P. v. Williams

Filed 6/29/20 P. v. Williams CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ANZYLON WILLIAMS,
Defendant and Appellant.
B300341
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA212549)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Craig J. Mitchell, Judge. Affirmed.
James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Charles S. Lee and Chung L. Mar, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________

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In 2001, appellant Anzylon Williams was charged with
attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder and
conspiracy to commit murder. During her trial, the court
instructed the jury that it could find the attempted murder was
willful, deliberate, and premeditated if it found the attempted
murder was a natural and probable consequence of the
commission of the target crime of assault with a firearm. (See
People v. Wilson (Mar. 13, 2003, B156275) [nonpub. opn.] [2003
WL 1091052 at p. *2] (Wilson).1) The jury convicted Williams of
attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder and
conspiracy to commit murder. The court sentenced Williams to
26 years to life in prison.
In 2018, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-
2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437). Among other things, Senate
Bill 1437 enacted Penal Code section 1170.95,2 which permits a
person convicted of murder under the felony-murder rule (subject
to some exceptions) or a natural and probable consequences
theory to petition the trial court to vacate the murder conviction
and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts.
(§ 1170.95.)
Williams filed a section 1170.95 petition in the trial court.
The trial court denied Williams’s petition, finding Williams did
not establish a prima facie showing for section 1170.95 relief.
The key question Williams raises on appeal is whether section
1 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of this court’s
2003 unpublished opinion following Williams’s trial. (Evid. Code,
§ 452, subd. (d).)
2 All unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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1170.95 applies to attempted murder. Consistent with the
opinions issued by our colleagues in the Second and Fifth
Districts, we conclude that convictions for attempted murder do
not fall within the ambit of section 1170.95. Accordingly, we
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Shooting and Trial
We quote a portion of our summary of facts from our 2003
opinion. “The victim (Clark) had a live-in relationship with
defendant Williams. In October of 2000, Williams told Clark that
if she could not have him no one could and that (presumably if
the relationship soured) she would kill him or have him killed.
The following month, Clark ended the relationship and Williams
moved out. Early in the morning on December 2, 2000, as Clark
parked his car in a friend’s driveway and got out, a car owned by
Williams’ brother (defendant Wilson) pulled up behind. Three
people were in the car. Williams sat up from the back seat,
pointed at Clark, and ducked back down. Wilson, the front
passenger, got out of the car, hurled a profanity at Clark, and
pulled out a hand gun. Clark ran. Wilson chased Clark and fired
several shots, hitting Clark in the arm and left buttock. The
culprits drove away.” (Wilson, supra, B156275 [2003 WL
1091052 at p. *1].) Clark survived the shooting. (Ibid.)
An amended information charged Williams with attempted
willful, deliberate, premeditated murder with malice
aforethought in violation of sections 187, subdivision (a), and 664;
conspiracy to commit murder in violation of sections 182,
subdivision (a)(1), and 187; and a firearm enhancement pursuant
to section 12022, subdivision (a)(1).

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During the trial, the court instructed the jury: “ ‘If you
should find the defendant Anzylon Williams guilty of [c]ount 1
based on this theory [aiding and abetting], then in order to find to
be true the allegation pursuant to . . . section 664[, subdivision]
(a) that the [a]ttempted [m]urder was willful, deliberate, and
premeditated, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
and unanimously agree that this allegation was a natural and
probable consequence of the commission of the target crime of
[a]ssault with a [f]irearm.” (Wilson, supra, B156275 [2003 WL
1091052 at p. *2].) The jury convicted Williams of attempted
murder and conspiracy to commit murder, found that the
attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, and
found that in the commission of the attempted murder, a
principal was armed with a firearm. The court sentenced
Williams to an indeterminate term of 26 years to life in prison.
During her 2003 appeal, Williams argued the trial court
should have “instructed that in order to find Williams guilty of
premeditated attempted murder it must find that she indeed
premeditated and deliberated,” but “concede[d] that this
argument was rejected in People v. Laster (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th
1450 . . . .” (Wilson, supra, B156275 [2003 WL 1091052 at p. *2].)
This court affirmed the judgment. (Id. at pp. *1, *6.)
B. Williams Files Section 1170.95 Petitions
On February 4, 2019, Williams filed a section 1170.95
petition for resentencing using a check-the-box form prepared by
Re:Store Justice, a cosponsor of Senate Bill 1437. (See Sen. Com.
on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg.
Sess.) Apr. 24, 2018, p. 1.) The People filed an opposition in
which they argued Williams was not eligible for resentencing
because she was not convicted of first or second degree murder

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and attached the minutes of the jury verdict and the abstract of
judgment to their opposition. The trial court denied Williams’s
petition without prejudice.
On April 29, 2019, Williams filed another section 1170.95
petition, again using a check-the-box form. Williams did not
check the box that she was convicted of first or second degree
murder, although she checked both boxes later in the form
indicating that she was convicted of first degree murder under
the felony-murder rule and that she was convicted of second
degree murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. At the hearing on her petition, the trial court stated,
“[t]he court does not find that simply checking the box without
making any factual representation as to the circumstances in this
case satisfies the requisite standard of showing a prima [facia]
case of entitlement to relief.” On July 1, 2019, the trial court
issued a minute order stating that Williams did not establish a
prima facie showing that she was entitled to relief and denied the
petition without prejudice. Williams appeals from the July 1,
2019 minute order.
DISCUSSION
A. Senate Bill 1437 Modifies Accomplice Liability for
Murder
The Legislature passed Senate Bill 1437, effective
January 1, 2019, “to amend the felony murder rule and the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to
murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a
person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018,

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ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) “Except as stated in subdivision (e) of
Section 189 of the Penal Code, a conviction for murder requires
that a person act with malice aforethought. A person’s
culpability for murder must be premised upon that person’s own
actions and subjective mens rea.” (Id., subd. (g).)
Accordingly, Senate Bill 1437 amended sections 188 and
189. Section 188, subdivision (a)(3) limited the natural and
probable consequences doctrine for murder, providing “[e]xcept as
stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be convicted of
murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought.
Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.” Senate Bill 1437 also limited the
felony-murder rule by adding subdivision (e) of section 189, which
provides that “[a] participant in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of a felony listed in [section 189,] subdivision (a) in
which a death occurs[, may be] liable for murder only if one of the
following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶]
(2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to
kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited,
requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of
murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of
Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e).)
B. Senate Bill 1437 Permits Petitions to Vacate Certain
Murder Convictions and Seek Resentencing
The Legislature also enacted section 1170.95, which gave
Senate Bill 1437 some retroactive effect. Section 1170.95,
subdivision (a), permits “[a] person convicted of felony murder or
murder under a natural and probable consequences theory may

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file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have
the petitioner’s murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced
on any remaining counts” when a “complaint, information, or
indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine”; “[t]he
petitioner was convicted of first degree or second degree murder
following a trial . . .”; and “[t]he petitioner could not be convicted
of first or second degree murder because of changes to Section
188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (Ibid.)
The petition must include a declaration by the petitioner
that he or she is eligible for relief based on all the requirements
of subdivision (a), the superior court case number and year of the
petitioner’s conviction, and whether the petitioner requests the
appointment of counsel. (§ 1170.95, subd. (b)(1).) The petition
should be filed with the court that sentenced the petitioner, if
possible. (Ibid.) Further, the petitioner must serve a copy of the
petition on the district attorney, or on the agency that prosecuted
the petitioner, and on the attorney who represented the
petitioner in the trial court or on the public defender of the
county where the petitioner was convicted. (Ibid.) Subdivision
(b)(2) of section 1170.95 provides that if any of the information “is
missing from the petition and cannot be readily ascertained by
the court, the court may deny the petition without prejudice to
the filing of another petition and advise the petitioner that the
matter cannot be considered without the missing information.”
Subdivision (c) of section 1170.95 states: “The court shall
review the petition and determine if the petitioner has made a
prima facie showing that the petitioner falls within the provisions
of this section. If the petitioner has requested counsel, the court

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shall appoint counsel to represent the petitioner. The prosecutor
shall file and serve a response within 60 days of service of the
petition and the petitioner may file and serve a reply within 30
days after the prosecutor response is served. These deadlines
shall be extended for good cause. If the petitioner makes a prima
facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief, the court shall
issue an order to show cause.”
The court must hold a hearing within 60 days after the
order to show cause has issued “to determine whether to vacate
the murder conviction and to recall the sentence and resentence
the petitioner on any remaining counts in the same manner as if
the petitioner had not been previously been sentenced.”
(§1170.95, subd. (d)(1).) “At the hearing to determine whether
the petitioner is entitled to relief, the burden of proof shall be on
the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is ineligible for resentencing. . . .” (Id., subd. (d)(3).)
C. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Williams’s
Petition
1. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying
Williams’s Petition Prior to Appointing Counsel
or Issuing an Order to Show Cause
In her opening brief, Williams argued her petition “stated a
prima facie claim for re-sentencing” and thus, “the trial court
erred in summarily denying the petition.”3 She claimed that
3 Williams failed to check a required box on the form. In
arguing she made all necessary allegations, Williams cites her
first section 1170.95 petition, filed in February 2019. However,
Williams’s notice of appeal states that she appeals from the
July 1, 2019 minute order, which relates to her April 29, 2019
petition. We need not consider the effect of this omission from

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under section 1170.95, the trial court could only deny her petition
if it was missing information that was not readily ascertainable
or if the petition, on its face, showed she was ineligible for relief.
Accordingly, she argued, the court should have proceeded with
the next steps, including appointing counsel who would advocate
for the issuance of an order to show cause why relief should not
be granted.
After Williams filed her opening brief, this district issued
two seminal decisions interpreting section 1170.95: People v.
Lewis (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1138, review granted
March 18, 2020, S260598 (Lewis) and People v. Verdugo (2020) 44
Cal.App.5th 320, review granted March 18, 2020, S260493
(Verdugo). In analyzing the statutory framework of subdivision
(c), Lewis held the trial court need not appoint counsel until after
a petitioner demonstrates a prima facie showing that she falls
within the provisions of section 1170.95. (Lewis, supra, at
pp. 1139-1140 [“When the statutory framework is, overall,
chronological, courts will construe the timing of particular acts in
relation to other acts according to their location within the
statute; that is, actions described in the statute occur in the order
they appear in the text”].) Verdugo thereafter provided further
analysis of the steps a trial court must take in evaluating a
section 1170.95 petition. (Verdugo, supra, at pp. 327-332.) The
Verdugo court concluded that subdivision (c) of section 1170.95
requires petitioner to make two prima facie showings. First, a
petitioner must show she “ ‘falls within the provisions of this
section’ ”—that is, that she is eligible for section 1170.95 relief—
Williams’s petition because, as we discuss below, we conclude
that she is not entitled to resentencing relief under section
1170.95 as a matter of law.

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before the trial court appoints counsel and orders briefing.
(Verdugo, supra, at p. 329; see § 1170.95, subd. (c).) Thereafter,
the trial court is to evaluate whether the petitioner has
demonstrated a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief
before issuing an order to show cause why relief should not be
granted. (Verdugo, supra, at p. 328.)
Lewis further held that in determining whether a
petitioner established the initial prima facie showing of
eligibility, the trial court is not limited to reviewing the petition.
The court may also consider the record of conviction (Lewis,
supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 1138), including the complaint,
information, or indictment filed against the petitioner; the verdict
form or factual basis documentation for a negotiated plea; and
the abstract of judgment (Verdugo, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 330, 331-332).4 “Allowing the trial court to consider its file
and the record of conviction is . . . sound policy” because it will
avoid misuse of judicial resources “ ‘when even a cursory review
of the court file would show as a matter of law that the petitioner
is not eligible for relief.’ ” (Lewis, supra, at p. 1138; accord,
Verdugo, supra, at pp. 331-332, citing Sen. Com. on
4 The Supreme Court has granted review in Lewis to decide
(1) whether the trial court may consider the record of conviction
in determining whether a defendant has made a prima facie
showing of eligibility for relief under section 1170.95, and
(2) when in the process outlined under that section the right to
appointed counsel arises. (See Lewis, supra, S260598.) The
Supreme Court also has granted review in Verdugo, deferring
further action pending disposition of the issues in Lewis. (See
Verdugo, supra, S260493.) However, Williams does not provide
any argument that we should depart from Lewis’s or Verdugo’s
holdings.

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Appropriations, Analysis Addendum to Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1437
(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 25, 2018, p. 1 [noting
“potentially-major workload costs in the millions of dollars to
courts to process and adjudicate petitions”; “[u]nknown costs to
county District Attorneys’ Offices and Public Defenders’ Offices to
litigate petitions for resentencing”; and “[u]nknown, potentially-
major costs in the hundreds of thousands . . . to the millions of
dollars to the [Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation] to
supervise and transport inmates from state facilities to
appropriate courthouses for resentencing hearings”].)
In her reply brief, filed after Lewis and Verdugo issued,
Williams acknowledges that a petitioner must make two prima
facie showings under subdivision (c) of section 1170.95. Relying
on People v. Drayton (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 965, Williams also
concedes the trial court may consider the record of conviction and
“need not credit factual assertions that are untrue as a matter of
law—for example, a petitioner’s assertion that a particular
conviction is eligible for relief where the crime is not listed in
subdivision (a) of section 1170.95 as eligible for resentencing.”
(Id. at p. 980.) However, Williams argues that “[n]othing in the
record [of conviction] contradicts the allegations [in her petition],
or otherwise shows she is ineligible for relief.” Thus, she argues
we should remand with instructions that the trial court issue an
order to show cause. We disagree. A cursory review of Williams’s
record of conviction readily reveals Williams was not convicted of
murder, but of attempted murder. As we discuss below, section
1170.95 does not apply to attempted murder. Thus, the trial
court could properly find she was ineligible for resentencing relief
as a matter of law without first appointing counsel, ordering

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briefing, or issuing an order to show cause.5 (See People v.
Drayton, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 980; Verdugo, supra, 44
Cal.App.5th at pp. 330-332; Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p.
1138.)
2. Section 1170.95 Does Not Apply to Attempted
Murder
“ ‘ “ ‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our
fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so
as to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We begin by
examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and
commonsense meaning.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Gonzalez
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141.) “ ‘We must follow the statute’s
plain meaning, if such appears, unless doing so would lead to
absurd results the Legislature could not have intended.’
[Citations.]” (People v. Lopez (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1104,
review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S258175 (Lopez).) “If the statute’s
5 Williams argues the trial court also erred in its reasoning
for denying her petition. Specifically, during the hearing on
Williams’s petition, the trial court stated: “The court has
received a boilerplate check-the-box form that the court has
received over and over again from individuals in state prison
seeking relief. The court does not find that simply checking the
box without making any factual representations as to the
circumstances in this case satisfies the requisite standard of
showing a prima [facie] case of entitlement to relief.” “Because
we review the correctness of the order, and not the court’s
reasons, we will not consider the court’s oral comments or use
them to undermine the order ultimately entered.” (Whyte v.
Schlage Lock Co. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1451.) An
appealed order correct on any theory will be affirmed. (Davey v.
Southern Pacific Co. (1897) 116 Cal. 325, 330.)

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text evinces an unmistakable plain meaning, we need go no
further.” (Beal Bank, SSB v. Arter & Hadden, LLP (2007) 42
Cal.4th 503, 508.)
Here, section 1170.95 unambiguously limits its
applicability to “person[s] convicted of felony murder or murder
under a natural and probable consequences theory.” (§ 1170.95,
subd. (a).) Accordingly, each of the four appellate courts that
have considered whether section 1170.95 extends to attempted
murder has concluded the plain language of the statute and
legislative history demonstrate it does not. (People v. Medrano
(2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1016-1018, review granted Mar. 11,
2020, S259948; People v. Larios (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 956, 970,
review granted Feb. 26, 2020, S259983; People v. Munoz (2019)
39 Cal.App.5th 738, 754, review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S258234
(Munoz); Lopez, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1104-1105, review
granted.)
Williams argues that Lopez and Munoz were wrongly
decided.6 However, the only arguments Williams offers in
support of this contention are the same arguments soundly
considered and rejected in Lopez and Munoz. First, citing People
v. King (1993) 5 Cal.4th 59 (King), People v. Barrajas (1998) 62
6 Williams spends considerable time in her reply brief
discussing the Fifth District’s analysis in both Larios and
Medrano that Senate Bill 1437’s amendments to sections 188 and
189 apply to attempted murder. (People v. Medrano, supra, 42
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1015-1016; People v. Larios, supra, 42
Cal.App.5th at p. 968.) While true that the Fifth District held the
amendments to sections 188 and 189 apply to attempted murder,
in considering whether section 1170.95 applied to attempted
murder, both Larios and Medrano concluded it did not.
(Medrano, supra, at p. 1018; Larios, supra, at pp. 968-969.)

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Cal.App.4th 926 (Barrajas), and other decisions, Williams
contends remedial legislation should apply to attempted murder
because it is a lesser-included offense of the completed crime.
Williams next argues that interpreting section 1170.95 not to
apply to attempted murder will produce absurd results contrary
to the Legislature’s intent because if she had been convicted of
murder, her sentence could be vacated and she would serve a
lesser sentence.
As the Lopez court observed, King “involved a decidedly
different situation in which a series of then-operative provisions
of the Penal Code and the Welfare and Institutions Code,
combined with prior decisions of the Supreme Court, on their face
permitted a person under the age of 18 who had committed first
degree murder and was tried as an adult to be sentenced to the
California Youth Authority (CYA), while the same person who
had attempted but failed to commit the same crime was not
eligible for CYA, but instead was to be sentenced to prison.
(King, [supra, 5 Cal.4th] at pp. 62-63.) Recognizing that this
result made no sense, and reviewing the legislative history of the
statutory change that created the anomaly, the [King] court
explained, ‘The clear legislative intent to make first degree
murderers under the age of 18—and by extension those who
attempt but fail to commit the crime—eligible for CYA should
prevail over any irrational result caused by the amendment of
different statutes in separate codes at different times for
unrelated purposes. . . .’ (Id. at p. 69.)
“Here, in contrast, we are not dealing with amendments of
different statutes in separate codes at different times leading to
an unintended result, but a single piece of legislation in which
the Legislature unequivocally elected, both in the words it chose

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and its statement of purpose, to provide a benefit to one category
of aiders and abettors prosecuted under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine—those facing the lengthiest prison
sentences—and not to others.” (Lopez, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1106-1107; accord, Munoz, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 759
[“Senate Bill 1437’s plain language is not the result of a
disjointed series of amendments over time, as was the case in
King, from which we might infer inadvertence or irrationality.
Instead, the relevant provisions are contained in a single cohesive
bill”].)
In Barrajas, the appellate court found a drug diversion
statute applied to a defendant who had attempted to possess
methamphetamine, despite the fact the statutory scheme listed
possession, but not attempted possession, as a divertible offense.
(Barrajas, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 930.) The Barrajas court
observed, “it makes little sense to suppose the Legislature
intended to exclude from diversion those persons whose efforts to
acquire drugs were sincere but unavailing.” (Ibid.) The Barrajas
court explained that expanding the statue to apply to attempted
possession was consistent with the legislative intent and sound
policy. “ ‘First, diversion permits the courts to identify the
experimental or tentative user before he becomes deeply involved
with drugs, to show him the error of his ways by prompt exposure
to educational and counseling programs in his own community,
and to restore him to productive citizenship without the lasting
stigma of a criminal conviction. Second, reliance on this quick
and inexpensive method of disposition, when appropriate,
reduces the clogging of the criminal justice system by drug abuse
prosecutions and thus enables the courts to devote their limited
time and resources to cases requiring full criminal processing.’

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[Citation]. There is no apparent reason consistent with this
purpose to treat persons who attempted a divertible offense
differently from those who completed it.” (Ibid.)
In contrast, as the appellate court in Lopez observed with
respect to section 1170.95, “the Legislature’s decision to limit
sentencing reform at this time to offenders in cases of murder is
certainly rational. First, the gap between a defendant’s
culpability in aiding and abetting the target offense and the
culpability ordinarily required to convict on the nontarget offense
is greater in cases where the nontarget offense is murder, than
where the nontarget offense is attempted murder or, in the
prosecutor’s discretion, aggravated assault. The Legislature
could have reasonably concluded reform in murder cases ‘was
more crucial or imperative.’ [Citation.]
“Second, the process created in section 1170.95 for those
convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and
probable consequences theory to petition the sentencing court to
vacate that conviction and to be resentenced is not cost free. The
staff of the Senate Appropriations Committee estimated, if 10
percent of the inmates eligible for relief under Senate Bill 1437
petitioned the courts for resentencing, additional court workload
costs would approximate $7.6 million. The committee’s report
expressed concern that this increase in workload ‘could result in
delayed court services and would put pressure on the General
Fund to fund additional staff and resources.’ (Sen. Com. [on]
Appropriations[, Rep. on Sen Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)
as introduced Feb. 16, 2018], p. 3.) Additional expenditures
would also be required to transport petitioners in custody to and
from court hearings. (Ibid.)

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“In a world of limited resources, it is reasonable for the
Legislature to limit the scope of reform measures to maintain the
state’s financial integrity. [Citations.]” (Lopez, supra, 38
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1111-1112, fn. omitted; accord, Munoz, supra,
39 Cal.App.5th at p. 765 [“balancing the costs involved, the fact
the penalties for attempted murder are less severe than for
murder, and the length of prison terms mandated for potentially
relevant felonies, the Legislature could rationally have
determined that extending Senate Bill 1437 relief to attempted
murders would put too great a strain on state resources, while
resulting—in most cases—in insignificant decreases in the
sentences served for attempted murder convictions”].)
As to whether precluding attempted murder from the scope
of section 1170.95 would be contrary to the intent of the
Legislature and produce absurd results, the Munoz court
explained “it is far from clear that interpreting Senate Bill 1437
to apply to convictions for murder, but not attempted murder,
will always, or typically, result in longer sentences for the latter.
Senate Bill 1437 does not mandate any particular punishment for
either murder or attempted murder. The penalties for these
crimes are prescribed in other statutes, and . . . the basic
punishment for attempted murder is far less severe than that
imposed for murder. [Citations.] Nor does applying the statute’s
plain language undermine the primary legislative goal of making
punishment commensurate with culpability, because the
punishment for attempted murder was already, prior to Senate
Bill 1437’s enactment, less than that imposed for murder.”
(Munoz, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 757-758.) That an
attempted murderer could be punished more severely than a
murderer “does not trigger application of the absurdity exception.

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The ‘absurdity exception requires much more than [a] showing
that troubling consequences may potentially result if the
statute’s plain meaning were followed or that a different
approach would have been wiser or better. [Citations.] Rather,
“[t]o justify departing from a literal reading of a clearly worded
statute, the results produced must be so unreasonable the
Legislature could not have intended them.” [Citation.]’ ” (Id. at
p. 758.) “The remedy for any potentially inequitable operation of
section 1170.95 lies with the Legislature. If the Legislature
concludes it is unwise or inequitable to exclude attempted
murderers from Senate Bill 1437’s reach, it has only to amend
the law.” (Id. at p. 760.)
DISPOSITION
The July 1, 2019 order denying William’s petition is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WHITE, J.*
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. BENDIX, J.
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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