Mike Samadi v. Bank of America, N.A.

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 4, 2012
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 11-13561
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-00002-JRH-WLB
MIKE SAMADI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
________________________
(April 4, 2012)
Before MARCUS, PRYOR and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

-- 1 of 6 --

Mike Samadi appeals pro se the summary judgment against his complaint
that the Bank of America violated the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et
seq., the Fair Credit Reporting Act, id. § 1681 et seq., and Georgia law. Samadi
challenges the denial of his motions governing discovery, the imposition of
sanctions for failing to attend his deposition, and the denial of his motions to
remand his action to state court and for leave to amend his complaint. Samadi also
challenges the summary judgment in favor of the Bank. We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Samadi’s
motions to compel, to extend the time for discovery, and to hold a status
conference. Although we construe pro se filings liberally, “procedural rules in
ordinary civil litigation should [not] be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by
those who proceed without counsel.” McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113,
113 S. Ct. 1980, 1984 (1993). The district court was not required to grant
Samadi’s motion to compel when he failed to certify that he had conferred in good
faith with counsel for the Bank, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1), or to comply with a local
rule that he object with specificity to the responses of the Bank to requests for
discovery, S.D. Ga. R. 26.5. The district court also was not required to extend the
time for discovery a second time for Samadi to file another motion to compel after
he had failed to file a corrected motion within the first extended period for
2

-- 2 of 6 --

discovery. See Shotz v. City of Plantation, Fla., 344 F.3d 1161, 1184 n.35 (11th
Cir. 2003). There was no need for the district court to conduct a status conference
to resolve Samadi’s grievance with the Bank regarding discovery when Samadi
refused to avail himself of procedures for resolving his grievance. See Holloman
v. Mail-Well Corp., 443 F.3d 832, 843–44 (11th Cir. 2006).
The district court acted within its discretion by sanctioning Samadi for
failing to attend his deposition. “[A]ll federal courts have the power, by statute,
by rule, and by common law, to impose sanctions against recalcitrant . . . parties
litigant.” Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 775 F.2d 1440, 1446 (11th Cir. 1985).
Samadi refused to make himself available for a deposition within the time for
discovery and, after receiving notice of the date scheduled, he refused to appear
unless he received materials that he had requested in two discovery requests. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(1). Samadi argues that he was not required to appear
because of discovery misconduct by the Bank, but the record supports the decision
of the district court that Samadi’s dispute with the Bank did not “substantially
justif[y]” his failure to appear. Id. 37(d)(3). As a result, the district court was
entitled to order Samadi to “pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s
fees,” incurred by the Bank as a result of Samadi’s absence. Id.
Samadi challenges the reasonableness of the expenses, but we cannot say
3

-- 3 of 6 --

that the district court “‘committed a clear error of judgment’” when it awarded the
$2,283.85 that the Bank requested in its revised statement of fees and costs.
Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1313 (11th Cir.
2011) (quoting Dorey v. Dorey, 609 F.2d 1128, 1135–36 (5th Cir. 1980)). The
district court ordered the Bank to revise its first statement of $4,400, and the Bank
complied with that order by including in its revised statement only its expenses
related to attempting to depose Samadi and preparing a motion for sanctions.
The district court also did not abuse its discretion by denying as untimely
Samadi’s motions to remand his action to state court and for leave to amend his
complaint. Samadi moved to remand this action over six months after the Bank
removed it to the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). And Samadi did not
request leave to amend his complaint until after the deadline for discovery and
pre-trial pleadings had expired and after the Bank had moved for summary
judgment. See Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc. v. Olin Corp, 313 F.3d 1307, 1314–15
(11th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff must have “good cause for belatedly amending [his]
complaint,” Sosa v. Airprint Sys., Inc., 133 F.3d 1417, 1418 (11th Cir. 1998); see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4), but Samadi sought to withdraw his federal claims to
defeat federal jurisdiction and to avoid an unfavorable summary judgment.
The district court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of the
4

-- 4 of 6 --

Bank and against Samadi’s claims under the Truth in Lending Act. To be subject
to regulation under the Lending Act, the Bank must have extended Samadi, as a
“consumer,” credit to be used “primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1602(i). Samadi argues that he obtained two lines of
credit for consumer purposes, as evidenced by his “personal information and
signature” on the loan documents and the lack of a “restriction [on] the use of [the]
funds” by the Bank. But the record establishes that Samadi used the lines of credit
“primarily for business, [or] commercial . . . purposes,” which are exempt from the
Lending Act. Id. § 1603(1). Samadi, a real estate investor, testified that he had
intended to “borrow money against . . . [his] line of credit . . . to purchase another
property” for investment; to use the “funds . . . to do repairs on . . . properties”;
and to add a business partner, Bradley Kirkland, as a guarantor on the lines of
credit to “improve his [credit] score.”
The district court also did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of
the Bank and against Samadi’s claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The
Reporting Act imposes on entities that furnish information to consumer reporting
agencies duties to review and investigate the accuracy of its information and to
report any errors. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a(f), 1681s-2. Samadi complained that the
Bank had violated the Reporting Act in three ways: (1) denying applications to
5

-- 5 of 6 --

add Kirkland to the lines of credit; (2) reducing one of Samadi’s lines of credit
without notifying him; and (3) reporting and failing to correct information about
Samadi’s two lines of credit. Samadi’s first two complaints failed to state a claim
under the Reporting Act, and Samadi failed to establish that a genuine issue of fact
existed that the Bank had breached any duty when reporting information about
Samadi’s lines of credit. After the Bank learned about a dispute regarding
information it had provided to Experian regarding Samadi’s lines of credit, the
Bank investigated and determined that its information was accurate. Samadi
argues that the Bank should have reported his lines of credit using different
terminology, but the reports were in accordance with the credit agreements that
Samadi signed, which governed the terms and conditions of his lines of credit.
We AFFIRM the summary judgment in favor of the Bank.
6

-- 6 of 6 --