Mersch v. City of Coral Springs

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUG 30, 2011
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 10-14927
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D.C. Docket No. 0:10-cv-60359-KMM
CHARLES MERSCH,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
CITY OF CORAL SPRINGS,
a Florida municipality,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee,
CORAL SPRINGS POLICE DEPARTMENT,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllDefendant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(August 30, 2011)
Before TJOFLAT and MARTIN, Circuit Judges, and DAWSON, District Judge.*
Honorable Robert T. Dawson, United States District Judge for the Western District of*
Arkansas, sitting by designation.

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PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant, Charles Mersch, appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the defendant-appellee, the City of Coral Springs.
Our review is de novo. Dees v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 168 F.3d 417
(11th Cir. 1999); Jones v. LMR Intern., Inc., 457 F.3d 1174. 1177 (11th Cir.
2006).
Mersch brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Coral
Springs violated his federal and state constitutional rights, as well as certain state
statutory rights, in the manner in which it arrested him and then investigated his
conduct following an alleged domestic altercation between Mersch and his ex-
wife. Because he brings suit against the city, he must demonstrate not only that
his rights were violated, but also that they were violated pursuant to a policy or
custom of the city. See McMillan v. Monroe Cnty., 520 U.S. 781, 785, 117 S. Ct.
1734, 1736 (1997). The district court concluded that Mersch could not make this
showing, and that his state claims did not entitled him to relief, and as a result
granted summary judgment in favor of the city. We now affirm.
Mersch’s federal and state constitutional claims fail because he does not
identify any constitutional violations for which he is entitled to relief. Mersch’s
former wife gave a sworn statement implicating Mersch, which gave the police
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ample probable cause to effect an arrest and open an internal investigation into the
altercation. Moreover, although the first internal investigation into Mersch’s
conduct was tainted by improper conduct, as the district court explained, “[t]hat
investigation was terminated[,] . . . [a] new investigation was initiated, and Mersch
does not bring claims for any violations of constitutional rights that occurred as a
result of [that second] investigation.” Quite simply, therefore, his accusations
“leave[] no room for the conclusion . . . that the City of Coral Springs has a custom
or policy of permitting high ranking officials in the [Coral Springs Police
Department] to utilize internal investigations in an abusive manner that violates
the constitutional rights of its officers.” His state constitutional claims fail for the
same reason—he has failed to tie any misconduct in the first investigation to the
second investigation, for which all discipline stemmed.
Mersch also seeks equitable relief for violations of certain Florida statutes,
but we find this argument to be moot. Generally, “[a] case is moot when the
challenged conduct ceases such that there is no reasonable expectation that the
wrong will be repeated in circumstances where it becomes impossible for the court
to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” City of Erie v.
Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287, 120 S. Ct. 1382, 1390 (2000) (quotation marks
omitted). Here, Mersch avers that the improper conduct that tainted the first
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internal investigation is likely to cause him future harm when that investigation is
released to the public. But the record reveals that Mersch successfully obtained
injunctive relief that removed the tainted investigation from the public record, and
we can find no evidence suggesting that Coral Springs failed to comply with that
mandate. Therefore, as the district court concluded, “there is no live controversy
with respect to which this Court can provide meaningful relief.”
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the City of Coral Springs.
AFFIRMED.
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