USA v. Frederick Wardell Mitchell

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-14893
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:09-cr-00429-VMC-EAJ-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
FREDERICK WARDELL MITCHELL,
a.k.a. Wardell,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(June 24, 2014)
Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Frederick Mitchell, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of
his Fed.R.Crim.P. 33 motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence
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concerning his 2010 convictions for robbery and other related offenses. In support
of his Rule 33 motion, Mitchell submitted an affidavit by Roberto Almaguer
asserting that the government had coerced him into falsely testifying against
Mitchell at trial. The record shows that Almaguer originally testified at trial that
he and Mitchell, along with a third individual, committed an armed robbery of a
Waffle House restaurant. On appeal, Mitchell argues that: (1) the district court
erred in finding that Almaguer’s affidavit, recanting his former testimony, did not
constitute newly discovered evidence warranting a new trial; and (2) the court
erred in denying his motion for a new trial without first conducting an evidentiary
hearing. After careful review, we affirm.
We review the district court’s denial of a Rule 33 motion for a new trial for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Sweat, 555 F.3d 1364, 1367 (11th Cir. 2009).
We also review a decision to rule on a Rule 33 motion without an evidentiary
hearing for abuse of discretion. United States v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 944, 990 (11th
Cir. 1997). Additionally, “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard
than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.”
Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted).
Rule 33 allows a defendant to file a motion for a new trial within 3 years
after the verdict if the motion is based on “newly discovered evidence,” or 14 days
after the verdict if based on “other grounds.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(b). The court may
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grant the motion “if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(a). We
have held that, to succeed on a Rule 33 motion based on newly discovered
evidence, the defendant must establish that:
(1) the evidence was discovered after trial, (2) the failure of the defendant to
discover the evidence was not due to a lack of due diligence, (3) the
evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching, (4) the evidence is
material to issues before the court, and (5) the evidence is such that a new
trial would probably produce a different result.
United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotations
omitted). The defendant must satisfy all of these elements to warrant relief.
United States v. Williams, 816 F.2d 1527, 1530 (11th Cir. 1987). We have noted
that motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence “are highly
disfavored . . . and should be granted only with great caution.” United States v.
Campa, 459 F.3d 1121, 1151 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (quotations omitted).
“In ruling on a motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence,
it is within the province of the trial court to consider the credibility of those
individuals who give statements in support of the motion.” United States v. Reed,
887 F.2d 1398, 1404 n.12 (11th Cir. 1989). Further, we have held that, for newly
discovered evidence to justify a new trial, “the evidence must be material and not
merely cumulative or impeaching, and must be such that it will probably produce
an acquittal.” United States v. Diaz, 190 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999).
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The government’s presentation of perjured testimony or failure to correct
false evidence violates due process. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55
(1972). In order to establish a Giglio violation, the defendant must show that “(1)
the contested statements were actually false, (2) the statements were material, and
(3) the prosecution knew that they were false.” United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d
1381, 1395 (11th Cir. 1997) (quotations omitted). In order to show that the
contested statements were material, the defendant must demonstrate that “the false
testimony could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light
as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” United States v. Dickerson, 248 F.3d
1036, 1041 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted).
First, we reject Mitchell’s claim that the district court abused its discretion
by denying the motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. As the
record shows, Almaguer’s affidavit was conclusory -- it did not identify which
portions of his trial testimony were untrue or provide a corrected account of the
robbery. Thus, it was within the district court’s province to find that the affidavit
was not credible when viewed against Almaguer’s detailed testimony at trial. As
for whether Almaguer’s affidavit constituted newly discovered evidence, the
affidavit was not dated, and Mitchell did not show that he obtained the affidavit
after the trial was completed. Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, that
Almaguer’s affidavit constituted new evidence, the record shows that the
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government produced substantial evidence of Mitchell’s guilt at trial apart from
Almaguer’s testimony. As a result, there was little in the record for the district
court to find that Almaguer’s affidavit would have probably produced an acquittal.
See Diaz, 190 F.3d at 1255. In short, the district court did not abuse its discretion
by denying the motion for new trial on this claim. Nor, moreover, did the district
court abuse its discretion in finding that Mitchell was not entitled to a new trial on
the basis of any Giglio violation. Among other things, Mitchell failed to
demonstrate that the government knowingly introduced any false testimony. See
Bailey, 123 F.3d at 1395.
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to conduct an
evidentiary hearing before denying Mitchell’s motion for a new trial. We have
said that a defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a Rule 33 motion
if “the acumen gained by a trial judge over the course of the proceedings [made
her] well qualified to rule on the [motion] without a hearing.” Schlei, 122 F.3d at
994 (quotations omitted). Here, District Judge Covington, who ruled upon
Mitchell’s motion, also presided over his trial. Because Judge Covington was
already familiar with the evidence and the demeanor of the witnesses, it was not
necessary for the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing before ruling on
Mitchell’s motion. See id.
AFFIRMED.
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