USA v. Colum Patrick Moran, Jr.

[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-12573
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
COLUM PATRICK MORAN, JR.,
a.k.a. Emily lover,
a.k.a. emilylover@aol.com,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 3:19-cr-00040-MMH-JBT-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-12573
Before J ORDAN, ROSENBAUM , and NEWSOM , Circuit Judges.
NEWSOM , Circuit Judge:
Colum Moran, a collector of child pornography, com-
mented on several “mom blog” posts asking mothers to display
sexually explicit images of their young daughters. We must decide
whether Moran’s requests constitute criminal attempts to produce
child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e).
Moran contends, in essence, that his requests—posted on
otherwise-wholesome mom-blog sites—were so unlikely to suc-
ceed that they can’t support attempt liability. In particular, he
makes three related arguments. First, he asserts that the unlikeli-
hood of success negates his intent to complete the production
crime. Second, he says that because he couldn’t have known—or
even thought—that his plot would succeed, it can’t be shown that
he “kn[ew] or ha[d] reason to know that such visual depiction
w[ould] be transported or transmitted using any means or facility
of interstate or foreign commerce,” as the production statute re-
quires. Finally, he argues that his verbal requests were too insig-
nificant to constitute the “substantial step” necessary to prove at-
tempt.
We reject all three of Moran’s contentions. First, the sheer
unlikelihood that Moran’s requests to the mom-bloggers would re-
sult in the production of child pornography does not negate his de-
sire—and thus his intent—to produce child pornography, and there
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21-12573 Opinion of the Court 3
is in any event plenty of evidence, even beyond the messages them-
selves, that he intended to do so. Second, contrary to Moran’s sug-
gestion, § 2251(a)’s interstate-nexus element does not require that
a defendant know ex ante that his plot will succeed—only (as rele-
vant here) that
if it succeeds, the forbidden images will travel in
interstate commerce. Finally, Moran’s substantial-step argument,
which he failed to clearly present to the district court, fails under
plain-error review.
I
“Mom blogs” are websites on which mothers—and likely
some fathers—share parenting stories and tips. They are chock-full
of family-oriented and family-friendly content. One illustrative
site, “Your Modern Family,” is authored and maintained by a
mother and retired teacher and includes sections about kids’ activ-
ities, parenting tips, and marriage and home-management advice.1
Posts range from ideas for playing with sidewalk chalk to spring-
cleaning suggestions—the latter sponsored by a soap company—to
tips for the kids’ first day of school.2 The point—Moran’s point—
is that mom-bloggers aren’t likely to post child pornography on
their sites.
1 To be clear, “Your Modern Family” isn’t one of the sites that Moran targeted.
To protect the identities of the children at issue in this case, we won’t identify
the names of those sites here.
2
See https://www.yourmodernfamily.com (last visited Nov. 4, 2022).
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-12573
When Moran left a disturbing comment on one such blog,
authorities launched an investigation. Moran had complimented a
mom-blogger’s young daughter’s swimsuit and graphically de-
scribed how he liked to perform a particular sex act with “pretty”
“little girl[s]” in swimsuits like hers. Unbeknownst to Moran, that
blogger’s husband (and the little girl’s father) was an FBI agent.
The investigation that ensued revealed that Moran, using
the handle “Emily lover” at Emilylover@aol.com, had on three oc-
casions asked other mom-bloggers to post pornographic pictures
of their children. Warning: Moran’s messages are vile. But to
fairly assess one of his main arguments—namely, that the mes-
sages, while harassing, weren’t
really attempts to produce child
pornography—we must analyze his comments in some detail.
Moran’s first request responded to a mother’s blog post
about her five-year-old daughter learning to take photographs.
Moran sent a comment asking the mother to have the girl—whom
we’ll just call “
A”—take pornographic pictures of herself:
She did a great job with these! The next time [
A]
wants to take pictures, you should suggest something
fun. Have [
A] take all her clothes off and take pictures
of herself in the mirror. Especially when she’s sitting
in front of the mirror with her legs spread wide open
so we can see her vagina. Maybe she could try spread-
ing her vagina lips apart with her fingers so she can
get a good picture of her little pink hole. My niece
loves to have her picture taken while she uses the
head of her toothbrush inside her vagina. If [
A] wants
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21-12573 Opinion of the Court 5
to try it, my niece likes to lick the white cream from
the brush when she’s done. [
A] would look so cute
with her tasty girl goo smeared all over her smiling
mouth � � � �
Doc. 128-2.
Not quite a year later, Moran sent a second request to the
same blogger, also about
A. This time, Moran responded to a post
about the now-six-year-old’s morning routine:
Great post! But the pictures I would most like to see
are missing. [T]hose would be the ones of [
A] doing
her “morning stuff”. In particular, some pictures of
her on the toilet would be awesome. I’d like to see
her panties around her ankles, with her legs spread
wide enough to see the pee dribbling from between
her vagina lips. I’d also like a couple of them to show
her beautiful smiling face, and a couple of good
closeups of her vagina � � � �
Doc. 128-4. Moran later suggested that
A’s mother buy her a sex
toy for her 7th birthday—and even provided a link to facilitate the
purchase.
Moran sent his third request to a different blogger, a mother
who had recently advertised flushable baby wipes on Instagram. In
a comment on one of the mother’s blog posts, Moran referenced
the Instagram ad and the mother’s twin three-year-old daughters,
whom we’ll call “
B” and “
C”:
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-12573
I’m really interested in the flushable wipes you were
talking about on IG [Instagram]! Can you please post
some pictures or a video of [
B] and [
C] using them?
I’m curious to see how easily their little fingers can
navigate their crotches with them and how well they
clean the girl’s vaginas. Thanks � � � �
Doc. 128-7.
Federal law-enforcement officers traced the IP address from
which Moran had sent all three messages to his residence. When
officers searched Moran’s apartment, they seized his laptop and cell
phone, which together contained more than 1,000 images of child
pornography—many of toddlers. Forensic computer evidence
demonstrated that Moran had specifically searched for pornogra-
phy involving seven- and eight-year-olds. It also revealed since-de-
leted file folders called “Babies” and “Potty time,” as well as files
with names like “Toilet_Girls” and “8yo school girl.” Separately,
investigators found 24 pairs of children’s underwear in Moran’s
house—even though no children lived there. When officers inter-
viewed Moran during the search, he denied ever posting messages
as “Emily lover.”
The government charged Moran with one count of posses-
sion of child pornography,
see 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2),
and three counts of attempted production of child pornography,
see id. § 2251(a) and (e). The jury convicted Moran on all four
counts, and the judge sentenced Moran to 64 years’ imprisonment.
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21-12573 Opinion of the Court 7
II
Moran now appeals the attempted-production convictions.
In relevant part, the production statute makes it unlawful for any
person to:
employ[], use[], persuade[], induce[], entice[], or co-
erce[] any minor to engage in . . . any sexually explicit
conduct for the purpose of producing any visual de-
piction of such conduct . . . if such person knows or
has reason to know that such visual depiction will be
transported or transmitted using any means or facility
of interstate or foreign commerce.
Id. § 2251(a). Subsection (e) of the same statute provides for the
punishment of “[a]ny individual who . . . attempts . . . to violate”
§ 2251(a). Moran challenges his attempted-production convictions
on three related grounds, which we will consider in turn.3
A
Moran first contends that the government can’t prove a nec-
essary element of its case—namely, that he had “the specific intent
or mens rea to commit the underlying charged crimes.”
United
States v. Yost, 479 F.3d 815, 819 (11th Cir. 2007). Here, therefore,
3 It is undisputed here that a defendant can violate § 2251(a) and (e) even with-
out communicating directly with a minor.
See United States v. Lee, 603 F.3d
904, 913 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that those provisions apply to individuals
who “attempt[] to produce child pornography by communicating with only
an adult intermediary”).
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8 Opinion of the Court 21-12573
the evidence must show that Moran intended, for instance, to “en-
tice[] . . . any minor to engage in . . . any sexually explicit conduct
for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct”
and that he “kn[ew] or ha[d] reason to know that such visual depic-
tion w[ould] be transported or transmitted using any means or fa-
cility of interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a).
Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, Moran says, a jury couldn’t conclude that he actually
wanted—intended—the bloggers to post child pornography.4 He
says so for two related reasons. First, he asserts that specific intent
requires that he “at least think [success] might be plausible,” Br. of
Appellant at 20, and that his efforts to procure child pornography
via comments on mom-blogs were almost surely destined to fail.
Second, he insists that he was obviously just “internet trolling”—
that is, harassing the bloggers for his own entertainment—rather
than actually trying to produce child pornography. We find neither
argument persuasive.
As to the first, Moran is simply mistaken. A defendant’s de-
sire alone—wholly without respect to his likelihood of success—
4 “We review the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal trial de novo. We
must: (1) view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government; (2)
resolve any conflicts in favor of the government; (3) accept all reasonable in-
ferences that tend to support the government’s case; and (4) assume that the
jury made all credibility choices in support of the verdict.”
United States v.
Lebowitz, 676 F.3d 1000, 1013 (11th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
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21-12573 Opinion of the Court 9
can establish his intent. The Supreme Court has been perfectly
clear about this:
[A] person who acts . . . intends a result of his act . . .
under two quite different circumstances: (1) when he
consciously desires that result, whatever the likeli-
hood of that result happening from his conduct; and
(2) when he knows that the result is practically certain
to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may
be as to that result.
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445 (1978) (citing
W. LaFave & A. Scott,
Criminal Law 196 (1972));
accord, e.g.,
Tilton v. Playboy Ent. Grp., 554 F.3d 1371, 1377 (11th Cir. 2009)
(observing that “‘[p]urpose’ refers to the desire that a particular re-
sult will occur”). Using the Supreme Court’s terminology, Moran
could have “consciously desired”—and thus intended—to produce
child pornography, however remote the “likelihood of that result
happening.”
Moran’s internet-troll theory suffers from a similar flaw. On
sufficiency-of-the-evidence review, it isn’t “enough for a defendant
to put forth a reasonable hypothesis of innocence” because the sole
issue is whether a jury “reasonably could have found guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.”
United States v. Lebowitz, 676 F.3d 1000,
1013 (11th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). And because evidence of
one purpose doesn’t exclude another, the government needn’t
prove that Moran “was single-minded in his purpose.”
Id. Moran
could have, for example, desired both outcomes—that his
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10 Opinion of the Court 21-12573
messages would both (1) troll people
and (2) result in the produc-
tion of child pornography.
The fundamental question under the deferential sufficiency-
of-the-evidence standard, then, is whether a jury could reasonably
conclude that Moran consciously desired the bloggers whom he
contacted to post pornographic images. The jury had ample evi-
dence from which it could find that Moran had the requisite intent:
(1) Moran’s messages themselves; (2) his demonstrated sexual in-
terest in children; and (3) his false exculpatory statements.
First, to state the obvious, evidence that Moran asked for
child pornography
is evidence that he desired to obtain—and thus
to produce—child pornography. To be sure, the unlikelihood that
Moran’s mom-blog comments would actually net child pornogra-
phy—and their consistency with a trolling theory—might
weaken
their evidentiary value. But they are most assuredly evidence.
Two characteristics mark Moran’s messages, in particular, as pro-
bative. For one, the sorts of pornographic images that they re-
quested matched Moran’s particular preferences. Two requests
were for images of children on the toilet, and Moran’s stash in-
cluded a deleted folder called “Potty time” and files named “Toi-
let_Girls.” And Moran’s collection of children’s underwear in-
cluded some for kids the same age as the targeted bloggers’—be-
tween three and six years old. For another, Moran used what
might be viewed as persuasive tactics in his messages to increase
their likelihood of success: In one, he bragged that his “niece loves
to have her picture taken” in a particular way, implying that the
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21-12573 Opinion of the Court 11
blogger’s children would as well; in another, he emphasized that
the blogger’s children would be “smiling”; and in yet another, he
suggested that a blogger buy her child a sex toy and sent her a link
to it.
Second, Moran’s sexual interest in children speaks to his de-
sire to obtain child pornography. A jury could reasonably conclude
that an individual who has more than 1,000 images of child pornog-
raphy and 24 pairs of children’s underwear—despite having no chil-
dren living with him—meant what he said when he asked the blog-
gers to post or send him pictures.
Cf. United States v. Gillis, 938
F.3d 1181, 1190 (11th Cir. 2019) (noting that possession of child por-
nography is evidence of intent to have sex with a minor).
Third, Moran’s false exculpatory statements—dishonestly
denying that he had ever posted under the pseudonym “Emily
lover”—are substantive evidence of his guilt.
See United States v.
Hughes, 840 F.3d 1368, 1385 (11th Cir. 2016). Because Moran lied
about not being “Emily lover,” a jury could reasonably doubt his
lawyer’s suggestion during closing argument that his posts were
just part of an elaborate joke and evidence of nothing but trolling.
In sum, the government presented sufficient evidence for a
jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Moran con-
sciously wanted the bloggers to make and send him child pornog-
raphy—and that he therefore had the intent necessary for the at-
tempted-production charge.
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12 Opinion of the Court 21-12573
B
Moran separately contends that there is insufficient evidence
to satisfy § 2251(a)’s interstate-nexus element. Again, in relevant
part, § 2251(a) makes it unlawful for any person to “employ[], use[],
persuade[], induce[], entice[], or coerce[] any minor to engage
in . . . any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing
any visual depiction of such conduct . . . if such person knows or
has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported
or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign
commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a).5
Plenty of evidence would allow a jury to reasonably con-
clude that Moran knew that,
if produced—
i.e., if posted on the in-
ternet or sent to emilylover@aol.com—the child pornography
that he sought would travel in interstate commerce. But Moran
insists that to know that “such visual depiction” will travel inter-
state, he must first know
that there will be a visual depiction.
See
Br. of Appellant at 34–38. That is, he says, he must know that his
attempt to produce the photo will succeed. The government con-
tends, by contrast, that he needed to know only that the depictions
would move in interstate commerce
if produced.
The government’s reading is the better one. As relevant
here, § 2251(a) contains three interrelated clauses. The first makes
5 Section 2251(a)’s interstate-nexus element contains three independently suf-
ficient clauses.
See United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2006).
Here, however, the government relied only on the first.
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21-12573 Opinion of the Court 13
clear that a completed violation requires proof of conduct: A de-
fendant must “employ[], use[], persuade[], induce[], entice[], or co-
erce[] any minor to engage in . . . any sexually explicit conduct.”
The second specifies that the defendant must have a “purpose of
producing [a] visual depiction of such conduct.” And the third re-
quires the defendant to “know[] or ha[ve] reason to know that such
visual depiction will be transported or transmitted using any means
or facility of interstate or foreign commerce.” Ordinarily, when
one clause refers to an action, a second requires that action to be
for the purpose of producing a thing, and the third refers to what
someone “knows” about “such” thing, the final clause is under-
stood to be implicitly conditioned on the successful production of
the thing. Consider the following illustrative example:
John takes notes on his hikes for the purpose of pro-
ducing a book about hiking, and he
knows that
such
a book will sell millions of copies.
The average reader wouldn’t take the last clause to mean that John
knows
that he will write a book—only that John knows what will
happen
if he does write one.
More generally, proscribing an action (
e.g., inducing certain
conduct) rather than the outcome of that action (here, producing
depictions) contemplates that the outcome might not result. But
when we ask what one “knows” about the product of “such” out-
come, the question is ordinarily understood as taking for granted
the attempt’s success—and the outcome’s realization. So, for in-
stance:
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14 Opinion of the Court 21-12573
Jane is sending applications to out-of-state colleges.
She
knows that she will move away to attend
such
schools.
The latter sentence doesn’t communicate anything about Jane’s
knowledge of whether her application for admission will be ac-
cepted—only her knowledge about what will happen
if it is.
Moran’s contrary reading—that a defendant must know in
advance that his scheme will result in the production of child por-
nography—is untenable. While he emphasizes the unusual facts
here—he says that he
knew he would
fail—his argument sweeps
much more broadly: It would exculpate anyone who
didn’t know
that he would
succeed. But can any criminal ever really know ex
ante that his scheme will succeed? On Moran’s understanding, if a
would-be child-pornography producer can show that he harbored
any uncertainty about whether he might be arrested before he
could complete his crime—or even more so, if the government
couldn’t prove that he had none—an acquittal would be required.
That’s pretty much every case.6
6 To be clear, Moran’s position wouldn’t just insulate him from attempt liabil-
ity; it would exculpate anyone who actually induces a minor to engage in ex-
plicit conduct with the hope of producing a depiction so long as the inducer
wasn’t certain that he would succeed in producing a depiction. Consider an
example. An individual equips a room with cameras and connects them to a
computer that randomly—
i.e., without any manual input—selects 50% of
days to record. The individual then induces a minor to engage in sexual con-
duct in the room, with the hope that the act produces a visual depiction. If it
was a recording day, he could argue, as Moran does here, that he didn’t
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21-12573 Opinion of the Court 15
We hold that in a prosecution for producing child pornogra-
phy under § 2251(a), the government must prove that the defend-
ant knew that,
if produced, the pornography he sought would
travel in interstate commerce. Under this standard—which applies
to attempt prosecutions under § 2251(e) as well,
see, e.g.,
United
States v. Lee, 603 F.3d 904, 913–14 (11th Cir. 2010) (requiring the
same mens rea for attempt as for the completed crime)—the evi-
dence against Moran is clearly sufficient.
C
Finally, Moran contends that the evidence is insufficient to
satisfy attempted production’s actus reus element—namely, that
he “took actions that constituted a ‘substantial step toward the
commission of [the] crime.’”
Yost, 479 F.3d at 819 (quoting
United
States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222, 1227–28 (11th Cir. 2002)). The prob-
lem is that he didn’t challenge the sufficiency of the substantial-step
“know” depictions would be produced such that they would travel in inter-
state commerce. But as we have explained, § 2251(a)’s third clause requires
only knowledge that they will travel in interstate commerce
if they are pro-
duced.
And the oddity of Moran’s position doesn’t end with § 2251(a). Sec-
tions 2251(b)—which provides for punishment of parents who allow their chil-
dren to be used for child pornography—and 2251(d)—which provides for pun-
ishment of those who solicit child pornography—contain similar language.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2251(b) (“such . . . person knows or has reason to know that
such visual depiction will be transported”);
id. § 2251(d)(2)(A) (“such person
knows or has reason to know that such notice or advertisement will be trans-
ported”).
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16 Opinion of the Court 21-12573
element at trial when he moved for a judgment of acquittal. In-
stead, he argued only that the government hadn’t presented suffi-
cient evidence of his
intent.
See Doc. 171 at 131–32. Accordingly,
we may review Moran’s sufficiency challenge to the substantial-
step element only for plain error.
See United States v. Baston, 818
F.3d 651, 663–64 (11th Cir. 2016);
United States v. Dunlap, 279 F.3d
965, 966–67 (11th Cir. 2002).
To establish plain error, Moran must show that “(1) an error
occurred; (2) the error was plain; (3) it affected his substantial
rights; and (4) it seriously affected the fairness of the judicial pro-
ceedings.”
United States v. Ramirez-Flores, 743 F.3d 816, 822 (11th
Cir. 2014). With respect to the second prong, in particular, we have
held that in the absence of “explicit language of a statute or rule,”
an error “cannot be plain unless the issue” in question has been
“specifically and directly resolved by . . . on point precedent from
the Supreme Court or this Court.”
United States v. Sanchez, 940
F.3d 526, 537 (11th Cir. 2019).
Moran hasn’t met his burden of establishing all four prongs
of the plain-error standard.
See Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct.
2090, 2097 (2021). In an effort to satisfy the second prong, Moran
invokes just one relevant decision,
United States v. Lee, 29 F.4th
665 (11th Cir. 2022). But
Lee is hardly “on point” within the mean-
ing of our plain-error precedents. The portions of
Lee that Moran
cites deal with completed violations of § 2251(a), not attempts.
The critical language—“arrange for a minor to engage in sexually
explicit conduct,”
id. at 671—comes directly from
United States v.
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21-12573 Opinion of the Court 17
Ruggiero, 791 F.3d 1281, 1284–85 (11th Cir. 2015), in which the de-
fendant pleaded guilty to a completed violation of § 2251(a) and an
attempted violation of § 2422(b).
Id. at 1284. Moreover, and in any
event, Moran hasn’t even attempted to show that he satisfies the
last two prongs of the plain-error standard. Accordingly, he hasn’t
shown an entitlement to plain-error relief.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we hold (1) that a defendant’s de-
sire to produce child pornography is sufficient to establish his intent
for purposes of proving an attempted violation of § 2251(a), no
matter how unlikely his attempt is to succeed, and that the evi-
dence here was sufficient to establish Moran’s desire; (2) that
§ 2251(a)’s interstate-commerce element does not require a defend-
ant to know ex ante that child pornography will be produced, and
that there was sufficient evidence of Moran’s knowledge that the
images,
if produced, would travel in interstate commerce; and (3)
that Moran’s belated substantial-step argument fails plain-error re-
view.
AFFIRMED.
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