P. v. Hill 10/8/25 L.A./AD

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Filed 10/8/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JASON HILL,
Defendant and Appellant.
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24APCM00173
(Clara Shortridge Foltz Criminal
Justice Center Trial Court No.
1CJ07503-01)
OPINION
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Maria Lucy
Armendariz, Judge. Appeal dismissed; petition denied.
Robert B. Corsun, under appointment by the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, for Defendant and Appellant.
Hydee Feldstein Soto, Los Angeles City Attorney, Kent J. Bullard, Assistant City
Attorney, Jeanne Kim, Deputy City Attorney, for Plaintiff and Respondent
* * *

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Jason Hill (defendant) appeals from an order to pay victim restitution, made as a
condition of pretrial diversion granted by the trial court pursuant to Penal Code section
1001.95.1 Defendant contends the restitution order exceeded the court’s jurisdiction as the
evidence, in his view, revealed the victim sustained no actual economic loss. The People
contest the merits of defendant’s argument while also urging dismissal of the appeal taken from
a non-appealable order. We agree with the People’s position and dismiss the appeal.
Construed as a petition for writ of mandate, we deny the petition.
BACKGROUND
In a misdemeanor complaint filed on September 13, 2021, defendant was charged with
assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) and simple battery (§
242) against the victim, Michael L.2 The alleged offenses occurred on September 7, 2020.
Defendant failed to appear for an arraignment hearing and an arrest warrant was issued. On
August 7, 2023, private counsel appeared on behalf of defendant pursuant to section 977, and
an arraignment hearing was continued upon defendant’s request.
On September 15, 2023, defendant filed a written motion for judicial diversion pursuant
to section 1001.95 et seq. According to the unverified memorandum of points and authorities,
defendant was assured by the City Attorney that charges would not be filed in this case,3 he
subsequently moved to Nevada for work, the prosecutor decided to file charges “because
[Michael L.] . . . was claiming that [he] had a deviated septum,” and he was unaware of the
charges until he received a letter in or around July 2023.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 To protect personal privacy interests, we refer to the victim by first name and last initial. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).)
3 The exhibits filed in support of the motion include a letter from the City Attorney dated
January 22, 2021, requesting defendant’s appearance for an “office hearing.”

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The memorandum, offered to prove defendant’s suitability for diversion included
personal background information about defendant and summarized the circumstances
underlying the alleged offenses. Michael L. was riding an electronic scooter, defendant honked
at Michael L. and “words were exchanged.” Defendant exited his car and punched Michael L.
one time in the nose before leaving the scene. Michael L. had redness to his face and a bloody
nose, but he refused medical treatment. Video surveillance captured the license plate number
on defendant’s vehicle. Michael L. selected defendant’s photograph in a lineup with 80 percent
assurance that he was the perpetrator. Defendant stated that prior to the punch, Michael L.
“banged his scooter into [defendant’s] car causing a dent” and “postured as if he was going to
hit [defendant].” Defendant’s motion also included numerous letters attesting to his volunteer
service, non-violent character, and work ethic. Defendant had a college degree, was gainfully
employed, had no prior arrests or convictions, and performed numerous hours of volunteer
community service for non-profit organizations.
The People opposed the request for diversion, arguing therein that defendant was
not suitable for diversion because the incident involved a violent act and resulted in
serious bodily injury, defendant was unrepentant, and granting diversion may “provide[e]
insufficient time to secure restitution for the victim[].”
A hearing on the motion convened on September 28, 2023. Defendant and his counsel
appeared remotely. Neither party presented additional argument. Over the People’s objection,
the court granted the motion for diversion for a period of 12 months, with various terms and
conditions including that defendant “make restitution in an amount to be determined later at a
hearing, but liability is admitted.” Defendant affirmed the terms of diversion were acceptable
and waived time. The court decreed the complaint would be dismissed in one year if defendant
satisfied all terms and conditions.
At the restitution hearing on August 30, 2024, the court indicated that defendant had
satisfied all conditions of diversion other than victim restitution. The People’s exhibit 1, a 20-
page packet of restitution documentation, was admitted into evidence but is not included in the
record on appeal. The People called Michael L. as its only witness.

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Michael L. is a veteran who earns a living doing contract work as a screenwriter.
Following the assault, Michael L. required two nasal surgeries to “breathe normally again,” but
he continues to have permanent breathing loss following the attack. The first surgery was on
March 19, 2021, and the second surgery was on May 16, 2022. The People only sought
restitution for lost wages incurred after the second surgery. No restitution was sought for
medical bills paid by the Veteran’s Administration.
In May 2022, Michael L. was set to commence an exclusive contract for approximately
three months to write a screenplay for Millennium Films. When his recovery from the second
surgery took longer than expected, Michael L. had to “push back the . . . commencement of the
contract” to July 2022, which pushed the end date into the fall. Due to this delay and an
exclusivity clause, Michael L. was unable to take on a second screenwriting contract in fall
2022, as was his usual practice. Tax documents confirmed Michael L. was paid earnings of
$45,691 for the contract in 2022, compared to earnings of $110,000 for two screenwriting
contracts in 2021. The People sought restitution of $11,422, using a pro rata calculation of lost
wages during the three-week period of rehabilitation between the second surgery and the
delayed commencement of Michael L.’s contract in July 2022. The court took the matter under
submission.
The court convened another hearing on September 11, 2024,4 with counsel appearing on
defendant’s behalf. The court indicated it read a supplemental report filed by defendant,5 and
restated that diversion was conditioned on defendant’s payment of victim restitution of $11,422
to Michael L. The court asked if defendant wished to “go via civil judgment, or you can
withdraw the diversion and take this to trial.” Counsel, who was unable to contact defendant,
requested another continuance and agreed to waive time. The court set a hearing for October
16, advising the parties: “[Defendant] has completed all terms of judicial diversion. We can
discuss him going to a financial evaluator to discuss his ability to pay the restitution. I would
4 All further date references are to the year 2024 unless otherwise indicated.
5 The supplemental report was from a physician, retained as a defense expert in support of
defendant’s position that Michael L. sustained no injuries due to the attack.

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be willing to extend diversion until he pays it, or he can go to via civil judgment or you can . . .
go to trial.”
On October 10, defendant filed a notice of appeal, purporting to appeal from the
September 11 order to pay restitution as a condition of diversion.6
DISCUSSION
Restitution Order as a Condition of Diversion Was Not Appealable
We address the People’s unopposed position that the appeal should be dismissed as
being taken from a non-appealable order.7 Appealability of orders related to diversion have
been adjudicated by appellate courts,8 but no published decision has assessed whether victim
restitution ordered as a condition of section 1001.95 diversion is an appealable order. We
conclude it is not.
At the outset, we assess whether the September 11 order that is the subject of the appeal
is final or interlocutory. The one final judgment rule prohibits appellate review of interlocutory
rulings until a final disposition of the appealable judgment or order. (People v. Superior Court
(Gregory) (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 324, 330.) A decree is interlocutory “where anything
6 The record includes a minute order from the October 16 hearing which indicates that “defense
counsel stipulates to extend judicial diversion [¶] . . . to January 31, 2025” and “Proof of restitution
payment or via civil judgment is continued to . . . January 14, 2025, . . .” The proceeding was
electronically recorded but there is no record of the proceeding before this court.
7 As noted by the People, defendant’s opening brief fails to include a mandatory statement of
appealability. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.883(a)(2)(B); see Good v. Miller (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th
472, 476-477 [requirement to include a statement of appealability is intended to avoid confusion about
the appealability of a judgment or order before the appellate court].)
8 For example, a defendant may appeal an order to pay restitution made after a case is dismissed
pursuant to diversion. (See, e.g., People v. Berlin (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 757 [adjudicating appeal of
post-dismissal order to pay restitution, after completion of mental health diversion, without addressing
appealability].) The People may challenge an order granting diversion to an ineligible defendant on
mandamus. (See, e.g., People v. Superior Court (Ortiz) (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 851; People v. Superior
Court (Espeso) (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1.) Similarly, an order finding a defendant ineligible or
unsuitable for diversion is reviewable by petition for extraordinary writ. (See, e.g., Tan v. Superior
Court (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 130 [reviewing denial of section 1001.95 diversion on mandamus];
Grassi v. Superior Court (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 283, 289 [declining to address whether a writ petition
was appropriate to challenge the denial of section 1001.95 diversion, due to real party’s failure to press
the issue].)

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further in the nature of judicial action on the part of the court is essential to a final
determination of the rights of the parties,” whereas a decree is final “where no issue is left for
future consideration except the fact of compliance or noncompliance with the terms of the first
decree, . . .” (People v. Wright (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 490, 492.)
Our interpretation of the record is that the September 11th decree to pay victim
restitution as a condition of diversion was a final decision, as no issue was left for future
consideration other than defendant’s choice to “go via civil judgment” or to “withdraw [from]
diversion and take this to trial.” We have no record of the oral proceedings from the October
16th proceeding—which occurred after the filing of the notice of appeal. A minute order of the
proceeding indicates that defendant stipulated to extend the term of diversion, and a hearing to
show proof of restitution payment was continued to January 2025. Presumably, defendant
accepted the restitution decree as a condition of diversion. We consider the September 11 order
to be a final adjudication of the decree to pay victim restitution as a condition of diversion.
That the decree to pay restitution was final, however, does not necessarily make it appealable.
Appellate courts have jurisdiction over appeals only from appealable judgments or
orders. (People v. Gray (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 148, 157.) The right to appeal is dictated by
statute. (People v. Mazurette (2001) 24 Cal.4th 789, 792.) This court has jurisdiction to
adjudicate a defendant’s appeal, in a misdemeanor case, from (1) a final judgment of conviction
including an order granting probation, or (2) an order made after an appealable judgment
affecting the defendant’s substantial rights. (§ 1466, subd. (b).)
Enacted in 2021, section 1001.95 authorizes trial courts to offer pretrial diversion, even
over the People’s objection, to a defendant charged with an eligible misdemeanor offense.9 (§
1001.95, subds. (a), (e).) Diversion is “‘intended to offer a second chance to [certain] offenders
who are minimally involved in crime and maximally motivated to reform . . . .’” (People v.
Shaginyan (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 12.) The trial court “may continue a diverted case
for a period not to exceed 24 months and order the defendant to comply with terms, conditions,
9 It is undisputed the offenses charged in this case—sections 242 and 245—are not among the
narrow category of offenses that are ineligible for diversion. (§ 1001.95, subd. (e).)

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or programs that the judge deems appropriate based on the defendant’s specific situation.” (§
1001.95, subd. (b).) If the court grants diversion, the prosecution is suspended while the
defendant completes the conditions ordered by the court, including making “full restitution,”
prior to having the case dismissed. (§§ 1001.95, subd. (c), 1001.96, subds. (a), (b); see People
v. Shaginyan, supra, at p. Supp. 9.) The defendant is entitled to dismissal of the prosecution if,
at the end of the period of diversion, he or she has satisfactorily complied with all conditions
ordered by the court. (§§ 1001.95, subd. (c), 1096, subd. (a).) If, however, the defendant does
not comply with the conditions of diversion, the court may end diversion, after notice and a
hearing, and the prosecution is reinstated. (§ 1001.95, subd. (d).)
During the diversion period, “there is—as yet—no judgment from which defendant can
appeal.” (People v. Mazurette, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 794 [no appeal from order deferring
entry of judgment and diverting case]; accord, People v. Orihuela (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 70,
72-73 [no judgment during the period of diversion]; see also Ricki J. v. Superior Court (2005)
128 Cal.App.4th 783, 790-791 [order of informal supervision is not appealable].) Considering
the order of diversion was not an appealable judgment or order, it follows the decree to pay
victim restitution as a condition of diversion was not an order made after a final judgment, and
was therefore not appealable under subdivision (b)(2) of section 1466. (See People v. Lyon
(1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 86, 88-89 [post-dismissal order not appealable]; cf. People v. Ford
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 282, 286 [order of restitution made after a judgment is appealable].)
Our view that the order was not appealable is supported by decisions in the analogous
context of restitution ordered as a condition of informal supervision or deferred entry of
judgment in juvenile delinquency cases. (See, e.g., In re M.T. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 947, 952-
956 [dismissing appeal of restitution order imposed as condition of informal supervision]; see
In re Mario C. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1307-1311 [dismissing appeal from order
deferring entry of judgment which challenged the denial of a motion to suppress]; see also G.C.
v. Superior Court (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 371, 378 [mandamus available when the court
refused to consider minor’s ability to pay restitution awarded as a condition of deferred entry of

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judgment].) From the foregoing authority, we hold the appeal was unauthorized and must be
dismissed. (See People v. Superior Court (Manuel G.) (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 915, 922-924.)
Defendant Not Entitled to Writ Relief
Reviewing courts have discretion to treat an appeal taken from a nonappealable
order as a petition for writ of mandate when supported by the interests of justice. (People
v. Superior Court (Manuel G.), supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 925-926; People v. Payne (1988)
202 Cal.App.3d 933, 937.) Circumstances authorizing the treatment of an appeal as a writ
petition include uncertainty in the law respecting appealability (Drum v. Superior Court (2006)
139 Cal.App.4th 845, 852-853), and the absence of an adequate remedy at law (People v.
Newton (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1002). Both circumstances are present in this case;
therefore, we elect to treat the appeal as a petition for extraordinary writ.
Mandamus relief is authorized only where there is a clear ministerial duty on the part of
the trial court and a correlative beneficial right in the petitioner to the court’s performance of
that duty. (People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 340.) “A ministerial duty is an
obligation to perform a specific act in a manner prescribed by law whenever a given state of
facts exists, without regard to any personal judgment as to the propriety of the act.” (Ibid.) A
writ is not available, however, to force the exercise of discretion in a particular manner. (Payne
v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 908, 925; People v. Privitera (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d Supp.
39, 48.)
Section 1001.95 authorizes the trial court to “offer diversion to a defendant” (§ 1001.95,
subd. (a), italics added), on condition that the defendant complies with the terms and conditions
deemed appropriate by the court (§§ 1001.95, subd. (b), 1001.96, subd. (a)), including
“mak[ing] full restitution” (§ 1001.96, subd. (b)). Seeing the terms of judicial diversion are an
“offer,” defendant was free to reject them and allow the prosecution to proceed in the usual
manner. (See People v. Hughes (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 749, 755 [unaccepted offer has no
effect].) The broad discretion afforded to the court to fashion the conditions of diversion
requires an exercise of judgment and precludes relief on mandamus. Accordingly, we perceive
no violation of a beneficial right of defendant to the court’s performance of any duty.

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Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that defendant had a beneficial right, and
the court had a ministerial duty, to limit the scope of restitution ordered as a condition of
diversion to a concrete economic loss, defendant is not entitled to relief. No published case has
addressed the scope of discretion afforded to the conditions of diversion imposed by a trial
court. Because diversion is treated as a specialized form of probation, we draw from the rules
governing restitution ordered as a condition of probation. (See People v. Shaginyan, supra, 109
Cal.App.5th at pp. Supp. 11-12.)
The standard of proof at a restitution hearing is proof by a preponderance of the
evidence. (People v. Grandpierre (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 111, 115.) A victim’s statement of
economic loss is prima facie evidence of the loss, and the defendant bears the burden to
disprove the prima facie loss claimed by the victim. (Ibid.) As an appellate court, we review
the restitution order for abuse of discretion; an abuse of discretion occurs if the court’s decision
is arbitrary or capricious, or if there is no factual and rational basis for the amount ordered.
(People v. Tafoya (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 868, 905.) This discretion is broadest when
restitution is imposed as a condition of probation or, in this case, a condition of diversion. (See
People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 653, 663, & fn. 7.)
We find the restitution decree in this case was supported by ample evidence and was not
an abuse of discretion. Defendant stipulated to his liability to pay restitution, while disputing
the amount of the loss. The evidence produced at the hearing was that in 2021, Michael L. had
two screenwriting contracts for total earnings of $110,000. In 2022, Michael L. was limited to
accepting only one three-month contract for a total payment of $45,691, caused by the delay in
his rehabilitation following the second surgery. This period of delay was attributable to
defendant, as the second procedure was required to correct Michael L.’s breathing loss
following the alleged attack. The $11,422 award was calculated by taking the 2022 contract
total of $45,691, dividing that figure by 12 (the number of weeks for the three-month contract),
which equates to $3,807.58 per week, and then multiplying that figure by three (for the three
weeks of recovery time).

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The evidence introduced at the hearing satisfied the People’s burden to present prima
facie evidence of loss. (People v. Grandpierre, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 115.) The defense
cross-examined the veracity of Michael L.’s testimony but the prima facie evidence of loss was
not effectively rebutted. (See ibid.) The trial court, which was in a superior position to observe
the demeanor of Michael L., impliedly found his testimony and the People’s documentary
evidence to be credible—a determination we do not reweigh on appeal. (People v. Tafoya,
supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 905; see People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 36-37.) “Indeed,
given the opportunity to proceed under a grant of diversion rather than face criminal
prosecution, it is difficult to perceive how a sincere defendant could reasonably object to [the
restitution] requirement . . . .” (People v. Fleming (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1571-1572.)
Defendant is not entitled to relief.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. Construing the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate,
the petition is denied.
_________________________
P. McKay, P. J.
We concur:
_________________________ _________________________
Ricciardulli, J. Guillemet, J.