United States v. Eric Judkins

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 00-1597
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
ERIC JUDKINS,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Selya and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
Tina Schneider on brief for appellant.
Mark E. Howard, Assistant United States Attorney, and Paul
M. Gagnon, United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
October 5, 2001

-- 1 of 7 --

-- 2 of 7 --

-3-
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Eric Judkins appeals from his
conviction for bank robbery and interstate transportation of
stolen property, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), 2314 (1994). Judkins
argues that the evidence was neither sufficient to show: (1)
that the bank involved, the Gateway Credit Union, was federally
insured, nor (2) that it was a “Federal credit union” or a
“State-chartered credit union” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113. The second argument assumes the legal principle, denied
by the government, that the government must show more than that
the bank was federally insured. We affirm.
I.
The Gateway Credit Union is a credit union located in
Hudson, New Hampshire. On May 7, 1999, at approximately 2:00
p.m., Gateway was robbed of approximately $21,000. A bank
employee testified at trial that Gateway's deposits are
federally insured by the National Credit Union Administration
("NCUA"). She read Gateway's state charter number into the
record, then described the bank’s loss calculation. At trial,
Judkins did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to
federal insurance, or as to the state-chartered status. On
October 20, 1999, the jury convicted Judkins of bank robbery in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113 and interstate transportation of
stolen property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. The district

-- 3 of 7 --

-4-
court sentenced Judkins to a 210-month term for bank robbery to
run concurrently with a 120-month term for interstate
transportation of stolen property.
II.
Because Judkins failed to raise a lack of
sufficiency claim at the district court, he has waived this
argument on appeal unless his conviction is "clearly and
grossly unjust." United States v. Neal, 36 F.3d 1190, 1207
(1st Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Lopez, 709 F.2d 742,
746 (1st Cir. 1983)). That he cannot do. Taking the evidence
in favor of the government, it was sufficient. United States
v. Alicea, 205 F.3d 480, 483 (1st Cir. 2000).
Judkins first argues the government failed to
present sufficient evidence that Gateway was federally insured
on May 7, 1999, the date of the robbery, as opposed to at the
date of trial. Proof of federal insurance at the time of the
robbery is an essential element for conviction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113. See United States v. Johnson, 71 F.3d 139, 142-43
(4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Brunson, 907 F.2d 117, 118-
119 (10th Cir. 1990). To prove the federally-insured status
of Gateway, the government elicited uncontradicted testimony
from Rolande Suchocki, the manager and treasurer of Gateway.

-- 4 of 7 --

1 Although the threshold required by courts to prove that
federal insurance existed at the time of the offense is not
substantial, the government would be wise to heed the warnings
sounded by other circuits. The Fifth Circuit held that oral
testimony was sufficient to prove insurance at the time of the
robbery, but castigated the government for repeatedly failing to
prove this element more diligently. United States v. Maner, 611
F.2d 107, 111-12 (5th Cir. 1980). The Eighth Circuit also
admonished the government: "[W]e are at a loss to understand why
the government did not introduce more specific evidence
regarding the bank's insured status on the date of the offense,
including a copy of the certificate of insurance." United
States v. Hadamek, 28 F.3d 827, 828 (8th Cir. 1994).
-5-
Suchocki testified that Gateway is a credit union, is
federally insured, and is a member of NCUA.
While it would have been far better if the testimony
had been focused on the bank’s status on the date of the
robbery, that evidence suffices under this highly deferential
standard of review. See, e.g., United States v. Rangel, 728
F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1984) (assistant vice president of credit
union's testimony in robbery trial that the union "is"
federally insured by NCUA is sufficient to allow inference that
it was insured at the time of the offense, which occurred about
two years prior to the trial); United States v. Knop, 701 F.2d
670, 672-73 (7th Cir. 1983) (bank president's testimony that
bank "is" insured allowed a reasonable jury inference that it
was insured at the time of the offense, which occurred roughly
two years before the trial).1

-- 5 of 7 --

-6-
Judkins also argues that the government lacked
sufficient evidence to prove that Gateway was either a federal
credit union or a state-chartered credit union, and that such a
showing is required by 18 U.S.C. § 2113. This statute defines
a credit union as "any Federal credit union and any State-
chartered credit union the accounts of which are insured by the
National Credit Union Administration Board. . . . The term
'State-chartered credit union' includes a credit union
chartered under the laws of a State of the United States . . .
." 18 U.S.C. § 2113(g). The legal premise of the argument is
that the government has to show, beyond the federal insurance,
that the bank is also either a federal credit union or a state-
chartered one. Judkins’ legal argument, which the government
disputes, is waived because it was not presented below.
The evidence here suffices even were Judkins’s legal
argument accepted. Suchocki testified to Gateway's federal
insurance and read its state charter number into the record.
Judkins argues that because the government neglected to
elaborate on the significance of the state charter number, it
failed to sustain its burden. We disagree. "Chains of
inference are a familiar, widely accepted ingredient of any
process of ratiocination. This method of reasoning, commonly
called logic, is regularly relied upon in the realm of human

-- 6 of 7 --

-7-
endeavor, and should not be forbidden to a criminal jury."
United States v. Spinney, 65 F.3d 231, 238 (1st Cir. 1995).
Here, the testimony of Suchocki coupled with the state charter
number permits an inference that Gateway was a state-chartered
credit union with federal insurance. Viewing this evidence in
the light most favorable to the verdict, we cannot say the
conviction is “clearly and grossly unjust.”
Affirmed.

-- 7 of 7 --