Rhonda Ledbetter v. IDN-Armstrong's, Inc., et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 19-13792
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-04157-SCJ

RHONDA LEDBETTER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

IDN-ARMSTRONG’S, INC.,
IDN GLOBAL, INC.,
IDN, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees,

IDN DISTRIBUTORS, INC.,

Defendant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(May 15, 2020)
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Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JORDAN and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
Rhonda Ledbetter appeals the summary judgment in favor of her former
employer IDN-Armstrong’s, Inc., and its successor entities, IDN Global, Inc., and
IDN, Inc., and against her second amended complaint of discrimination in
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B). The
district court ruled that Ledbetter failed to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination and, alternatively, that she failed to prove that the legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason proffered for her termination was a pretext for
discrimination. We affirm.
We review a summary judgment de novo and view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Wascura v. City of S. Miami, 257 F.3d
1238, 1242 (11th Cir. 2001), Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Ledbetter sought to prove her claim of discrimination with circumstantial
evidence using the burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Wascura, 257 F.3d at
1242. Under that framework, an employee must establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, which creates a rebuttable presumption that her employer has acted
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unlawfully. Id. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the
Americans With Disabilities Act, the employee must establish that she is disabled
or regarded as being disabled and discriminated against because of her disability or
perceived disability. Lewis v. Union City, Ga., 934 F.3d 1169, 1179 (11th Cir.
2019). After the employee establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, her
employer can rebut the presumption by proffering a legitimate reason for its
conduct. Wascura, 257 F.3d at 1242. If the employer provides a legitimate reason,
the employee must prove that the reason is a pretext for discrimination. Id. The
employee must present evidence “sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to
conclude that the reasons given by the employer were not the real reasons for the
adverse employment action.” Id. at 1243 (quoting Chapman v. AI Transport, 229
F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).
IDN presented evidence that it fired Ledbetter for the legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason that she never contacted IDN to explain her continued
absence after she was released to return to work. IDN learned that Ledbetter
underwent surgery for a fractured arm in February and expected her to return in
March based on weekly progress reports provided by her daughters. In April, IDN
presumed that Ledbetter was still receiving treatment for her arm based on one
telephone call from Ledbetter’s daughter reporting that Ledbetter was undergoing
medical tests and one call from Ledbetter from an addiction treatment facility in
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which she requested forms to extend her leave through May 15, 2017. But in early
May, IDN received from its disability insurance provider a physician’s statement
that Ledbetter was expected to “be able to return to work” on March 27, 2017. The
insurer also informed IDN that Ledbetter had been “cleared . . . to return to work
on March 27th” and that she had not sought to extend her disability benefits. On
May 8, 2017, IDN notified Ledbetter that her “short-term disability had terminated
on March 27, 2017,” she had been “away from [her] position for eleven weeks,”
and it had “not heard from [her] for the past several weeks” and could “no longer
hold [her] position open.”
Ledbetter failed to “meet head on and rebut” the legitimate reason proffered
for her termination. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030. Ledbetter submitted evidence
that IDN reported to the Georgia Department of Labor that she had violated a
company policy that treated employees as having voluntarily abandoned their jobs
when they were absent for two consecutive days without explanation, but that
explanation was consistent with the proffered reason for her termination. Ledbetter
also presented evidence that IDN initially cited “job abandonment” in her
termination letter and reworded the letter to state that she failed to communicate
the reasons for her absenteeism, but that rewording of Ledbetter’s termination
letter was also consistent with the proffered reason for her termination.
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Ledbetter argues that IDN knew she had not abandoned her job when she
was in an addiction treatment center and asked for an extension of leave until May
15, but Ledbetter presented no evidence that IDN knew that she was receiving
treatment for alcoholism. Ledbetter presented evidence that she drank excessive
amounts of alcohol to relieve her pain from her arm surgery, but she failed to
present any evidence that either she or her daughter told IDN that she had been
diagnosed as an alcoholic or was receiving treatment for alcoholism. Ledbetter
created no material factual dispute about whether the reason IDN proffered for her
termination was true.
We AFFIRM the summary judgment in favor of IDN.
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