Carla Mize v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 3, 2011
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 10-12053
Non-Argument Calendar
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D. C. Docket No. 2:08-cv-02071-KOB
CARLA MIZE,
on behalf of D.I.M.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(June 3, 2011)
Before EDMONDSON, MARTIN and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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Carla Mize appeals the district court’s order affirming the Commissioner’s
denial of her claim, filed on behalf of her minor son, D.I.M., for Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”) benefits. Mize argues that the Administrative Law
Judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of benefits was not supported by substantial evidence.
After thorough review, we affirm.
I.
We review de novo a district court’s judgment reviewing a decision of the
Commission of Social Security. Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d
1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007). In such cases, we review the agency’s decision to
determine if it is supported by substantial evidence. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d
1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla,” but
less than a preponderance: it “is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person
would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted). “We
may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment
for that of the [Commissioner].” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8
(11th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). We must,
however, conduct an “exacting examination of the [Commissioner’s] conclusions
of law.” Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990).
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II.
Mize first argues that the ALJ erred by discrediting her opinion and the
opinions of her son’s teachers and treating physicians in concluding that her son
did not suffer from a disability. “Absent good cause, an ALJ is to give the medical
opinions of treating physicians substantial or considerable weight.” Winschel v.
Comm’r Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks
omitted). “[T]he ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to different
medical opinions and the reasons therefor.” Id.
The ALJ properly gave considerable weight to the opinions of D.I.M.’s
treating physicians when determining whether D.I.M. was disabled. According to
the ALJ, he accorded the treating physicians’ opinions “controlling” weight. The
ALJ noted that D.I.M.’s pediatrician reported that D.I.M.’s asthma was controlled
relatively well with medication, he had no restriction on his physical activities,
and that he had a good prognosis. The ALJ acknowledged that D.I.M.’s other
treating physician, Dr. Grad, reported that D.I.M. was “doing great” on his
medications. Moreover, the ALJ observed that recent medical records indicated
that D.I.M’s asthma and sleep apnea were “well controlled.” We therefore
conclude that the ALJ properly accorded substantial or considerable weight to the
opinions of D.I.M.’s treating physicians. See Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179.
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The ALJ also considered the opinions of Mize and D.I.M.’s school teachers
in concluding that D.I.M.’s impairments did not constitute a disability. The
reports from D.I.M.’s teachers revealed that he had “some slight problems at
school secondary to his impairments, but none that have significantly curtailed
him in regular classroom placement.” Similarly, while Mize testified that she had
taken D.I.M. to the emergency room on several occasions, the treatment D.I.M.
received and the number of hospital visits did not rise to the severity level required
by the regulations. See Listing 103.03(B) (providing that the child must suffer
asthma attacks requiring physician intervention at least once every two months or
at least six times a year). We therefore conclude that Mize’s argument that the
ALJ ignored her opinion and those of D.I.M.’s teachers lacks merit.
III.
Mize next argues that the ALJ erred in finding that D.I.M.’s impairments
did not constitute a disability. An ALJ must conduct a three-part sequential
analysis to determine whether a child is entitled to disability benefits. See 20
C.F.R. § 416.924(a). The ALJ first must determine whether the child is engaged
in substantial gainful activity. See id. If the child is engaged in such activity, then
he is neither disabled nor eligible for benefits. If the child is not engaged in
substantial gainful activity, the ALJ next determines whether the child has an
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impairment or combination of impairments that is severe. Id. If the child does not
suffer from a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the child is
ineligible for benefits. But if the child has a severe impairment, the ALJ finally
determines whether the child’s impairment meets, or is medically or functionally
equal to, an impairment included in the listing of impairments. Id. If the child’s
impairment is a “slight abnormality or combination of slight abnormalities that
causes no more than minimal functional limitations” the child is ineligible for
benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(c).
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Mize’s minor child did
not suffer from an impairment or combination of impairments that met, medically
equaled, or functionally equaled any of the listed impairments. To qualify for SSI
benefits for asthma, the child must experience asthma attacks, “in spite of
prescribed treatment and requiring physician intervention, occurring at least once
every 2 months or at least six times a year” over a consecutive twelve-month
period. See Listing 103.03(B). During the relevant twelve-month period, D.I.M.
had only four non-routine visits to a doctor as a result of his asthma. Substantial
evidence also supports the ALJ’s finding that D.I.M.’s impairments did not
functionally equal any of the listings. One of D.I.M.’s treating physicians
indicated that D.I.M.’s asthma may restrict his physical activities, but he noted that
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such restrictions would only occur when D.I.M. experienced an exacerbation of
his usual symptoms. In light of D.I.M.’s medical record and the opinions of his
treating physicians, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
denial of D.I.M.’s claim.
IV.
Mize finally argues that the ALJ erred by failing to fully develop the record
by seeking further medical review. “The administrative law judge has a duty to
develop the record where appropriate but is not required to order a consultative
examination as long as the record contains sufficient evidence for the
administrative law judge to make an informed decision.” Ingram, 496 F.3d at
1269. Here, the record before the ALJ was sufficient such that the ALJ had no
duty to develop it further. The administrative record included opinions from
D.I.M.’s treating physicians as well as D.I.M’s medical records. It also included
anecdotal evidence from D.I.M.’s teachers. We conclude that the ALJ did not err
in finding that the record was sufficient to make an informed decision about
D.I.M.’s impairments.
For all these reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court
affirming the ALJ’s denial of SSI benefits.
AFFIRMED.
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