Kozak v. Hillsorough County Public Transportation Commission

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 30, 2011
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 10-11217
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 8:04-cv-01162-JDW-TBM
WALTER KOZAK,
d.b.a. Gunny’s Intrastate Travel and Tours,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA,
a political subdivision of the State of Florida, et al.,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants,
HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION,
an Independent Special District of the State of Florida,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(June 30, 2011)

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Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and HILL, Circuit Judges.
CARNES, Circuit Judge:
Walter Kozak owns and operates Gunny’s Interstate Travel and Tours, a
flat-rate ground transportation service operating in Hillsborough County, Florida
that transports passengers and their luggage. He provides that service using a 15-
passenger vehicle and a 7-passenger minivan. Florida law authorizes the
Hillsborough County Public Transportation Commission to regulate transportation
services in the area where Kozak operates, see 2001 Fla. Laws 299, and it has
adopted regulations exercising that authority. Under the Commission’s
regulations, in order for Kozak to pick up passengers in Hillsborough County
using either of his two vehicles he must first obtain a certificate and a permit for
each vehicle from the Commission. Kozak has not obtained either one for either
of his vehicles.1
Kozak filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that
the Commission’s regulations requiring him to obtain certificates and permits for
his vehicles were preempted by 49 U.S.C. § 14501, also known as the
In its opinion the district court provided an in-depth discussion of the facts. See Kozak v.1
Hillsborough Pub. Transp. Comm’n, 695 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1289–94 (M.D. Fla. 2010). Neither
party has suggested that those factfindings are erroneous, and we adopt them for purposes of our
decision. See id. at 1289–93.
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Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century. Specifically, Kozak contended
that 49 U.S.C. § 14501(a)(1)(C) preempts the Commission’s regulation regarding
his 15-passenger vehicle and that 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) preempts the
Commission’s regulation regarding his 7-passenger minivan. Rejecting both of
those contentions, the district court granted the Commission’s motion for summary
judgment. Kozak v. Hillsborough Pub. Transp. Comm’n, 695 F. Supp. 2d 1285,
1303 (M.D. Fla. 2010). Kozak appealed pro se.
I.
Kozak’s first argument here, as in the district court, is that the
Commission’s regulation requiring him to obtain a certificate and permit for his
15-passenger vehicle is expressly pre-empted by 49 U.S.C. § 14501(a)(1)(C).
Section 14501(a)(1)(C) states:
(a) Motor carriers of passengers.--
(1) Limitation on State law.--No State or political subdivision thereof
and no interstate agency or other political agency of 2 or more States
shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other
provision having the force and effect of law relating to--
* * *
(C) the authority to provide intrastate or interstate charter bus
transportation.
§ 14501(a)(1)(C). We affirm the district court’s decision rejecting this argument
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for the reasons set out in its opinion, see Kozak, 695 F. Supp. 2d at 1296–1301,
that part of which we adopt.
II.
Kozak also argues here, as in the district court, that in light of the
Commission’s regulation prohibiting him from operating his 7-passenger minivan
without a certificate and permit, its luxury service transportation rule that prevents
him from obtaining the required certificate and permit for his 7-passenger
minivan, is expressly preempted by 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). Section 14501(c)(1)
states:
(c) Motor carriers of property.--
(1) General rule.--Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), a State,
political subdivision of a State, or political authority of 2 or more States
may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the
force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor
carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property.
§ 14501(c)(1) (emphasis added). The district court found that the Commission’s
rule was not preempted because that rule does not significantly impact the rates,
routes, or services with respect to property. Kozak, 695 F. Supp. 2d at 1302–03.
We affirm the district court’s decision about this regulation and rule, but we do so
for a different reason. See Chappell v. Chao, 388 F.3d 1373, 1376–77 (11th Cir.
2004) (“We may affirm the district court’s decision for reasons different than those
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stated by the district court.”).
The definitions section for 49 U.S.C. § 14501 is contained in § 13102,
which defines “[m]otor carrier” as “a person providing motor vehicle
transportation for compensation.” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(14). Kozak does not dispute
that he is a “[m]otor carrier.” See id. The term “[m]otor carriers of property” is
not defined in the statute. See 49 U.S.C. § 13102. Kozak argues that he is one.
He admits, however, that he “never transports property by itself”; and he plainly
falls under § 14501(a), which applies to “[m]otor carriers of passengers.” Even so,
Kozak argues that he is also a motor carrier of property when he transports
passengers using his minivan because, as an “ancillary service” (his term), he also
transports his passengers’ property.
If we were to accept Kozak’s argument, every “[m]otor carrier” would be a
“[m]otor carrier of property,” because motor carriers transporting passengers
would, at the same time, be transporting property, unless all of the passengers
were unclothed and had no bags, purses, glasses, cell phones, or other property
with them. Absent that barely imaginable circumstance, any time any vehicle
transports any passengers it is also transporting as an “ancillary service” some of
their property. For that reason, Kozak’s strained interpretation of the term “motor
carrier of property” would render the statutory words “of property” superfluous.
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See Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 476–77 (2003) (“[W]e should not
construe the statute in a manner that is strained and, at the same time, would
render a statutory term superfluous.”); see also Corley v. United States, ___ U.S.
___, 129 S.Ct. 1558, 1566 (2009) (“[O]ne of the most basic interpretive canons
[is] that a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so
that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant” and “[t]he
fundamental problem with [a specific] reading of [a statute] is that it renders [part
of that statute] nonsensical and superfluous.” (quotation marks, alterations, and
citations omitted)). If we were to read the statutory term “[m]otor carriers of
property” to include all “[m]otor carriers of passengers,” we would undo the
difference in treatment that the statute provides for “[m]otor carriers of
passengers” in § 14501(a) and for “[m]otor carriers of property” in § 14501(c),
thereby undermining the whole point of different statutory terms and subdivisions.
See Shotz v. City of Plantation, Fla., 344 F.3d 1161, 1173 (11th Cir. 2003)
(“Every statute must be viewed in its entirety so that each part has a sensible and
intelligent effect harmonious with the whole.” (quotation marks omitted)).
For these reasons, we conclude that because Kozak transports property only
as an ancillary service to the transportation of passengers he is not a “[m]otor
carrier of property” under § 14501(c). It follows that the provision and its
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subparts do not preempt the Hillsborough County Public Transportation
Commission’s luxury service transportation rule. The district court correctly
granted summary judgment to the Commission.
AFFIRMED.
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