New Commune DTLA v. Redondo Beach

Filed 7/30/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

NEW COMMUNE DTLA LLC,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

CITY OF REDONDO BEACH et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

B337897
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23STCP00426)

APPEAL from judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, James Chalfant, Judge. Affirmed.
Patterson & O’Neill, Ryan Patterson and Brian O’Neill, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Joy A. Ford, City Attorney; Richards, Watson & Gershon and Ginetta L. Giovinco for Defendants and Respondents.

In this appeal, we address two statutory schemesthat promote state policies over the interests of local governments: the Housing Accountability Act (HAA) (Gov. Code, § 65589.5) and the California Coastal Act (Coastal Act) (Pub. Resources Code, § 30000 et seq.). The HAA seeks to increase affordable housing throughout the state. The Coastal Act aims to protect the California coast. A statewide agency implements each act. The California Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD)reviews and certifieslocal housing elements, and the California Coastal Commission (Commission) reviews and certifies local coastal programs (LCPs).Alocality’s housing element and LCPshapedevelopment of real estate within its boundaries.
New Commune DTLA, LLC (Developer) applied to the City of Redondo Beach and its Department of Community Development and City Council (collectively City), for permits to develop 30 condominium units,sixof which would serve as affordable housing, in the City’s coastal zone. Following the denialof its application, Developer petitioned for writ of mandate compelling the City to approve its application under the builder’s remedy provisions of the HAA. The trial court denied the petition, findingDeveloper’sproposed projectviolated the City’s LCP. The LCP, as certified by the Commission, designated the zone in which Developer sought to build residences only forpublic access, coastal recreational facilities, and services supporting boating and fishing.
Developer contends the trial court erred by effectively overriding the HAA in favor of the Coastal Act and offers a proposal for “harmonizing” the two acts. We decline Developer’s requested construction, which would impose on local governments the duty to determine whether new and Commission-uncertified land uses comply with the Coastal Act. Instead, we assumethe HAA’s builder’s remedy appliesin this appeal. One of itsprovisions, Government Code section 65589.5, subdivision (d)(3), compels us to considerwhether (1) the City’s denial was required under the Coastal Act as a matter of state law; and (2) no feasible method existed for the proposed housing to be compliant. This approach accords deference to the HAA while upholding Coastal Act requirements and necessary Commission oversight of coastal land uses. We uphold the City’s denial and affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND
A.The Coastal Act
The Coastal Act governs coastal development. Itcreated the current Commission tooversee “‘the orderly process of planning for the future development’” of the coastline. (Shear Development Co., LLC v. California Coastal Com.(2026) 19 Cal.5th 334, 344 (Shear Development).) Its chapters include general declarations and definitions (Chapters 1–2; §§ 30000–30122)and address planning and management (Chapter 3; §§30200–30270); creation and powers of the Commission (Chapters 4–5; §§ 30300–30421); implementation and development (Chapters 6–7; §§ 30500–30627); ports (Chapter 8; §§30700–30721); and judicial review, penalties, and severability (Chapters 9–10; §§30800–30900). These provisions must be liberally construed. (§ 30009; Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012)55 Cal.4th 783, 793–794 (Pacific Palisades).)
The Coastal Act’sprimary goals include protecting the coastal zone, conserving its resources, maximizing public access to the coast and recreational opportunities for the public, and promoting conservation principles and the constitutionalrights of private property owners.(§30001.5, subds. (a)–(c).)Chapter 3 prescribes more than 40 additional policies (hereinafter Chapter3 policies) concerning public access and recreation (§§ 30210–30224), protection of the marine environment (§§ 30230–30244), and prioritization of private land uses for public-serving recreational facilities over private residential development. (See §§ 30221, 30222; see also §§ 30210–30214, 30220, 30223–30265.5.)
As expressly stated in the Coastal Act, the Commission and local governments “share responsibility for planning coastal development.” (Shear Development, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 344.)Local governments with coastal land must submit an LCP to the Commission for certification. (§ 30500, subd. (a).) AnLCPmust include a land use plan—the functional equivalent ofa general plan for property in the coastal zone. The LCP must also include a local implementation plan that includes zoning, zoning maps, and other implementing actions for the coastal zone. (§§ 30108.5, 30108.6.)The Chapter 3 policies “constitute the standards by which” the Commission determines LCP adequacy. (§ 30200.)
Once the Commission certifies anLCP, the local government is statutorily delegated “issuing authority” over coastal development permits (CDPs) that are required for coastal development. (§ 30519, subd. (a).) This authority is limited. The local government “shall” issue a CDP only if the proposed development conforms to its certified LCP. (§§ 30600, 30600.5, subd. (c), 30604, subd. (b).) To authorize any use of coastal land other than that designated in its certified LCP, the local government must obtain Commission approval through an amendment process. (§ 30514, subd. (e).)
The Coastal Act also reserves power in “the requirements of state and federal law with respect to providing low- and moderate-income housing, . . . or any other obligation related to housing imposed by existing law or any law hereafter enacted.” (§ 30007.) This provision preserves some authority in those other statutory schemes and is to be strictly construed. (See City of Dana Point v. California Coastal Com. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 170, 195; Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. County of Orange (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1384.)

B.The City’s Certified LCP
It is undisputed that the City had a Commission-certified LCP at all relevant times in this case. (See Redondo Beach Mun. Code, §§ 10-5.102, 10-5.200(b), 10-5.201(a)–(b), 10-5.2210(a).) The LCP designates permitted uses for different coastal zones. The City’sCoastal Commercial-4 (CC-4) zone is restricted to public access uses, coastal-related commercial-recreational facilities, and service facilities supporting pedestrian-oriented recreational boating and fishing. (See id., §§ 10-5.101, 10-5.800, 10-5.810, 10-5.815, 10-5.2600; see also id., § 10-5.102].) Residential uses are neither permitted nor conditionally permitted in this zone. (See id., § 10-5.202(a).)
The City’s coastal land use implementing ordinancesprescribe mandatory amendment procedures to changeany portion of its coastal zoning regulations or map. (See Redondo Beach Mun. Code,§§ 10-5.2504–10-5.2505.) These procedures require public notice, at least one hearing, and if necessary, an administrative appeal prior to adopting any change. (Ibid.) No change can “take effect until it has been submitted to and reviewed and certified by the . . . Commission . . . for consistency with the City’s certified [LCP].” (Ibid.)

C.Developer’s Application
In July 2022, Developer applied to the City for permission to build a 141,000 square foot mixed-use project, consisting mainly of 30 condominiums, six of which would serve as affordable housing. Throughout its application, Developeracknowledged residential uses were not permitted but declared its application must be approved as a “builder’s remedy” project under the HAA.

D.The Housing Element Law, HAA, and Builder’s Remedy
Like other local governments, the City must adopt comprehensive, long-term plans for development within its jurisdiction. (See California Building Industry Assn. v. City of San Jose (2015) 61 Cal.4th 435, 444.) Under the Housing Element Law (Gov. Code, §§65580–65588), the City’s general plan must contain a variety of “housing elements”to address its regional housing needs. (See Gov. Code, §§ 65580, 65582.)
Among other requirements existing at the time Developer submitted its project for approval, its housing elementhad to address theidentification, assessment, and analysis of existing and projected housing needs, as well as a program setting forth a schedule of actions to achieve housing element objectives through land use and development controls. (Former Gov. Code, § 65583, subds. (a), (c)(1), as amended by Stats. 2021, Ch. 358, §§ 1.5, 5.)
When a local government fails to obtain an HCD-certified housing element in a timely fashion,the HAA severely constrains its ability to reject any builder’s remedy project that proposesaffordable housing, even if that project conflicts with local zoning and general plan standards. (See Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subds.(a)–(d); Kalnel Gardens, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 927, 938–939.)During this period of HAA noncompliance,the local government may not disapprove such project without makingspecific written findings. These findings include,in relevant part,that “denial of the housing development project or imposition of conditions is required in order to comply with specific state or federal law, and there is no feasible method to comply without rendering the development unaffordable to low- and moderate-income households . . . .” (Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (d)(3).) Nothing in this provision or the HAA “shall be construed to relieve”a local government from complying with the Coastal Act. (Id., §65589.5, subd. (e).)

E.Application Denial and Underlying Proceedings
The City did not have a substantially compliant housing element certified by HCD at the time Developersubmitted its project for approval.(See New Commune DTLA LLC v. City of Redondo Beach (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 111, 126.)The project, which includes six units of affordable housing, thus constitutes a “‘builder’s remedy’” project. (See Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd.(h)(11).) Two months after HCD certified its housing element in September 2022, the City notified Developer it was not processing its project application because it proposed unpermitted uses under the City’scertified LCP. The notice informed Developer that if it “wish[ed] to develop residential uses on this site,” it could submit an application(s) for a general plan amendment, LCP land use plan amendment, orzoning amendment. (Redondo Beach Mun. Code,§§ 10-2.2505, 10-5.204, 10-5.2505.)
Following an unsuccessful administrative appeal, Developer filed a verified petition for writ of mandate compelling the approval of its application under the HAA and requesting a declaration finding the City’s decision unlawful. The court denied the petition following a bench trial. Despite finding the HAA builder’s remedy provisions applicable to the dispute, the court found those provisions could not override coastal land development requirements under the Coastal Act and the City’s certified LCP.

DISCUSSION
Developer contends the trial court erred by prioritizing Coastal Act provisions over the HAA and offers its own proposal for “harmonizing” the two acts.
“We apply well-established principles to this question of statutory interpretation. ‘“‘When we interpret a statute, “[o]ur fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. . . . If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.” [Citation.] “Furthermore, we consider portions of a statute in the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.”’”’” (Shear Development, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 366.)
We address Developer’s proposed harmonization of the HAA and Coastal Act first before analyzing the statutory schemes independently.

A.Developer’s Proposed Harmonization
In Developer’s view, theCity’s certified LCP contains local restrictions that can beunmoored from the Coastal Act. Becauseits project is a builder’s remedy under Government Code section65589.5, Developer argues these local restrictionscannot be used to override compulsory approval under the HAA.
As Developer admits, however,it and the City are bound by the Coastal Act. To accord significance to both statutory schemes, Developer argues the City’s approval process for builder’s remedy projects can be formulated by “harmonizing”various HAA and Coastal Actprovisions. Under this proposed harmonization,the City must approve any builder’s remedy project in the coastal zone unless it makes written findings that disapproval is necessary to comply with specific, objective resource protection policiesprescribed by Chapter 3 of the Coastal Act.
The standard Developerproposes—compliance with “core,” “specific,”and “objective” Chapter 3 policies—is unworkable. Developer jettisons the majority of Chapter 3 policies in favor of six policies it avers “could potentially form”specific, objective policies on which disapprovals could be based.At oral argument, developer could notidentify which of these policies are truly “objective.” Instead, it directedus to California Renters Legal Advocacy & Education Fund v. City of San Mateo (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 820 (California Renters), whichdefines an “objective” policy as “‘involving no personal or subjective judgment by a public official and being uniformly verifiable by reference to an external and uniform benchmark. . . .’” (Id. at p. 840, quoting Gov. Code, § 65589.5, former subd.(h)(8).)
Under this standard, almost all the policies Developer identifies as “potentially” objectivearesubjective. For example, one policy restricts areas adjacent to environmentally sensitive habitat areas and parks and recreation areas to uses that are “compatible with the continuance of those habitat and recreation areas.” (§ 30240, subd. (b), italics added.) This policy, like the others identified by Developer, lacks “specificity” and “requires interpretation and subjective judgment.” (California Renters, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p.842.)Developer identifies no external and uniform benchmark to verify uses that are compatible with coastal habitat and recreation areas. Indeed, this type ofinterpretation and judgment is expressly delegated to the Commission whose “primary responsibility” is implementing the Coastal Act’s provisions. (§ 30330; see § 30200, subd. (a).) We discern nothing in the Coastal Act delegating that responsibility(or expertise) to a local government driven by its own interests.We may not, under the guise of construction,delegate or impose upon local governments the responsibility to determine whether “specific, objective” Coastal Act policies would be served by projects proposed in their jurisdictions.(See DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, 992.)
Instead, we assume without deciding the builder’s remedy applies in this case and analyze whether, under the builder’s remedy provisions, specifically Government Code section 65589.5, subdivision (d)(3), denial of Developer’s builder’s remedy project is necessary to comply with the Coastal Act. We review the relevant facts for substantial evidence and the City’s ultimate decision denying the project for abuse of discretion. (Code Civ. Proc., §1094.5, subd. (b); see Wall v. California Coastal Com. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 943, 951 (Wall); Reddell v. California Coastal Com. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 956, 962.)
B.Application of Government Code Section 65589.5
Government Code section 65589.5, subdivisions (d)(1) through (d)(5) place conditions on disapprovinga builder’s remedy project. Under subdivision (d)(3), the City may not disapprove sucha project absent written findings supported by the preponderance of the evidence that (1) disapproval was required under state law; and (2) no feasible method existed to comply with state law without rendering the proposed development unaffordable. As we shall discuss, the City determined disapproval was required by the Coastal Act and no feasible method was shown to comply with it.

1.The Coastal Act Required the City’s Disapproval
a.The Certified LCP Embodies Coastal Act Policies and Law
Contrary to Developer’s construction, the City’s certified LCP does not solely embodylocal standards. The LCP was devised and coordinated with Commission input as required by the Coastal Act. (McAllister v. California Coastal Com. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 912, 922 (McAllister).) When reviewing the City’s LCP, the Commission had to determine whether the“kinds, location, and intensity of land uses” in its land use plan conformed with Chapter 3 policies. (§§ 30108.5, 30512, subds.(a)(1), (c), 30512.2, subds. (a), (b).) Such review also required the Commission’s encouragement of affordable housing and “the provision of new affordable housing opportunities . . . in the coastal zone.”(§ 30604, subd. (g).)
Following its certification of the City’s LCP land use plan, the Commission was required to determine whether the kinds of uses, locations, and intensities in the land use plan were adequately carried out by the City’s zoning ordinances, maps, and other implementing actions. (§§ 30512, subd. (a)(1), 30513, subd.(b); see also § 30516, subd. (a)).The Commission’s certification confirms these findings and Coastal Act conformity. (See McAllister, supra, 169 Cal.App.4that pp. 922–923; Santa Barbara County Flower & Nursery Growers Assn. v. County of Santa Barbara (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 864, 871–872; see also §§ 30510–30526.)
The substance of these procedures and the Commission’s involvement in them reflecta “‘fundamental’” Coastal Act purpose to “‘ensure that state policies prevail over the concerns of local government.’” (Pacific Palisades, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p.794; see also City of Chula Vista v. Superior Court (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 472, 489 [“Surely the Legislature did not go to all this trouble to create a statewide rubber stamp agency which does no more than review local legislation for arbitrary and capricious enactments”].) As both local and state governments “engage[d] in extensive work to draft, edit, and enforce” the City’s LCP under Coastal Act direction, the actions of both are “sufficiently comparable to authorship.” (Shear Development, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 354.) Thus, the City’s certified LCP embody policies that are “‘not solely a matter of local law, but embody state policy.’” (Pacific Palisades, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 794, quotingCharles A. Pratt Construction Co., Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (2008)162 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1075; see Shear Development, at p.343 [“An LCP is enacted law”].)

b.The City’s Issuing Authority is Limited to LCP-CertifiedUses or a Commission-Certified Amendment
Upon LCP certification, the Coastal Act delegated the City “issuing” authority over CDP applications in its jurisdiction. (Pacific Palisades, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 794; see Wall, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p.949; see also §§30512–30513, 30519, subd. (a), 30600, subd. (a), 30600.5, subd. (b).)This authority is expressly limited: the City must (“shall”) issue CDPs for proposed coastal developments if the proposed projects are in “conformity” with its certified LCP. (§ 30604, subd. (b); see Hanks v. State Board of Equalization (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 427, 434 [“The word ‘conform’ is commonly used as, and is defined [as] ‘to bring into harmony or agreement’”]; see Black’s Law Dict. (12th ed. 2024) p. 147 [“conforming” defined as “[b]eing in accordance with”].)
Developeracknowledgesthis “shall issue” authorityfor LCP conformitybut argues section30604(b) does not requireCDP disapprovals for LCP land use nonconformity. We are not persuaded.
The Coastal Act does not grantlocal governments with Commission-certified LCPs the authority to approve unsanctioneduses of coastal land. The Coastal Actamendment procedures, “similar procedures to those for reviewing a new LCP” (Shear Development, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 355),preclude this type of local approval. An “‘amendment of a certified [LCP]’” is defined as “any action... that authorizes theuse of a parcel of land other than a use that is designated in the certified [LCP] as a permitted use of the parcel.” (§ 30514, subd. (e), italics added.)
The purpose of this amendment procedure is clear: Any land use not previously certified in an LCP must be submitted for Commission certification before it may be approved locally.Developer’s proposed construction would defeat this manifest requirement and render various LCP certification, amendment, and CDP approval procedures ineffective.(See Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 257, 274 [“Wellestablished canons of statutory construction preclude a construction which renders a part of a statute meaningless or inoperative”].)
Other Coastal Act provisions demonstrate the necessity for Commission approval of coastal land uses. One provision authorizes Commission review of “minor” amendments or those requiring “rapid” action. (§ 30514, subds. (c), (d)(1)(B).) This provision expressly precludes expedited review for “any change in land use or . . . allowable use of property.” (See ibid.) Another provision governing affordable housing approvalsprohibits the restriction of residential densities, provided residential uses are permitted in a certified LCP. (See § 30604, subd. (f) [absent finding density cannot be accommodated in a manner that conforms withcertified LCP, government may not restrict densities below local zoning and the Density Bonus Law].)
As these provisions demonstrate,the City’s ability to “authorize[ ] a use other than that designated in the LCP as a permitted use does require certification by the Commission (§ 30514, subd. (d)).” (Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561, 573, fn. 9.)We conclude the City’s disapproval was required under Government Code section 65589.5, subdivision (d)(3).

c.Developer’s Extratextual Evidence
Developer relies on several casesand various Commission documents to demonstrate the City’sability toapproveproject applications notwithstanding LCP nonconformity.Developer overstates the impact of these authorities.
The caseson which Developer relydid not involve local approvals of uncertified land uses.In Hines v. California Coastal Com.(2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 830 and Alberstone v. California Coastal Com.(2008)169 Cal.App.4th 859,the courts upheld localCDP approvals that authorized projectsin technical nonconformity with specific development standards because those nonconformities were overall compliant with LCP policies and the landusesat issue were permitted. (See Hines, at pp.848–850 [reduced buffer width of single-family residence]; Alberstone, at pp. 864–867 [residential lot merger restrictions and requirements].) As these approvals applied to land already zoned for residential use, no Commission-certified land use designation change wasrequired. (See also Conway v. City of Imperial Beach (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 78, 89 [upholding modified residential density because “permitted uses of property in the coastal zone were not altered”].)
TheCommission documents are similarly limited. Several documents recommend LCP amendmentsfor Density Bonus Law modifications impacting “community character, visual resources, public views, sensitive biological resources . . . or public access to the coast.” (See Cal. Coastal Com., Staff Recommendation on City of Carlsbad Major Amendment No. LCP-6-CAR-20-0078-2 (2022) pp. 1–3; Cal. Coastal Com., Staff Recommendation on San Luis Obispo County LCP Amendment No. LCP-3-SLO-21-0025-1-Part D (2021) p. 1.)These documents underscore the importance of Commissioncertification for even modifications compelled by state law if those modifications potentially impact Coastal Act policies. (See e.g., §§30250 [community character], 30251 [scenic and visual qualities], 30230 & 30240 [sensitive biological areas and resources], 30252 [public access].)
Other Commission documents recommend “no substantial issue” determinations, which the Commission may make to summarily dismiss a pending administrative appeal. (See §§ 30603, 30625, subds. (a), (b)(2).) Like the other authorities discussed,these administrative appeals challenged development standard conformity. (See Cal. Coastal Com., Combined Staff Report: Substantial Issue Determination Appeal No. A-3-MRA-24-0026 (2024)pp. 64–66, 83 [sensitive habitat standards, public access, and recreational opportunities]; Cal. Coastal Com., Appeal Staff Rep.: Substantial Issue Determination Appeal No.A-2-HMB-16-0058 (2016) pp. 1–2 [visual compatibility with watershed character]). These appealsdo support Commission approval of technical LCP nonconformitiesin light of additional, overriding LCP policies, but theydo notsupport a city’s approval of uncertified land uses.

d.Conclusion
Under Government Code section 65589.5, subdivision(d)(3), denial of a builder’s remedy project may be required as a matter of state law. In this case,compliance with the Coastal Act required denial of a CDP permit for Developer’s project.We recognize the friction in this conclusionand the HAA’s laudable goal of providing affordable housing, but to adopt the construction proposed by Developerwould effectively repeal Coastal Act procedures mandating Commissionoversight. The Legislature may choose to curtail Coastal Act requirementsafter hearingfrom interested stakeholdersbeyond the parties before us. We may notrewrite the law as Developer requests.

2.Feasible Method to Comply with State Law
We turn now to the secondinquiry under Government Code section65589.5, subdivision (d)(3), and determine whether any feasible method existedto comply with the Coastal Act without rendering Developer’s project unaffordable. “‘Feasible’” is defined as “capable of being accomplished in a successful manner within a reasonable period of time, taking into account economic, environmental, social, and technological factors.” (Id., § 65589.5, subd. (h)(1).)
The record supports the City’s infeasibility finding in this case. When notifyingDeveloper its project sought unpermitted coastal land uses, the City informed Developer that itsproject was infeasible as a matter of law. The City’s noticeinvitedDeveloper to apply for a changed designation of land to residential use. (See § 30514; Redondo Beach Mun. Code, §§ 10-5.2504–10-5.2505.) Developerignoredthis invitation. Absent any input from Developer, the City had no reason to determine, or a record from which it could determine, legal oreconomic feasibility.
Under these circumstances, we find guidance from California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) cases addressingthe very same statutory definition of “feasible” for program alternatives. (See In re Bay-Delta etc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1143, 1163; Uphold Our Heritage v. Town of Woodside (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 587, 597–598(Woodside)[“[u]nder CEQA ‘feasible’ is defined as ‘capable of being accomplished in a successful manner within a reasonable period of time, taking into account economic, environmental, social, and technological factors’”]; see also § 21061.1.) As these cases demonstrate, legally infeasible alternatives need not be fully analyzed because there is no discretion to approve them. (See California Native Plant Society v. City of Santa Cruz (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 957, 981–982(Santa Cruz) [agency needn’t consider “infeasible” alternatives]; TiburonOpen Space Committee v. County of Marin (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 700, 732; Woodside, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 602.)
Consistent with these decisions,the Coastal Act, and the undisputed fact of Developer’s abstention from the City’s proffered amendment process, we conclude that the City’s feasibility reviewin this case was limited.Without Developer’sparticipation in the amendmentprocessor any resulting Commission approval or guidance, the City could not legally amend its certified LCP to allow residential uses in the CC-4 zone.Where such “alternative is infeasible,” the City’s decision cannot be “inadequate simply because it failed to include an analysis of that alternative.” (Sequoyah Hills Homeowners Assn. v. City of Oakland (1993) 23 Cal.App.4th 704, 715, fn. 3; see alsoSanta Cruz, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p.981 [project approval depends on whether “the alternatives are actually feasible”].)
In light of the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion in the City’sdecision disapprovingDeveloper’s builder’s remedy development application under Government Code section65589.5, subdivision (d)(3).

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

MORI, Acting P. J.

We concur:

TAMZARIAN, J.

COGLIATI, J.**