Karyn D. Stanley v. City of Sanford, Florida

[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10002
____________________
KARYN D. STANLEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF SANFORD, FLORIDA,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 6:20-cv-00629-WWB-GJK
____________________
Before WILSON, G RANT, and B RASHER , Circuit Judges.
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10002
B RASHER , Circuit Judge:
Can a former employee sue under Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act for discrimination in post-employment distri-
bution of fringe benefits? We answered “no” in Gonzales v. Garner
Food Services, Inc., 89 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1996). Gonzales put us at
odds with the Second and Third Circuits but in league with the
Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. In this appeal, we must decide
whether Gonzales is still good law after (1) the Supreme Court’s de-
cision about Title VII retaliation in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S.
337 (1997), and (2) Congress’s changes to the text of the ADA.
We believe Gonzales is still good law. We thus reaffirm that
a Title I plaintiff must “hold[] or desire[]” an employment position
with the defendant at the time of the defendant’s allegedly wrong-
ful act. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Because plaintiff Karyn Stanley is suing
over the termination of retirement benefits when she neither held
nor desired to hold an employment position with her former em-
ployer, the City of Sanford, Gonzales bars her claim. We therefore
affirm the district court.
I.
Karyn Stanley became a firefighter for the City of Sanford,
Florida, in 1999. She served the City in that capacity for about fif-
teen years until she was diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease in 2016.
Although she managed to continue working as a firefighter for
about two more years, her disease and accompanying physical dis-
abilities eventually left her incapable of performing her job. So, at
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22-10002 Opinion of the Court 3
the age of 47, Stanley took disability retirement on November 1,
2018.
When Stanley retired, she continued to receive free health
insurance through the City. Under a policy in effect when Stanley
first joined the fire department, employees retiring for qualifying
disability reasons, such as Stanley’s Parkinson’s disease, received
free health insurance until the age of 65. But, unbeknownst to Stan-
ley, the City changed its benefits plan in 2003. Under the new plan,
disability retirees such as Stanley are entitled to the health insur-
ance subsidy for only twenty-four months after retiring. Stanley
was thus set to become responsible for her own health insurance
premiums beginning on December 1, 2020. She filed this suit in
April 2020, seeking to establish her entitlement to the long-term
healthcare subsidy.
Stanley believes the City’s decision to trim the health insur-
ance subsidy was discriminatory against her as a disabled retiree.
Her complaint alleged violations of Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Florida Civil Rights
Act. She also asserted that, by changing the benefits plan, the City
unconstitutionally discriminated against her in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally,
she brought a claim under Florida Statutes section 112.0801, which
authorizes municipalities to offer employees health insurance.
The district court entered judgment for the City. On a mo-
tion to dismiss, the district court concluded that Stanley’s claims
under the ADA, the Rehab Act, and the Florida Civil Rights Act
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10002
were insufficiently pleaded. Relying on our decision in Gonzales,
the district court reasoned that Stanley could not state a plausible
disability discrimination claim because the discriminatory act al-
leged—the cessation of the health insurance premium payments—
would occur while Stanley was no longer employed by the City.
The district court later granted summary judgment to the City on
Stanley’s claims under the Equal Protection Clause and Florida
Statutes section 112.0801(1). It reasoned that the City’s decision sat-
isfied rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause and
that nothing in the Florida statute prevented the amendment to the
benefits plan.
Stanley timely appealed.
II.
We review a dismissal for failure to state a claim for which
relief may be granted de novo. United States ex rel. Osheroff v. Hu-
mana, Inc., 776 F.3d 805, 809 (11th Cir. 2015). We ask whether the
complaint alleges “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). Likewise, we review a grant of summary judg-
ment de novo. Sunbeam Television Corp. v. Nielsen Media Rsch., Inc.,
711 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is proper
if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute about any ma-
terial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Id. We view the summary judgment record in the light most
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22-10002 Opinion of the Court 5
favorable to the non-moving party, and we draw all reasonable in-
ferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id.
III.
A.
We begin with Stanley’s claims under Title I of the ADA, the
Rehab Act, and the Florida Civil Rights Act. The parties agree that
our disposition of Stanley’s Title I claim will control all three stat-
utory disability discrimination claims. See Boyle v. City of Pell City,
866 F.3d 1280, 1288 (11th Cir. 2017); D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.,
422 F.3d 1220, 1224 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, our analysis
of Title I and the viability of Stanley’s claim under it applies with
equal force to her claims under the Rehab Act and the Florida Civil
Rights Act.
The dispute between the parties turns on the definition sec-
tion of the ADA. Title I of the ADA, as originally enacted, made it
unlawful to “discriminate against a qualified individual with a disa-
bility because of the disability of such individual in regard to . . .
employee compensation, . . . and other terms, conditions, and priv-
ileges of employment.” Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
Pub. L. 101-336, § 102(a), 104 Stat. 331–32 (1990). The statute de-
fined a “qualified individual with a disability” as someone “who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the es-
sential functions of the employment position that such individual
holds or desires.” Id. § 101(8), 104 Stat. 331 (emphasis added).
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-10002
We held in Gonzales that a former employee who does not
hold or desire to hold an employment position cannot sue over dis-
criminatory post-employment benefits. 89 F.3d 1523, 1531. We rec-
ognized that the ADA protects against discrimination in fringe ben-
efits, such as health insurance, because these benefits have always
been recognized as one example of a term, condition, or privilege
of employment. See Pub. L. 101-336, § 102(b)(2), 104 Stat. 331; Gon-
zales, 89 F.3d at 1526 & n.9. But because the ADA prohibits discrim-
ination only as to those individuals who hold or desire to hold a
job, we reasoned that a former employee cannot bring suit under
Title I to remedy discrimination in the provision of post-employ-
ment fringe benefits. Under the “prior-panel-precedent rule,” we
are required “to follow the precedent of the first panel to address
the relevant issue, unless and until the first panel’s holding is over-
ruled by the Court sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court.” Scott
v. United States, 890 F.3d 1239, 1257 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). And any later en banc or Supreme
Court decisions must “actually abrogate or directly conflict with,
as opposed to merely weaken, the holding of the prior panel.”
United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246, 1255 (11th Cir. 2005).
Stanley argues that her claim is not barred by Gonzales for
three reasons. First, she points to a Supreme Court case handed
down shortly after Gonzales, which she says calls into question our
reasoning in Gonzales. Second, she points to statutory changes in
the text of the ADA, which she says undermine the result in Gon-
zales. Third, she argues that Gonzales is distinguishable. We will
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22-10002 Opinion of the Court 7
start by unpacking our reasoning in Gonzales, and then address each
argument in turn.
1.
Gonzales was the first time we considered a former em-
ployee’s ability to sue under Title I. Timothy Bourgeois, who suf-
fered from AIDS, was fired from his job but kept receiving health
insurance through his former employer. Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1524.
About six months after the termination, Bourgeois’s former em-
ployer amended its health insurance plan by capping AIDS-related
coverage. Id. In the time between that amendment and Bourgeois’s
death, he incurred significant treatment costs for which he was de-
nied coverage. Id. at 1525. August Gonzales, the administrator of
Bourgeois’s estate, sued under Title I, alleging that the insurance
plan amendment was unlawful disability discrimination. Id. at
1524.
Relying on “the plain language of the ADA,” we held that
Bourgeois (and thus his estate) had no viable Title I claim “because
he neither held nor desired to hold a position with [his former em-
ployer] at or subsequent to the time the alleged discriminatory con-
duct was committed.” Id. at 1526. That conclusion followed from
the text of Title I’s anti-discrimination provision. It expressly ap-
plied only to “qualified individual[s] with a disability” who “hold[]”
or “desire[]” an “employment position.” Pub. L. 101-336, § 101(8),
104 Stat. 331. We also relied on Title I’s listed examples of discrim-
ination, which mentioned only “qualified individual[s] with a disa-
bility,” “applicant[s],” and “employee[s]” as possible victims of
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-10002
disability discrimination. Id. § 102(b)(1), 104 Stat. 332; see Gonzales,
89 F.3d at 1526–27 & nn. 10–11. We explained that each of these
terms had an inherent temporal qualification: a qualified individual
with a disability held or desired to hold a job when the discrimina-
tion occurred; an employee was “an individual employed by an em-
ployer” when the discrimination occurred; and an applicant, alt-
hough not defined by Title I, was necessarily someone who had
applied for a job when the discrimination occurred. Gonzales, 89
F.3d at 1526–27 (citation omitted).
In interpreting the ADA in Gonzales, we recognized that
other employment discrimination statutes, such as Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, have been construed to protect former
employees. See id. at 1527–29. We noted, however, that the prece-
dents adopting that interpretation arose in the context of retalia-
tion, not discrimination. See id. We found that distinction im-
portant. As we had previously held, such a construction was “nec-
essary to provide meaning to anti-retaliation statutory provisions
and effectuate congressional intent.” Id. at 1529 (citing Bailey v. USX
Corp., 850 F.2d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir. 1998)). That is, by prohibiting
retaliation, a statute necessarily contemplated that it would apply
to individuals who accused a former employer of unlawful behav-
ior. See id. at 1529 n.14 (“[W]e note that many retaliation claims are
filed by former employees alleging, for example, post-employment
blacklisting.”). So we endorsed a broad interpretation of anti-retal-
iation provisions to avoid excluding an especially vulnerable class
of people from the statute’s protection and thus undermining Con-
gress’s remedial scheme.
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22-10002 Opinion of the Court 9
We explicitly declined to extend this reasoning to Title I dis-
crimination claims in Gonzales. Title I’s “qualified individual” defi-
nition, we said, was dispositive evidence that “Congress intended
to limit the protection of Title I to either employees performing, or
job applicants who apply and can perform, the essential functions
of available jobs which their employers maintain.” Id. at 1527. We
concluded that the plain language of Title I’s anti-discrimination
provision did not “frustrate the statute’s central purpose”—i.e.,
protecting disabled people who can nevertheless perform the es-
sential functions of a job—the way that a “literal interpretation” of
other statutes’ anti-retaliation provisions may have threatened to
do. Id. at 1528–29. Instead, to construe Title I to apply to former
employees would “essentially render[] the [qualified individual] re-
quirement . . . meaningless.” Id. at 1529.
Thus, after Gonzales, the rule in this circuit was settled. To
fall within Title I’s anti-discrimination provision, a plaintiff’s claim
must depend on an act committed by the defendant while the
plaintiff was either working for the defendant or seeking to work
for the defendant. The result was that a former employee could not
sue for alleged discrimination in post-employment fringe benefits.
That settled rule was briefly disturbed five years later when
a panel of this Court declared Gonzales overruled by intervening
Supreme Court precedent. See Johnson v. K Mart Corp., 273 F.3d 1035
(11th Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court, in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,
519 U.S. 337 (1997), held that an individual could sue his or her for-
mer employer under Title VII for a post-employment retaliatory
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-10002
act. The Johnson majority considered Robinson to be a decision of
such magnitude that it “mandate[d] the conclusion that Gonzales is
no longer good law and must be deemed overruled.” Johnson, 273
F.3d at 1037. The Johnson majority then held that Title I prohibits
discriminatory acts against current and former employees alike. See
id.
But Johnson’s precedential life was short-lived. The opinion
was vacated when this Court voted to rehear the case en banc. Id.
at 1070. K Mart later filed for bankruptcy, the parties settled, and
the appeal was dismissed. See Johnson v. K Mart Corp., 281 F.3d 1368
(11th Cir. 2002) (en banc). Because of the bankruptcy and settle-
ment, we never issued an en banc opinion in Johnson. But the result
of our en banc vacatur is that Gonzales regained its status as this
Court’s governing precedent on Title I’s qualified individual re-
quirement.
2.
We now turn to Stanley’s arguments. The centerpiece of
Stanley’s appeal is her request that we resurrect Johnson, ignore
Gonzales, and hold that, after Robinson, former employees can sue
under Title I for post-employment discrimination. But Stanley
greatly overstates Robinson’s impact. “For a Supreme Court deci-
sion to undermine panel precedent to the point of abrogation, the
decision must be clearly on point and clearly contrary to the panel
precedent.” Edwards v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 56 F.4th 951, 965 (11th Cir.
2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted). This can happen
“where the Supreme Court has clearly set forth a new standard to
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22-10002 Opinion of the Court 11
evaluate” a claim or issue. United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347,
1352 (11th Cir. 2008). But Robinson did nothing of the sort.
The Supreme Court’s holding in Robinson—a Title VII retal-
iation case—did not even upend our Title VII precedents, much
less our Title I caselaw. Long before Robinson, we had held that Ti-
tle VII’s anti-retaliation provision allowed claims for post-employ-
ment retaliation. See Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1528–29. Robinson adopted
the same rule. But, in Gonzales, we distinguished Title I discrimina-
tion claims from our Title VII precedents based on the different
text of the ADA. Id. Because Robinson’s interpretation of Title VII
did not change our Title VII caselaw, it is hard to say it overruled
our Title I caselaw. Judge Carnes said it best in his Johnson dissent:
“It is a bit audacious . . . to say that a Supreme Court decision whose
holding was anticipated, acknowledged, and considered by a prior
panel when deciding a different issue has undermined that prior
panel’s decision on the different issue to such an extent that it may
be disregarded.” Johnson, 273 F.3d at 1068 (Carnes, J., dissenting).
Like its holding, Robinson’s reasoning also does little to un-
dermine Gonzales. Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision at issue in
Robinson applies to “employees.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Neither
the statutory definition of “employees” nor the anti-retaliation pro-
vision’s specific use of that term provides any “temporal qualifier.”
Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341–42. Looking to the rest of Title VII, the
Robinson Court found that Title VII regularly “use[s] the term ‘em-
ployees’ to mean something more inclusive or different than ‘cur-
rent employees.’” Id. at 342. For example, reinstatement is a Title
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12 Opinion of the Court 22-10002
VII remedy. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g)(1), 2000e-16(b)).
Because “one does not ‘reinstate’ current employees,” the Robinson
Court reasoned that Title VII’s remedial provisions’ use of “em-
ployees” “necessarily refers to former employees.” Id. (brackets
omitted). The term “employees” in Title VII’s anti-retaliation pro-
vision was, therefore, ambiguous because it could be “consistent
with either current or past employment.” Id.
Title I’s anti-discrimination provision is not afflicted with
any such ambiguity. There is a clear temporal qualifier in Title I:
Only someone “who, with or without reasonable accommodation,
can perform the essential functions of the employment position
that such individual holds or desires” is protected from disability dis-
crimination. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8) (emphases added), 12112(a); see
also Slomcenski v. Citibank, N.A., 432 F.3d 1271, 1280–81 (11th Cir.
2005). “Can,” “holds,” and “desires” are in the present tense. So, to
be a victim of unlawful disability discrimination, the plaintiff must
desire or already have a job with the defendant at the time the de-
fendant commits the discriminatory act. See McKnight v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 550 F.3d 519, 520 (6th Cir. 2008); Weyer v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000). And unlike Title
VII’s varied use of “employees,” Title I consistently uses the term
“qualified individual” to refer to active employees or current appli-
cants. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a)–(b), 12114.
We acknowledge that the circuits are split. Our reading of
Robinson aligns us with the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. Each
of those courts has held that (1) Robinson does not implicate Title
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22-10002 Opinion of the Court 13
I’s anti-discrimination provision and (2) Title I does not protect
people who neither held nor desired a job with the defendant at the
time of discrimination. See McKnight, 550 F.3d at 522–28; Morgan v.
Joint Admin. Bd., 268 F.3d 456, 457–59 (7th Cir. 2001); Weyer, 198
F.3d at 1108–13. The Second and Third Circuits have held that Title
I’s anti-discrimination provision is ambiguous, however, and have
resolved that purported ambiguity in favor of former employees.
See Castellano v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58, 66–69 (2d Cir. 1998);
Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 604–08 (3d Cir. 1998).
We are not convinced by Stanley’s argument that we should
follow the Second and Third Circuits. The question we are answer-
ing here is whether Robinson is so compelling that it justifies ignor-
ing a prior precedent. But neither the Second nor Third Circuit an-
swered that question. Moreover, a review of those courts’ deci-
sions convinces us that we are on the right side of the split. Neither
court established that the text of Title I’s anti-discrimination provi-
sion is ambiguous. Instead, the Second and the Third Circuit ex-
pressed something between discomfort and disagreement with the
policy choice underlying the line, drawn by the text of the ADA,
between disabled individuals who hold or desire to hold a job and
those who do not. See Castellano, 142 F.3d at 67–68; Ford, 145 F.3d
at 605–06. But not “even the most formidable policy arguments”
empower a court to ignore unambiguous text. BP P.L.C. v. Mayor
& City Council of Baltimore, 141 S. Ct. 1532, 1542 (2021) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). Nothing in Robinson, Castellano, or
Ford gives us a basis to ignore Gonzales.
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14 Opinion of the Court 22-10002
3.
We are also confident that Gonzales survived Congress’s
amendments to the ADA. Stanley points to two pieces of post-Gon-
zales legislation—the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-
325, 122 Stat. 3553, and the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,
Pub. L. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5—and argues that because both acts
amended the ADA’s text, we are free to, and should, depart from
Gonzales’s interpretation of the original text of the ADA. It is of
course true that when Congress amends a statute, we need not fol-
low decisions interpreting discarded statutory language. But we
consider a prior precedent overruled by subsequent legislation only
if the congressional amendment represents “a clear change in the
law.” Sassy Doll Creations, Inc. v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 331 F.3d
834, 840 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Neither the ADAAA
nor the Fair Pay Act fits that bill.
Turning first to the ADAAA, we cannot say that the ADAAA
upset Gonzales’s interpretation of Title I’s qualified individual defi-
nition. The ADAAA altered Title I’s anti-discrimination provision.
Where Title I originally said that employers could not “discrimi-
nate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the dis-
ability of such individual,” Pub. L. 101-336, § 102(a), 104 Stat. 331
(emphasis added), it now prohibits discrimination “against a quali-
fied individual on the basis of disability,” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (em-
phasis added). But the definition of “qualified individual”—some-
one who, “with or without reasonable accommodation” is able “to
perform the essential functions of the employment position that
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22-10002 Opinion of the Court 15
such individual holds or desires”—was materially unchanged by
the ADAAA and remains in effect today. Compare Pub. L. 101-336,
§ 101(8), 104 Stat. 331 with 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); see Pub. L. 110-325,
§ 5(c), 122 Stat. 3557 (striking “with a disability” but otherwise leav-
ing section 12111(8) as originally enacted). So the text upon which
we relied in Gonzales is still the operative text in the statute.
Stanley contends that the result in Gonzales undermines
Congress’s purpose in adopting the ADAAA. The purpose of the
ADAAA, says Stanley, was to broaden the scope of Title I. We have
no doubt that is true; Congress said as much when passing the
ADAAA. See Pub. L. 110-325, § 2(a)–(b), 122 Stat. 3553–54. But only
the rare statute pursues its purpose to the exclusion of everything
else. The ADAAA expanded Title I’s protections by expanding the
mental and physical conditions that satisfy the statutory definition
of “disability.” See id. Nobody disputes that Stanley is disabled. The
issue here is whether Stanley was a “qualified individual” at the rel-
evant point in time. And the substance of the qualified individual
standard, including the temporal qualifications, was unaffected by
the ADAAA. See Adair v. City of Muskogee, 823 F.3d 1297, 1306–07
(10th Cir. 2016); Neely v. PSEG Tex., Ltd. P’ship, 735 F.3d 242, 245–
47 (5th Cir. 2013).
So too for the Fair Pay Act. To be sure, the Fair Pay Act ef-
fected a serious change in employment law. Before the Fair Pay
Act, discriminatory compensation claims generally accrued at only
one point in time: when the discriminatory compensation decision
or practice was made or adopted. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
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16 Opinion of the Court 22-10002
Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618, 621 (2007). That rule posed serious
statute of limitations problems for potential plaintiffs, who may not
have even learned of the discriminatory compensation scheme un-
til well after its initial adoption. See id. at 649–50 (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting). The Fair Pay Act reflects Congress’s decision to relax the
statute of limitations. Pub. L. 111-2. § 2(1)–(2), 123 Stat. 5. Now, a
claim for discriminatory compensation accrues “when a discrimi-
natory compensation decision or other practice is adopted, when
an individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation
decision or other practice, or when an individual is affected by ap-
plication of a discriminatory compensation decision or other prac-
tice . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A); see id. § 12117(a); Pub. L.
111-2, § 5(a), 123 Stat. 6 (stating that the Fair Pay Act “shall apply
to claims of discrimination brought under title I”).
The Fair Pay Act made it easier to sue after discrimination—
as defined by Title I—occurred. Cf. AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S.
701, 713–16 (2009); McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 694 F.3d
873, 888 (7th Cir. 2012). But, like the ADAAA, the Fair Pay Act did
not change the statutory language that we relied on in Gonzales.
Both before and after the Fair Pay Act, a Title I discrimination claim
requires a plaintiff to show that he or she was a “qualified individ-
ual” who was subject to discriminatory terms, conditions, or bene-
fits of employment. The Fair Pay Act’s relaxed statute of limitations
helps a plaintiff only if that plaintiff otherwise has a claim for dis-
crimination. Because nothing in the Fair Pay Act changes Title I’s
substantive requirements, Gonzales is still binding precedent with
respect to a former employee’s ability to sue under Title I.
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22-10002 Opinion of the Court 17
4.
Because we hold that Gonzales is still good law, we must ask
whether Stanley was a disabled employee or job applicant capable
of performing the job at the time of the alleged discrimination.
There are three points in time in which Stanley can theoretically
root her Title I claim: (1) in October 2003, when the City amended
the benefits plan; (2) whenever she first became subject to the al-
legedly discriminatory provisions of the benefits plan as a disabled
employee; or (3) in December 2020, when she was affected by the
termination of the health insurance premium payments.
Neither option 1 nor option 3 works for Stanley. Although
she was employed by the City in October 2003, she concedes, and
we agree, that her claim cannot turn on the 2003 amendment to
the benefits plan because she was not yet disabled at that time. Alt-
hough she was disabled at the time of the December 2020 termina-
tion of the health insurance premium payments, that option
doesn’t work because, by that time, Stanley’s relationship with the
City was as retiree, not employee. She did not hold or desire to
hold, nor was she qualified to hold, an “employment position” with
the City, as required by Title I’s anti-discrimination provision and
Gonzales.
In response to this reasoning, Stanley makes an argument
similar to one advanced by the estate administrator in Gonzales. She
argues that she was a “qualified individual” in December 2020 and
remains so today because the “‘employment position’ that [she]
now holds is that of a retired employee . . . .” But we rejected that
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18 Opinion of the Court 22-10002
argument in Gonzales, refusing to recognize “post-employment
benefits recipient” as a job. 89 F.3d at 1530. In light of Gonzales, we
must reject Stanley’s identical argument today.
The final option is that Stanley suffered discrimination as a
disabled employee at some unknown point before she retired but
after she was diagnosed with Parkinson’s. Stanley argued at oral ar-
gument that, while working for the City in the two years after her
Parkinson’s diagnosis, the writing was on the wall that she would
need to take disability retirement. So, the argument goes, the alleg-
edly discriminatory benefits plan became a finalized term of her
employment whenever disability retirement became a foregone
conclusion. The upshot is that a completed claim of disability dis-
crimination may have accrued while Stanley was a qualified indi-
vidual performing her duties as a firefighter.
This argument, if successful, would distinguish Stanley’s
case from Gonzales, where the alleged discrimination occurred en-
tirely after the employment relationship had already terminated.
But it would not distinguish this case from decisions of the Sixth
and Ninth Circuits. Those circuits have held that a Title I plaintiff
must be a qualified individual, not only at the time of discrimina-
tion, but also when the plaintiff files suit. See McKnight, 550 F.3d at
528; Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1108–09. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits are
on our side of the split. So, even though Stanley’s argument is not
foreclosed by our holding in Gonzales, there is some tension be-
tween this argument and our reasoning in Gonzales.
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22-10002 Opinion of the Court 19
We need not resolve this tension today because Stanley
waited too long to make this argument. In the district court, Stan-
ley’s sole argument in support of her qualified individual status was
that the Johnson majority was correct, so the district court should
ignore Gonzales. But Stanley did not try to distinguish her case from
Gonzales, essentially conceding that she loses if Gonzales applies.
Then, in her initial brief on appeal, Stanley affirmatively conceded
that “[i]n this action, Ms. Stanley does not claim she was impacted
by the discriminatory 24-month rule during her employment.” The
first time this argument appeared was in the United States’ brief as
amicus curiae in this Court. We will not consider arguments raised
only by amici. Richardson v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 935 F.2d 1240,
1247 (11th Cir. 1991). That rule is particularly appropriate where,
as here, a party did not make an argument to the district court and
specifically disclaimed the argument in its own brief.
Because Stanley cannot establish that the City committed
any discriminatory acts against her while she could perform the es-
sential functions of a job that she held or desired to hold, her Title
I claim fails. For the same reason, so do her claims under the Rehab
Act and the Florida Civil Rights Act.
B.
Finally, we turn to Stanley’s claims under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause and Florida Statutes section 112.0801. The district court
concluded that the City was entitled to summary judgment on
both claims. We agree.
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20 Opinion of the Court 22-10002
The City’s benefits plan does not run afoul of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. Disabled persons are not a suspect class, and gov-
ernment-paid health insurance is not a recognized fundamental
right, so we scrutinize the City’s benefits plan under the lenient
standard of rational basis review. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Liv-
ing Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445–46 (1985); Morrissey v. United States, 871
F.3d 1260, 1268 (11th Cir. 2017). We do not grade the wisdom of
the City’s decision. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993). If
“there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could pro-
vide a rational basis for the” City’s decision, it will be upheld. Id.
(citation omitted). The City’s benefits plan advances the legitimate
governmental purpose of conserving funds. And its chosen
method—decreasing the number of employees for whom the City
subsidizes health insurance—is rationally related to that legitimate
purpose. So there is no equal protection problem here.
Neither does the City’s benefits plan violate Florida Statutes
section 112.0801. The statute requires that a “municipality . . . that
provides . . . health . . . insurance . . . for its officers and employees
and their dependents upon a group insurance plan or self-insurance
plan shall allow all [retired] personnel . . . the option of continuing
to participate in the group insurance plan or self-insurance plan.”
Fla. Stat. § 112.0801(1). The health insurance must be offered at the
same “cost applicable to active employees,” but “[f]or retired em-
ployees . . . , the cost of continued participation may be paid by the
employer or by the retired employees.” Id. Stanley receives exactly
what she is owed under the statute: the option to remain on the
City’s health insurance plan. The statute does not require the City
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22-10002 Opinion of the Court 21
to pay Stanley’s health insurance premiums. To the contrary, the
statute grants the City discretion over whether to pay retirees’ pre-
miums. The City cannot violate a statute by exercising the discre-
tion specifically granted by that statute.
IV.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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