P. v. Superior Court (G.M.)

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Filed 12/23/19 P. v. Superior Court (G.M.) CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY,
Respondent;
G.M.,
Real Party in Interest.
E072822
(Super.Ct.Nos. FSB18000959 &
J267447)
OPINION
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate. Richard V. Peel,
Winston Keh, and David J. Mazurek, Judges. Petition for writ of mandate is denied.
Jason Anderson, District Attorney, Eric M. Ferguson, Deputy District Attorney for
Petitioner.
Mark D. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Real Party in
Interest.
No appearance by Respondent.

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I.
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner, the People, challenge the criminal trial court’s order granting, real party
in interest, G.M.’s motion to transfer his case back to the juvenile court under recently
enacted Senate Bill No. 1391 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1012, § 1) (SB 1391). The People argue
the trial court erred in ruling SB 1391 is a constitutional amendment to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 707,1 as modified by the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of
2016 (Proposition 57). SB 1391 bars, in most instances, minors under the age of 16 from
being tried in criminal (or adult) court. The People assert SB 1391 is unconstitutional
because it is inconsistent with the intent and purpose of Proposition 57. We disagree and
deny the People’s petition for writ of mandate.
II.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In October 2017, the People filed a petition in juvenile court against G.M. under
section 602 (case No. J267477). The petition alleges that, when G.M. was 15 years old,
he committed various crimes on September 27, 2017, including murder (Pen. Code, §
187, subd. (a)), attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)); second degree
robbery (Pen. Code, § 211); and carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a)).
1 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

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Proposition 57 barred the district attorney from directly filing in adult court
criminal charges against G.M., a minor. Therefore, the prosecution filed a motion to
transfer G.M. from the juvenile court to adult court under section 707, subdivision (a)(1).
In January 2018, at G.M.’s transfer hearing, the prosecution filed a probation
department report recommending that the juvenile court find G.M. not suitable for
juvenile court and that the district attorney prosecute him in adult court.
During the section 707 evidentiary transfer hearing in March 2018, the juvenile
court found that G.M. was not amenable to rehabilitation in juvenile court and granted the
prosecution’s motion to transfer the case to adult court. The juvenile court dismissed the
juvenile petition without prejudice (case No. J267447). G.M. was later arraigned in adult
court.
In September 2018, the California State Governor signed into law SB 1391,
codified in section 707, which generally bars 14- and 15-year-old offenders from being
prosecuted in adult court.2 SB 1391 took effect on January 1, 2019. SB 1391 changed
section 707, subdivision (a) to read, in relevant part: “In any case in which a minor is
alleged to be a person described in [s]ection 602 by reason of the violation, when he or
she was 16 years of age or older, of any offense listed in subdivision (b) or any other
2 Section 707, subdivision (a)(2) provides the following rare exception: “In any
case in which an individual is alleged to be a person described in [s]ection 602 by reason
of the violation, when he or she was 14 or 15 years of age, of any offense listed in
subdivision (b), but was not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction,
the district attorney or other appropriate prosecuting officer may make a motion to
transfer the individual from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction.” (Italics
added.)

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felony criminal statute, the district attorney or other appropriate prosecuting officer may
make a motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal
jurisdiction.” (Italics added.) Before enactment of SB 1391, section 707, subdivision
(a)(1) stated that, when a minor is alleged to have committed any felony criminal offense
at age 16 or older, or any offense listed in section 707, subdivision (b) at the age of 14 or
15, the district attorney could bring a motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to
adult court. (Former § 707, subd. (a)(1), eff. Nov. 9, 2016, to Dec. 31, 2018.)
In the instant case, on January 14, 2019, the People filed a brief arguing that SB
1391 was unconstitutional and therefore G.M. should not be transferred from adult court
back to juvenile court. The matter was continued until May 23, 2019. In the interim, on
April 30, 2019, the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, held in
People v. Superior Court (Alexander C.) (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 994, 997, 1004
(Alexander C.), that SB 1391 is constitutional. On June 26, 2019, the California Supreme
Court denied the People’s petition for review of Alexander C.
During the hearing on May 23, 2019, defense counsel made an oral motion to deny
the People’s request that the court find SB 1391 unconstitutional. Defense counsel also
made a motion to transfer G.M. back to juvenile court under SB 1391. The trial court
concluded Alexander C. was controlling and denied the People’s request that the court
find SB 1391 is unconstitutional. The court also granted G.M.’s motion to transfer G.M.
back to juvenile court.
On May 28, 2019, the People filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking to
reverse the order on May 23, 2019, transferring G.M. to juvenile court. The People also

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requested a stay of the transfer order. On May 28, 2019, this court ordered the parties to
show cause why the relief prayed for should not be granted. This court also ordered the
proceedings stayed pending determination of the People’s writ petition on the merits or
until further order by this court. After this court ordered counsel appointed for G.M. in
this matter, G.M. filed a return to the People’s writ petition, arguing SB 1391 is
constitutional. The People filed a traverse, responding to G.M.’s return.
III.
HISTORY OF PROPOSITION 57 AND SB 1391
Until the passage of Proposition 21 in 2000, the juvenile court was required to
declare a minor unfit for the juvenile justice system before a district attorney could
prosecute that minor in adult court. (People v. Superior Court (Lara ) (2018) 4 Cal.5th
299, 305 (Lara).) With the passage of Proposition 21, district attorneys were required to
charge directly in criminal court, minors 14 years old or older who were accused of
specified murder and sex crimes. (Former § 602, subd. (b), repealed by Initiative
Measure (Prop 57, § 4.1, approved Nov. 8, 2016, eff. Nov. 9, 2016).) As to other
specified serious offenses, Proposition 21 provided district attorneys with discretion to
charge minors 14 or older in adult court instead of in juvenile court. (Former § 707,
subd. (d), repealed by Initiative Measure (Prop 57, § 4.2, approved Nov. 8, 2016, eff.
Nov. 9, 2016).)
In November 2016, Proposition 57 rolled back the Proposition 21 provisions
allowing district attorneys to file charges against minors directly in adult court. “For
juvenile offenders, Proposition 57 ‘largely returned California to the historical rule’ by

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eliminating direct filing in criminal court.” (Alexander C., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at
p. 998, quoting Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 305; see also People v. Superior Court (K.L.)
(2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 529, 535-538 (K.L.), for summary of historical development of
relevant law preceding SB 1391.) Under Proposition 57, “‘[c]ertain categories of minors
. . . can still be tried in criminal court, but only after a juvenile court judge conducts a
transfer hearing to consider various factors such as the minor’s maturity, degree of
criminal sophistication, prior delinquent history, and whether the minor can be
rehabilitated.’” (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 305-306; accord, Alexander C., supra, at
p. 998.) Proposition 57 permits district attorneys to request the juvenile court to transfer
minors 16 or older, to adult court for any felony offense. (Former § 707, subd. (a)(1).)
However, Proposition 57 limits transfer of 14 and 15 year olds to those who were accused
of specified serious or violent offenses. (§ 707, subds. (a)(1), (b), repealed by Stats.
2018, ch. 1012 (SB 1391), § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2019.)
After SB 1391 went into effect on January 1, 2019, “[SB] 1391 eliminate[d] the
district attorneys’ ability to seek transfer of 14 and 15 year olds from juvenile court to
criminal court, save for a narrow exception if the minor is ‘not apprehended prior to the
end of juvenile court jurisdiction.’ (§ 707, subd. (a)(2).) The Legislature declared that
[SB] 1391 amended Proposition 57 and ‘is consistent with and furthers the intent of
Proposition 57.’ ([SB] 1391, § 3.)” (Alexander C., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 998.)

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IV.
LAW APPLICABLE TO AMENDING INITIATIVES
The key issue here is thus whether SB 1391 is a constitutional statutory
amendment of the initiative, Proposition 57, codified in section 707.3 The Legislature
may amend an initiative statute by another statute only if (1) the Legislature amends the
initiative statute by another statute approved by a vote of the people or (2) the initiative
statute permits amendment without the electors’ approval. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 10,
subd. (c); Alexander C., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 999.) Otherwise the amendment is
unconstitutional. Proposition 57 expressly permits amendment by the Legislature, but
only “so long as such amendments are consistent with and further the intent” of
Proposition 57. (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elect. (Nov. 8, 2016) text of Prop. 57,
§ 5, p. 145.) “Such a limitation upon the power of the Legislature must be strictly
construed, but it also must be given the effect the voters intended it to have.” (Amwest
Surety Ins. Co. v. Wilson (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1243, 1255-1256.)
Our assessment of the constitutionality of SB 1391 requires balancing these
concerns, beginning with the presumption that the Legislature acted within its authority
3 We reject G.M.’s contention SB 1391 does not amend Proposition 57. The
Legislative Counsel’s Digest for SB 1391 (Sept. 30, 2018) expressly states SB 1391
amends Proposition 57: “This bill would repeal the authority of a district attorney to
make a motion to transfer a minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction
in a case in which a minor is alleged to have committed a specified serious offense when
he or she was 14 or 15 years of age, unless the individual was not apprehended prior to
the end of juvenile court jurisdiction, thereby amending Proposition 57. By increasing
the number of minors retained under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, this bill would
impose a state-mandated local program.” (Italics added.)

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when enacting SB 1391. (Alexander C., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at pp. 999-1000.) When
assessing SB 1391, “we shall uphold the validity of [the legislative amendment] if, by
any reasonable construction, it can be said that the statute furthers the purposes” or intent
of Proposition 57. (Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1256;
accord, Alexander C., supra, at p. 1000.) We review de novo the trial court’s ruling that
SB 1391 is a constitutional amendment of Proposition 57 that furthers the purposes and
intent of Proposition 57. (People v. Health Laboratories of North America, Inc. (2001)
87 Cal.App.4th 442, 445.)
V.
DISCUSSION
The People argue that SB 1391 is unconstitutional because it does not further
Proposition 57’s purpose and intent. This same challenge to SB 1391 was recently raised
and almost uniformly rejected by the Courts of Appeal. (B.M. v. Superior Court (2019)
40 Cal.App.5th 742 (4th Dist., Div. 2); Alexander C., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th 994, 997 (1st
Dist., Div. 4); K.L., supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at pp. 540-541 (3rd Dist.); People v. Superior
Court (T.D.) (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 360, 365 (T.D.) (5th Dist.), review granted Nov. 26,
2019, S257980; People v. Superior Court (I.R.) (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 383, 386 (5th
Dist.), review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S257773; People v. Superior Court (S.L.) (2019) 40
Cal.App.5th 114, 117 (6th Dist.), review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S258432.) The People
urge this court to disregard these decisions and follow the dissents and the recent
decision, O.G. v. Superior Court (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 626, 628-629 (2nd Dist.) review
granted Nov. 26, 2019, S259011), which assert SB 1391 is unconstitutional because it is

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inconsistent with the intent of Proposition 57, which the People argue was to ensure the
ability to continue transferring 14- and 15-year-old offenders to juvenile court. In the
instant case, G.M. disagrees, arguing SB 1391 is consistent with the intent of Proposition
57 to remove the power of prosecutors to determine whether to charge certain juveniles in
adult court and shift the power to the juvenile court to make the decision instead. We
agree.
A. Expressly Stated Purposes of Proposition 57
Proposition 57’s purpose and intent is stated in section two of Proposition 57’s
uncodified text, entitled “[p]urpose and [i]ntent,” which states: “In enacting this act, it is
the purpose and intent of the people of the State of California to: [¶] 1. Protect and
enhance public safety. [¶] 2. Save money by reducing wasteful spending on prisons. [¶]
3. Prevent federal courts from indiscriminately releasing prisoners. [¶] 4. Stop the
revolving door of crime by emphasizing rehabilitation, especially for juveniles. [¶] 5.
Require a judge, not a prosecutor, to decide whether juveniles should be tried in adult
court.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elect., supra, text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 141.) In
Alexander C., the court concluded SB 1391 furthered these five purposes. (Alexander C.,
supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1000-1002.)
B. Proposition 57 Purposes Stated in Paragraphs 4 and 5
The Proposition 57 purposes quoted above in paragraphs 4 and 5 of Proposition
57’s uncodified text, expressly address juvenile offenders, as opposed to the other three
purposes stated in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3. Paragraph 4 states that Proposition 57 is
intended to emphasize rehabilitation, especially for juveniles. In Alexander C., the court

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concluded SB 1391 furthers this goal by “ensuring that almost all who commit crimes at
the age of 14 or 15 will be processed through the juvenile system. As the Assembly
Committee on Public Safety concluded: ‘Keeping 14 and 15 year olds in the juvenile
justice system will help to ensure that youth receive treatment, counseling, and education
they need to develop into healthy, law abiding adults.’ (Assem. Com. on Public Safety,
Rep. on [SB] 1391 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 25, 2018, p. 4.) It is
apparent that [SB] 1391 is consistent with and furthers Proposition 57’s goal of
emphasizing rehabilitation for juvenile offenders.” (Alexander C., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1000.)
SB 1391 also furthered the purpose of Proposition 57 stated in paragraph 5, of
barring district attorneys from making the determination of whether to try a juvenile
offender in adult court. Whereas Proposition 57 permitted prosecution in adult court of
some 14 and 15 year olds who committed specified heinous crimes, SB 1391 further
limited prosecuting in adult court most all 14- and 15-year-old juvenile offenders. In
doing so, SB 1391, is consistent with Proposition 57’s objective of barring the district
attorney from filing charges against juveniles directly in adult court, thus keeping most
juveniles under the age of 16 in juvenile court.
The court in Alexander C. explained that SB 1391 furthers Proposition 57’s
purpose stated in paragraph 5, by narrowing “the class of minors who are subject to
review by a juvenile court for potential transfer to criminal court—eliminating most 14[]
and 15[]year[]olds from consideration—but it in no way detracts from Proposition 57’s

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stated intent that, where a transfer decision must be made, a judge rather than a
prosecutor must make the decision.” (Alexander C., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 1001.)
The People urge this court not to follow Alexander C. on the grounds Alexander
C.’s finding of constitutionality is irrational and it was wrongly decided. The People
contend the Alexander C. court erred in concluding SB 1391 is consistent with the
Proposition 57 purposes stated in paragraphs 4 and 5. The People argue that SB 1391
eliminated, with one rare exception,4 a trial judge’s authority provided in Proposition 57
to transfer to adult court offenders aged 14 or 15 years old. The People conclude that by
eliminating this judicial transfer authority, the Legislature usurped the trial judge’s
authority, in violation of the separation of powers.
We disagree. There was no improper conflict between SB 1391 and the
fundamental purpose of Proposition 57. The stated purpose in paragraph 5 of Proposition
57, of requiring “a judge, not a prosecutor, to decide whether juveniles should be tried in
adult court,” concerned eliminating the prosecutor’s preexisting authority to file charges
against juveniles directly in adult court. (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elect., supra,
text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 141.) The paragraph 5 purpose is not inconsistent with SB 1391
barring charging 14- and 15-year-old juvenile offenders in adult court, other than in
specified rare circumstances.
The analysis of Proposition 57, stated in the voter pamphlet, summarizes the
initiative regarding juvenile offenders as making “changes to state law [section 707] to
4 The rare exception provided in SB 1391 is when the offender is “not
apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(2).)

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require that youths have a hearing in juvenile court before they can be transferred to adult
court. (Ballot Pamp., analysis by the Legislative Analyst, p. 56, [¶] 2.) The Proposition
57 analysis further elaborates that the juvenile transfer hearing measure “changes state
law to require that, before youths can be transferred to adult court, they must have a
hearing in juvenile court to determine whether they should be transferred. As a result, the
only way a youth could be tried in adult court is if the juvenile court judge in the hearing
decides to transfer the youth to adult court. Youths accused of committing certain severe
crimes would no longer automatically be tried in adult court and no youth could be tried
in adult court based only on the decision of a prosecutor.” (Voter Information Guide,
Gen. Elect., analysis by the Legislative Analyst, p. 56, [¶] 6.)
We reject the People’s contention that the court in Alexander C. wrongly held that
SB 1391 is consistent with Proposition 57’s stated purposes in paragraphs 4 and 5, of
rehabilitation and requiring a judge to authorize all transfers to adult court of juvenile
offenders under the age of 16. As the court in Alexander C. explained, “[SB] 1391 takes
Proposition 57’s goal of promoting juvenile rehabilitation one step further by ensuring
that almost all who commit crimes at the age of 14 or 15 will be processed through the
juvenile system . . . [and] receive treatment, counseling, and education they needed to
develop into healthy, law abiding adults.’” (Alexander C., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1000.) Therefore, SB 1391 is consistent with Proposition 57’s purposes expressly
stated in paragraphs 4 and 5 of Proposition 57’s uncodified text.
C. Proposition 57 Purposes Stated in Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3

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The remaining three Proposition 57 purposes expressly stated in paragraphs 1, 2,
and 3 of Proposition 57’s uncodified text do not directly address prosecution of minors.
SB 1391 nevertheless is consistent with these purposes.
1. Purpose of Protecting Public Safety
As to the purpose stated in paragraph 1, of protecting and enhancing public safety,
Alexander C. noted: “The proponents of Proposition 57 indicated that increasing the
number of minors in the juvenile system protects and enhances public safety, since
‘minors who remain under juvenile court supervision are less likely to commit new
crimes.’ (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elect., supra, argument in favor of Prop. 57,
p. 58.) It follows that the Legislature could reasonably conclude SB 1391 protects and
enhances public safety because [SB] 1391 expands the category of minors who will
remain in the juvenile system. (Accord, Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on [SB]
1391 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 25, 2018, at p. 4 [‘When youth are given
age-appropriate services and education that are available in the juvenile justice system,
they are less likely to recidivate’].)” (Alexander C., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 1001.)
The People argue that public safety nevertheless is not protected and enhanced
under SB 1391 by adjudicating in juvenile court violent 14- and 15-year-old juvenile
offenders, because they will be released, at the latest, when they turn 25, without having
been fully rehabilitated and without being placed on parole, rather than being prosecuted
and sentenced in adult court to a much longer term. (See § 1769, subd. (d)(2).) The court
in Alexander C. acknowledged and addressed this concern, concluding that, while the
concern is understandable, it is mitigated by the district attorney’s “ability to petition a

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court to extend the duration of juvenile court jurisdiction if discharging a juvenile
offender ‘would be physically dangerous to the public because of the person’s mental or
physical deficiency, disorder, or abnormality that causes the person to have serious
difficulty controlling his or her dangerous behavior.’ (§ 1800, subd. (a).) Indeed, in
signing [SB] 1391, the Governor ‘considered the fact that young people adjudicated in
juvenile court can be held beyond their original sentence’ under section 1800.
(Governor’s message to Sen. on [SB] 1391 (Sept. 30, 2018) Sen. J. (2017-2018 Reg.
Sess.) p. 6230.)” (Alexander C., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1001-1002.)
Under these circumstances, SB 1391 can reasonably be construed as promoting
and enhancing public safety, consistent with Proposition 57, by increasing the number of
juvenile offenders who will remain in the juvenile justice system receiving rehabilitation
treatment, rather than being sent to prison, which is more likely to lead to recidivism. In
addition, SB 1391 leaves intact prosecutors’ ability to petition the juvenile court to extend
its jurisdiction if discharging a juvenile offender “would be physically dangerous to the
public because of the person’s mental or physical deficiency, disorder, or abnormality
that causes the person to have serious difficulty controlling his or her dangerous
behavior.” (§ 1800, subd. (a).) This provision recognizes that not every juvenile
offender will be successfully rehabilitated and creates a safety valve for circumstances in
which an offender remains dangerous.

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2. Purposes of Reducing Wasteful Spending and Preventing Indiscriminate
Release of Prisoners
SB 1391 is also consistent with, and furthers, Proposition 57’s additional purposes
stated in paragraphs 2 and 3, of saving money “by reducing wasteful spending on
prisons” and preventing “federal courts from indiscriminately releasing prisoners.”
(Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elect., supra, text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 141.) As stated in
this regard in Alexander C., “Proposition 57 was passed with the goal of ‘reduc[ing] state
prison and parole costs as . . . youths would no longer spend any time in prison or be
supervised by state parole agents following their release.’ (Voter Information Guide,
Gen. Elect., supra, analysis by the Legislative Analyst, p. 57.) Proposition 57 was also
designed to facilitate the state’s compliance with a federal court order to ‘reduce the
prisoner population to 137.5% of the adult institutions’ total design capacity,’ so that
federal courts would not order prisoners released to address overcrowding. [Citation.]
Once again, [SB] 1391 promotes both of these goals by narrowing the class of minors
who would be subject to a lengthy prison sentence in an adult institution.” (Alexander C.,
supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 1002.)
The People argue the purpose stated in paragraph 2 is “fundamentally vague”
because it is unclear what policy outcome actually could alleviate “wasteful” spending.
The People argue that the term, “wasteful,” is inherently subjective and, furthermore,
expenditures to house violent offenders are not “wasteful.” We are unpersuaded by this
argument. It is sufficiently clear that Proposition 57’s stated purpose of saving money by
reducing wasteful spending on prisons concerns reasonably cutting unnecessary prison

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costs. SB 1391 furthers this purpose by substantially reducing the number of juvenile
offenders transferred from juvenile court to adult court, which in turn reduces
incarceration of juveniles in prison. The Legislature therefore could reasonably conclude
that transferring juvenile offenders under the age of 16 to adult court and incarcerating
them in prison, rather than rehabilitating them in juvenile court, constitutes wasteful
prison spending.
Furthermore, when voting on Proposition 57, the voters likely recognized that the
more juvenile offenders who remain in the juvenile justice system, the less money
California would spend on “state prison and parole costs as . . . youths would no longer
spend any time in prison or be supervised by state parole agents following their release.”
(Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elect., supra, analysis by the Legislative Analyst, p. 57.)
Proposition 57 and SB 1391 potentially reduce prison spending by making it more
difficult for prosecutors to try juvenile offenders in adult court. Because SB 1391 will
necessarily result in fewer juveniles being transferred to the adult criminal justice system,
there inevitably will be a reduction in incarceration of juveniles and prison spending.
As to Proposition 57’s purpose stated in paragraph 3, the People argue that SB
1391 does not further this purpose of preventing federal courts from indiscriminately
releasing prisoners, because the purpose was likely directed primarily to the Proposition
57 provisions affecting adult parole eligibility. Furthermore, the People conclude that the
elimination of the small class of convicted juvenile offenders from the prison population
will have the opposite intended effect, of causing highly dangerous and violent juvenile

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offenders to be automatically released earlier than had they been prosecuted and
sentenced in adult court.
Alexander C. adequately addressed and appropriately rejected this objection. By
requiring most juvenile offenders under the age of 16 to remain in juvenile court, SB
1391 avoids indiscriminate release of juvenile offenders by attempting to rehabilitate
them, and advances Proposition 57’s purpose of reducing prison overcrowding in
response to the 2009 federal court order under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996.
(Coleman v. Schwarzenegger (2009) 922 F.Supp.2d 882, 962; see Voter Information
Guide, Gen. Elect., supra, text of Prop. 57 p. 141 [identifying a purpose of
“[p]revent[ing] federal courts from indiscriminately releasing prisoners”].)
D. Implied Purpose of Proposition 57
The People contend that SB 1391 is unconstitutional because it is inconsistent with
Proposition 57’s implied purpose and intent to continue the practice of permitting
prosecution of 14 and 15 year olds in adult court for serious or violent offenses.
(Alexander C., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 1002.) We agree with the following three
reasons stated in Alexander C., rejecting this contention.
First, the practice of allowing prosecution of certain 14 and 15 year olds in adult
court “is not an ‘actual change[ ]’ wrought by Proposition 57, but a continuation of prior
practice.” (Alexander C., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 1002.) Proposition 57 effected
change to the procedure for prosecuting minors in adult court, by barring a district
attorney from directly filing charges against a minor in adult court and by requiring a
judge to approve transferring a minor to the adult court. Proposition 57 “did not

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expand—and was not intended to solidify—the class of juvenile offenders subject to that
procedure.” (Id. at p. 1003.)
Second, any amendment will change an initiative’s scope or effect, but this does
not necessarily result in the amendment being inconsistent with the initiative’s intent or
purpose. To conclude otherwise would prevent Proposition 57 from ever being amended,
and there would be no purpose to including the language in Proposition 57 “expressly
allowing legislative amendments that ‘are consistent with and further the intent’ of the
proposition. (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elect., supra, text of Prop. 57, § 5,
p. 145.).” (Alexander C., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 1003.) This court must look to the
initiative as a whole to discern its purpose, rather than defining the intent of the initiative
“at a level so granular as to equate that intent with each of the specific provisions in the
initiative.” (Ibid.) In doing so, the California Supreme Court in People v. Brown (2016)
63 Cal.4th 335, 354, described Proposition 57’s purpose and intent as “address[ing] the
process for transferring minors to adult court for criminal prosecution, and expand[ing]
parole suitability review for state prisoners.” (Italics added.) SB 1391 is consistent with
this general purpose.
Third, the drafting history of Proposition 57 does not undermine the conclusion
that SB 1391 is consistent with Proposition 57’s purpose and intent, and therefore is
constitutional. The court in Alexander C. acknowledged that, before the election, the
proponents of Proposition 57 intentionally omitted language that would have had the
same effect as SB 1391. The Alexander C. court recognized that this change “is most
persuasive to the conclusion that the [initiative] should not be construed to include the

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omitted provision.” (People v. Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 245; accord, Alexander C.,
supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 1004.) But Alexander C. rejected the district attorney’s
argument that this history undermined the constitutionality of SB 1391.
The court in Alexander C. explained that the district attorney confused statutory
construction of a specific provision of law with determination of the purpose and intent of
Proposition 57. The Alexander C. court concluded that “Proposition 57’s drafting history
confirms what is in any event clear from the initiative’s text, namely that Proposition 57
cannot itself be construed to prevent district attorneys from seeking transfer to criminal
court of 14 and 15 year olds accused of serious or violent crimes. But nobody has argued
that Proposition 57 prevents Alexander’s case from being transferred to criminal court. It
is [SB] 1391 that accomplishes this result. And nothing about the intent of Proposition
57, as it can be inferred from examining the initiative as a whole, is inconsistent with this
result.” (Alexander C., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 1004.)
The court in K.L. also rejected the argument that the drafting history of
Proposition 57 demonstrates that SB 1391 is inconsistent with Proposition 57, because
Proposition 57, as initially proposed, contained language that would have established 16
as the minimum age at which juveniles may be transferred to adult court. (K.L., supra,
36 Cal.App.5th at p. 536.) K.L. noted that, “Because that version of the proposition was
not voted on by the voters or included in the official materials provided to the voters, it
does not provide us any indication of the voters’ intent in approving Proposition 57. (See
Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 802 [declining to consider material that
was not presented to the voters as evidence of the voters’ intent]; see also Board of

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Supervisors v. Lonergan (1980) 27 Cal.3d 855, 866 [‘ballot pamphlets may constitute the
only legislative history of an initiative measure adopted by the voters’].)” (K.L., supra, at
p. 536, fn. 4.)
The court in T.D. likewise rejected the People’s argument relying on the history of
Proposition 57. T.D. acknowledged that the drafters of Proposition 57 clearly were aware
of arguments for and against transfer of 14 and 15 year olds to criminal court and rejected
barring 14 and 15 year olds from transfer to adult court. (T.D., supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at
p. 376.) The T.D. court explained that “Unlike inferences to be drawn from amendments
made during the legislative process, however, we cannot conclude from drafting changes
made prior to an initiative measure’s submission to voters that voters were aware of, and
so necessarily rejected, the measure’s original provisions. The California Supreme Court
‘has made it clear that the “motive or purpose of the drafters of a statute is not relevant to
its construction, absent reason to conclude that the body which adopted the statute was
aware of that purpose and believed the language of the proposal would accomplish it.
[Citations.] The opinion of drafters or legislators who sponsor an initiative is not relevant
since such opinion does not represent the intent of the electorate and we cannot say with
assurance that the voters were aware of the drafters’ intent. [Citations.]” [Citation.]’
[Citations.] Nothing in Proposition 57’s text or the accompanying materials suggested
the initiative was rejecting 16 years old as the minimum age for transfer to criminal court.
[Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 376-377.)
We thus conclude that, although Proposition 57 retained the ability to prosecute in
adult court a limited category of 14- and 15-year-old juvenile offenders, Proposition 57’s

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“overriding purpose was to channel more juvenile offenders into the juvenile justice
system and to have a juvenile court judge make the transfer decision if one was to be
made, not to set in stone the age parameters for such a determination. That Proposition
57 permitted the transfer of 14 and 15 year olds to criminal court in some circumstances
does not mean precluding such transfer is inconsistent with and/or does not further the
intent of the Act, particularly when we take into account that voters desired the Act to ‘be
broadly construed to accomplish its purposes.’ (Voter Information Guide, supra, text of
Prop. 57, § 5, p. 145.)” (T.D., supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 374.) We reject the
proposition that the intent of Proposition 57 was to preserve prosecutors’ ability to
request the juvenile court to transfer 14 and 15 year olds to adult court.
Proposition 57 changed the procedure for prosecuting juveniles, thereby reversing
the previous trend towards increased prosecution of juveniles in adult court. (Voter
Information Guide, Gen. Elect., supra, analysis by the Legislative Analyst for Prop. 57,
p. 57 [“As a result of these provisions, there would be fewer youths tried in adult
court.”].) SB 1391 is consistent with Proposition 57’s the overriding purpose of
channeling more juvenile offenders into the juvenile justice system, in furtherance of
rehabilitating offenders in juvenile court. In evaluating Proposition 57 as a whole in
discerning its purpose, we conclude SB 1391 is consistent with Proposition 57’s general
purpose and therefore is constitutional. (Alexander C., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 1003.)

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VI.
DISPOSITION
The People’s petition for writ of mandate is denied. The stay issued by this court
on May 28, 2019, shall expire when this decision becomes final.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J.
We concur:
MILLER
Acting P. J.
MENETREZ
J.

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