Castaneda-Ramirez v. Bondi

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
_________________________________
MIGUEL CASTANEDA-RAMIREZ,

Petitioner,

v.

TODD BLANCHE
∗
, United States
Attorney General,

Respondent.

No. 25-9554
(Petition for Review)
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
∗∗

_________________________________
Before MATHESON, CARSON, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
An immigration judge (“IJ”) denied Miguel Castaneda-Ramirez’s application
for cancellation of removal. The IJ also denied his motion to terminate proceedings
based on his pending U Visa petition. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)

∗
On August 10, 2026, Todd Blanche became the Attorney General of the
United States. Consequently, his name has been substituted as Respondent. See
Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2)

∗∗
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the brief without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without argument. This case is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, re judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir.
R. 32.1
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

August 18, 2026

Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
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affirmed and also denied his renewed motion to terminate proceedings. Exercising
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), we deny his petition for review.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2011, Mr. Castaneda-Ramirez, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the
United States illegally. After the Department of Homeland Security charged him
with removability, he conceded the charge and filed for cancellation of removal. See
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).
A. IJ Proceedings
1. Cancellation of Removal
Cancellation of removal involves a two-step process. “First, the IJ must
decide whether the noncitizen is eligible for cancellation under the relevant statutory
criteria. Second, an IJ decides whether to exercise [her] discretion favorably and
grant the noncitizen relief in the particular case.” Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S.
209, 212-13 (2024).
At the first step, a petitioner must establish (1) he had been physically present
in the United States for at least 10 years; (2) had a good moral character during that
period; (3) was not convicted of a disqualifying offense; and (4) his removal would
result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship for a qualifying relative. See
§ 1229b(1)(A)-(D). The IJ found that Mr. Castaneda-Ramirez had not shown good
moral character or exceptional hardship and therefore denied his application.
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At the hearing before the IJ, Mr. Castaneda-Ramirez testified about hardship to
his two qualifying relatives—United States citizen children, ages 14 and 9. The IJ
found him to be a credible witness.
His older daughter, X.C., then in ninth grade, provided a letter describing the
anguish she suffered from missing him. Mr. Castaneda-Ramirez testified she is
healthy, gets decent grades, and goes to the gym to stay in shape. She lives with her
mother,
1
who is employed and also receives help from her own mother.
Mr. Castaneda-Ramirez’s parents have helped X.C. adjust to life without her father.
The IJ concluded that although X.C. has shown signs of rebellion and frustration at
her father’s absence, she was not experiencing exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship.
The younger daughter, Y.C., was in third grade. The evidence showed she is
healthy, gets decent grades, and is somewhat argumentative with classmates. She
lives with her mother, who struggles a bit with her. Mr. Castaneda-Ramirez’s parents
and Y.C.’s mother receive help from their respective families in taking care of Y.C.,
who does not face significant mental or physical difficulties.
The IJ found that if Mr. Castaneda-Ramirez is removed to Mexico, he can
continue to communicate with X.C. and Y.C. through letters, phone calls, social

1
Although Mr. Castaneda-Ramirez’s brief and his administrative filings
occasionally refer to one mother of both daughters, and suggest they both reside with
her, see, e.g., Pet’r Opening Br. at 19; R., vol. 1 at 23, his testimony before the IJ,
along with the other evidence, shows that each daughter has a separate mother and
lives with her own mother. See R., vol. 1 at 238, 240, 249; vol. 2 at 325-26, 483.
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media, and video. Both children, when they get older, should be able to visit him in
Mexico.
The IJ concluded Mr. Castaneda-Ramirez did not meet his burden to show that
his daughters would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if he is
returned to Mexico. For this reason, and because he did not establish good moral
character for the past 10 years,
2
the IJ denied his cancellation application. The IJ
granted him voluntary departure.
2. U Visa Petition
To qualify for a U Visa, a noncitizen must demonstrate that (1) he suffered
substantial physical or mental abuse from being a victim of certain enumerated types
of criminal activity committed in the United States; (2) he has information about that
criminal activity; and (3) a law enforcement official has certified that he has been, is
being, or is likely to be helpful in the investigation or prosecution of the criminal
activity. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(I)–(IV).
The IJ declined to terminate removal proceedings based on Mr. Castaneda-
Ramirez’s pending petition for a U Visa. But she stated:
The court also considers the fact that [petitioner] has applied for a U visa.
[Its status is] unclear [to] the court: [petitioner’s] counsel indicates that this
has been approved; the Department is arguing that it’s not been approved.
But it is, at least, a potential viable form of relief that may bring respondent
back should he leave voluntarily to Mexico. If the visa is approved, it
would be a way for him to come back.

2
Because we do not resolve this case based on the moral character
determination, we do not discuss in detail the facts underlying the IJ’s resolution of
th at issue.
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R., vol. 1 at 75.
B. BIA Appeal
On appeal, the BIA upheld the denial of cancellation. It agreed with the IJ that
Mr. Castaneda-Ramirez had failed to show exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship to a qualifying relative.
The BIA also denied a renewed request for termination due to the pending U
Visa application. It noted that Mr. Castaneda-Ramirez had presented no new
evidence on appeal concerning the application’s status; the crimes on which his U
Visa application relied dated from 2003 and 2007; his removal proceedings had been
pending since December 22, 2022; his inadmissibility was not in dispute; and his
cancellation application had been resolved. The BIA reinstated his application for
voluntary departure.
II. DISCUSSION
“When, as here, a single BIA member issues a reasoned decision addressing a
petitioner’s arguments on appeal, we confine our review to the BIA’s decision and
will not address the IJ’s decision except where the BIA has explicitly incorporated
[her] reasoning.” Miguel-Pena v. Garland, 94 F.4th 1145, 1153 (10th Cir. 2024)
(brackets, ellipsis, and internal quotation marks omitted). “[B]ut we are not
precluded from consulting the IJ’s more complete explanation of those same
grounds” on which the Board based its decision. Aguayo v. Garland, 78 F.4th 1210,
1216 (10th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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A. Cancellation of Removal
1. Legal Background on Hardship Determination
We lack jurisdiction to review certain denials of discretionary relief, see
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), but we retain jurisdiction to review questions of law, see
id. § 1252(a)(2)(D). “[T]he application of the exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship standard to a given set of facts is reviewable as a question of law under
§ 1252(a)(2)(D).” Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 217. “Because this mixed question is
primarily factual, that review is deferential.” Id. at 225; see also Martinez v.
Garland, 98 F.4th 1018, 1021 (10th Cir. 2024) (“[W]e apply a deferential standard to
review the BIA’s hardship determination.”).
“To meet [the hardship] standard, a noncitizen must demonstrate that a
qualifying relative would suffer hardship that is substantially different from or
beyond that which would ordinarily be expected to result from their removal, but
need not show that such hardship would be unconscionable.” Id. at 215 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The analysis should consider all hardship factors in the
aggregate. Id.
2. Analysis
Mr. Castaneda-Ramirez raises five arguments. Each one fails.
First, he contends the BIA did not consider the hardship factors in the
aggregate and failed to provide any reason for its hardship ruling. We disagree. The
BIA adopted the IJ’s analysis and affirmed her decision. The IJ stated she had
reviewed and considered all the exhibits. She discussed the hardship to both children
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and stated, based on the totality of the evidence, that she could not find that
Mr. Castaneda-Ramirez had met his hardship burden. The BIA reached the same
conclusion “[b]ased on the totality of the evidence.” R., vol. 1 at 65. It explained,
“While we do not diminish the emotional and financial hardship the respondent’s
family will suffer upon his removal, we agree with the [IJ] that the hardship does not
rise to the level of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship as required under
law.” R., vol. 1 at 3. “The BIA is not required to write an exegesis on every
contention. What is required is that it consider the issues raised, and announce its
decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard
and thought and not merely reacted.” Maatougui v. Holder, 738 F.3d 1230, 1242-43
(10th Cir. 2013) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). The BIA did so.
Second, Mr. Castaneda-Ramirez argues the BIA failed to consider all the
hardship factors articulated in Matter of Anderson, 16 I. & N. Dec. 596 (BIA 1978).
But the BIA has explained that it need not consider all of the Anderson factors in a
cancellation-of-removal case. Instead, the essential relevant factors are “the ages,
health, and circumstances of [the] qualifying . . . United States citizen relatives,” In
re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 63 (BIA 2001), which the IJ and BIA did
consider. “Factors relating to the applicant himself . . . can only be considered
insofar as they may affect the hardship to a qualifying relative.” Id. The IJ
considered the relevant factors, and the BIA adopted her hardship analysis. We
discern no error under Anderson.
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Third, and relatedly, he contends we should direct the BIA to apply all of the
hardship factors identified in Monreal-Aguinaga; In re Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N.
Dec. 319 (BIA 2002), and In re Gonzalez Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. (BIA 2002). But
“each case must be assessed and decided on its own facts.” Monreal-Aguinaga,
23 I. & N. Dec. at 63. And we do not require the agency to discuss every piece of
evidence. See Maatougui, 738 F.3d at 1242-43.
Fourth, Mr. Castaneda-Ramirez contends the agency erred by failing to
consider harm to his citizen brother, undocumented parents, his daughters’ mothers,
and his brothers. The brothers are Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals recipients.
But he fails to show he made this argument to the BIA. See R., vol. 1 at 19-37; 53-54
(notice of appeal and BIA brief). A noncitizen must “exhaus[t] all administrative
remedies available to the alien as of right.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). Although
§ 1252(d)(1) is a non-jurisdictional claims processing rule, see Santos-Zacaria v.
Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 423 (2023), this court has discretion to consider sua sponte
whether a petitioner failed to exhaust an argument, see Miguel-Pena, 94 F.4th at
1158. Mr. Castaneda-Ramirez’s argument is fact-specific and is not well developed
in his opening brief. See Pet’r Opening Br. at 19-20. We decline to consider it.
Fifth, to the extent Mr. Castaneda-Ramirez raises a cognizable legal challenge
to the BIA’s determination that the evidence did not rise to the level of exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship, he fails to show a basis for reversal under our
deferential standard of review. See, e.g., Martinez, 98 F.4th at 1021 (stating
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“economic detriment and diminished educational opportunities are insufficient” to
meet the high standard associated with exceptional and extremely unusual hardship).
3

B. Request to Terminate due to U Visa Application
The IJ or the BIA may grant discretionary termination based on a pending U
Visa application when certain regulatory requirements are met, see 8 C.F.R. §
1003.1(m)(1)(ii), including a showing that the noncitizen is prima facie eligible for
relief from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). See id.
§ 1003.1(m)(1)(ii)(B). In making this decision, the BIA “shall consider the reason
termination is sought and the basis for any opposition to termination.” Id.
§ 1003.1(m)(1)(ii). Mr. Castaneda-Ramirez makes five unsuccessful arguments that
the BIA abused its discretion by denying his request to terminate proceedings.
First, he contends the BIA factually erred by stating he sought discretionary
termination based on his application of July 5, 2023, when in fact he sought
termination based on his December 2023 application. Mr. Castaneda-Ramirez filed

3
Mr. Castaneda-Ramirez asserts various challenges to the IJ’s finding that he
failed to satisfy the good moral character requirement. Although the BIA discussed
the IJ’s moral character finding, it ultimately affirmed the IJ’s decision based on
Mr. Castaneda-Ramirez’s failure to “meet his burden of proof to establish
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, which is dispositive.” R., vol. 1 at 4
(emphasis added). In cases involving a single Board member’s brief order, “we limit
our review to the grounds for the BIA’s decision.” Escobar-Hernandez v. Barr,
940 F.3d 1358, 1360 (10th Cir. 2019). Here, the BIA relied on the hardship
determination. But even if the BIA relied independently on both the hardship and
good moral character factors, given our affirmance of the BIA’s dispositive hardship
determination, we would not need to address the moral character issue. See Berdiev
v. Garland, 13 F.4th 1125, 1137–38 (10th Cir. 2021) (where the Board relies on two
independent, valid grounds to deny relief, we may deny review based on either
ground). We therefore decline to address the “good moral character” issue.
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four separate U Visa applications. The first one lacked supporting documents, but
the last three, all identical, included them. He fails to show how the BIA’s alleged
error in referring to the wrong application prejudiced him.
Second, Mr. Castaneda-Ramirez argues the IJ failed to adequately explain her
denial of his request to terminate proceedings and misstated petitioner’s position
concerning his application. He raised these alleged errors to the BIA and requested it
grant termination. The BIA declined. The criteria for the IJ and the BIA to grant
termination are essentially the same. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(m)(1)(ii) with id.
§ 1003.18(d)(1)(ii). The BIA adequately explained its reasoning for denying
termination.
Third, Mr. Castaneda-Ramirez contends the BIA should not have relied on the
fact that no new evidence had been submitted on appeal concerning his application,
and he argues it should have remanded to the IJ if it believed further fact-finding was
needed. But it was his responsibility to alert the BIA if he had new evidence to
support his application. He fails to show he did so.
Fourth, Mr. Castaneda-Ramirez argues that even though his U Visa has not yet
been granted, he received a “bona fide determination” from USCIS in response to his
December 2023 U Visa application and was granted “deferred action” based on a
showing of “prima facie eligibility,” regulatory terms used in the U Visa application
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context that would support Mr. Casteneda’s motion to terminate proceedings.
4
But
he relies on receipt notices he received from USCIS, which state that USCIS received
and was processing his U Visa form. The notices do not grant any immigration status
or benefit, nor do they evidence that the U Visa application is still pending. The BIA
did not abuse its discretion by declining to grant discretionary termination based on
these notices.
Fifth, although Mr. Castaneda-Ramirez asserts that DHS incorrectly told the IJ
that his application had been denied, Mr. Castaneda-Ramirez has not shown the BIA
relied on that alleged representation.
In sum, Mr. Castaneda-Ramirez has failed to show that the BIA abused its
discretion by declining to terminate the removal proceedings.
III. CONCLUSION
We deny the petition for review.
Entered for the Court

Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
Circuit Judge

4
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(m)(1)(ii)(B), (C); USCIS Policy Manual, Chapter 5 –
Bona Fide Determination Process, https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-3-
part-c-chapter-5.
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