Lan Zhu Pan v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 05-1751
LAN ZHU PAN,
Petitioner,
v.
ALBERTO R. GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER
OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Before
Selya, Lynch, and Howard, Circuit Judges.
Wei Jia and Law Office of Wei Jia on brief for petitioner.
Hillel R. Smith, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation,
Civil Division, Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, and
Terri J. Scadron, Assistant Director, on brief for respondent.
April 17, 2006

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HOWARD, Circuit Judge. Lan Zhu Pan, a citizen of China,
petitions for review of a final order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals denying her claims for asylum and withholding of removal.
We deny the petition.
Petitioner grew up in a small village in southeastern
China. In 1998, her father partnered with Su Fei Pan, a local
Communist Party boss, to start a new business. After an employee
embezzled the business's proceeds, the venture failed and
petitioner's father was left unable to pay off his outstanding
loans. Su Fei Pan, however, brokered a deal to clear the father's
debts. A wealthy Taiwanese man would pay off the debts if
petitioner's father would permit the man to marry his daughter,
petitioner's older sister. Petitioner's father agreed, but the
sister, who was 19 years younger than the Taiwanese man, refused
and ran away from home.
A month later, in September 1999, Su Fei Pan attempted to
broker the same deal but with petitioner taking the place of her
older sister. Su Fei Pan told petitioner that her older sister was
waiting for her in a hotel in the city of Fuzhou (a two hour drive
from her village). When petitioner entered the hotel room, she was
grabbed by an older man, presumably the Taiwanese man, who then
tried to force her down onto the bed. Petitioner resisted and was
able to escape. She fled from the hotel and went into hiding.
From September 1999 until February 2002, petitioner lived in

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Fuzhou, working in the textile and shoe factories. She did not
return home during this time, nor did she see the Taiwanese man or
Su Fei Pan again. A friend in the city subsequently helped
petitioner procure a bogus visa. On February 22, 2002, petitioner
left China and arrived at Los Angeles International Airport later
that day.
After presenting her fraudulent visa, petitioner was
taken into custody and placed in removal proceedings. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (barring entry of an alien who seeks admission
by fraud); id. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (barring entry of any alien
not in possession of a valid visa or other entry documents).
Petitioner conceded removability and applied for asylum and
withholding of removal. See id. §§ 1158, 1231(b)(3). Following a
hearing, an immigration judge denied petitioner's claims and
ordered her removal to China. The Board of Immigration Appeals
dismissed her appeal, and this petition for review followed.
We review the Board's denial of asylum and withholding of
removal under the deferential substantial evidence standard, under
which the decision will stand unless "the record evidence would
compel a reasonable factfinder to make a contrary determination."
Romilus v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Guzman
v. INS, 327 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2003)). Legal conclusions are
evaluated de novo, "with appropriate deference to the agency's
interpretation of the underlying statute in accordance with

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administrative law principles." Gailius v. INS, 147 F.3d 34, 43
(1st Cir. 1998).
An asylum applicant bears the burden of establishing her
eligibility for relief. Romilus, 385 F.3d at 6; 8 U.S.C. §
1158(b)(1). That burden requires proof of a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of a statutorily protected ground,
including, among others, membership in a particular social group.
Romilus, 385 F.3d at 6. A showing of past persecution creates a
presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution. See Khalil v.
Ashcroft, 337 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2003).
Although the immigration judge did not credit
petitioner's alleged motive for coming to the United States -- to
escape persecution -- he accepted her narrative of factual events
as "essentially credible." Nevertheless, the judge denied her
asylum and withholding claims because she had failed to establish
that she belonged to a particular social group. On appeal, the
Board agreed that "young women from rural China" is too broad to be
considered a "particular social group" within the purview of the
immigration laws. See Ravindran v. INS, 976 F.2d 754, 761 & n.5
(1st Cir. 1992). Even assuming the more narrowly defined category
of "unmarried young wom[en] from rural China . . . who have
resisted being forced into marriages and sexual relationships by a
person in power" could be a valid social group, the Board held that
petitioner had failed on the evidence to establish that such women

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are targets of persecution in China. The Board therefore concluded
that petitioner had failed to establish a well-founded fear of
persecution in China on account of her membership in a particular
social group.
In her brief to this court, petitioner abandons her
contention that her social group, for asylum purposes, consists
broadly of "young women from rural China." Instead, she urges this
court to hold, as a matter of law, that "young unmarried women from
rural China who have resisted forced marriages and forced sexual
relationships by a person in power constitute an appropriate
particular social group." Because we uphold the Board's analysis,
we need not decide this question.
Even assuming arguendo that petitioner's proffered social
group is valid for asylum purposes, she has failed to establish
that she has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of her
membership in that group. Petitioner's only evidence of
persecution is that her father and his business associate attempted
to sell her and her sister into an arranged marriage (or some other
kind of involuntary sexual relationship), and that both she and her
sister successfully resisted and escaped. But there is no evidence
of persecution following petitioner's escape from the hotel.
Petitioner never again saw Su Fei Pan or the Taiwanese man.
Indeed, although Petitioner remained in China for two and a half
years following the hotel incident, she was never punished or

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persecuted because of her resistance. See Velasquez v. Ashcroft,
342 F.3d 55, 59 (1st Cir. 2003) (no well-founded fear of
persecution where petitioners remained in the country for eight
years after the alleged persecution), abrogated on other grounds by
Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 266 (1st Cir. 2005); Novoa-Umania
v. INS, 896 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1990) (no ongoing threat of
persecution where petitioner stayed in the country for six months
without incident). She likewise has presented no evidence that
anyone in China now intends to punish her for her resistance.
Nor has petitioner presented evidence establishing that
other young unmarried women from rural China who have similarly
resisted forced sexual relationships have been persecuted on that
basis. Petitioner relies on a State Department Country Report
acknowledging that China has problems generally with domestic
violence, arranged marriages, sex trafficking, and prostitution.
The country report does not, however, indicate that women who have
resisted forced sexual relationships are singled out for
persecution. Nor does the country report indicate that such women
cannot find safety, as petitioner did, by relocating within China,
or that the government of China condones forced sexual
relationships. See Galicia v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 446, 448 (1st
Cir. 2005) (no well-founded fear where petitioner's claims of
country-wide and government-sponsored or -condoned discrimination
were not supported in the country report).

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For these reasons, the evidence is insufficient to compel
a finding that petitioner's fear of persecution on account of her
resistance is objectively reasonable. Romilus, 385 F.3d at 7 (a
well-founded fear of persecution requires that the applicant's fear
be both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable). Because
petitioner failed to satisfy the more lenient asylum standard, she
a fortiori cannot satisfy the more demanding standard for
withholding of removal. See id. at 8.
The petition for review is denied.

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