Singh, Surinder, Applicant v. S LINE TRANSPORTATION, AJAIB SINGH KAHLON; UNISURED EMPLOYERS BENEFIT TRUST FUND Defendants

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SURINDER SINGH, Applicant
vs.
S LINE TRANSPORTATION, AJAIB SINGH KAHLON; UNISURED EMPLOYERS
BENEFIT TRUST FUND
Defendants
Adjudication Number: ADJ16790828
Oakland District Office
OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING PETITION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
AND DECISION AFTER
RECONSIDERATION
Applicant seeks reconsideration of the Findings and Order (F&O) issued on July 15, 2025.
The workers’ compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) found that applicant was not an
employee of defendant S Line Transportation (S Line).
Applicant argues that applicant’s testimony as to his job duties as well as evidence of
payment from S Line to applicant support a finding that applicant was employed by defendant (S
Line).
Defendant filed an answer. Because the trial WCJ is no longer available, the Presiding WCJ
issued a Report and Recommendation (Report) recommending denial of the Petition.
We have considered the allegations of the Petition for Reconsideration and the Answer and
the contents of the Report of the WCJ with respect thereto. Based on our review of the record, and
for the reasons discussed below, we will grant reconsideration, rescind the decision and return the
matter to the trial level for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
Applicant filed an application for adjudication on October 7, 2022 alleging a specific injury
to his back, neck, right hand, chest, right finger, and lower extremities while employed by S Line

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on December 16, 2021. The limited medical record indicates that applicant was actually injured
on December 13, 2021, when a container truck backed up and pinned applicant against a wall
resulting in a crush injury. (Defendant A & Applicant 1.) On December 20, 2021, the applicant
advised his physician that he was employed as a security guard. (Applicant 1, p. 29.)
This matter proceeded to a Mandatory Settlement Conference on November 15, 2023.
Applicant objected to the matter being set for trial as they were pending further discovery to
develop the record, but the matter was set over his objection.
The first day of trial was June 18, 2024. The parties stipulated that the date of injury was
December 16, 2021 and that applicant claimed to have been working as a security guard for S Line
at the time of injury. (Minutes of Hearing/Summary of Evidence (MOH/SOE), 06/18/2024, 2:19-
24.) The only issue set was the issue of employment. (MOH/SOE, 06/18/2024, 2:40.)
Applicant was called as a witness through the assistance of a Punjabi interpreter and
testified as follows:
Applicant testified that he began working for S Line on August 31, 2021 as a security guard
in an area where trucks were loaded. (MOH/SOE, 06/18/2024, 3:26-29). His understanding was
that he was hired by Ajab Singh, a manager for S Line, but that the company was owned by Bobby
Singh. (MOH/SOE, 06/18/2024, 3:32.) They agreed to a salary of $3,000 per month which was
ultimately paid by direct deposit into a bank account set up by Ajab Singh. (MOH/SOE,
06/18/2024, 3:38, 4:17-18.) Applicant testified that he lived in an RV located on the S Line Yard.
(MOH/SOE, 06/18/2024, 3:40-41.) He did not testify as to whether this was part of the
employment agreement or who allowed him to live on site. He was not provided with meals, but
other co-workers would bring groceries and cook. (MOH/SOE, 06/18/2024, 4:21-23.) He would
rotate morning and evening shifts weekly with another security guard. Each shift was 8am-8pm
and 8pm-8am. (MOH/SOE, 06/18/2024, 3:34-36.) Keys to unspecified trailers were kept in the
security guard room and were numbered. (MOH/SOE, 06/18/2024, 5:45-47.)
He provided detailed testimony regarding his job duties. He would keep a log of vehicles
that came and went. The summary indicates that there were log forms in English with entries for
where the deliveries were going, origination and destination addresses, name of company, etc.
(MOH/SOE, 06/18/2024, 4:4-9.) He would take pictures and send them to dispatch. (MOH/SOE,
06/18/2024, 4:11.) There is no information in the record about what was being photographed. Ajab
Singh and another person only identified as “Sonu” would assign him tasks. (MOH/SOE,

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06/18/2024, 4:11-13.) The logs were given over to another security guard during shift changes.
(MOH/SOE, 06/18/2024, 6:2-4.) The applicant witnessed Ajab paying “KK” in cash, and the
applicant wrote down the date, time, and how much was paid. (MOH/SOE, 06/18/2024, 6:7-12).
Applicant was in the process of applying for asylum through an immigration attorney Anil
Vinij. His attorney referred him to Ajab Singh. (MOH/SOE, 06/18/2024, 4:39-45). A reason for
the referral is not clarified.
His phone is through TMobile and he used WhatsApp to text. He stated “Henry” or
someone else at the yard helped him pay for the phone. (MOH/SOE, 06/18/2024, 5:4-6.) There
was no clarification as to who Henry is or whether the other person were employed by S Line or
otherwise affiliated.
No questions were asked about the date of the injury or the circumstances involving the
injury. Applicant testified that after his injury Ajib Singh and Bobby Singh visited him and made
him sign documents. (MOH/SOE, 06/18/2024, 5:16-25.) He was told that they would not fill out
disability documents for him. (MOH/SOE, 06/18/2024, 16-17.)
The second day of trial was August 12, 2024. Applicant was not present. Sukhbinder Singh
Sibhu,1 the owner of S Line, was called by defendant. He testified that he is the sole owner of S
Line which is a company that hauls ocean containers. (MOH/SOE, 08/12/2024, 2:11-13.) S Line
does not own any of the trucks used to do the hauling and all of their drivers are independent
contactors. (MOH/SOE, 08/12/2024, 2:12.) S Line receives jobs from brokers, which are sent to
drivers who can refuse any job. The drivers get 90% of the money and S Line gets 10%.
(MOH/SOE, 08/12/2024, 3:14-19.) He testified that every independent contractor uses their name
as their business name. (MOH/SOE, 08/12/2024, 4:1.)
The containers are picked up and dropped off at the S Line yard at the Port of Oakland.
The yard is open with two modular trailers that do not have a kitchen or living space, but do have
a bathroom (MOH/SOE, 08/12/2024, 2:15-18.) They do not use security guards at the yard.
(MOH/SOE, 08/12/2024, 2:26.) Dispatch is located in India who keeps track. There is no log.
(MOH/SOE, 08/12/2024, 2:29-32.) The witness was shown pictures of a module, but the pictures
were not identified or admitted into evidence. He testified that no one has ever lived on the lot.
(MOH/SOE, 08/12/2024, 3:36-38.)
1 From the context of the record, it appears that this individual is also referred to as “Bobby” but that is never
confirmed. We will refer to the persons by the names as they are used in the record throughout testimony.

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Mr. Sibhu testified that he did not hire the applicant, but knew him through Ajab Singh.
(MOH/SOE, 08/12/2024, 2:20-21.) He testified that Ajab Singh is not an employee. (MOH/SOE,
08/12/2024, 2:41.) He did give Ajab Singh $3000.00 as a loan, then stated that he gave two loans
without knowing what the loan was for. (MOH/SOE, 08/12/2024, 3:43-44.)
The next witness called was Ravisher Singh. He testified that he performs sales for S Line.
(MOH/SOE, 08/12/2024, 4:15.) S Line used to have a physical office, but the office moved to the
yard during COVID. (MOH/SOE, 08/12/2024, 4:19-20.) According to Mr. Singh, no one works at
the yard on a daily basis and he never works at the office at the yard either. (MOH/SOE,
08/12/2024, 4:25, 32.) They do not keep logbooks as they have a third party software and a
company overseas that plans the loads. (MOH/SOE, 08/12/2024, 4:39-40.) They do not tell the
drivers where to park. (MOH/SOE, 08/12/2024, 4:44.)
He does not know the applicant. (MOH/SOE, 08/12/2024, 4:30.) He believes that if
someone were living in the yard, a driver would tell them and the Port would not allow anyone to
live there. (MOH/SOE, 08/12/2024, 5:1, 5:27.) Ajab has a key to the modular units which he hides
so that the drivers can find it to use the restroom. (MOH/SOE, 08/12/2024, 5:21-22.)
Ajaib Khlon, who appears to be the same person as the aforementioned Ajab Singh and is
later referred to as Ajaib Singh Kahlon also testified. He is a truck owner/operator. He has worked
for S Line since 2009 and is at the yard one to five days per week to drop off an empty container
or pick up a load. (MOH/SOE, 08/12/2024, 5:39-41.) He testified that he is not a manager.
(MOH/SOE, 08/12/2024, 6:13.)
He knew applicant from a temple that they attended in Sacramento. (MOH/SOE,
08/12/2024, 5:5.) Applicant asked the witness for money to assist with his asylum claim. The
witness borrowed money from “Bobby.” (MOH/SOE, 08/12/2024, 6:1-4.) He testified that he does
not know if the loan was part of his 1099 and he paid the applicant with a personal check.
(MOH/SOE, 08/12/2024. 7:4-6.) He has never taken the applicant to the yard, has never seen him
there before, never showed him where the key was, but has dropped him off in Oakland across
from the yard. (MOH/SOE, 08/12/2024, 6:27-28.) He testified that applicant never worked for
him. (MOH/SOE, 08/12/2024, 7:3.)
There is a trailer on the yard that has office supplies and a bathroom. He has the key with
him sometimes, but the key is mostly under the mat so that the drivers can use the restroom.
(MOH/SOE, 08/12/2024, 6:17-23.)

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The matter was continued again to September 24, 2024 when the applicant was re-called
to testify. He was asked again about the RVs at the yard in S Line. He confirmed that in his
deposition he testified to staying in an RV on the property and confirmed that there were two RVs
on S Line’s property, one of which people stayed in and the other used as an office. (MOH/SOE,
09/24/2024, 2:4-9.) There was no kitchen, but people would bring a gas cylinder to cook with.
(MOH/SOE, 09/24/2024, 2:9-10.)
Applicant testified to the specificities of his job as follows:
He worked in the S Line yard as a security guard. The items loaded into the trucks
came from different locations. Some containers on the yard were empty and some
full. They were transported from the yard. The containers are sealed, but there is a
paper on the container indicating its contents. At the security post, when people
were coming in, they would say if the containers were full or empty, and the witness
would direct them where to park, and keep a handwritten log. His job was to
document who was coming in and out. He would also look at which trailers were
full and contact dispatch. He was not responsible for repairing punctures to tires,
but would over see when people came out to repair them.
(MOH/SOE, 09/24/2024, 2.10-11.)
He testified that he received instructions from Ajaib and would speak to Ajaib everyday as
Ajaib would come in the morning between 4:30 to 5:00am and then again in the evening.
(MOH/SOE, 09/24/2024, 2:20-23.) He testified that he slept on a green cot purchased by Ajaib.
(MOH/SOE, 09/24/2024, 3:3-4.)
Applicant filed an amended application on October 21, 2024, added Ajaib Singh Kahlon
as an additional defendant. Service of the application on Mr. Kahlon was unsuccessful and on
December 12, 2024 the matter was continued with an order that applicant publish a special notice
of lawsuit. The parties appeared for a status conference on February 27, 2025, but the matter was
continued again.
The final day of trial proceeded on May 20, 2025. Applicant objected to the proceeding
moving forward as applicant’s counsel was attempting to serve “the new defendant,” presumably
with the amended application, but was unable to. The “ new defendant” was “drop served” at the
trial. Applicant requested a continuance so that a petition for joinder could be filed. There was no
ruling on the objection noted, but the proceedings did move forward. (MOH/SOE, 05/20/2025,
2:5-8.)

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“Ravi Sher Singh” was recalled as a witness.2 He testified again that he does not have a
key to the portable without the bathroom (thereafter referred to as portable 2) and that he never
furnished a cot for ‘portable 2.’ (MOH/SOE, 05/20/2025, 2:15-16.) He has never seen a cot in the
portable and does not believe there is room for a cot. (MOH/SOE, 05/20/2025, 3:1-3.) He was then
shown pictures of the alleged ‘portable 2’ which were not offered or admitted into evidence.
(MOH/SOE, 05/20/2025, 3:4-7.)
Ajaib Kahlon was then recalled to testify. He testified that “Bobby” is the only person who
has a key to portable 2. He has only seen ‘portable 2’ three times a month and has never been
inside of it. (MOH/SOE, 05/20/2025, 3:14.)
Sukhbinder Singh Sidhu was recalled. He confirmed that he is the only person with a key
to portable 2 which is the smaller storage unit. (MOH/SOE, 05/20/2025, 3:17-19.) All of the items
in the unit are his and came from a move from their prior physical office. (MOH/SOE, 05/20/2025,
3:20-23.)
On June 5, 2025, applicant filed a petition to join Ajaib Singh Kahlon. The order joining
Ajaib Singh Kahlon issued on June 10, 2025.
On July 15, 2025, the WCJ issued the F&O findings that applicant is not an employee of S
Line and deferring all other issues. In the accompanying opinion, the WCJ indicated that she did
not find applicant as credible as the defense witnesses.
DISCUSSION
I
Former Labor Code section 59093 provided that a petition for reconsideration was deemed
denied unless the Appeals Board acted on the petition within 60 days from the date of filing. (Lab.
Code, § 5909.) Effective July 2, 2024, section 5909 was amended to state in relevant part that:
(2) 	A petition for reconsideration is deemed to have been denied by the appeals
board unless it is acted upon within 60 days from the date a trial judge
transmits a case to the appeals board.
(b)
(1) 	When a trial judge transmits a case to the appeals board, the trial
judge shall provide notice to the parties of the case and the appeals board.
2 This appears to be Ravisher Singh, who testified in part 2 of the trial on August 12. 2024.
3 All further statutory references will be to the Labor Code unless otherwise indicated.

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(2) 	For purposes of paragraph (1), service of the accompanying report,
pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 5900, shall constitute providing
notice.
Under section 5909(a), the Appeals Board must act on a petition for reconsideration within
60 days of transmission of the case to the Appeals Board. Transmission is reflected in Events in
the Electronic Adjudication Management System (EAMS). 	Specifically, in Case Events, under
Event Description is the phrase “Sent to Recon” and under Additional Information is the phrase
“The case is sent to the Recon board.”
Here, according to Events, the case was transmitted to the Appeals Board on September
11, 2025 and 60 days from the date of transmission is November 10, 2025. This decision is issued
by or on November 10, 2025, so that we have timely acted on the petition as required by Labor
Code section 5909(a).
Section 5909(b)(1) requires that the parties and the Appeals Board be provided with notice
of transmission of the case. Transmission of the case to the Appeals Board in EAMS provides
notice to the Appeals Board. Thus, the requirement in subdivision (1) ensures that the parties are
notified of the accurate date for the commencement of the 60-day period for the Appeals Board to
act on a petition. Section 5909(b)(2) provides that service of the Report and Recommendation shall
be notice of transmission.
Here, according to the proof of service for the Report and Recommendation by the workers’
compensation administrative law judge, the Report was served on September 11, 2025 and the
case was transmitted to the Appeals Board on September 11, 2025. Service of the Report and
transmission of the case to the Appeals Board occurred on the same day. Thus, we conclude that
the parties were provided with the notice of transmission required by section 5909(b)(1) because
service of the Report in compliance with section 5909(b)(2) provided them with actual notice as
to the commencement of the 60-day period on September 11, 2025.
II
We first address the issues with the record.
Decisions of the Appeals Board “must be based on admitted evidence in the record.”
(Hamilton v. Lockheed Corporation (Hamilton) (2001) 66 Cal.Comp.Cases 473, 476 (Appeals
Board en banc).) An adequate and complete record is necessary to understand the basis for the
WCJ’s decision. (Lab. Code, § 5313.) “It is the responsibility of the parties and the WCJ to ensure

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that the record is complete when a case is submitted for decision on the record. At a minimum, the
record must contain, in properly organized form, the issues submitted for decision, the admissions
and stipulations of the parties, and admitted evidence.” (Hamilton, supra, 66 Cal.Comp.Cases at
p. 475.) An adequate and complete record is necessary to understand the basis for the WCJ’s
decision. (Lab. Code, § 5313; see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10787.) “It is the responsibility of
the parties and the WCJ to ensure that the record is complete when a case is submitted for decision
on the record. At a minimum, the record must contain, in properly organized form, the issues
submitted for decision, the admissions and stipulations of the parties, and admitted evidence.”
(Hamilton, supra, 66 Cal.Comp.Cases at p. 475.)
It is well established that decisions by the Appeals Board must be supported by substantial
evidence. (§§ 5903, 5952(d); Lamb v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 274 [39
Cal.Comp.Cases 310]; Garza v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 312 [35
Cal.Comp.Cases 500]; LeVesque v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627 [35
Cal.Comp.Cases 16].) “The term ‘substantial evidence’ means evidence which, if true, has
probative force on the issues. It is more than a mere scintilla, and means such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion…It must be reasonable in
nature, credible, and of solid value.” (Braewood Convalescent Hospital v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeals Bd. (Bolton) (1983) 34 Cal.3d 159, 164 [48 Cal.Comp.Cases 566].) The law has long
recognized that where the WCAB cannot reach a just and reasoned decision on the existing record
because the evidence is insufficient, unclear or conflicting, the WCAB has the power and even the
duty to further develop the record under sections 5701 and 5906. When the record is inadequate to
address the issues framed by the parties, “the WCJ has a duty to develop an adequate record.”
(Kuykendall v Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 396, 403 [65 Cal. Comp. Cases
264], italics added; McClune v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1117 [63
Cal.Comp.Cases 261].) The duty arises out of the Board’s obligation to completely adjudicate the
issues submitted for decision by the parties, consistent with principles of due process. (Telles
Transport v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Zuniga) (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165 [66
Cal.Comp.Cases 1290].) Here, the record is replete with inconsistencies and missing information,
and it is inadequate to address the issue of employment.
For example, the record refers to photographs which were shown to defendant’s witnesses
on August 12, 2024 and again on May 20, 2025. WCAB Rule 10787(c)(3) requires a descriptive

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listing of all exhibits received for identification or in evidence with the identity of the part offering
the same. These were never identified or admitted into the record as exhibits, nor were they listed
in the pre-trial conference statement. As a result, they are not properly part of the record and cannot
be relied upon. Further, not only were the photographs not identified by the date taken, they were
also not shown to applicant, and in fact, applicant was not present on either date that the
photographs were shown. Moreover, it is unclear whether the witnesses were talking about the
same portable, which has created a very confusing record.
We agree with applicant that the bank account statement is vital to their argument and lends
itself to a finding of employment. However, the parties imply, and the WCJ reiterates (Opinion, p.
8), that the account belonged to Ajaib Kahlon Singh, but the document itself indicates that the
account is in the name of applicant. (Exhibit 2.) Applicant testified that he opened the account with
Ajaib, but it is never clarified whether Ajaib opened it in his own name. This is highly relevant
because the other witnesses testified that the “loan” was to Ajaib, not the applicant. The evidence
shows that the account is in applicant’s name and two payments directly from S Line in the amount
of his alleged salary were remitted to him on December 2, 2021 and October 25, 2021. Further
confusing the issue, Sukhbinder Singh Sibhu testified that, “payments were marked as security on
the bank 	statement 	for 	his 	accountant.” (MOH/SOE, 	08/12/2024, 	2:34-35.) 	There is 	no
clarification as to what payments were being discussed. He testified that he never paid applicant.
(MOH/SOE, 08/12/2024, 3:43-44.) However, on the bank statement, again in applicant’s name,
the 10/25/2021 payment of $3000.00 states, “ACH Pmt S Line Transport Pay Payment from Month
of September 9/1/2021 to 09..” The payment appears to be made from S Line directly to applicant
and correlates to the first date that applicant testified working for S Line. Then on December 2,
2021 a second payment is made and is described as, “ACH Pmt S Line Transport pay for S Line
yard security guard Month of 10/15/20.” Defendant Sukhbinder Singh Sibhu must clarify not only
why he was told by the accountant to list security, but why he actually listed “yard security guard.”
Quite frankly, the bank statement listing applicant’s name with a payment from S Line indicating
payment for “yard security guard” services may be sufficient on its own to support a finding that
applicant was an employee.
The record indicates the existence of documentary evidence that is relevant to deciding the
issue of employment. Applicant testified that he was asked to keep a log of inbound and outbound
trucks and report the same to dispatch through the text app WhatsApp. While it is unclear whether

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the logs are available as defendant denies keeping them, defendant apparently made a demand for
the WhatsApp messages at the deposition and applicant did not offer them into evidence. In San
Bernardino Cmty. Hosp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (McKernan) 74 Cal.App.4th 928 [64
Cal.Comp.Cases 986] (McKernan)), the court granted the Board the ability to, “act to develop the
record with new evidence if, for example, it concludes that neither side has presented substantial
evidence on which a decision could be based, and even that this principle may be appropriately
applied in favor of the employee.” Here, the record is so inconsistent that the production of these
documents or verification that they do not exist or are not available is necessary to creating a
substantial record. While the WCJ may have not found applicant credible, applicant did provide
fairly detailed testimony regarding the alleged process of S Line, including knowing that they used
dispatch in India. It is troublesome that defendant’s witness indicated that they did not use logs or
people on site. Yet, they did not clarify how dispatch knew when the trucks were inbound and
outbound.
Further, the WCJ relies on Exhibit C, a letter purportedly authored by applicant, as
evidence that applicant “just happened” to be at the yard as opposed to working at the yard. Section
5708 makes clear that the WCAB is not bound by the common law or statutory rules of evidence
and procedure, and that it “may make inquiry into the manner, through oral testimony and records,
which is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties.” While not required,
Evidence Code section 1400 is instructive that a “writing is authenticated by (a) the introduction
of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that it is what the writing that the proponent of the
evidence claims it is or (b) the establishment of such facts by any other means provided by law.”
(Evid. Code, § 1400.) Though applicant did not object, we cannot rely on this document as it was
not authenticated, and its origin is questionable. First, applicant was not asked to authenticate this
letter at trial, nor was he asked about its contents. Second, it is written in English when applicant
only speaks Punjabi. Third, the letter is not addressed to any person or entity. Beyond the
authenticity issue, the WCJ only relies on one comment while ignoring that the letter does indicate
that the accident happened in the yard while he was removing the king pin lock from a container
so that a truck driver could attach it. Defendant offers this letter to disprove employment, yet the
activities outlined in the letter support applicant being at the S Line site and performing duties that
are ostensibly consistent with his testimony regarding the job requirements. All of the defense
witnesses were adamant that no one stayed or worked at the yard, yet they offered a letter that

11
indicates otherwise. Further testimony is required to verify the information in the letter as well as
to authenticate it.
Finally, Ajaib Kahlon Singh was joined as an additional party after the trial had already
been submitted.4 Over applicant’s objection, the WCJ continued with proceedings. In this case,
Mr. Singh is an indispensable party as a potential employer. The matter should not have been heard
or decided until he was properly joined. All parties to a workers’ compensation proceeding retain
the fundamental right to due process and a fair hearing under both the California and United States
Constitutions. (Rucker v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 151, 157-158 [65
Cal.Comp.Cases 805].) A fair hearing is “. . . one of ‘the rudiments of fair play’ assured to every
litigant . . .” (Id. at p. 158.) As stated by the California Supreme Court in Carstens v. Pillsbury
(1916) 172 Cal. 572, [The] commission, . . . must find facts and declare and enforce rights and
liabilities, -- in short, it acts as a court, and it must observe the mandate of the constitution of the
United States that this cannot be done except after due process of law. (Id. at p. 577.) Because the
parties are so intertwined, the issue of multiple employments cannot be bifurcated, and due process
requires that all potential employers be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. Even if the
record were not in shambles as it is here, due process would still require that the decision be
rescinded and remanded.
III
While we make no final conclusions as to the merits, due to the flawed legal analysis by
the WCJ, we wish to outline the correct legal analysis with respect to 	the instant employment
dispute.
California has a no-fault workers’ compensation system. With few exceptions, all
California employers are liable for the compensation provided by the system to employees injured
4 or disabled in the course of and arising out of their employment, "irrespective of the fault of
either party.” (Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 4.) The protective goal of California’s no-fault workers’
compensation legislation is manifested “by defining ‘employment’ broadly in terms of ‘service to
an employer’ and by including a general presumption that any person ‘in service to another’ is a
covered ‘employee.’” (Lab. Code, §§ 3351, 5705(a)1; S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of
Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341, 354 [54 Cal.Comp.Cases 80].)
4 For the sake of clarity, the application was first amended to include Mr. Kahlon as an additional defendant but service
could not be effectuated. Subsequently, a petition for joinder was filed, and an order for joinder issued.

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An “employee” is defined as “every person in the service of an employer under any
appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, whether
lawfully or unlawfully employed.” (Lab. Code, § 3351.) Further, any person rendering service for
another, other than as an independent contractor or other excluded classification, is presumed to
be an employee. (Lab. Code, § 3357.) Here, the WCJ apparently disregarded the evidence of the
bank statement listing applicant’s name with a payment from S Line indicating payment for “yard
security guard” services. Defendant’s claims that it did not intend to hire applicant cannot change
the fact that the evidence appears to indicate that applicant rendered the service.
Based on our preliminary review, it appears that defendant’s argument is that applicant
never provided service and that it never intended to hire applicant in any capacity. In her Opinion,
the WCJ discussed the analysis of whether defendant met its burden to show that applicant was an
independent contractor, but that would be irrelevant if applicant did not render service and
defendant never intended to hire applicant. However, so as to make sure that the law is clearly
explained, section 3351 was amended, effective July 1, 2020, so that if applicable, defendant must
meet its burden to show that applicant was an independent contractor pursuant to section 2775 and
not Borello, supra.
Once an applicant meets the burden of proving that they rendered service for defendant, the
burden shifts to defendant to rebut the employment presumption with proof that that the service was
rendered in the excluded status of an independent contractor. (California Compensation Ins. Co. v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Hernandez) (1998) 63 Cal.Comp.Cases 844 (writ den.); Lara v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2010) 182 Cal.4th 393, 402 [75 Cal.Comp.Cases 91].) That is, once the
person rendering service establishes a prima facie case of “employee” status, the burden shifts to
the hirer to affirmatively prove that the worker is an independent contractor. (Cristler v. Express
Messenger Sys., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 72, 84 [74 Cal.Comp.Cases 167]; Narayan v. EGL,
Inc. (2010) 616 F.3d 895, 900 [75 Cal.Comp.Cases 724].) Consequently, unless the hirer can
demonstrate that the worker meets specific criteria to be considered an independent contractor, all
workers are presumed to be employees.
The courts have consistently held that an owner or general contractor is not liable under
workers’ compensation for injury to the employee of an independent contractor hired by the
general contractor. (State Comp. Ins. Fund v. I.A.C. (1941) 46 Cal.App.2d 526, 528-530
(Grashel); Western Ind. Co. v. I.A.C., (1916) 172 Cal. 766 [158 P. 1033] (Turner); Sturdivant v.

13
Pillsbury (1916) 172 Cal. 581 (Silva); Carstens v. Pillsbury (1916) 172 Cal. 572; S. A. Gerrard
Co. v. I.A.C. (1941) 17 Cal. 2d 411 (Valdez).) Likewise, it has been held that where a person hired
by a primary employer is an employee rather than an independent contractor, the primary employer
may be liable for workers’ compensation injuries to person hired by the employee on the theory
that they are also the primary employer’s employees. (Blew v. Horner (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1380
[51 Cal.Comp.Cases 615]; Valdez, supra, 17 Cal. 2d 411; Brietigam v. I.A.C. (1951) 37 Cal. 2d
849).)
Section 2775(b) states in pertinent part:
(1) For purposes of this code and the Unemployment Insurance Code, and for the
purposes of wage orders of the Industrial Welfare Commission, a person
providing labor or services for remuneration shall be considered an employee
rather than an independent contractor unless the hiring entity demonstrates that
all of the following conditions are satisfied:
(A) The person is free from the control and direction of the hiring entity in
connection with the performance of the work, both under the contract for
the performance of the work and in fact.
(B) The person performs work that is outside the usual course of the hiring
entity’s business.
(C) The person is customarily engaged in an independently established trade,
occupation, or business of the same nature as that involved in the work
performed.
In Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903 [83 Cal. Comp.
Cases 817], the court provided the ABC test, which was then codified in section 2775. It is important
to recognize that a hiring entity must satisfy all three factors in order to meet its burden to show that a
worker was an independent contractor.
Part A of section 2775 requires that the presumed employee is free from control and direction
of the hiring entity. In Dynamex, the court remarks, “depending on the nature of the work and overall
arrangement between the parties, a business need not control the precise manner of or details of the
work in order to be found to have maintained the necessary control that an employer ordinarily
possesses over its employees.” (Dynamex, supra, at p. 958.) The right to control has been demonstrated
by evidence that the worker must obey instructions and is subject to consequences, including discipline
or termination, for failure to do so. (Toyota Motor Sales v. Superior Court (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 864,
p. 875; Borello, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 350.) Moreover, “the unlimited right to discharge at will and

14
without cause has been stressed by a number of cases as a strong factor demonstrating employment.”
(Toyota, supra, at p. 875.) So long as the employer has the authority to exercise complete control
“whether or not that right is exercised with respect to all details, an employer-employee relationship
exists.” (Id. p. 874.) Hence, when considering the right to control, the focus is on the necessary control,
and an employment relationship for purposes of workers’ compensation may be found even when the
company “is more concerned with the results of the work rather than the means of its accomplishment.”
(JKH Enterprises v. Dept. of Ind. Relat. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1064-1065 [71 Cal.Comp.Cases
1257]; see also Borello, supra, at pp. 355-360; Air Couriers, Intl. v. Emp. Dev. Dept. (2007) 150
Cal.App.4th 923, 937.)
Part B requires the hiring entity to establish that the worker performs work that is outside
the usual course of its business. Last, part C requires the hiring entity to prove that the worker is
customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or business as the work
performed for the hiring entity. In Dynamex, the court notes that an independent contractor is
ordinarily understood to refer to an individual that has independently made the decision to go into
business for themself. The court points out, “such an individual generally takes the usual steps to
establish and promote his or her independent business-for example, through incorporation,
licensure, advertisements, routine offerings to provide the services of the independent business to
the public or to a number of potential customers.” (Dynamex, supra, at 962.) They go on to state,
“the fact that a company has not prohibited or prevented a worker from engaging in such a business
is not sufficient to establish that the worker has independently made the decision to go into business
for himself.” (Id.)
On return, and once the record is clarified as outlined in part II, the parties and the trier of
fact should consider each of the potential employer relationships if indicated by the developed
record. If it becomes clear that a service was being rendered, then the various employment
relationships must be discussed. S Line contends that it has no employees. However, if Mr. Kahlon
is the hirer of applicant, S Line as the hirer of Mr. Kahlon must prove that Mr. Kahlon is an
independent contractor pursuant to section 2775 or its exceptions. If S Line cannot prove that he
is an independent contractor, then applicant will also be an employee of S Line.
We conclude that the record should be developed, as appropriate, on the issue of
employment with both S Line and Mr. Kahlon.

15
Accordingly, we will grant the Petition for Reconsideration and, as our Decision for
Reconsideration, we will rescind the F&O and return the matter to the trial level for further
proceedings consistent with this decision.

16
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Reconsideration is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED as the Decision After Reconsideration of the Workers’
Compensation Appeals Board that the WCJ’s decision of July 15, 2025 is RESCINDED and this
matter is RETURNED to the trial level for further proceedings and decision by the WCJ.
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
/s/ LISA A. SUSSMAN, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
I CONCUR,
/s/ KATHERINE WILLIAMS DODD, COMMISSIONER
/s/ JOSEPH V. CAPURRO, COMMISSIONER
DATED AND FILED AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
November 10, 2025
SERVICE MADE ON THE ABOVE DATE ON THE PERSONS LISTED BELOW AT
THEIR ADDRESSES SHOWN ON THE CURRENT OFFICIAL ADDRESS RECORD.
SURINDER SINGH
DANDRE LAW
FLETCHER BROWN
TF/md
I certify that I affixed the official seal of
the Workers’ Compensation Appeals
Board to this original decision on this
date. 	o.o