Gregory O'Neil Henerson v. Allen Davis, et al.

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 17, 2012
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 11-13374
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-24482-AJ
GREGORY O’NEIL HENDERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ALLEN DAVIS,
Correctional Probation Supervisor,
ELIZABETH MANGER,
Correctional Probation Supervisor,
KIMBERLY MAY,
Correctional Probation Supervisor,
LATRENDA SMALL,
Parole Examiner,
Defendants-Appellees.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(April 17, 2012)

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Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Gregory O’Neil Henderson appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42
U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). He contends the district court improperly dismissed his amended
complaint pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because the
district court misconstrued it as an attack upon the revocation of his Florida state
conditional release. After review, we affirm the district court.1
A state prisoner may not bring a damages claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, wherein success would logically contradict the underlying reason for his
incarceration. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. “Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages
in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it
would, the complaint must be dismissed . . . .” Id.
Henderson’s success in his civil rights action alleging the defendants
conspired to commit perjury and violate his rights under the Fifth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment would logically contradict the revocation of his
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to 281
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1489-90 (11th Cir. 1997).
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conditional release. Furthermore, his requests for monetary damages were directly
attributable to the revocation of his conditional release and re-incarceration, and
therefore barred by Heck. Accordingly, Heck bars these claims, and the district
court did not err in dismissing them pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
However, Henderson’s success on his Fourth Amendment claim, that the
search and seizure at his residence by parole officers was unconstitutional, would
not necessarily contradict the revocation of his conditional release. While the
information gathered during the search served as the basis for the revocation of his
conditional release, that evidence was admissible at the revocation hearing
regardless of the constitutionality of the search due to the inapplicability of the
exclusionary rule to conditional release revocation hearings. See Pa. Bd. of Prob.
& Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 (1998) (explaining while courts generally
exclude material gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary
rule does not apply in state parole revocation hearings to exclude evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment). Regardless, the district court did
not err in dismissing his Fourth Amendment claim because it was untimely
submitted more than four years after the date upon which it accrued. See Fla.2
We may affirm a district court’s decision on any ground supported by the record.2
Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1088 n.21 (11th Cir. 2007).
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Stat. § 95.11(3)(p); Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1188 (11th Cir.
1999) (stating § 1983 actions commenced in Florida are governed by the four-year
residual state statute of limitations).
Thus, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Henderson’s civil action.
AFFIRMED.
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