Douglas T. Edwards v. Apple Computer, Inc., et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-10244
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-22017-KMM
DOUGLAS T. EDWARDS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
APPLE COMPUTER, INC.,
HARSHAW RESEARCH, INC.,
ISAAC WILEY,
Official & Individual Capacities,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(March 9, 2016)
Before TJOFLAT, JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Douglas Edwards, a prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
grant of defendant Apple Computer, Inc.’s (“Apple”) motion to dismiss his
complaint alleging misappropriation of trade secrets, under the Florida Uniform
Trade Secrets Act (“FUTSA”), Fla. Stat. §§ 688.001-.007, and unjust enrichment.
I.
On appeal, Edwards argues that the district court erred in holding that his
complaint was barred by the statute of limitations because the prisoner mailbox
rule did not apply to claims brought under FUTSA and unjust enrichment claims.
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to
satisfy the statute of limitations, accepting as true the allegations in the complaint.
Jackson v. Astrue, 506 F.3d 1349, 1352 (11th Cir. 2007). We review a district
court’s denial of a request for an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion.
Cason v. Seckinger, 231 F.3d 777, 781 (11th Cir. 2000). An abuse of discretion
occurs if the district court fails to apply the proper legal standard or to follow
proper procedures in making the determination or bases its ruling upon findings of
fact that are clearly erroneous. Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1326 (11th
Cir. 2002).
A complaint is subject to dismissal when its allegations, on their face, show
that an affirmative defense bars recovery on the claim. Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d
1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2008). Thus, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
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is an appropriate method for raising a statute of limitations defense. Mann v.
Adams Realty Co., Inc., 556 F.2d 288, 293 (5th Cir. 1977).
Under FUTSA, the statute of limitations for misappropriation of trade
secrets is three years after the misappropriation was discovered or should have
been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence. Fla. Stat. § 688.007. In
Florida, the statute of limitations for unjust enrichment is four years. See Merle
Wood & Associates, Inc. v. Trinity Yachts, LLC, 714 F.3d 1234, 1237 (11th Cir.
2013).
Under the prisoner mailbox rule, a pro se prisoner’s filing is considered to
be filed on the date that the prisoner delivers the notice to prison authorities for
mailing. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 275-76, 108 S. Ct. 2379, 2385, 101
L. Ed. 2d 245 (1988). We have extended this rule to cases filed under the 42
U.S.C. § 1983, the Federal Torts Claim Act, and pro se prisoners’ filings of
motions to vacate. Adams v. United States, 173 F.3d 1339, 1341 (11th Cir. 1999)
(motions to vacate); Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 783 (11th Cir. 1993)
(Federal Tort Claims Act and § 1983 actions). In determining whether a prisoner
delivered his filing to prison authorities, we “take into account any and all relevant
circumstances, including any lack of diligence on the part of prisoner in following
up in a manner that would be expected of a reasonable person in his
circumstances.” Allen v. Culliver, 471 F.3d 1196, 1198 (11th Cir. 2006).
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Even if the prisoner mailbox rule applied to Edwards’s FUTSA and unjust
enrichment claims, he provides no basis for his assertion that he mailed his original
complaint before the statute of limitations ran. A reasonable person would take
steps to ensure his claim was docketed before 33 months passed, and Edwards does
not demonstrate that he took any such steps. Therefore, the complaint was filed
after the three-year statute of limitations for the FUTSA claim and the four-year
statute of limitations for the unjust enrichment claim. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s grant of Apple’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
II.
Edwards also argues that the district court abused its discretion when it
denied his motion to amend his complaint a second time.
We review the denial of a motion for leave to amend a complaint for abuse
of discretion. Covenant Christian Ministries, Inc. v. City of Marietta, 654 F.3d
1231, 1239 (11th Cir. 2011). A district court’s decision will not be disturbed on
abuse-of-discretion review if its decision falls within a range of permissible
choices, and it is not influenced by a mistake of law. Zocaras v. Castro, 465 F.3d
479, 483 (11th Cir. 2006).
Here, Edwards could only amend his complaint by leave of court or with
Apple’s written consent. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The decision whether to
grant the motion is within the discretion of the district court, but should be granted
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unless there is a substantial reason to deny. Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660
F.2d 594, 597-98 (5th Cir. 1981). We have held that the futility of an amendment
is one such reason. Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1110 (11th Cir.
1996).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that further
amendment would have been futile because any amendment of his complaint to
better specify the trade secrets would not have overcome the statute-of-limitations
bar. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of his motion to amend his
complaint.
III.
Edwards also argues that the district court erred in not granting his motion to
remand to the state court without addressing his argument that Apple’s removal
was untimely.
We review the denial of a motion to remand de novo. Valdivieso v. Atlas
Air., Inc., 305 F.3d 1283, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002). Under § 1441(a), a defendant
may remove to federal district court any civil action brought in state court that
could have originally been filed in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The
defendant has 30 days to file a notice of removal after it receives or is served with
the initial pleading. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(B). A defendant’s time to remove is
triggered by service of the summons and complaint, or receipt of the complaint
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through service or otherwise, and not by receipt of the complaint “unattended by
any formal service.” Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344,
347-48, 119 S. Ct. 1322, 1325, 143 L. Ed. 2d 448 (1999).
Apple’s notice of removal was timely because Edwards never formally
served Apple with process, and Apple removed the case from the state court two
days after waiving service of process. Thus, the district court did not err in not
granting Edwards’s motion to remand.
IV.
Edwards also argues that the district court abused its discretion when it
denied his motion to appoint counsel and erred when it denied his motion to
appoint the United States Marshal service to serve process on out-of-state
defendants.
We review the denial of a motion to appoint counsel in a civil case for abuse
of discretion. Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 1999). A plaintiff in
a civil case has no constitutional right to counsel. Id. at 1320. Therefore, the
district court has broad discretion in making this decision and should appoint
counsel only in exceptional circumstances. Id. The key is whether the pro se
litigant needs help in presenting the essential merits of his or her position to the
court. Kilgo v. Ricks, 983 F.2d 189, 193 (11th Cir.1993). In Bass, we held that
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because the legal issues were straightforward, there were no exceptional
circumstances justifying the appointment of counsel. 170 F.3d at 1320.
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, “[a]t the plaintiff's
request, the court may order that service be made by a United States marshal or
deputy marshal or by a person specially appointed by the court. The court must so
order if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Edwards’s pending
motions. Edwards did not show exceptional circumstances justifying the
appointment of counsel. In addition, the district court properly denied Edwards’s
motion to appoint the U.S. marshal as moot because his claim was barred by the
statute of limitations, and even if process was served on additional defendants, it
would not cure the statute-of-limitations defense.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of Apple’s motion to
dismiss and denial of Edwards’s pending motions.
AFFIRMED.1
1 Edwards’s Motion to Supplement Reply Brief is DENIED.
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