Daniel Grajales; Wanda I. González; Conjugal Partnership Grajales-González v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 18-1424
DANIEL GRAJALES; WANDA I. GONZÁLEZ;
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP GRAJALES-GONZÁLEZ,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
PUERTO RICO PORTS AUTHORITY,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Pedro A. Delgado-Hernández, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Chief Judge,
Thompson and Barron, Circuit Judges.
Eugenio W.A. Géigel-Simounet, with whom Géigel-Simounet Law
Offices C.S.P. was on brief for appellants.
Luis E. Palou Balsa, with whom Jennifer Lopez-Negrón and
Nolla, Palou & Casellas LLC were on brief for appellee.
April 29, 2019

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BARRON, Circuit Judge. This appeal is the latest to
have reached us concerning a suit that Daniel Grajales, his wife,
and their children bring under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Puerto Rico
law against the Puerto Rico Ports Authority (the "PRPA") and
several of its employees after the PRPA transferred him from one
posting at the PRPA to another and then eventually terminated his
employment. In this appeal, Grajales asks us to overturn the
District Court's grant of summary judgment to the PRPA on res
judicata grounds. We affirm.
I.
This appeal represents Grajales's third in this case.
See Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2012)
("Grajales I"); Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 831 F.3d 11 (1st
Cir. 2016) ("Grajales II"). In brief, Grajales alleges that he
was transferred to a new job location and subsequently terminated
from his employment with the PRPA because of both his political
affiliation and his reporting of alleged safety violations by PRPA
employees to the Puerto Rico Occupational Safety and Health
Administration. See Grajales II, 831 F.3d at 14.
Grajales filed the operative complaint in the District
of Puerto Rico on August 31, 2012. He alleged that the PRPA, by
taking such actions against him, violated the First Amendment of
the Federal Constitution and various provisions of Puerto Rico
law. His wife and their minor children also brought claims against

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the PRPA, in which they sought damages under a Puerto Rico tort
statute that permits relatives of those unlawfully terminated from
employment to bring derivative claims.
On May 18, 2012, just before Grajales filed his complaint
in federal court, the Secretary of Labor and Human Resources of
Puerto Rico (the "Secretary of Labor"), "representing and for the
benefit of" Grajales, filed a civil complaint against the PRPA in
the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance. See Complaint, Sec'y of
Labor & Human Res. v. P.R. Ports Auth., No. AC2012-0079 (P.R. Ct.
of First Instance May 18, 2012). The Secretary of Labor alleged
in that complaint that Grajales had observed and reported an
incident that involved the safety of another employee, that the
PRPA had terminated Grajales in retaliation for his reporting of
the incident, and that an investigation by the Puerto Rico
Department of Labor had found that the PRPA engaged in practices
that endangered the authority's employees. The Secretary of Labor
sought Grajales's reinstatement and back pay for him on the basis
of Puerto Rico's Occupational Safety and Health Act, P.R. Laws
Ann. tit. 29, § 361aa, and Puerto Rico's Retaliation in the Work
Place Law, id. § 194a.
On May 17, 2017, while Grajales's federal suit against
the PRPA was still pending, the Court of First Instance entered
judgment in favor of the PRPA. The Court of First Instance ruled
that Grajales's termination was justified for a number of non-

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retaliatory reasons, including acts of insubordination, violation
of various PRPA policies, and disrespectful behavior that created
a hostile work environment for others. The Court of First Instance
also rejected Grajales's contention that he was terminated in
retaliation for his reporting activity.
The PRPA then moved for summary judgment in the District
of Puerto Rico case on res judicata grounds in light of the ruling
by the Court of First Instance, and the District Court granted
that motion. Grajales now appeals from that judgment.
II.
We are dealing here with the claimed res judicata effect
of a judgment of a Commonwealth court and thus with a judgment
that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, must be given "full faith and
credit." Id.; see also R.G. Fin. Corp. v. Vergara-Nuñez, 446 F.3d
178, 182-83 (1st Cir. 2006). In keeping with this statute, we
must give the same res judicata effect to that judgment as the
jurisdiction that issued it would give it in its own courts. 28
U.S.C. § 1738; see also R.G. Fin. Corp., 446 F.3d at 182-83. Thus,
we apply Puerto Rico law to determine the preclusive effect of the
judgment of the Court of First Instance. R.G. Fin. Corp., 446
F.3d at 182-83. Our review of the District Court's res judicata
determination is de novo. Id. at 182.
Puerto Rico's Civil Code provides, in relevant part:

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In order that the presumption of the res
adjudicata may be valid in another suit, it is
necessary that, between the case decided by
the sentence and that in which the same is
invoked, there be the most perfect identity
between the things, causes, and persons of the
litigants, and their capacity as such.
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 3343. Thus, to demonstrate that the
judgment of the Court of First Instance has res judicata effect
here, the PRPA "must establish three elements: (i) the existence
of a prior judgment on the merits that is 'final and unappealable';
(ii) a perfect identity of thing or cause between both actions;
and (iii) a perfect identity of the parties and the capacities in
which they acted." R.G. Fin. Corp., 446 F.3d at 183 (quoting
Boateng v. InterAm Univ., Inc., 210 F.3d 56, 61-62 (1st Cir. 2000))
(applying Puerto Rico law). Even if the PRPA makes that showing,
however, res judicata effect may not be given under Puerto Rico
law to the judgment of the Court of First Instance if "doing so
would defeat the 'ends of justice, especially if reasons of public
policy are involved.'" Núñez-Colón v. Toledo-Dávila, 648 F.3d 15,
19 (quoting Bonafont Solís v. Am. Eagle, Exec. Airline, Inc., 1997
P.R. Eng. 423416, 1997 WL 423416 (P.R. 1997)).
We start with the claims that Grajales brings in his own
right, before then turning to the derivative claims of his wife
and children. With respect to the claim that he brings on his
own, Grajales first contends that the PRPA failed to establish
that the "perfect identity of thing or cause" element had been

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satisfied. Specifically, he contends that the claims that the
Secretary of Labor brought on his behalf in the Court of First
Instance "could not include a claim for damages or for [a] First
Amendment violation" and was only for the "purpose of reinstating
[him] to his previous position" and to recover lost wages.
But, the "identity of thing or cause," we have explained,
"refers to factual cause" and is satisfied where two actions "flow
from the same principal ground or origin." R.G. Fin. Corp., 446
F.3d at 183 (citing Lausell Marxuach v. Diaz de Yanez, 3 P.R.
Offic. Trans. 742, 746 (1975)). Thus, "a mere difference in the
legal theories on which two causes of action are grounded does not
destroy the identity of thing or cause that otherwise exists
between two suits arising out of a common nucleus of operative
fact." Id. at 184 (citing Boateng, 210 F.3d at 62). Instead,
there may still be an "identity of thing or cause" between
Commonwealth and federal actions -- notwithstanding the different
legal theories and remedies sought in each -- if they share "a
common nucleus of operative fact." See id.
We conclude that the District Court correctly determined
that the two actions at issue here do share "a common nucleus of
operative fact." Id. As the PRPA explains, in both actions
Grajales "claims he was dismissed from his employment in
retaliation for complaining about safety issues in the workplace
and/or participating in an investigation performed by [Puerto Rico

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safety agencies]." Accordingly, we reject Grajales's challenge on
this score.
Grajales also relies on Puerto Rico's "public policy
exception," which prevents the application of res judicata in
"special circumstances." García-Monagas v. De Arellano, 674 F.3d
45, 56 (1st Cir. 2012). Specifically, Grajales contends that his
case presents such "special circumstances" because the Secretary
brought the prior suit in the Court of First Instance to remedy a
"violation of . . . Puerto Rico Public Policy" and that the Puerto
Rico court "frustrated the ends of justice" by deciding the matter
"on documents only," i.e., at summary judgment.
But, the first case that Grajales relies on to support
this argument, Pagán-Hernández v. University of Puerto Rico, 7
P.R. Offic. Trans. 795 (P.R. 1978), makes clear that even the
"invocation of a constitutional right" is not sufficient, in and
of itself, to warrant application of the public policy exception.
Id. at 808. We thus fail to see how the nature of the claims that
Grajales brings suffices to show that the public policy exception
to res judicata applies in this case. Nor does Grajales identify
any authority that requires the conclusion that res judicata effect
may not be given to a judgment of a Commonwealth court just because
that court dismissed claims of the sort that Grajales brings here
via summary judgment rather than after a trial.

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In his reply brief, Grajales cites Ramos-González v.
Félix-Medina, 21 P.R. Offic. Trans. 304 (P.R. 1988), to support
his argument that his circumstances should fall into the public
policy exception. In that case, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court
applied the exception to allow to go forward claims alleging
serious misconduct by three marshals of the Puerto Rico General
Court of Justice that had been dismissed based on the plaintiff's
failure to prosecute the action in the Commonwealth court. Id. at
309-11.
The Ramos-González court identified "exceptional
reasons" compelling it "to set aside the finality of a judgment."
Id. at 333. The court explained that it would set a "bad precedent"
to permit a "procedural technicality" -- namely, the dismissal of
the claims based on the plaintiff's failure to prosecute -- "to
defeat the claim of some citizens against three officers of this
branch of government who allegedly tried to take advantage of their
position as such." Id. at 334. The court concluded in that
connection that "[t]here is a public interest at stake in the
instant case: the purity of the judicial process and the trust in
its institutions." Id. at 334.
Here, we see no similarly "exceptional reasons" to
compel us "to set aside the finality of a judgment," id. at 333,
given both the differing nature of the claims that are at issue
here and the fact that they were dismissed based on a grant of

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summary judgment and not by reason of what Ramos-Gonzalez
characterized as a "procedural technicality." Id. at 334. We
thus reject this ground for not giving res judicata effect to the
judgment of the Court of First instance.
We turn, then, to the claims that are brought by
Grajales' wife and children. The contention is that res judicata
does not bar these claims because the PRPA has failed to show that
there is a "perfect identity . . . of parties" between the two
actions that are at issue, given that the Secretary of Labor
brought the suit in the Court of First Instance only on Grajales's
behalf. But, the District Court concluded that the claims of
Grajales's wife and children are brought only "under Article 1802
of the Puerto Rico Civil Code," and no contrary argument has been
made on appeal. That feature of the case matters because, as the
District Court explained, Article 1802 claims are "derivative of
the principal plaintiff's claim in that [they are] premised on
some harm to the principal plaintiff, and 'if the principal
plaintiff's claim fails, so too does the relative's derivative
claim.'" Pagán-Colón v. Walgreens of San Patricio, Inc., 697 F.3d
1, 16 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting González-Figueroa v. J.C. Penney
P.R., Inc., 568 F.3d 313, 320 (1st Cir. 2009)). Thus, because
Grajales's own claims are barred by res judicata, the derivative
claims of his wife and children necessarily fail.

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III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
District Court.

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