Wilfredo Frederick Daria v. U.S. Attorney General

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUGUST 12, 2011
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 10-14963
Non-Argument Calendar
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Agency No. A034-714-953
WILFREDO FREDERICK DARIA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
________________________
(August 12, 2011)
Before EDMONDSON, WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Wilfredo Frederick Daria petitions this Court for review of his removal
proceedings. Specifically, he claims that the U.S. Attorney General violated his

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procedural due process rights by waiting until 2008 to commence removal
proceedings based on an aggravated felony conviction—sexual battery—in 1991.1
“The procedural component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
protects against the deprivation of life, liberty, or property without the ‘due
process of law.’ The necessary first step in evaluating any procedural due-process
claim is determining whether a constitutionally protected interest has been
implicated.” Tefel v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1286, 1299 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal citation
omitted).
Here, Daria does not articulate the constitutionally protected interest at
stake. He does not demonstrate that either “property” or “liberty” are implicated
by the Attorney General’s decision to commence removal proceedings in 2008.
Instead, he argues that the Attorney General’s decision violated general precepts
of fairness. But that claim does not warrant relief under the Due Process Clause in
this case. See, e.g., Dandan v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 567, 575 (7th Cir. 2003)
(“[T]he decision when to commence deportation proceedings is within the
The notice to appear issued by the Department of Homeland security also stated Daria1
was removeable because (1) he committed two crimes of moral turpitude—the 1991 conviction
for sexual battery and a 2007 conviction for unemployment compensation fraud; and (2) he
committed aggravated-felony burglary in 2000. The Florida courts vacated the burglary
conviction in 2008, and Daria entered into a new guilty plea, which resulted in a sentence of less
than one year of imprisonment. Accordingly, it was no longer an independent ground for
removal. Ultimately, the Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration Appeals denied relief
based on the sexual battery conviction.
2

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discretion of the Attorney General and does not, therefore, involve a protected
property or liberty interest.”). Accordingly, we deny his petition for review.
PETITION DENIED.
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