P. v. Statiras

Filed 4/25/19 P. v. Statiras CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
PERICLES TERRANCE STATIRAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
D073891
(Super. Ct. No. SCD275960)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Polly H.
Shamoon, Judge. Affirmed.
Eric E. Reynolds, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler and Julie L. Garland,
Assistant Attorneys General, Robin Urbanski and Donald W. Ostertag, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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Defendant Pericles Terrance Statiras pleaded guilty to one count of burglary (Pen.
Code, § 459). The court placed him on five years formal probation with the condition
that he serve 365 days in custody, with treatment in a residential treatment facility after
serving 160 actual days. It imposed as conditions of probation (1) an electronic search
requirement that Statiras "[s]ubmit [his] person, vehicle, residence, property, personal
effects, computers, and recordable media including electronic devices to search at any
time with or without a warrant, and with or without reasonable cause, when required by
[a probation officer] or law enforcement officer" and (2) a requirement that Statiras
obtain his probation officer's approval as to his residence and employment. On appeal,
Statiras contends the electronic search condition is unreasonable under People v. Lent
(1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) and unconstitutionally overbroad. He further contends the
residence and employment approval condition is likewise unconstitutionally overbroad.
We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
In March 2018, Statiras pleaded guilty to burglary, admitting as the factual basis
for the plea that he "entered a non-commercial building with the intent to commit a
theft—(a law office not during business hours[).]" He poured liquid on an alarm keypad;
ransacked offices, the kitchen and bathrooms; and pried open an alarm box and tried to
disable it by tearing out wires and components. He then locked himself in a rear office
1 Some of the background facts are taken from Statiras's probation report.

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and either fell asleep or passed out from using narcotics. After his arrest, Statiras began
screaming at the officers, complaining it was too hot in the police vehicle and removing
his clothing. When officers told him to calm down because it was 63 degrees and the
windows of the car were down as much as possible, Statiras replied, "You do two bindles
of meth and then get grabbed by the cops and try to be calm!"
Statiras was 46 years old and a transient at the time of the offense. He has a
history of committing crimes in Georgia, Montana and Florida beginning in 1990.
Specifically, he has on his record two 1990 felony burglary convictions, 1991
misdemeanor driving while intoxicated and felony terrorist threat convictions, a 1992
misdemeanor theft conviction, a 1992 plea of nolo contendere to misdemeanor contempt,
a 1994 plea of nolo contendere for misdemeanor possession of a barbiturate, 2001
misdemeanor convictions for possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia and obstructing
a peace officer; 2012 convictions for felony willful obstruction of a law enforcement
officer and possession/use of a drug-related object, a 2013 plea of nolo contendere for
fleeing officers, and a 2014 conviction for felony possession of a schedule 1 controlled
substance. In 2013 and 2015 he violated his probation and a warrant was issued for his
arrest. In San Diego, Statiras pleaded guilty in 2018 to two misdemeanor offenses of
possessing controlled substances after failing to appear in December 2017, but warrants
were later issued for his arrest. In January 2018 he was convicted of misdemeanor
vandalism in Los Angeles. He was active on probation in two Georgia cases at the time
of the current offense, and the probation officer considered his adjustment to probation
unsatisfactory.

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Statiras also has a history of daily marijuana use since age 16. He smoked cocaine
three to four times a week for ten years ending in 1997, used LSD 25 to 50 times since
age 16, had been using methamphetamine since November 2017, and used
methamphetamine on the day of his arrest.
At Statiras's sentencing hearing, the court stated it would impose the above-
referenced electronic search condition (condition 6n) and a condition requiring Statiras to
obtain his probation officer's approval as to his residence and employment (condition g).
It ordered Statiras to, among other things, "obey all laws," and imposed a condition that
Statiras submit his residence, personal effects, and vehicle to search at any time with or
without a warrant, and with or without reasonable cause, when required by his probation
officer. Statiras's counsel objected to imposition of condition 6n, stating: "This is a case
in which my client while high on drugs entered a building and ransacked it. I don't even
think he had any electronic devices on him. His pockets were filled with things like
throat lozenges and hair ties. There is no nexus to the conduct in this case nor anything
in his prior history." The probation officer responded by asserting that Statiras "gathered
items to sell" and it was "likely he would have used an electronic device to attempt to do
that." The probation also pointed out Statiras was "in possession of controlled substances
and has prior controlled substance offenses . . . . It's also likely he can try and obtain
drugs through electronic devices."
The court imposed the conditions, stating: "This gentleman has had a drug
problem for the last two decades that has apparently spurred other violations in the law.
We're going back to a conviction date of 1989 and included in the several pages of his rap

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sheet—that included within the probation report—is a history of drug use and abuse,
violations of probation for getting more drugs, fleeing and theft as a result of drug issues
along with the fact that he continues to show violence when he is under the influence of
drugs. Based on all of those, the Court will find probation will be helped with the
opportunity and ability to get into electronic devices to see if he is trying to obtain more
drugs or using that to sell drugs. Also based on his presentation that he has started using
drugs at age 13 and has used a variety of them, it's unlikely that without further
supervision from probation he will stop. Given all those reasons, [probation condition]
6n is being ordered in this case to extend to electronic devices."
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
"When an offender chooses probation, thereby avoiding incarceration, state law
authorizes the sentencing court to impose conditions on such release that are 'fitting and
proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the
breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and . . .
for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer.' ([Pen. Code,] § 1203.1, subd.
(j).) Accordingly, . . . a sentencing court has 'broad discretion to impose conditions to
foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety pursuant to . . . [Penal Code] section
1203.1.' [Citation.] But such discretion is not unlimited: '[A] condition of probation
must serve a purpose specified in the statute,' and conditions regulating noncriminal
conduct must be ' "reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted
or to future criminality." ' " (People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 402-403.)

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"[T]he types of conditions a court may impose on a probationer are not unlimited.
We first recognized the limits on probation conditions in the seminal case of [Lent,
supra,] 15 Cal.3d 481 . . . . 'Generally, "[a] condition of probation will not be held
invalid unless it '(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted,
(2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct
which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . .' [Citation.]" [Citation.] This
test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will
invalidate a probation term. [Citations.] As such, even if a condition of probation has no
relationship to the crime of which a defendant was convicted and involves conduct that is
not itself criminal, the condition is valid as long as the condition is reasonably related to
preventing future criminality.' " (People v. Moran, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 405.)
Appellate courts generally review probation conditions for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Moran, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 403; People v. Acosta (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th
225, 229.) Thus, "a reviewing court will disturb the trial court's decision to impose a
particular condition of probation only if, under all the circumstances, that choice is
arbitrary and capricious and is wholly unreasonable." (Moran, at p. 403.) But
constitutional challenges, such as a claim that a condition is overbroad, are reviewed de
novo. (People v. Acosta, at p. 229; People v. Stapleton (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 989, 993.)
II. Electronic Search Condition
Statiras challenges the electronic search condition under Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d
481 as having no relationship to his burglary conviction, involving conduct not itself
criminal, and not reasonably related to his future criminality. Comparing his case to In re

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Erica R. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 907 and In re J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749
involving crimes of misdemeanor possession of ecstasy and petty theft respectively, and
pointing out cell phones are now ubiquitous, he argues there is nothing about his current
or past offenses or his personal history that demonstrates a predisposition to use
electronic devices in connection with criminal activity. Statiras further contends the
condition is unrelated to his future criminality; that "nothing in the record indicates [he]
had any disposition to plan or commit crimes using computers, cell phones, or any other
electronic devices" and thus the record does not establish the required factual nexus
between his burglary conviction, his personal history, and imposition of warrantless and
unrestricted searches of his electronic storage devices. Statiras finally contends the
condition is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face, and violates his privacy rights under
Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373 (Riley).
The People concede that the challenged electronics search condition has no
relationship to Statiras's burglary offense and involves conduct that is not itself criminal.
They maintain, however, that the condition is reasonably related to Statiras's supervision
and to his rehabilitation and preventing potential future criminality. Specifically, they
argue the condition will allow law enforcement to supervise Statiras more effectively
because it aids the probation department in monitoring and ensuring his compliance with
the terms of his probation, and it is especially important given his long history of
substance abuse, drug-related crimes, probation violations, as well as his violent acts
while under the influence of drugs. The People point out that Statiras admitted to using
methamphetamine on the day he committed the offenses, and permitting probation

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officers to search his electronic devices could easily reveal evidence of illicit drug
purchases or substance abuse that would violate his probation and jeopardize community
safety.
A. The Condition is Reasonable under Lent
We agree with the People that the electronics search condition meets the
reasonableness standard for preventing future criminality under Lent.2 As this court
pointed out in People v. Trujillo (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 574, 583, review granted
November 29, 2017, S244650, our Supreme Court has made clear that a "condition of
probation that enables a probation officer to supervise his or her charges effectively is . . .
'reasonably related to future criminality.' " (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 380-
381; see also People v. Valdivia (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1130, 1138, review granted Feb.
14, 2018, S245893.) In Valdivia, the court pointed out that to meet this requirement, the
condition need not have a specific connection to the facts of the defendant's offense or
other past criminal conduct, and it need not have a tendency to preclude a defendant
from engaging in similar criminal conduct in the future. (Id. at pp. 1137-1138.) Rather,
" 'probation conditions authorizing searches "aid in deterring further offenses . . . and in
monitoring compliance with the terms of probation. [Citations.] By allowing close
supervision of probationers, probation search conditions serve to promote rehabilitation
and reduce recidivism while helping to protect the community from potential harm by
2 Many cases dealing with the validity of electronic search conditions are pending
review in the California Supreme Court, with the lead case being In re Ricardo P. (In re
Ricardo P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 676, review granted Feb. 17, 2016, S230923.)

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probationers." ' [Citations.] . . . '[A] warrantless search condition is intended to ensure
that the subject thereof is obeying the fundamental condition of all grants of probation,
that is, the usual requirement . . . that a probationer "obey all laws." Thus, warrantless
search conditions serve a valid rehabilitative purpose, and . . . such a search condition is
necessarily justified by its rehabilitative purpose.' " (Valdivia, at p. 1138.) The Valdivia
court concluded: "Like most, if not all, probationers, defendant here was ordered as a
condition of probation to '[o]bey all laws applicable to [him].' Given this condition, the
fact that defendant may not have shown any predisposition to use an electronic storage
device like a cell phone or computer for purposes of criminal activity . . . does not render
the electronic storage device search condition unreasonable under Lent. The electronic
storage device search condition—like the rest of the search conditions (to which
defendant did not object)—serves to enable defendant's probation officer to supervise
him effectively by helping the probation officer ensure that defendant is complying with
the conditions of his probation by obeying all laws, not just the law he previously
disobeyed . . . . Because the electronic storage device search condition serves this valid
rehabilitative purpose, it is reasonably related to future criminality and thus satisfies the
Lent test." (Id. at pp. 1138-1139.)
All of these conclusions apply to Statiras's condition. The probation officer's
report recounted Statiras's lengthy criminal history including felony offenses, and the
lower court here had a reasonable basis to conclude Statiras has substantial risk factors
relevant to reoffending—including his history of drug use and recent homelessness—that
had to be addressed by the probation officers. It could decide that an effective way to

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confirm his compliance would be to permit his electronic devices to be examined, rather
than merely relying on meetings and telephone conversations. (Accord, People v.
Trujillo, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at pp. 583-584, rev. gr.) Further, because Statiras has
performed poorly on probation, conditions such as this one that will assist probation
officers to closely monitor his compliance are justified for their rehabilitative purpose.
This distinguishes his case from In re Erica R., or In re J.B., in which the juveniles did
not have the sort of criminal history as he does (In re Erica R., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at
p. 913 [record was absent information regarding minor's social or personal history]; In re
J.B., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 753 [minor admitted to two and a half years of
marijuana use and had poor attendance and performance at school]; see also In re Juan R.
(2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1083, 1091 [distinguishing Erica R. and J.B.]). For the above
reasons articulated by the Valdivia court, we conclude the electronics search condition is
not unreasonable under Lent as applied to Statiras.
B. The Electronics Search Condition is Not Unconstitutionally Overbroad
We part company with the Valdivia court, however, with respect to Statiras's claim
of overbreadth; on this record we cannot say the electronics search condition is
unconstitutionally overbroad. A condition should be invalidated as overbroad when it
imposes limitations on a person's constitutional rights that are not closely tailored to
the purpose of the condition. (People v. Acosta, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 229, citing
In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890.) " 'A restriction is unconstitutionally
overbroad . . . if it (1) "impinge[s] on constitutional rights," and (2) is not "tailored
carefully and reasonably related to the compelling state interest in reformation and

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rehabilitation." [Citations.] The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the
closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it
imposes on the defendant's constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that
perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some
infringement.' " (People v. Stapleton, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 993.)
Statiras contends the electronics search condition is overbroad on its face because
it does not limit in any way the scope of any search of his electronic devices—assertedly
having applications containing detailed personal information unrelated to any potential
probation violation—and it does not specify the devices to which it applies. He relies on
the United States Supreme Court's observation in Riley (supra, 573 U.S. at pp. 385-386)
as to the breadth of data on a cell phone, and argues Riley makes clear such searches
implicate privacy concerns not implicated by a traditional search. Statiras maintains we
should follow the reasoning of the courts in People v. Valdivia, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th
1130, review granted and People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, which held
warrantless searches of electronic storage devices carried the potential for significant
intrusion into a defendant's private affairs having nothing to do with illegal activity
(Valdivia, at p. 1144; Appleton, at p. 725), and remanded for the trial court to narrow the
condition. (Valdivia, at p. 1147; Appleton, at p. 727.)3
3 People v. Valdivia, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th 1130, review granted, involved a
defendant who pleaded no contest to inflicting corporal injury on his spouse and was
sentenced to probation. His conditions of probation not only permitted warrantless
searches of electronic storage devices under the defendant's control, but required him to
provide necessary passwords to facilitate any such search. Though it upheld the

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The People respond that the overbreadth doctrine is not recognized in the Fourth
Amendment context; Statiras waived his Fourth Amendment rights by consenting to the
condition; and the challenged condition is reasonable and constitutional given the
"special needs" of California's probation system as well as the fact Statiras's diminished
expectation of privacy as a probationer does not take precedence over the state's
compelling probationary interests.
We reject Statiras's overbreadth challenge on its premise, that is, that Riley's
analysis of Fourth Amendment protections applies to him. In Riley, the court held the
warrantless search of an arrestee's cell phone implicated and violated the individual's
Fourth Amendment rights. (Riley, supra, 573 U.S. 373 at p. 403.) The court explained
that modern cell phones, which have the capacity to be used as mini-computers, can
potentially contain sensitive information about a number of areas of a person's life. (Id.
at pp. 393-394.) The court emphasized, however, that its holding was that cell phone
reasonableness of the electronic search condition under Lent, the Valdivia court, based on
Riley, supra, 573 U.S. 373, held the electronic search condition was unconstitutionally
overbroad under the Fourth Amendment (Valdivia, at pp. 1144-1147) because its
potential impact on the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights "exceed[ed] what is
reasonably necessary to serve the government's legitimate interest in ensuring that he
complies with the terms of his probation." (Valdivia, at p. 1147.) In Appleton, the court
found the state had an interest in preventing the defendant from "us[ing] social media to
contact minors for unlawful purposes." (People v. Appleton, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at
p. 727.) Given that limited justification, the court struck a general electronic device
search condition and remanded the matter to the trial court to craft a narrower condition.
(Ibid.) This court disagreed with Appleton in both People v. Trujillo, supra, 15
Cal.App.5th 574, review granted and People v. Nachbar (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1122,
review granted December 14, 2016, S238210, explaining that Riley's conclusions do not
necessarily apply in the probation-condition context without specific facts showing a
heightened privacy interest. (Trujillo, at pp. 587-589; Nachbar, at p. 1129.) We find the
reasoning of Trujillo and Nachbar persuasive.

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data is subject to Fourth Amendment protection, "not that the information on a cell phone
is immune from search." (Riley, at p. 401.)
Unlike the defendant in Riley who had not been convicted of a crime and was still
protected by the presumption of innocence, Statiras is under probation supervision, and
thus his privacy rights are diminished and may more readily be burdened by restrictions
that serve a legitimate purpose. (See United States v. Knights (2001) 534 U.S. 112, 119
[probationer does not " 'enjoy "the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled" ' "];
People v. Trujillo, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at 574, rev. gr.; People v. Nachbar, supra, 3
Cal.App.5th at p. 1129, rev. gr.; In re J.E. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 795, 805, review granted
October 12, 2016, A145399.) In People v. Trujillo, this court made the same observation,
pointing out that courts routinely uphold broad probation conditions permitting searches
of a probationer's residence without a warrant or reasonable cause. (Id. at pp. 587-588.)
Like the defendant in Trujillo, at pages 588-589, Statiras does not challenge the probation
condition authorizing officers to conduct random and unlimited searches of his residence
at any time and for no stated reason, and he made no showing that a search of his
electronic devices would be any more invasive than an unannounced, without-cause,
warrantless search of his residence. Here, as in Trujillo, the record supports a conclusion
that the electronic device search condition is necessary to protect public safety and to
ensure Statiras's rehabilitation during his supervision period, and a routine search of
defendant's electronic data "is strongly relevant to the probation department's supervisory
function." (Id. at p. 588.) We adopt a similar conclusion as Trujillo: "Absent
particularized facts showing the electronics-search condition will infringe on [Statiras's]

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heightened privacy interests, there is no reasoned basis to conclude the condition is
constitutionally overbroad or to remand for the court to consider a more narrowly-drawn
condition." (Id. at p. 589.) On this record, we conclude the burden on Statiras's privacy
is insufficient to show overbreadth, given the legitimate penological purpose shown for
searching his electronic devices.
Because we reject Statiras's overbreadth claim on its premise, we do not address
the People's contention that the overbreadth doctrine does not apply outside the First
Amendment context. (Compare Schall v. Martin (1984) 467 U.S. 253, 268, fn. 18
["[O]utside the limited First Amendment context, a criminal statute may not be attacked
as overbroad"] with Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1095, fn. 15 [noting
that limitation of overbreadth claims to First Amendment violations "is not invariably
observed"].)
III. Condition G: Probation Officer Approval of Residence and Employment
Statiras contends the condition that he obtain his probation officer's approval for
his residence and employment is unconstitutionally overbroad. Specifically, he maintains
it "infringes on [his] ability to live and work without being reasonably related to the
state's compelling interest in his rehabilitation or public safety" and is "an improper
delegation of judicial authority because it confers unfettered power to veto Mr. Statiras's
choice of residence or employment for any reason, or no reason at all." Statiras asks us to
strike the condition as a violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to
association, privacy, and liberty.

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A. Forfeiture
Pointing out Statiras did not object to probation condition g below, the People
argue the condition is facially valid, and that Statiras forfeited any as-applied challenge.
Statiras concedes he did not object to the condition, but he maintains under In re Sheena
K., supra, 40 Cal.4th 875, the constitutional challenge is not forfeited because it presents
a pure question of law that may be raised for the first time on appeal.
" 'As a general rule, failure to challenge a probation condition on constitutional or
Lent grounds in the trial court waives the claim on appeal.' [Citations.] This rule is
intended to ' "encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so they
may be corrected." ' [Citation.] An exception exists, however, where a party raises a
facial challenge to a condition of probation as constitutionally vague or overbroad that
can be resolved without reference to the sentencing record in a particular case. [Citation.]
In reaching this conclusion, our high court emphasized that it 'd[id] not conclude that "all
constitutional defects in conditions of probation may be raised for the first time on
appeal, since there may be circumstances that do not present 'pure questions of law that
can be resolved without reference to the particular sentencing record developed in the
trial court.' [Citation.] In those circumstances, '[t]raditional objection and waiver
principles encourage development of the record and a proper exercise of discretion in the
trial court.' " ' " (In re L.O. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 706, 711-712, quoting In re Antonio
C. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1033; People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237; In re
Sheena K, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 881, 887, 889; People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th
850, 856.)

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Under the foregoing principles, Statiras forfeited his overbreadth challenge to the
employment approval condition. Statiras relies on People v. Burden (1988) 205
Cal.App.3d 1277,4 contending that like the defendant in Burden, his own "employment
had no relation to his offense; and going forward, the type of job [he] obtains does not
impact the state's interest in [his] reformation and rehabilitation." These arguments,
however, require a consideration of underlying facts including Statiras's offense and his
employment history. Such an analysis does not present a pure question of law, but
instead, requires review of the record. To preserve that sort of argument, Statiras was
required to raise his challenge in the lower court so as to allow it to consider the specific
argument with reference to Statiras's personal circumstances, rather than ask this court to
address the claim on an undeveloped record. (See Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp.
888-889.)
4 In People v. Burden, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d 1277, the defendant, who worked as a
salesperson, pleaded guilty to writing bad checks and the trial court imposed a probation
condition barring him from " 'working in a position of outside or commissioned sales.' "
(Id. at p. 1279.) This court struck the condition, explaining that a condition relating to
employment "must be 'necessary to serve the dual purpose of rehabilitation and public
safety' " and the condition there was an "unnecessary infringement on [the defendant's]
right to work." (Id. at p. 1281.) We acknowledged that a court could impose a probation
condition "imping[ing] upon the defendant's scope of employment," where "the defendant
perpetrated the crime in the course of his business." (Id. at p. 1280.) But in Burden, the
defendant "was not acting in the capacity of a salesperson when he wrote the bad
checks." (Ibid.)

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B. Residence Approval
Relying on People v. Bauer (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 937 and People v. Soto (2016)
245 Cal.App.4th 1219, Statiras contends the condition requiring he obtain probation
officer approval of his residence is overbroad because it "vested full discretion in the
probation officer to approve or reject [his] choice of residence" and gives the officer
unfettered and unnecessary "broad and sweeping power over [his] choice of residence."
In People v. Bauer, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d 937, the appellate court rejected a
residence approval requirement—designed to prevent the defendant from living with his
parents—in part because the defendant's probation report did not suggest his home life
contributed to the crime of which he was convicted or was reasonably related to future
criminality. (Id. at p. 944.) The court held the condition therefore violated Lent, supra,
15 Cal.3d 481, and also impinged on the defendant's constitutional right to travel and
freedom of association. (Bauer, at p. 944.) According to the court, it was extremely
broad since it gave the probation officer the power to forbid the defendant "from living
with or near his parents—that is, the power to banish him." (Ibid.) In People v. Soto,
supra, 245 Cal.App.4th 1219, the Court of Appeal struck a probation condition requiring
the defendant to obtain prior approval before changing his place of residence or leaving
the state. (Id. at p. 1226.) The basis for the court's decision was not that the condition
was overbroad, but unreasonable under Lent, where the defendant was convicted of
driving under the influence of alcohol and with a suspended license, crimes not
reasonably related to where he lived or could be influenced by whether he left the state:
"[L]ike the Bauer defendant, there is nothing in the record to indicate that defendant's

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living situation contributed to his crime or would contribute to his future criminality. The
only mention of defendant's living situation is contained in the probation report, which
indicated that defendant had a stable residence and was living with his brother. In sum,
there is nothing to suggest that leaving Monterey County or the State of California would
have an effect on defendant's rehabilitation." (Soto, at p. 1228.) The court held the
record did not support a finding that the condition had any relation to the defendant's
future criminality. (Id. at p. 1228.)
As we have previously explained, it is now settled that a "condition of probation
that enables a probation officer to supervise his or her charges effectively is . . .
'reasonably related to future criminality.' " (People v. Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp.
380-381; accord, People v. Soto, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 1227.) Unlike the
condition in Bauer, the residence condition imposed here is not designed to prevent
Statiras from living where he pleases or "banish" him. (Accord, People v. Arevalo (2018)
19 Cal.App.5th 652, 657.) Moreover, unlike both defendants in Bauer and Soto, Statiras
has a lengthy criminal and drug use history, thus, where he lives may directly affect, and
is needed to aid in, his rehabilitation. As in Arvalo, the probation officer can limit
Statiras's exposure to sources of temptation for future criminality by, for example, not
approving residences in close proximity to drug dealers. (Arevalo, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th
at p. 658.) And likewise, "[l]iving in an area having easy access to drug suppliers could
negatively affect [his] rehabilitation." (Ibid.) Without a limitation placed by the
residence condition or without supervision, Statiras could opt to live where drugs are
used, sold, or manufactured. A probation officer supervising a person like Statiras must

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reasonably know where he resides and with whom he is associating in deterring future
criminality. We conclude the residence approval condition is constitutionally valid.
C. Request to Modify Probation Condition
As an alternative to striking probation condition g, Statiras asks that this court
remand his case with instructions that the trial court modify the condition to impose
"guidelines" for the probation officer to employ in determining whether to approve his
choice of residence and employment. The request is premised on his contention that the
condition is overbroad; so we decline the request on the grounds stated above.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
O'ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, Acting P. J.
HALLER, J.

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