United States of America v. Teofilo Tineo-Gonzalez

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 16-2153
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
TEOFILO TINEO-GONZALEZ,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Chief Judge,
Boudin and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
Camille Lizarribar-Buxó on brief for appellant.
Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney,
Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief,
Appellate Division, and John A. Mathews II, Assistant United States
Attorney, on brief for appellee.
June 25, 2018

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BOUDIN, Circuit Judge. Charged with importation of
controlled substances, possession with intent to distribute, and
conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, 952(a), and 963, Teofilo
Tineo-Gonzalez ("Tineo") pled guilty unconditionally after the
start of trial. He now appeals his conviction, arguing that prior
to his plea the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress certain incriminating statements. The facts are as
follows.
On October 3, 2015, Tineo and at least three other
individuals traveled from the Dominican Republic to Puerto Rico in
a small boat loaded with hundreds of brick-shaped packages that
contained, in total, over 210 kilograms of cocaine and 2 kilograms
of heroin. As they finished unloading, private security personnel
from a nearby hotel arrived at the scene, followed by Puerto Rico
police officers. Tineo had fled but was captured a few hours
later.
The arresting officers allegedly read Tineo Miranda
warnings and took him to a local precinct where he was interviewed
by the Puerto Rico police and later by DEA agents. See Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The DEA agents reportedly again
read Tineo Miranda warnings, secured a written waiver, and obtained
incriminating statements, most importantly, that Tineo had indeed
traveled to Puerto Rico in the boat later found to have contained
large quantities of drugs.

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On October 29, 2015, after Tineo was indicted, the court
ordered that pretrial motions be filed "no later than fourteen
(14) days before the trial date." Later, Tineo's trial was set
for March 28, 2016. On February 9, the government filed its
designation of evidence, including statements Tineo had made to
the DEA. On March 23, the government filed an amended designation
of evidence, which included Tineo's statements to the Puerto Rico
police. On March 25, three days before trial, Tineo moved to
suppress the statements made to the police, arguing that the Puerto
Rico police did not in fact read him his Miranda rights and coerced
and intimidated him.
On the first day of Tineo's trial, prior to jury
selection, the district court ruled that Tineo had long known of
his incriminating statements and could have moved to suppress them
before the scheduling order's deadline. Then, after the jury was
sworn in, Tineo entered a straight guilty plea on all counts with
no condition or reservation and no plea agreement with the
government. He was later sentenced to 151 months' imprisonment as
to each count, to be served concurrently.
On this appeal, Tineo argues that the district court
abused its discretion when it denied his motion to suppress as
untimely without reaching the merits of his claim of Miranda
violations. The argument fails. Tineo's motion to suppress was

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filed well after the district court's explicit deadline for
pretrial motions.
Such deadlines are common in the management of
trials--last minute suppression motions can cause havoc for
counsel and witnesses alike--and, in this case, the deadline was
more than generous. Tineo knew of the circumstances surrounding
his statements and had nearly five months between the scheduling
order and the deadline to make his motion. The brief implies that
Tineo had no obligation to make any motion until it became clear
(one might think it always inevitable) that the prosecutor would
offer the statements made to the Puerto Rico police.
Anyhow, "[o]rdinarily a guilty plea, entered
unconditionally--that is, without reserving an issue or issues for
appeal--establishes guilt and forfeits all objections and
defenses." United States v. Gonzalez, 311 F.3d 440, 442 (1st Cir.
2002) (citation omitted). Exceptions to this forfeiture rule
exist, 1 but in general the rule bars challenges based on "case-
related constitutional defects that 'occurred prior to the entry
of the guilty plea.'" Class, slip op. at 6-7 (citing Blackledge,
417 U.S. at 30).
1 These include attacks on the government's power to
criminalize conduct, Class v. United States, No. 16-424 (U.S. Feb.
21, 2018) (constitutionality of statute of conviction); a
vindictive prosecution claim, Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21
(1974); or a double jeopardy claim, Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61
(1975).

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Tineo's present appeal falls squarely within the latter
category. See United States v. Castro-Vazquez, 802 F.3d 28, 32-
33 (1st Cir. 2015). By pleading guilty at trial, Tineo waived his
right to challenge the denial of a motion to suppress "filed on
the eve of trial." Id. at 30; see also Haring v. Prosise, 462
U.S. 306, 321 (1983); Menna, 423 U.S. at 63 n.2. How Tineo expected
to challenge the statements made to the police, where the warnings
and waiver seem ample, is unclear but Tineo's guilty plea forfeited
that claim and that is the end of the matter.
Affirmed.

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