USA v. Ardarrius Keithlyn Speigner

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 20-12540
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cr-00318-LCB-HNJ-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ARDARRIUS KEITHLYN SPEIGNER,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
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(February 18, 2021)
Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Ardarrius Speigner appeals his 72-month sentence for pleading guilty to
possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. The government moved to dismiss this
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appeal under the appeal waiver provision of Speigner’s plea agreement. After careful
review, we grant the government’s motion and dismiss this appeal.
I.
Speigner pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). According to the plea agreement’s signed factual
basis, Speigner was pulled over after he fell asleep at a stop light and remained there
as the light cycled from red to green several times. During an ensuing pat-down
search, Speigner removed a Bersa .380 pistol from the back pocket of his pants. The
officer confiscated the pistol and arrested Speigner. The plea agreement stipulated
that the maximum statutory punishment for Speigner’s offense was 10 years’
imprisonment.
The plea agreement also included a sentence appeal waiver. Set out in bold
typeface, the waiver provided that Speigner waived his right to appeal his conviction
or sentence, as well as any fines, restitution, or forfeiture orders imposed by the
district court or imposed in any post-conviction proceeding. The waiver did not
extend to sentences imposed outside the applicable statutory maximum or guidelines
range. Nor did the waiver prevent Speigner from appealing any ineffective assistance
of counsel claims.
The agreement stated that before giving up these rights, Speigner had
discussed the guidelines and their application with his attorney. The agreement also
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included a signed acknowledgement that Speigner understood the wavier, and that
he was entering into it knowingly and voluntarily. Speigner signed the agreement
and initialed each page. Speigner’s counsel also signed an acknowledgment that he
had discussed the terms of the agreement with Speigner.
At the change-of-plea hearing, the district court told Speigner that, if anything
occurred that he did not fully understand, he should interrupt the proceedings and
alert the court. Speigner indicated that he understood these instructions. He then
testified under oath that he had a 10th grade education, that he had initialed and
signed the agreement, that he was not then under the influence of drugs or other
substances, and that he was not suffering from a mental or emotional impairment.
Speigner also stated that he had an opportunity to discuss the agreement with his
attorney before signing it.
The court then confirmed with Speigner’s attorney that he had explained and
discussed the waiver of appeal. The attorney stated that he had and that he was
satisfied that Speigner understood the terms of the waiver. Speigner then stated again
that he understood the terms of the waiver, that his counsel had explained the waiver
to him, and that he did not have any questions about the waiver or its operation. The
court found that Speigner was fully competent and capable of entering an informed
plea and that he was aware of the nature of the charges and of the consequences of
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the plea agreement. The court also found that Speigner’s plea was knowing,
voluntary, and supported by an independent factual basis.
According to the presentence report, Speigner’s guidelines range was between
70 and 87 months, based on a total offense level of 21 and a criminal history category
of V. Speigner requested a 42-month sentence, a downward variance from this
guidelines range based on his mental health and the fact that his two robbery
convictions were only charged separately because he crossed county lines in their
commission. At the hearing, the government recommended a sentence of 70 months.
The court sentenced Speigner to 72 months’ imprisonment. Speigner objected to the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence, and the court noted that the sentence was
within the guidelines range. The court then stated that Speigner had the right to
appeal his sentence within 14 days unless he had waived those rights as part of the
plea agreement. Even so, the court informed Speigner that he could present his
theory that his waiver was unenforceable to this Court. Speigner timely appealed.
II.
We review the validity of a sentence appeal waiver de novo. United States v.
Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008). A sentence appeal waiver’s validity
turns on whether it was made knowingly and voluntarily. United States v. Bushert,
997 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir. 1993). To establish that the waiver was made
knowingly and voluntarily, the government must show either that: (1) the district
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court specifically questioned the defendant about the waiver during the plea
colloquy; or (2) the record makes clear that the defendant otherwise understood the
full significance of the waiver. Id. A waiver is enforceable if the defendant claimed
to understand it during the plea colloquy, confirmed that he had read the plea
agreement and knew it was binding, and entered into the plea agreement freely and
voluntarily. United States v. Weaver, 275 F.3d 1320, 1323–24, 1333 (11th Cir.
2001).
Speigner argues that the court did not adequately explain the significance of
the appeal waiver during the guilty-plea colloquy and that the record does not
establish that he otherwise understood the significance of the appeal waiver.
Although it would have been better for the district court to have walked Speigner
through the terms of the appeal waiver at the change-of-plea hearing, see FED.R.
CRIM .P. 11(b)(1)(N), we disagree that the record does not establish that he
understood the significance of the appeal waiver. The court referenced the appeal
waiver, Speigner confirmed that he had read and understood the agreement and
waiver, and Speigner acknowledged in the agreement that he was making the waiver
freely and voluntarily. Accordingly, we hold that Speigner waived his appeal
knowingly and voluntarily, so the appeal waiver was valid and enforceable. Because
the issue Speigner raises on appeal—the substantive reasonableness of his
sentence—does not fit within an exception to the appeal waiver, his appeal is barred.
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III.
For the reasons stated above, the government’s Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED, and Speigner’s appeal is DISMISSED.
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