Melanie Smallwood v. Edwin F. Ainsworth

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-11467
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cv-03835-JOF
MELANIE SMALLWOOD,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
EDWIN F. AINSWORTH,
Cobb County Police Officer - In his individual capacity,
Defendant - Appellee.
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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(October 16, 2013)
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Melanie Smallwood appeals the district court’s grant of defendant Edwin
Ainsworth’s motion for summary judgment. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
Smallwood filed suit against Cobb County Police Officer Ainsworth, alleging that
he violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure
when he arrested her for driving under the influence without probable cause. The
district court granted Ainsworth’s motion for summary judgment, finding that no
constitutional violation took place. The district court also found that even if a
constitutional violation had occurred, Ainsworth would be entitled to qualified
immunity. Smallwood now appeals.
I.
The facts are as follows. On November 8, 2009, Officer Ainsworth, a 20-
year veteran of the Cobb County Police Department, was on duty and received
information from another officer about a possible impaired driver. The time was
2:00 a.m. As a result of this information, he began following Smallwood’s vehicle,
which matched the reporting officer’s description of the possible impaired driver: a
light colored minivan driving erratically westbound on Macland Road in Cobb
County, Georgia. Ainsworth testified that he observed Smallwood swerve and
sway in her lane, once almost striking the curb. Smallwood denies driving in such
a manner. Ainsworth followed Smallwood for some time and after he again
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observed her car touch the divider lines he determined that he had probable cause
to pull her over for a traffic stop.
After Ainsworth pulled Smallwood over, he approached her car to speak
with her. When Smallwood rolled down her window, Ainsworth detected an odor
of alcohol. Ainsworth asked whether Smallwood had been drinking. She denied
having had anything to drink, informed Ainsworth that she had taken cough
medicine, and suggested that the medicine might be what Ainsworth smelled.
Ainsworth stated that Smallwood’s eyes were bloodshot and watery. In
addition, she swayed back and forth when she exited the vehicle in order to
complete the field sobriety tests. Ainsworth conducted three different field
sobriety tests. First, Ainsworth conducted the horizontal haze nystagmus test.
This test scores each eye for a maximum of six clues to detect impairment. Based
on his training and experience, Ainsworth determined that Smallwood tested
positive for all six clues. He next administered the “walk and turn” field sobriety
test. This test produces eight clues of impairment, and Ainsworth determined that
Smallwood was positive for two clues, enough to constitute failure. Last,
Ainsworth administered the “one-leg stand” field sobriety test, which evaluates
coordination and balance. Smallwood indicated positive for two of the six clues
for impairment. Ainsworth then arrested Smallwood for driving under the
influence.
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Ainsworth transported Smallwood to the Cobb County Adult Detention
Center and administered a breathalyzer test. Smallwood blew a 0.03, which was
below the legal limit. Ainsworth then informed Smallwood that while she was not
charged with driving under the influence, she was charged with reckless driving
and failure to maintain her lane. Smallwood remained at the Cobb County jail for
four hours and bonded out with a $400 to $550 bond. The charges were eventually
dismissed for insufficient proof.
Smallwood brought suit alleging Ainsworth violated her Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable seizure. She also brought state law claims for
negligence, false arrest and/or imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.
Ainsworth moved for summary judgment, arguing that the stop and arrest did not
amount to a constitutional violation, and alternatively, suit was barred based on
qualified immunity. The district court granted Ainsworth’s motion for summary
judgment.
II.
“We review de novo the district court’s disposition of a summary judgment
motion based on qualified immunity, resolving all issues of material fact in favor
of [the plaintiff] and then answering the legal question of whether [the defendant
is] entitled to qualified immunity under that version of the facts.” Case v. Eslinger,
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555 F.3d 1317, 1324–25 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and emphasis
omitted).
“Qualified immunity protects government actors performing discretionary
functions from being sued in their individual capacities.” Holmes v. Kucynda, 321
F.3d 1069, 1077 (11th Cir. 2003). It offers complete protection for government
officials so long as “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982). The doctrine
“balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable
when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.”
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009). We have
often said that qualified immunity “protect[s] from suit all but the plainly
incompetent or one who is knowingly violating the federal law.” E.g., Lee v.
Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Once an official demonstrates that he was performing a discretionary
function, the plaintiff bears the burden to prove that qualified immunity does not
insulate the official from liability. Crosby v. Monroe County, 394 F.3d 1328, 1332
(11th Cir. 2004). The parties do not dispute that Ainsworth was engaged in a
discretionary function when he made the arrest in this case; Smallwood therefore
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shoulders the burden of proving that Ainsworth does not enjoy qualified immunity
protection. This she cannot do.
In determining whether an officer is qualifiedly immune, we undertake a
two-part inquiry, asking: (1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, demonstrate that the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right
of the plaintiff; and (2) whether the right allegedly violated was clearly established.
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001). For a right to be
clearly established, “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3039 (1987). Finally,
we are “permitted to exercise [our] sound discretion in deciding which of the two
prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the
circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S. Ct.
at 818.
Here, Smallwood alleges that Ainsworth violated her constitutional rights
because there was no probable cause to pull her over for a traffic violation.
Probable cause is “a standard well short of absolute certainty.” Los Angeles
County v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 615, 127 S. Ct. 1989, 1993 (2007). “Th[e]
standard is met when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge,
of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a prudent
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person to believe, under the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed,
is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1195 (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Probable cause requires more than mere suspicion, but
does not require convincing proof.” Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th
Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). The probable cause analysis is
undertaken in light of the totality of the circumstances, and the standard “must be
judged not with clinical detachment[] but with a common sense view to the
realities of normal life.” Craig v. Singletary, 127 F.3d 1030, 1042 (11th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 1985)).
III.
Looking at the totality of the circumstances, Ainsworth had probable cause
to stop Smallwood and arrest her on suspicion of impaired driving. Ainsworth
testified that: (1) he observed Smallwood’s car swerve in her lane and almost hit a
curb; (2) when he approached the car and Smallwood rolled down her window, he
smelled alcohol; (3) Smallwood’s eyes were bloodshot and watery, and she swayed
when she exited the vehicle to perform the field sobriety tests; and (4) when he
administered the field sobriety tests, Smallwood exhibited several of the clues that
indicate impairment. Because Ainsworth had probable cause to stop and then
arrest Smallwood on suspicion of impaired driving, there was no constitutional
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violation. The district court, therefore, properly granted Ainsworth’s motion for
summary judgment as to the federal constitutional claims.
The district court also properly granted summary judgment as to
Smallwood’s allegations of state law claims. “A suit against a public officer acting
in his or her official capacity will be barred by official immunity unless the public
officer (1) negligently performed a ministerial duty, or (2) acted with actual malice
or an actual intent to cause injury while performing a discretionary duty.” Tant v.
Purdue, 629 S.E.2d 551, 553 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Neither party disputes Ainsworth was performing a discretionary duty
when he stopped Smallwood and arrested her for impaired driving. Smallwood’s
state law claims fail, however, because Ainsworth did not do so with malice or
intent to cause injury. See id.
AFFIRMED.
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