Blake Warner v. Hillsborough County Clerk of Courts

FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-10748
____________________

BLAKE WARNER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus

HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY CLERK OF COURTS,
Defendant-Appellee.

____________________
Appeal f rom the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:22-cv-01977-MSS-SPF
____________________

Before L
UCK, LAGOA, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
L
AGOA, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Blake Warner claims that the Clerk of Courts of
Hillsborough County, Florida, violated the Fifth and Fourteenth
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 1 of 33

2 Opinion of the Court 24-10748
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution by declaring that funds he
had deposited into the court registry for an eviction proceeding
were forfeited to the county under Florida Statute § 116.21. Alt-
hough Warner had not claimed the funds for almost two years, he
argues that he was not given sufficient notice before they were de-
clared forfeited on account of abandonment. The Hillsborough
County Clerk mailed a letter to Warner’s old address—for which
the Clerk had already received 13 return-to-sender notices—and
published notice in a predominantly Spanish-language newspaper
serving less than 0.2 percent of the county. These attempts at no-
tice, Warner contends, violated his due process rights and led to an
unconstitutional taking. On summary judgment, the district court
disagreed, finding that the newspaper notice was constitutionally
sufficient, and that the forfeiture did not result in an unconstitu-
tional taking.
After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument,
we affirm in part and reverse in part the district court’s decision.
We hold that, although § 116.21’s notice procedure is not facially
unconstitutional, the Hillsborough County Clerk’s application of
the statute to Warner was unconstitutional because no notice was
reasonably calculated to reach him. The Clerk also effected an un-
constitutional taking of Warner’s property because Warner had
not abandoned the funds.

USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 2 of 33

24-10748 Opinion of the Court 3
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1

On April 25, 2018, Warner’s landlord initiated an eviction
proceeding against him in Hillsborough County Court. Florida
Statute § 83.60 requires a tenant in an eviction proceeding to de-
posit into the court registry any allegedly accrued rent until resolu-
tion of the litigation.
2
After eviction proceedings commenced,
Warner deposited into the court registry two months’ worth of
rent, which amounted to $3,398, plus an additional $101 per
month, for a total of $3,600. On April 27, 2018, Warner filed an
answer and a counterclaim.
At the time that the eviction litigation began, Warner’s ad-
dress was 3012 W. DeLeon St., Apt. 23, Tampa, Florida. On April
28, 2018, Warner registered an e-file account with the State of Flor-
ida on myfloridaaccess.com. This account contained an email ad-
dress, a phone number, and his mother’s mailing address, at which
he received mail from 2017 to 2022. As acknowledged by the Hills-
borough County Clerk during oral argument, Warner’s e-file

1
We largely adopt the district court’s factual summary, which, consistent with
the standard of review for summary judgment, summarizes undisputed or
stipulated facts. See Cambridge Christian Sch., Inc. v. Fla. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n,
Inc., 115 F.4th 1266, 1287 (11th Cir. 2024).
2
See Fla. Stat. § 83.60(2) (“In an action by the landlord for possession of a dwell-
ing unit, if the tenant interposes any defense other than payment, including,
but not limited to, the defense of a defective 3-day notice, the tenant shall pay
into the registry of the court the accrued rent as alleged in the complaint or as
determined by the court and the rent that accrues during the pendency of the
proceeding, when due.”).
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 3 of 33

4 Opinion of the Court 24-10748
account was accessible to the Clerk, and the Clerk had the ability
to view and send messages to Warner’s email address listed in the
account.
On June 22, 2018, Warner moved to 502 S. Fremont Ave.,
Apt. 1322, Tampa, Florida, and he filed an address-change notice in
the eviction litigation in compliance with the Hillsborough County
Court’s local administrative rules. The next day, Warner aban-
doned the apartment that was the subject of the eviction litigation.
On August 24, 2018, the landlord filed a Motion to Disburse
Money from the Registry of the Court to obtain the funds that
Warner had deposited. At a hearing on October 9, 2018, the Hills-
borough County Court directed the landlord to submit a proposed
order disbursing the funds to the landlord. Following this hearing,
however, the landlord and Warner entered into an oral agreement
whereby Warner would abandon his counterclaims in exchange
for the landlord’s allowing Warner to claim the funds.
On May 17, 2019, Warner moved to 3002 W. Cleveland St.,
Tampa, Florida, but this time, he did not update his address with
the Hillsborough County Court. From February 24, 2020, to April
10, 2020, the Hillsborough County Clerk received thirteen re-
turned mail notices for notices that the Clerk had mailed to Warner
at his old 502 S. Freemont Ave. address.
On June 12, 2020, the Hillsborough County Court dismissed
the eviction litigation for lack of prosecution.
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 4 of 33

24-10748 Opinion of the Court 5
On February 18, 2021, apparently pursuant to Florida Stat-
ute § 717.118,
3
the Hillsborough County Clerk mailed letters to the
landlord and Warner to notify them that the funds in the court reg-
istry would be sent to the State’s Division of Unclaimed Property
if they were not claimed.
4
The Clerk mailed Warner’s letter to his
old address at 502 S. Fremont Ave. and never electronically served
Warner at his e-mail address with any items during the eviction
litigation or thereafter.
On July 9, 2021, the Clerk published notice of the unclaimed
funds in La Gaceta, a primarily Spanish-language local newspaper.
This publication included the following entry in English:
“BOUTIQUE APARTMENTS LLC, BROOKLYN FLATS VS
WARNER, BLAKE 18-CC022377 05/24/2018 *717.113 $3,600.”
Although the entry cited Florida Statute § 717.113, which directs
unclaimed funds to the State’s Division of Unclaimed Property,
5

3
See Fla. Stat. § 717.118(1) (“In order to provide all the citizens of this state an
effective and efficient program for the recovery of unclaimed property, the
department shall use cost-effective means to make at least one active attempt
to notify owners of unclaimed property accounts valued at more than $250
with a reported address or taxpayer identification number.”).
4
The notification letter mentions the State’s Unclaimed Property Division but
does not cite to any statute. Later, the Clerk took the funds pursuant to Fla.
Stat. § 116.21. In this litigation, both parties now effectively agree that Fla.
Stat. § 116.21 is the applicable statute.
5
See Fla. Stat. § 717.113 (“All intangible property held for the owner by any
court, government or governmental subdivision or agency, public corpora-
tion, or public authority that has not been claimed by the owner for more than
1 year after it became payable or distributable is presumed unclaimed. Except
as provided in s. 45.032(3)(c), money held in the court registry and for which
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 5 of 33

6 Opinion of the Court 24-10748
the Clerk concluded the notice by stating that the listed funds
would be forfeited to the county pursuant to Florida Statute
§ 116.21.
6
Newspaper publication of this impending forfeiture was
required by that statute,
7
and Florida Statutes §§ 50.031 and 50.011

no court order has been issued to determine an owner does not become pay-
able or distributable and is not subject to reporting under this chapter.”).
6
See Fla. Stat. § 116.21(1) (“The sheriffs and clerks of the courts of the various
counties of the state are authorized at their discretion on or before September
25 of each and every year hereafter to pay into the fine and forfeiture fund of
their respective counties, or the fine and forfeiture fund created under s.
142.01, any or all unclaimed moneys deposited or collected by them in their
official capacity, which unclaimed moneys came into their hands prior to Jan-
uary 1 of the preceding year and for which moneys claim has not been made.
Any unclaimed moneys collected or deposited by the clerk of the circuit court
in the course of the clerk’s court-related activities may be processed under this
chapter; however, the clerk must pay for the cost of publication of the list of
unclaimed court-related funds. Any unclaimed court-related funds collected
or deposited by the clerk which remain unclaimed must be deposited into the
fine and forfeiture fund established under s. 142.01.”).
7
See Fla. Stat. § 116.21(2) (“The sheriffs and clerks of the various courts of the
respective counties may, during the month of July of each year, hereafter
make and compile a list of any or all unclaimed moneys which came into their
hands as provided in subsection (1) above. Such compilation shall list, in ad-
dition to the name of the defendant, the respective amounts of such unclaimed
moneys. Such list or compilation shall be published one time during the
month of July in a newspaper of general circulation in the county served by
such sheriff or clerk, and the notice shall specify that unless such moneys are
claimed on or before September 1 after such publication that same shall be
declared forfeited to such county.”).
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 6 of 33

24-10748 Opinion of the Court 7
specified the criteria by which newspapers may be selected by the
Clerk for this purpose.
8

On September 1, 2021, after no response was received, the
Clerk deposited the funds from the eviction litigation into the
county’s fine and forfeiture fund for public use pursuant to
§ 116.21.
On August 29, 2022, Warner initiated this action against the
Clerk under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Among other claims, Warner argued
that the Clerk took his property without due process of law in vio-
lation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and
without paying him just compensation in violation of the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause. Warner sought a declaratory judg-
ment that the Clerk violated these constitutional provisions; a de-
claratory judgment that Florida Statutes §§ 116.21 and 50.031 are
unconstitutional; damages in the amount of the property allegedly

8
See Fla. Stat. § 50.031 (1999) (requiring publication “in a newspaper which at
the time of such publication shall have been in existence for 1 year and shall
have been entered as periodicals matter at a post office in the county where
published, or in a newspaper which is a direct successor of a newspaper which
together have been so published”); Fla. Stat. § 50.011 (1999) (requiring “publi-
cation in a newspaper printed and published periodically once a week or of-
tener, containing at least 25 percent of its words in the English language, en-
tered or qualified to be admitted and entered as periodicals matter at a post
office in the county where published, for sale to the public generally, available
to the public generally for the publication of official or other notices and cus-
tomarily containing information of a public character or of interest or of value
to the residents or owners of property in the county where published, or of
interest or of value to the general public”).
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 7 of 33

8 Opinion of the Court 24-10748
taken, as well as nominal and punitive damages; and an award of
attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses. Both Warner and the Hills-
borough County Clerk moved for summary judgment on these
claims.
The district court granted the Clerk’s motion for summary
judgment. It concluded that the letter notice did not satisfy the
Due Process Clause “because [the Hillsborough County Clerk] had
reason to know [Warner] no longer lived [at 502 S. Fremont Ave].”
The district court, however, found that publication in La Gaceta
constituted adequate notice. The district court also rejected
Warner’s takings claim because “[t]he Supreme Court has consist-
ently upheld statutory schemes providing for the escheatment of
abandoned or unclaimed property.” Warner appealed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review a ‘summary judgment de novo, applying the
same legal standards used by the district court.’” Yarbrough v. Deca-
tur Hous. Auth., 941 F.3d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Galvez
v. Bruce, 552 F.3d 1238, 1241 (11th Cir. 2008)) (emphasis added).
“When the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judg-
ment, we review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment and view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-mov-
ing party on each motion.” Cambridge Christian Sch., Inc. v. Fla. High
Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 115 F.4th 1266, 1287 (11th Cir. 2024). “Sum-
mary judgment is appropriate if there is ‘no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 8 of 33

24-10748 Opinion of the Court 9
“We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo.”
United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1225 (11th Cir. 2005). This
standard of review applies to both facial and as-applied challenges.
See United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2007).
III. ANALYSIS
Warner challenges the Hillsborough County Clerk’s taking
of the court registry funds on three grounds. First, Warner con-
tends that Florida Statute § 116.21 is unconstitutional on its face
because it does not provide the notice required by the Due Process
Clause. Second, he argues that, even if § 116.21 is valid, the Clerk
applied it in a manner that deprived him of constitutionally ade-
quate notice. Third, Warner asserts that the Clerk’s taking of his
funds violated the Fifth Amendment because he had not aban-
doned the funds and, thus, the Clerk took them for public use with-
out just compensation. We address each in turn.
A. Facial Challenge to Florida Statute § 116.21 Under the Due
Process Clause
“[D]ue process requires the government to provide ‘notice
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise inter-
ested parties of the pendency of [a deprivation of property] and af-
ford them an opportunity to present their objections.’” Jones v.
Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 226 (2006) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover
Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). “[A] plaintiff can only
succeed in a facial challenge [to a statute on due process grounds]
by ‘establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which
the [the statute] would be valid,’ i.e., that the law is
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 9 of 33

10 Opinion of the Court 24-10748
unconstitutional in all of its applications.” Washington State Grange
v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008) (quot-
ing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (third alteration
in original)).
Here, § 116.21 provides that Florida’s clerks of court “may,
during the month of July of each year, ... make and compile a list
of any or all unclaimed moneys which came into their hands,” and
that this list “shall be published one time during the month of July
in a newspaper of general circulation in the county ..., and the no-
tice shall specify that unless such moneys are claimed on or before
September 1 after such publication that same shall be declared for-
feited to such county.” Section 116.21 thus does not require indi-
vidualized notice and, instead, provides only for publication notice.
Warner argues that § 116.21 violates the Due Process Clause
because, under Supreme Court precedent, publication notice alone
is insufficient when the government knows of other methods rea-
sonably calculated to inform the property owner. See Mullane, 339
U.S. at 319 (holding that statutory notice by publication to known
beneficiaries was inadequate because it was “not reasonably calcu-
lated to reach those who could easily be informed by other means
at hand”); see also Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212–13
(1962) (“[N]otice by publication is not enough with respect to a per-
son whose name and address are known or very easily ascertaina-
ble and whose legally protected interests are directly affected by
the proceedings in question.”). In short, Warner contends that
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 10 of 33

24-10748 Opinion of the Court 11
Mullane facially invalidated the statutory notice provision in that
case.
We disagree. To start, Mullane did not facially invalidate the
statutory notice provision in that case; instead, the Court invali-
dated the statute as applied in the circumstances before it. Compare
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317 (“Those beneficiaries represented by appel-
lant whose interests or whereabouts could not with due diligence
be ascertained come clearly within this category. As to them the
statutory notice is sufficient.”), with id. at 318 (“As to known pre-
sent beneficiaries of known place of residence, however, notice by
publication stands on a different footing. ... Where the names and
post office addresses of those affected by a proceeding are at hand,
the reasons disappear for resort to means less likely than the mails
to apprise them of its pendency.”). Because Mullane itself was an
as-applied constitutional case, it cannot, as Warner contends, com-
pel the facial invalidity of § 116.21.
Moreover, the application of § 116.21 would not necessarily
be unconstitutional in all circumstances. The Florida Attorney
General has explained that, in comparison with another statute
concerning the disposition of unclaimed funds held by a court,
§ 116.21 “governs the disposition of all other funds the clerk or the
sheriff has collected or deposited in his or her official capacity that
remain unclaimed and are not specifically directed to be otherwise
disposed of by law.” Fla. Att’y Gen. Op. 99-64 (1999) (emphasis
added). In other words, § 116.21 operates as a catch-all provision
for funds held by the county. Indeed, Warner acknowledges that
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 11 of 33

12 Opinion of the Court 24-10748
“the scope” of the statute “is much broader than just the court reg-
istry context.” In some circumstances, certain funds held by the
county may have no identifiable owner. For example, money
found and turned over to the county would appear to fall within
the scope of § 116.21. There, Mullane makes clear that publication
notice would be sufficient, since no owner would be known. See
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317.
Because Warner has not established that § 116.21 is uncon-
stitutional in all circumstances, his facial challenge must fail. See
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
decision on this count.
B. As-Applied Challenge to Florida Statute § 116.21 Under the
Due Process Clause
On appeal, it is uncontested that the Hillsborough County
Clerk complied with § 116.21 by publishing notice in a local news-
paper of the impending forfeiture of Warner’s funds.
9
But Warner
contends that publication notice in this instance was unconstitu-
tional because the Clerk published the notice in a primarily Span-
ish-language newspaper—despite Warner’s inability to understand
Spanish—that served only 0.2 percent of the county. He further
argues that the Clerk had other means of notice that were

9
“[A] § 1983 claim alleging a denial of procedural due process requires proof
of three elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or
property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.”
Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003). The first two elements
here are neither contested nor open to contest on appeal.
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 12 of 33

24-10748 Opinion of the Court 13
reasonably calculated to reach him—namely, his e-mail address,
phone number, and another mailing address that he actually used.
Warner next asserts that, although the Hillsborough County Clerk
exceeded the notice required by § 116.21 by sending a letter, that
notice was still inadequate because the Clerk had previously re-
ceived 13 return-to-sender notices for that outdated address. In re-
sponse, the Clerk maintains that the newspaper publication was
sufficient, primarily because Warner never updated his address
with the court and because the general public notice of § 116.21
itself constituted sufficient notice of forfeiture in this case.
For the following reasons, we hold that the County Clerk’s
application of § 116.21, as applied to Warner, violated the Due Pro-
cess Clause because the Clerk’s notice attempts were not reasona-
bly calculated to reach him.
i. General public notice of § 116.21 does not con-
stitute sufficient notice to Warner in this case.
At the outset, we must address the Hillsborough County
Clerk’s attempt to evade a due process analysis altogether. The
Clerk essentially contends that there is no situation in which §
116.21 is unconstitutional because “the mere passage of the law it-
self is a notice to all citizens of Florida that they must comply with
it.” For this argument, the Clerk relies on a statement in Texaco,
Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982). There, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed “how a legislature must go about advising its citizens of
actions that must be taken to avoid a valid rule of law that a mineral
interest that has not been used for 20 years will be deemed to be
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 13 of 33

14 Opinion of the Court 24-10748
abandoned.” Short, 454 U.S. at 531. “Generally,” the Court an-
swered, “a legislature need do nothing more than enact and publish
the law, and afford the citizenry a reasonable opportunity to famil-
iarize itself with its terms and to comply.” Id. at 532. From this,
the Clerk concludes that “publication of the law itself would pro-
vide sufficient notice to comport with the requirements of due pro-
cess.”
But the Clerk misinterprets this statement. As the Supreme
Court explained, the appellants in Short “d[id] not challenge the suf-
ficiency of the notice that must be given prior to an adjudication
purporting to determine that a mineral interest has not been used
for 20 years.” Id. at 536. Instead, they “simply claim[ed] that the
absence of specific notice prior to the lapse of a mineral right ren-
ders ineffective the self-executing feature of the Indiana statute.”
Id. Although the Court rejected this latter claim, it nonetheless ex-
plained that it could have upheld the former claim under different
circumstances. The Due Process Clause, the Court reasoned, “cer-
tainly would preclude [a defendant] from obtaining a declaratory
judgment that his adversary’s claim is barred without giving notice
of that proceeding.” Id. “ The reasoning in Mullane,” the Court ex-
plained, “is applicable to a judicial proceeding brought to deter-
mine whether a lapse of a mineral estate did or did not occur, but
not to the self-executing feature of the Mineral Lapse Act.” Id. at
535.
Here, Warner does not claim that he suffered a lack of notice
about the self-executing feature of § 116.21. He is not claiming, in
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 14 of 33

24-10748 Opinion of the Court 15
other words, that there was insufficient notice of the requirements
of § 116.21 such that the statute cannot operate to extinguish his
property interest in the funds if the conditions of the statute are
met. Rather, Warner asserts that he lacked sufficient notice of the
Clerk’s determination that the conditions of § 116.21 were met
with respect to his funds. Like the “judicial proceeding brought to
determine whether a lapse of a mineral estate did or did not occur”
discussed in Short, the Clerk’s determination that Warner aban-
doned his funds was a factual adjudication concerning property
rights that was subject to the Due Process Clause. See Lugar v. Ed-
mondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (holding a clerk of court’s issu-
ance of writ of attachment to be state action concerning property
rights that is equally subject to due process requirements).
In fact, specific notice of the Clerk’s determination is espe-
cially required here because the Clerk’s decision to apply § 116.21
to Warner was, itself, discretionary. In Tulsa Professional Collection
Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988), the Supreme Court ad-
dressed due process requirements for Oklahoma’s nonclaim stat-
ute, which was triggered by the commencement of court proceed-
ings. “Where the legal proceedings themselves trigger the time
bar, even if those proceedings do not necessarily resolve the claim
on its merits,” the Court stated, “the time bar lacks the self-execut-
ing feature that Short indicated was necessary to remove any due
process problem. Rather, in such circumstances, due process is di-
rectly implicated and actual notice generally is required.” Pope, 485
U.S. at 487. Put simply, if the State must take additional actions to
implement a forfeiture statute to a specific property, “there is
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 15 of 33

16 Opinion of the Court 24-10748
significant state action” that implicates the Due Process Clause. Id.;
see also Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1558 (11th Cir. 1987)
(“Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be
heard before any governmental deprivation of a property inter-
est.”).
Here, § 116.21 provides that “[t]he sheriffs and clerks of the
courts of the various counties of the state are authorized at their dis-
cretion” to take unclaimed moneys. Fla. Stat. § 116.21(1) (emphasis
added). In accordance with the plain meaning of these terms, a
Florida intermediate appellate court has interpreted the statute to
be discretionary. See Baker v. State, 343 So. 2d 622, 624 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1977) (noting that, under an earlier version of the statute with
the same relevant language, forfeiture was “invocable solely at the
discretion of the sheriff and clerk of the court involved”). Even
though a more recent amendment provides that, “[a]ny unclaimed
court-related funds collected or deposited by the clerk which re-
main unclaimed must be deposited into the fine and forfeiture fund
established under s. 142.01,” § 116.21(1) (emphasis added), that lan-
guage follows immediately after the provision requiring “the clerk
[to] pay for the cost of publication of the list of unclaimed court-
related funds.” Together, these provisions naturally read that any
funds “which remain unclaimed” after publication notice (i.e., after
the Clerk has decided to initiate § 116.21 proceedings) “must be de-
posited into the fine and forfeiture fund.” Indeed, the Legislature
that added the new language also said that unclaimed funds “may
be processed under this chapter.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the
plain language grants the Clerk discretion to take unclaimed funds,
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 16 of 33

24-10748 Opinion of the Court 17
which is conclusive as to the statute’s meaning.
10
See Cox Enters.,
Inc. v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 666 F.3d 697, 704 (11th Cir. 2012)
(“When the language of a [Florida] statute is plain and unambigu-
ous we must apply that meaning.”); Williams v. State, 186 So. 3d
989, 991 (Fla. 2016) (requiring statutes to be interpreted primarily
by its plain meaning).
Thus, the forfeiture of Warner’s funds was not a self-exe-
cuted consequence of § 116.21. Instead, the Clerk first decided to
initiate § 116.21 proceedings for Warner’s funds, and then, after re-
ceiving no response to its prior notice attempts, the Clerk deter-
mined that the funds met the statutory criteria for forfeiture and
took the funds. Because both Short and Pope command that specific
notice be provided to Warner, we conclude that general public no-
tice of § 116.21’s requirements was insufficient here.
ii. The Hillsborough County Clerk’s publication
notice in La Gaceta was constitutionally defi-
cient.
Having decided to initiate § 116.21’s forfeiture procedure,
the Hillsborough County Clerk made two attempts to notify
Warner. One was to publish notice in a local newspaper, which

10
The Clerk suggests that, under the canon of constitutional avoidance, we
should not interpret § 116.21 to provide the Clerk with discretion in its appli-
cation. But the plain meaning of the statutory language is clear, and “[i]n the
absence of more than one plausible construction, the canon [of constitutional
avoidance] simply has no application.” Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S.
573, 580 (2022) (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 296 (2018)); see also
Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Bridges, 402 So. 2d 411, 414 (Fla. 1981) (same).
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 17 of 33

18 Opinion of the Court 24-10748
was the only means of notice required by § 116.21. According to
Warner, this publication notice was constitutionally deficient for
two reasons: (1) other methods of notice reasonably calculated to
reach him were available, and (2) the Clerk’s use of La Gaceta was
not reasonably calculated to reach him as it is a primarily Spanish-
language newspaper serving less than 0.2 percent of the county.
The Clerk argues that publication notice was the only reasonably
available means of notice because Warner failed to inform the
Clerk of his new address. The Clerk also argues that the Constitu-
tion does not require any characteristics for the type of newspaper
used.
We hold that the Clerk’s use of La Gaceta violated the Due
Process Clause in this instance because other means reasonably cal-
culated to notify Warner were available. Accordingly, we do not
decide whether, if other means of notice were unavailable, the use
of La Gaceta in this instance would be constitutionally sufficient.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Mullane establishes that
publication notice satisfies the Due Process Clause if, and only if,
the persons so notified are unknown or otherwise unreachable. See
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317 (“This Court has not hesitated to approve
of resort to publication as a customary substitute in another class
of cases where it is not reasonably possible or practicable to give
more adequate warning.”); Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 237 (2006)
(“Following up by publication was not constitutionally adequate
under the circumstances presented here because, as we have ex-
plained, it was possible and practicable to give Jones more adequate
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 18 of 33

24-10748 Opinion of the Court 19
warning of the impending tax sale.”); Schroeder, 371 U.S. at 212–13
(“The general rule that emerges from the Mullane case is that notice
by publication is not enough with respect to a person whose name
and address are known or very easily ascertainable and whose le-
gally protected interests are directly affected by the proceedings in
question”); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, Kan., 352 U.S. 112, 116
(1956) (“Measured by the principles stated in the Mullane case, we
think that the notice by publication here falls short of the require-
ments of due process. ... In the present case there seem to be no
compelling or even persuasive reasons why such direct notice can-
not be given. Appellant’s name was known to the city and was on
the official records.”).
Here, there were other reasonably possible and practicable
ways to notify Warner. It is undisputed that Warner maintained
an e-file account with the State that contained his correct e-mail
address, telephone number, and another mailing address at which
he did, in fact, receive mail. This e-file account was accessible to
the Clerk, and the Clerk admits that it could have sent an e-mail to
Warner. In light of Mullane, this fact alone defeats the constitu-
tional sufficiency of publication notice in this case. Indeed, Mullane
recognized that commonly used means of communication should
be used instead of publication notice if they are available. Cf. Mul-
lane, 339 U.S. at 319 (“However it may have been in former times,
the mails today are recognized as an efficient and inexpensive
means of communication.”).
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 19 of 33

20 Opinion of the Court 24-10748
None of the Clerk’s arguments to the contrary prevail. The
Clerk argues that it was not required to find Warner’s e-file contact
information because Warner failed to update his address with the
Clerk as required by the court’s rules. But the Supreme Court has
rejected the idea that negligence waives the right to notice. See
Jones, 547 U.S. at 231–32 (holding that something more must be
done when a letter is returned unclaimed even if the addressee was
required to update his address). Although the Clerk was not re-
quired to conduct an open-ended search of public records for
Warner’s address, see id. at 235–36, and while it may be true that
the State, rather than the county, manages the e-file system, the
Clerk could have easily obtained Warner’s correct contact infor-
mation and the Clerk concedes that it could have sent Warner an
e-mail. In addition, the Clerk’s argument that notice was required
only for the landlord—on the ground that the court docket listed
the landlord as the last person identified as entitled to the funds—
is barred. The deposited funds were the subject of a dispute be-
tween Warner and the landlord, not automatically the landlord’s
exclusive property. Moreover, the Clerk stipulated that Warner
and his landlord reached an oral agreement entitling Warner to the
funds, so the Clerk cannot now challenge that fact. Finally, even if
the landlord had a property interest in the funds, Warner overpaid
into the court registry by $202, so he would also be entitled to no-
tice in any event. See Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,
449 U.S. 155, 160–61 (1980) (“The principal sum deposited in the
registry of the court plainly was private property, and was not the
property of Seminole County. This is the rule in Florida as well as
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 20 of 33

24-10748 Opinion of the Court 21
elsewhere.” (citation modified) (regarding different statute govern-
ing deposits with court)).
In sum, given the other more direct means of notice availa-
ble, the Clerk’s publication in La Gaceta was not reasonably calcu-
lated to reach Warner and, thus, was constitutionally deficient.
11

iii. The Hillsborough County Clerk’s letter notice to
Warner was constitutionally deficient.
Before publishing notice in La Gaceta, the Hillsborough
County Clerk sent a letter to Warner’s outdated address on file
with the court, informing him of an impending escheatment. This
means of notice was not required by § 116.21. Although this addi-
tional notice might have cured any deficiency with the publication
notice, we conclude that the letter was itself constitutionally defi-
cient since it was not reasonably calculated to reach Warner.
In Jones, the Supreme Court held that, “when mailed notice
of a tax sale is returned unclaimed, the State must take additional
reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice to the property
owner before selling his property, if it is practicable to do so.” 547
U.S. at 225. “We do not think,” the Court explained, “that a person
who actually desired to inform a real property owner of an impend-
ing tax sale of a house he owns would do nothing when a certified
letter sent to the owner is returned unclaimed.” Id. at 229. Indeed,
this principle—that alternative means of notice are required if it

11
For the same reasons, the fact that this notice also appeared on the State’s
online database of public notices does not satisfy the Due Process Clause here.
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 21 of 33

22 Opinion of the Court 24-10748
becomes apparent that the initial notice has failed and other means
of notice remain available—has been explicitly recognized by the
Florida Supreme Court as it applies to Florida’s clerks of court. See
Delta Prop. Mgmt. v. Profile Invs., Inc., 87 So. 3d 765, 771 (Fla. 2012)
(“Jones establishes ... that where a notice sent by certified mail is
returned undeliverable, the clerk of court must take additional rea-
sonable steps to notify a titleholder of the upcoming tax sale.”).
Here, the Clerk did not just send one letter and receive back
one return-to-sender notice before neglecting to take further ac-
tion. Instead, despite receiving 12 return-to-sender notices from
the Post Office for letters mailed to Warner’s old address, the Clerk
sent the letter informing Warner of an impending escheatment to
that same address. When that letter was also returned undelivered,
the Clerk took no further action. The Clerk never altered its means
of notice, even though it was apparent that letters mailed to
Warner’s 502 S. Fremont Ave. address were not reaching him. As
discussed above, other means of notifying Warner were available,
such as his e-mail address, telephone number, and another valid
mailing address, all of which were easily accessible within the
State’s e-file system that the Clerk concedes it uses. The Clerk’s
failure to use available alternative means of notice—and the con-
tinued mailing of letters to an obviously invalid address—demon-
strates that the letters were sent in a mechanical manner, with little
regard for whether Warner was actually informed of the impend-
ing escheatment.
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 22 of 33

24-10748 Opinion of the Court 23
And even if the letters had reached Warner, they still would
not have informed him of the impending forfeiture of his funds.
The letters stated that Warner’s funds would be transferred to the
State’s unclaimed property fund under § 717.001, rather than for-
feited to the county fine and forfeiture fund under § 116.21. Under
the former scenario, Warner’s funds would have been held by the
State in a custodial account, available for him to reclaim at any
time. Thus, even if Warner had received the Clerk’s letters, he
would not have received notice that the Clerk was on the threshold
of declaring his funds forfeited to the county and that any claim to
them would be “forever barred.”
Under the circumstances in this case, we conclude, like the
Supreme Court in Jones, that the Clerk’s letters were not reasonably
calculated to reach Warner and, thus, that the letters did not pro-
vide sufficient notice of the forfeiture under the Due Process
Clause.
C. Takings Clause Challenge Under the Fifth Amendment
Our Constitution prohibits a State f rom taking private prop-
erty for public use without just compensation. See U. S .
CONST.
amends. V, XIV.
12
“ The paradigmatic taking requiring just compen-
sation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of
private property.” Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537
(2005). This type of government action constitutes a per se taking,

12
The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause has been incorporated against the
States by way of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Chi-
cago B. & Q. Railroad Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 17 S.Ct. 581 (1897).
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 23 of 33

24 Opinion of the Court 24-10748
and to prove it, a plaintiff must show (1) that he owned the prop-
erty, (2) that the government directly appropriated the property for
its own use, and (3) that the plaintiff was not given just compensa-
tion. See Maron v. Chief Fin. Officer of Fla., 136 F.4th 1322, 1334 (11th
Cir. 2025).
“From an early time,” however, the Supreme Court “has
recognized that States have the power to permit unused or aban-
doned interests in property to revert to another after the passage of
time.” Short, 454 U.S. at 526. Such escheatment of abandoned
property is not a taking because “there is no owner to compen-
sate.” Cerajeski v. Zoeller, 735 F.3d 577, 581 (7th Cir. 2013). But
“[t]here must be a voluntary intention to abandon, or evidence
from which such intention may be presumed.” Katsaris v. United
States, 684 F.2d 758, 761–62 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting The No. 105,
97 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1938)).
Warner argues that he has a valid claim under the Takings
Clause for two reasons. First, he maintains that because the Hills-
borough County Clerk failed to provide adequate notice of the im-
pending forfeiture, his lack of response did not amount to abandon-
ment of his funds. Second, he argues that the statute’s presumption
of abandonment after 18 months is constitutionally insufficient.
The Clerk responds with several arguments: a taking can
occur only in the context of eminent domain; losing property be-
cause of a failure to take an action required by statute to maintain
the property is not a taking under Short; and there is no “hard-and-
fast rule” for what minimum amount of time must pass before a
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 24 of 33

24-10748 Opinion of the Court 25
State can presume that property is abandoned. The Clerk also
questions whether the funds were even Warner’s in the first place.
The Clerk’s arguments are without merit.
First, as already discussed above, the Clerk previously stipu-
lated to the district court that Warner had a property interest in the
funds; the Clerk cannot now disavow that stipulation on appeal.
Second, a takings claim is not limited to eminent domain sit-
uations. The Clerk’s argument to the contrary stems from its mis-
interpretation of the following passage from Bennis v. Michigan,
which concerned civil forfeiture of a car used in commission of a
crime: “The government may not be required to compensate an
owner for property which it has already lawfully acquired under
the exercise of governmental authority other than the power of
eminent domain.” 516 U.S. 442, 452–53 (1996). This statement re-
fers to the government’s exercise of its police power in the context
of property used in the commission of a crime. But this case does
not involve the police power, much the less exercise of the police
power in that context. Indeed, it is well established that a taking
can occur outside the traditional exercise of eminent domain. See,
e.g., Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (taking of court registry funds); Horne v.
Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 350 (2015) (taking of raisins produced for
commercial sale).
Third, on this particular record, the Clerk cannot presume
Warner abandoned his funds. Under Florida law, property can be
presumed abandoned only if there is evidence that the owner in-
tended to abandon the property. See Dade Cnty. v. City of N. Miami
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 25 of 33

26 Opinion of the Court 24-10748
Beach, 69 So. 2d 780, 783 (Fla. 1953) (“Abandonment is a question
of intent and he who asserts it, has the burden of proving it. Nonuse
is only evidence that may or may not point to abandonment.”);
Brown v. Reynolds, 872 So. 2d 290, 295 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Here,
the only premise for the Clerk’s inference that Warner intended to
abandon his funds, and that action under § 116.21 was therefore
permissible, was Warner’s failure to respond to the Clerk’s notice.
But the Clerk cannot premise abandonment on notices that were
constitutionally deficient and that Warner never received.
In fact, an inference of abandonment in these particular cir-
cumstances would be constitutionally invalid as it would allow the
government to take property because of its own failure to provide
due process. See Jones, 547 U.S. at 234 (“[B]efore forcing a citizen to
satisfy his debt by forfeiting his property, due process requires the
government to provide adequate notice of the impending tak-
ing.”); Bennis, 516 U.S. at 452 (“[I]f the forfeiture proceeding here in
question did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the property in the
automobile was transferred by virtue of that proceeding from peti-
tioner to the State.” (emphases added)); Lacy v. City of Chicago, 728
F. Supp. 3d 901, 915 (N.D. Ill. 2024) (“... Lacy has adequately stated
a Takings Clause claim based on the City’s failure to provide two
notices before selling or disposing of her impounded vehicle.”).
Fourth, the Clerk cannot prevail with its argument that
Warner forfeited his funds by not complying with § 116.21, which
is a statute addressing abandoned property. Forfeiture differs from
abandonment: property is forfeited not because the owner
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 26 of 33

24-10748 Opinion of the Court 27
intended to relinquish it, but because the owner failed to satisfy the
conditions of ownership. See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 100
(1985).
The Clerk’s reliance on Short to support its forfeiture argu-
ment is misplaced, as Short concerned abandonment, not forfei-
ture. Locke is equally unhelpful to the Clerk. Locke focused on a
special type of property created by legislative grant—mineral inter-
ests—rather than more traditional types of private property. See
471 U.S. at 104 (noting that the “power to qualify existing property
rights is particularly broad with respect to the ‘character’ of the
property rights at issue” in that case). Additionally, unlike the stat-
ute in Locke, it is not the case that “[s]pecific evidence of intent to
abandon is simply made irrelevant” by § 116.21. Id. at 100.
Whereas the statute in Locke deemed property forfeited when an
annual claim of ownership was not filed, § 116.21 requires the
Clerk to publish notice in a newspaper to confirm the owner’s in-
tent to abandon property that has already remained unclaimed.
Section 116.21 thus follows the traditional statutory scheme for de-
termining whether abandonment was intended. Nor does it mat-
ter that § 116.21 uses the term “forfeited” rather than “abandoned.”
In Locke, the statute at issue employed the term “abandonment”
rather than “forfeiture,” yet the Supreme Court treated the action
as a forfeiture in substance even if not in form. See id. at 97–100.
Because § 116.21 aims to determine whether property owners in-
tended to abandon their property—and because the Clerk could
not have presumed abandonment from Warner’s failure to
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 27 of 33

28 Opinion of the Court 24-10748
respond to the Clerk’s unconstitutional notice attempts—there is
no valid evidence that Warner abandoned his funds.
We thus conclude that the Clerk violated the Fifth Amend-
ment by taking Warner’s funds in the county registry for the
county’s use without providing just compensation.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm in part and reverse
in part the district court’s decision. We hold that § 116.21’s notice
procedure is not facially invalid under the Due Process Clause; that
the Hillsborough County Clerk’s application of the statute to
Warner violated the Due Process Clause; and that the Hills-
borough County Clerk effected a taking of Warner’s property in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. We remand to the district court
for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 28 of 33

24-10748 LUCK, J., Dissenting in Part 1
L
UCK, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
The majority opinion is split into three parts. First, it affirms
the judgment for the Hillsborough County Clerk of Court on Blake
Warner’s facial procedural due process challenge to Florida Stat-
utes section 116.21. Second, it reverses the judgment for the Clerk
on Warner’s as-applied procedural due process challenge to section
116.21. And third, it reverses the judgment for the Clerk on
Warner’s Takings Clause claim based on the application of section
116.21 to the money he left in the court registry. I join the first two
parts of the majority opinion, but I respectfully dissent as to the
third part. The district court properly granted judgment for the
Clerk on the takings claim.
The Clerk’s actions do not implicate the Takings Clause be-
cause Warner abandoned his money in the court registry under
section 116.21. The parties agree that the Clerk complied with the
requirements of section 116.21. And section 116.21 provides that
unclaimed registry funds are abandoned when the statutory re-
quirements are met. The legal question is whether a state violates
the Takings Clause when it appropriates abandoned property un-
der a facially valid escheat statute. The Supreme Court has an-
swered that question no.
In Texaco, Inc. v. Short, the Supreme Court upheld a state
statute that terminated without notice mineral rights not used or
affirmatively renewed for twenty years. 454 U.S. 516, 525–31
(1982). In doing so, the Supreme Court clarified that “[s]tates have
the power to permit unused or abandoned interests in property to
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 29 of 33

2 LUCK, J., Dissenting in Part 24-10748
revert to another after the passage of time.” Id. at 526. As the Su-
preme Court explained, the Takings Clause does not define prop-
erty rights. Id. at 525. Rather, property rights “are created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that
stem from an independent source such as state law . . . .” Id. (quot-
ing Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
And “just as a [s]tate may create a property interest that is entitled
to constitutional protection, the [s]tate has the power to condition
the permanent retention of that property right on the performance
of reasonable conditions that indicate a present intention to retain
the interest.” Id. at 526; see also United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84,
104 (1985) (“[A] legislature generally has the power to impose new
regulatory constraints on the way in which . . . rights are used, or
to condition their continued retention on performance of certain
affirmative duties.”).
One such condition is continued use of the property. After
an extended period of nonuse, “private property may be deemed
to be abandoned and to lapse upon the failure of its owner to take
reasonable actions imposed by law . . . .” Short, 454 U.S. at 530.
“[I]t follows that, after abandonment, the former owner retains no
interest for which he may claim compensation.” Id. That’s because
“[i]t is the owner’s failure to make any use of the property—and
not the action of the State—that causes the lapse of the property
right[.]” Id. And because abandoned property is no longer the
property of the original owner, a state may take custody of the
abandoned property through an escheat statute without violating
the Takings Clause. See id.; see also Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S.
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 30 of 33

24-10748 LUCK, J., Dissenting in Part 3
490, 497 (1993) (“States as sovereigns may take custody of or as-
sume title to abandoned personal property as bona vacantia, a pro-
cess commonly (though somewhat erroneously) called escheat.”).
Section 116.21 is a valid escheat statute. It clearly defines
conditions under which property is abandoned, and there is no dis-
pute that those conditions were met here. Nor does Warner claim
that the statute is facially unconstitutional as a taking. The only
question is whether the Clerk unlawfully “took” Warner’s registry
funds. Where, as here, property had been abandoned under a state
escheat statute, the Supreme Court has told us no.
The majority opinion nevertheless attempts to distinguish
this case from Short for two reasons: first, section 116.21 is a forfei-
ture statute that divests ownership by nonuse, whereas abandon-
ment requires affirmative evidence of intent to relinquish owner-
ship; and second, the Clerk did not provide any notice before taking
the money. Both reasons are unavailing.
First, the majority opinion contends that a lawful taking un-
der a valid escheat statute requires the property holder to abandon
the property, which requires an affirmative relinquishment. Be-
cause there is no evidence that Warner affirmatively relinquished
the money in the court registry, the Clerk’s taking it under section
116.21 violated the Fifth Amendment.
There’s two problems with this contention. One is that
Warner all but acknowledges he intentionally left the money in the
court registry for an indefinite period of time.
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 31 of 33

4 LUCK, J., Dissenting in Part 24-10748
Another problem is that the majority opinion is inconsistent
with Short’s holding that an extended period of nonuse suffices to
demonstrate abandonment. Short did not draw a distinction be-
tween property interests lost through an affirmative act of relin-
quishment and property interests presumed lost through non-
use. See 454 U.S. at 525–31. Indeed, the statute in Short, Indiana’s
Mineral Lapse Act, “put[] an end to interests in coal, oil, gas or
other minerals which have not been used for twenty years.” Id. at 518
(emphasis added). The failure to use the property for an extended
period of time showed that the property holder lacked a “present
intention to retain the interest” and had therefore abandoned the
property. Id. at 526. Section 116.21 works the same way.
So, contrary to the majority opinion’s conclusion, it cannot
be the case that section 116.21 violates the Takings Clause because
it conditions abandonment on nonuse rather than some affirmative
act of relinquishment. Otherwise, Short would have come out the
other way. Cf. id. at 530 (“In ruling that private property may be
deemed to be abandoned and to lapse upon the failure of its owner
to take reasonable actions imposed by law, this Court has never
required the State to compensate the owner for the consequences
of his own neglect.”). I’m afraid the majority opinion’s misreading
of Short will put other state escheat statutes in jeopardy—not just
section 116.21.
Second, the majority opinion maintains that the Clerk’s ac-
tions were unlawful because the Clerk did not provide notice be-
fore appropriating the registry funds. But notice is not an element
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 32 of 33

24-10748 LUCK, J., Dissenting in Part 5
of a takings claim. See Maron v. Chief Fin. Officer of Fla., 136 F.4th
1322, 1334 (11th Cir. 2025) (stating that the elements of a takings
claims are (1) that the plaintiff owns the property; (2) the govern-
ment directly appropriated the property for its own use; and (3) the
state failed to provide just compensation). And, in any event, the
statute itself provides sufficient notice of the escheatment. See
Short, 454 U.S. at 532 (finding that, in promulgating an escheatment
statute, “[g]enerally, a legislature need do nothing more than enact
and publish the law, and afford the citizenry a reasonable oppor-
tunity to familiarize itself with its terms and to comply”); cf. Gray-
den v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1239 (11th Cir. 2003) (“For one hun-
dred years, the Supreme Court has declared that a publicly availa-
ble statute may be sufficient to provide such notice because indi-
viduals are presumptively charged with knowledge of such a stat-
ute.”); Mixon v. One Newco, Inc., 863 F.2d 846, 849 (11th Cir. 1989)
(finding that “statutory notice to the [property] owner that he will
lose his rights through nonuse or nonpayment of taxes” was “suffi-
cient notice” of a “self-executing” escheatment).
I agree with the majority opinion that “the Clerk’s determi-
nation that Warner abandoned his funds was a factual adjudication
concerning property rights that was subject to the Due Process
Clause.” I also agree that the Clerk failed to give sufficient notice
for the reasons explained in the majority opinion. But, for the Tak-
ings Clause claim, notice was not required, and if it was, section
116.21 notified Warner that money he abandoned to the court reg-
istry could escheat to the Clerk.
USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 33 of 33