explained, Deputy Killough
did not violate Sosa’s Fourth Amendment right when he arrested
Sosa on the wanted Sosa’s warrant.
Martin County also cannot be liable for the lack of action by
its deputies at the jail who failed to correctly identify Sosa. That is
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20 Opinion of the Court 20-12781
so because the en banc Court has concluded that the three-day-and-
three-night overdetention did not violate Sosa’s constitutional
rights. As a result, Sosa has failed to allege enough facts to make
out a plausible
Monell claim on this first alleged policy.
Next, we turn to Sosa’s second alleged policy: the failure to
keep records so that those who have previously been misidentified
as a wanted person will not be so misidentified again on the same
warrant. This alleged policy was not passed by the local govern-
ment. Nor does the need for keeping a records system to ensure a
person is not mistakenly arrested twice on the same warrant for
someone else with the same or similar name rise to the level of
obviousness that the Supreme Court’s example of the need to train
officers with guns does.
So we consider whether Sosa sufficiently alleged a pattern of
similar constitutional violations that should have put Martin
County on notice that its deputies were regularly violating people’s
rights by rearresting them on the same outstanding warrant be-
cause of a misidentification error. For purposes of our analysis, we
assume a meaningful difference between the duty of an individual
deputy to avoid unreasonably mistakenly arresting a person as a
wanted person and the duty of a sheriff’s department as an entity
to prevent the unreasonably mistaken rearrests of a person on a
wanted person’s warrant.
See Barnett, 956 F.3d at 1301 (explaining
that “municipal liability can exist if a jury finds that a constitutional
injury is due to a municipal policy, custom, or practice,” even if “no
officer is individually liable for the violation”).
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20-12781 Opinion of the Court 21
But even assuming that a county may inflict constitutional
injury on a person by mistakenly arresting him a second time or
more on the same warrant because of a misidentification, the dis-
trict court did not err in dismissing Sosa’s
Monell claim. Sosa did
not allege enough facts to show that the Sheriff’s Department had
a pattern of rearresting the wrong person on a warrant because of
mistaken identity based on the arrestee’s name.
True, Sosa himself was rearrested once. But as to the
County’s notice
at the time of Sosa’s rearrest, which is what we
must evaluate, Sosa alleges only that “[u]pon information and be-
lief Martin County has arrested many innocent individual[s] be-
cause they failed to exclude a person based upon different identify-
ing information between the detainee and the actual person
wanted for a warrant.” Doc. No. 18, at 11 ¶ 59. To be sure, facts
based “upon information and belief” may support a claim when
facts “are not within the knowledge of the plaintiff but he has suf-
ficient data to justify” an allegation on the matter. 5 Charles A.
Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice & Procedure § 1224
(3d ed. 2012). But here, Sosa points to no data other than his own
rearrest (which, obviously and as we have noted, did not occur be-
fore his own rearrest) to support his information-and-belief allega-
tion.
Connick, 563 U.S. at 63 n.7;
Knight ex. rel. Kerr v. Miami-
Dade County, 856 F.3d 795, 820 (11th Cir. 2017). For that reason,
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22 Opinion of the Court 20-12781
Sosa did not plead enough facts to set forth a
Monell practice
claim,3 and the district court did not err in dismissing that claim.4
IV.
We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Sosa’s Fourth
Amendment and
Monell claims.
AFFIRMED.
3 Nevertheless, if the Sheriff has no policy on or practice of maintaining rec-
ords concerning those who have been mistakenly arrested on a warrant for
another person, because the two have the same or similar names, he takes his
chances that another mistakenly rearrested person may be able to establish a
pattern and practice based on Sosa’s rearrest and, if appropriate, on infor-
mation and belief.
4 The County also argues that Sosa’s
Monell claim should fail because it is not
a proper defendant in this case since it does not control the Sheriff’s office. We
need not reach this argument because we conclude that, in any event, Sosa’s
Monell claim fails because he has not sufficiently alleged a municipal policy or
custom. As we have explained, Sosa has not alleged a pattern of similar con-
stitutional violations that would show that the County’s decision not to train
its deputies constitutes an official government policy.
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