P. v. Reyes

Filed 10/20/17 P. v. Reyes CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
LISANDRO REYES,
Defendant and Appellant.
B269741
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA425003)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Edmund Wilcox Clarke, Jr., Judge.
Conditionally reversed with directions.
Julie Jakubik, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant
Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson and Lindsay Boyd, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________

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INTRODUCTION
Lisandro Reyes was accused of committing second degree
robbery and assault with a deadly weapon when he was 17 years
old. He was tried and convicted in adult criminal court and
sentenced to serve 28 years to life in state prison.
After Reyes’s conviction, but while this case was on appeal,
the voters passed Proposition 57, which changed the standards by
which courts determine whether minors will be tried in juvenile
or adult court. We conclude that Proposition 57 applies
retroactively, and thus we conditionally reverse and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
Juvenile Court Proceeding
On November 5, 2013, Gustavo Alvarez was shot in his
upper right arm and his right leg. Several days later, police
arrested 17-year-old Lisandro Reyes in connection with the
shooting. A Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition
was filed, alleging that Reyes had committed a single count of
attempted murder.
A. Hearing
On May 21, 2014, the juvenile court held a Welfare and
Institutions Code section 707 hearing to determine whether
Reyes was a “fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the
juvenile court law.” At the time of the hearing, section 707
required the juvenile court to decide whether Reyes was properly
tried in juvenile court by considering five factors: (1) Reyes’s
criminal sophistication; (2) whether Reyes could be rehabilitated
prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction;
(3) Reyes’s previous delinquent history; (4) the success of previous

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rehabilitation attempts; and (5) the circumstances and gravity of
the offenses alleged in the petition. (Former Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 707, subd. (c).)1
Officer Derrick Boykins testified at the hearing that on
November 5, 2013, he received a report that shots had been fired.
He and his partner discovered Alvarez lying in the doorway of
Trojan Cleaners, located at 1130 West Martin Luther King
Boulevard. Alvarez had been shot in his upper right arm and his
right leg.
Alvarez was taken to a hospital, where he told Officer
Boykins that earlier that day, he had arranged to meet Reyes,
whom he knew as “Suspect.” Alvarez and Reyes knew each other
from Camp Mendenhall, a detention facility for delinquent
minors. Alvarez said he and Reyes had agreed to meet that
afternoon at a McDonald’s to commit “licks” (robberies) together.
They had agreed that Alvarez would bring a firearm with him.
When Alvarez arrived at the McDonald’s, he saw Reyes
talking to another man. Alvarez and Reyes walked to a nearby
alley, and Reyes asked to see Alvarez’s firearm. As soon as
Alvarez handed the gun to Reyes, Reyes pointed the gun at
Alvarez and said he had 13 seconds to run. Alvarez initially
thought Reyes was joking, and then “kind of froze when he saw
the firearm pointed at him.” Reyes counted to six and then fired
one round, striking Alvarez in the upper right arm. As Alvarez
1 In this section of our opinion we shall refer to both former
and current Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 as “section
707.” The former section will be designated as such. All
subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.

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turned to run, Reyes shot him a second time in the right leg.
Alvarez ran through the alley and collapsed.
After the shooting, a search was conducted of Reyes’s home.
Officers recovered a gun that matched the description of the
firearm Alvarez had reported carrying the day he was shot.
Reyes was arrested. According to Officer Boykins, Reyes
said Alvarez “was an easy mark, street vernacular for easy
target. [Reyes] knew [Alvarez] from [Camp Mendenhall] and said
it was easy to attempt to make friends with him and betray that
friendship to get an easy weapon and get some money.” At the
time of the shooting, Reyes was high on kush (marijuana). Reyes
said he was not aiming at Alvarez and did not intend to kill him.2
B. Findings
At the conclusion of the fitness hearing, the juvenile court
made the following findings with regard to the section 707
factors:
(1) Criminal sophistication: The court found that
“[t]here was some planning to go [do] this [crime]. I’m not quite
sure I would use the term sophisticated to describe it, but there
was, if you will, a scheme in mind and developed prior to the
actual acts, and, therefore, based on that analysis, I would find
the minor unfit [to be tried in juvenile court].”
2 A transcript of Reyes’s recorded statements to law
enforcement was introduced at Reyes’s criminal trial. Reyes told
detectives that when he pointed the gun at Alvarez, Alvarez
looked shocked. Reyes said it was his intention to scare Alvarez,
not to “get” him, but “then boom, boom, boom. I was high.”
Reyes said: “I wasn’t planning to, I didn’t even, probably, like, it
wasn’t my intention to kill him, like. . . . I wasn’t really aiming
for like, a head or . . . if I really wanted to, I could’ve just . . . .”

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(2) Potential for rehabilitation: The court found Reyes
suitable to be tried in juvenile court with regard to his potential
for rehabilitation.
(3) Previous delinquent history: The court found that
Reyes’s previous delinquent history was “not insignificant, but
it’s not . . . in this court’s mind so egregious that [Reyes] couldn’t
be found fit [to be tried in juvenile court] under that criteria.”
(4) Success of previous attempts to rehabilitate: The
court noted that it did not have the entire juvenile court file, but
the probation department’s synopsis “suggests that there was a
graduated form of engagement with the minor. We don’t go
straight to DJJ [Department of Juvenile Justice] or straight to
camp. . . . Although I can’t speak for the sentencing court on the
underlying offenses, the courts generally take this graduated
approach where we try to engage the minor in some behavior
modification. But on balance, the court would find that he is not
fit on criteria four.”
(5) Circumstances and gravity of the alleged offense:
“The court finds that [the shooting] was, you know, not
necessarily very sophisticated, but it is brutal. I can’t find in my
mind, other than actually killing this man or rendering him an
invalid, it is certainly the most serious kind of offense that the
court handles, and, therefore, the court would find that the minor
is unfit on that criteria.”
Based on its findings, the juvenile court found Reyes not
suitable to be tried under the juvenile court law, and it permitted
the district attorney to file an adult criminal case against Reyes.

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II.
Criminal Trial and Conviction
On July 23, 2014, the district attorney filed a three count
information against Reyes alleging attempted murder (Pen. Code,
§§ 664, 187(a); count 1), second degree robbery (id., § 211; count
2), and assault with a firearm (id., § 245, subd. (a)(2); count 3).
The information further alleged as to all counts that Reyes
personally inflicted great bodily injury on Alvarez (id., § 12022.7,
subd. (a)), and personally used a firearm (id., §§ 12022.5, 1192.7,
subd. (c), 667.5, subd. (c)); and as to counts 1 and 2 that Reyes
personally and intentionally used and discharged a firearm,
causing great bodily injury to Alvarez (id., §12022.53, subds. (b),
(c), (d)).
On August 25, 2015, the jury found Reyes not guilty of
attempted murder, but guilty of second degree robbery and
assault with a semiautomatic firearm. The jury also made true
findings as to each of the associated firearm and great bodily
injury enhancements.
On January 15, 2016, the court imposed the following
sentence. As to count 2 (second degree robbery) the court
sentenced Reyes to three years in state prison under Penal Code
section 211, plus an indeterminate term of 25 years to life under
Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d), for a total term of
28 years to life in state prison. The remaining enhancements
attached to count 2 (10 years pursuant to Penal Code section
12022.53, subdivision (b), three years pursuant to Penal Code
section 12022.7, subdivision (a), and 20 years pursuant to Penal
Code section 12022.53, subdivision (c)) were imposed and stayed.
As to count 3 (assault with a firearm), the court sentenced Reyes
to the mid-term of three years, plus enhancements of three years

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under Penal Code section 12022.7, and four years under Penal
Code section 12022.5, to run concurrent to the sentence on count
2.3
Reyes timely appealed from the judgment of conviction.
III.
Post-Trial Issues
On November 8, 2016, after Reyes was sentenced and while
this appeal was pending, California voters passed Proposition 57,
the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016. The law
became effective the next day. Among other things, Proposition
57 significantly changed the procedure for determining whether a
minor is suitable to remain in the juvenile court system for trial
and sentencing.
Reyes filed a supplemental brief on appeal, urging that
Proposition 57 should apply to him retroactively, and thus that
this court should remand this matter to the juvenile court for a
new hearing under Proposition 57.4 At our request, the People
filed a response to Reyes’s supplemental brief.
3 We note a discrepancy between the court’s oral
pronouncement of sentence and the sentence reflected in the
court’s January 15, 2016 minute order with respect to count 3.
The oral pronouncement as to count 3 states that the mid-term
sentence of three years, plus the enhancements associated with
count 3, are “concurrent to count two.” The minute order,
however, states that the count 3 enhancements are stayed, and
“[t]he total sentence imposed as to count 3 is 3 years to run
concurrent to count 2.”
4 Under Welfare and Institutions Code former section 707,
subdivision (a)(1) and (c), the determination to be made was
whether the minor was a “fit and proper subject to be dealt with
under the juvenile court law.” The current section, as amended

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CONTENTIONS
Reyes contends that Proposition 57 applies retroactively,
and thus that the matter should be remanded to the juvenile
court for a new transfer hearing under Proposition 57. In the
alternative, Reyes contends that his sentence on count 3 should
have been stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654 because the
robbery and assault arose out of the same indivisible course of
conduct.
The People urge that Proposition 57 does not apply
retroactively and, in any event, the changes effected by
Proposition 57 would not have altered the juvenile court’s
decision to transfer Reyes out of juvenile court. The People
further contend that the trial court was not required by Penal
Code section 654 to stay the sentence on count 3 because
substantial evidence supported the trial court’s implicit finding
that Reyes had multiple or simultaneous objectives.
DISCUSSION
The question of whether Proposition 57 applies
retroactively has produced a split among the Courts of Appeal,
and the issue currently is on review before the California
Supreme Court.5 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that
by Proposition 57, eliminates the “fit and proper” language;
instead, the juvenile court is empowered to “decide whether the
minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction.”
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(2).) Given this change, we
will use the terms “fitness hearing” and “transfer hearing”
interchangeably, as appropriate.
5 E.g., People v. Cervantes (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 569
[Proposition 57 does not apply to convictions affirmed on appeal,
but does apply to convictions reversed and remanded for new

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Proposition 57 should be applied retroactively, and thus we
conditionally reverse and remand for a juvenile court hearing
under current law. In light of our conclusion as to Proposition 57,
and because the issue was not expressly addressed below, we do
not reach the Penal Code section 654 issue.
I.
Welfare and Institutions Code Section 707
A. Former Law
Reyes’s fitness hearing was conducted in May 2014 under
the then-current version of Welfare and Institutions Code section
707. As it was then written, section 707 provided that if a minor
14 years of age or older was alleged to have committed a felony
specifically enumerated in subdivision (b) (including robbery,
attempted murder, and assault with a firearm) and was alleged
to have personally used a firearm during the commission or
attempted commission of the felony, the district attorney had
discretion to file a juvenile court petition or to directly file
charges against the minor in adult criminal court. (Former § 707,
trial], review granted May 17, 2017, S241323; People v. Superior
Court (Lara) (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 753 [where minor had not yet
been tried in adult court, transfer to juvenile court for section 707
hearing was proper], review granted May 17, 2017, S241231;
People v. Mendoza (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 327 [no retroactive
application of Proposition 57], review granted July 12, 2017,
S241647; People v. Vela (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 68 [Proposition 57
applies retroactively], review granted July 12, 2017, S242298;
People v. Marquez (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 816 [no retroactive
application of Proposition 57], review granted July 26, 2017,
S242660; People v. Canon (Apr. 21, 2017, A133342) [nonpub.
opn.] [no retroactive application of Proposition 57], review
granted July 26, 2017, S242185.

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subds. (b)(3), (b)(12), (b)(13), (c), (d); People v. Villa (2009)
178 Cal.App.4th 443, 446.)
If a petition was filed in juvenile court and the district
attorney made a motion to transfer the matter to adult criminal
court, the juvenile court was required under section 707,
subdivision (c), to determine whether the minor was “a fit and
proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law.”
(Former § 707, subd. (c).) In making that determination with
respect to specified serious offenses, “the minor shall be
presumed to be not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under
the juvenile court law unless the juvenile court concludes, based
upon evidence, which evidence may be of extenuating or
mitigating circumstances, that the minor would be amenable to
the care, treatment, and training program available through the
facilities of the juvenile court based upon an evaluation of” five
statutory criteria—i.e., the minor’s (1) criminal sophistication,
(2) potential for rehabilitation, (3) previous delinquent history,
(4) success of previous attempts to rehabilitate, and
(5) circumstances and gravity of the alleged offense. (Former
§ 707, subd. (c), italics added.) A determination that the minor
was “a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile
court law” required a finding by the court that the minor was “fit
and proper under each and every one of the above criteria.”
(Former § 707, subd. (c), italics added.)
Section 707 was amended effective January 1, 2016 to
provide additional guidance concerning the five statutory criteria,
as follows:
“In making its [transfer] decision, the court shall consider
the criteria specified in subparagraphs (A) to (E). . . .

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“(A)(i) The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by
the minor. [¶] (ii) When evaluating the criterion specified in
clause (i), the juvenile court may give weight to any relevant
factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s age, maturity,
intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health
at the time of the alleged offense, the minor’s impetuosity or
failure to appreciate risks and consequences of criminal behavior,
the effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure on the minor's
actions, and the effect of the minor’s family and community
environment and childhood trauma on the minor’s criminal
sophistication.
“(B)(i) Whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the
expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. [¶] (ii) When
evaluating the criterion specified in clause (i), the juvenile court
may give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited
to, the minor’s potential to grow and mature.
“(C)(i) The minor’s previous delinquent history.
[¶] (ii) When evaluating the criterion specified in clause (i), the
juvenile court may give weight to any relevant factor, including,
but not limited to, the seriousness of the minor’s previous
delinquent history and the effect of the minor’s family and
community environment and childhood trauma on the minor’s
previous delinquent behavior.
“(D)(i) Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to
rehabilitate the minor. [¶] (ii) When evaluating the criterion
specified in clause (i), the juvenile court may give weight to any
relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the adequacy of the
services previously provided to address the minor’s needs.
“(E)(i) The circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged
in the petition to have been committed by the minor. [¶]

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(ii) When evaluating the criterion specified in clause (i), the
juvenile court may give weight to any relevant factor, including
but not limited to, the actual behavior of the person, the mental
state of the person, the person’s degree of involvement in the
crime, the level of harm actually caused by the person, and the
person’s mental and emotional development.” (§ 707,
subd. (a)(2).)
B. Proposition 57
On November 8, 2016, the voters enacted Proposition 57,
which made significant changes to section 707. (Prop. 57, § 1.)
Among other things, Proposition 57 eliminated prosecutorial
discretion to directly file a case against a minor in adult criminal
court: Under the amended law, all minors must have a hearing
in juvenile court before being transferred to adult criminal court.
(§ 707, subd. (a)(1).) Further, Proposition 57 eliminated the
presumption that minors accused of committing serious felonies
are not suitable to be tried in the juvenile court, as well as the
requirement that a minor satisfy “each and every one of the
[statutory] criteria” to be tried in juvenile court. Instead, section
707, subdivision (a)(2) now provides that “the juvenile court shall
decide whether the minor should be transferred to a court of
criminal jurisdiction. In making its decision, the court shall
consider the criteria specified in subparagraphs (A) to (E).”
II.
Proposition 57 Applies Retroactively
Had Reyes committed his offenses after Proposition 57
went into effect, he would have been entitled to a transfer
hearing under the new law. The question before us is whether
Proposition 57 applies to juvenile offenders tried and convicted

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before the Act’s effective date, but whose cases are not yet final
on appeal.
Whether the voters intended Proposition 57 to apply
retroactively is a question of law to which we apply our
independent judgment. “ ‘ “In interpreting a voter initiative” ’ . . .
‘ “we apply the same principles that govern statutory
construction. [Citation.] Thus, [1] ‘we turn first to the language
of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning.’
[Citation.] [2] The statutory language must also be construed in
the context of the statute as a whole and the overall statutory
scheme [in light of the electorate’s intent]. [Citation.] [3] When
the language is ambiguous, ‘we refer to other indicia of the voters’
intent, particularly the analyses and arguments contained in the
official ballot pamphlet.’ ” ’ (Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003)
30 Cal.4th 894, 900–901.) ‘In other words, our “task is simply to
interpret and apply the initiative’s language so as to effectuate
the electorate’s intent.” ’ (Id. at p. 901.)” (People v. Arroyo (2016)
62 Cal.4th 589, 593.)
A. Presumptions Regarding Retroactivity
“It is well settled that a new statute is presumed to operate
prospectively absent an express declaration of retrospectivity or a
clear indication that the electorate, or the Legislature, intended
otherwise.” (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 287
(Tapia).) It is undisputed that Proposition 57 does not expressly
state whether it applies retroactively to pending cases. Reyes
contends, however, that an exception to the presumption of
prospectivity, established in In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740
(Estrada) and its progeny, applies here. For the reasons that
follow, we agree.

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In Estrada, the Legislature reduced the punishment for a
crime after the defendant committed the crime but before he was
sentenced. (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 743–744.) Although
the amending act was silent as to whether the reduced
punishment applied to defendants who had been convicted of the
crime prior to the amendment, the Estrada court held that when
a statute that is silent as to its retroactivity reduces the penalty
for a “particular crime,” “the new lighter penalty” will apply “to
acts committed before its passage[,] provided the judgment
convicting the defendant of the act is not final.” (Id. at p. 745.)
The Court explained that by reducing a crime’s punishment, the
Legislature “obviously expressly determined that its former
penalty was too severe and that a lighter punishment is proper as
punishment for the commission of the prohibited act. It is an
inevitable inference that the Legislature must have intended that
the new statute imposing the new lighter penalty now deemed to
be sufficient should apply to every case to which it
constitutionally could apply. The amendatory act imposing the
lighter punishment can be applied constitutionally to acts
committed before its passage provided the judgment convicting
the defendant of the act is not final. This intent seems obvious,
because to hold otherwise would be to conclude that the
Legislature was motivated by a desire for vengeance, a conclusion
not permitted in view of modern theories of penology.” (Ibid.)
In People v. Francis (1969) 71 Cal.2d 66 (Francis), the
Supreme Court extended Estrada’s retroactivity rule to a
statutory amendment that “does not revoke one penalty and
provide for a lesser one but rather vests in the trial court
discretion to impose either the same penalty as under the former
law or a lesser penalty.” (Id. at p. 76.) The Francis court rejected

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the contention that, where the trial court retains discretion under
an amended statute to reimpose the same penalty required by the
former statute, there is no “inevitable inference” that the
Legislature determined that the former penalty was too severe
and thus intended the amendment to apply retroactively. The
court explained: “[T]here is such an inference because the
Legislature has determined that the former penalty provisions
may have been too severe in some cases and that the sentencing
judge should be given wider latitude in tailoring the sentence to
fit the particular circumstances.” (Ibid., italics added.) The
Francis court also rejected the argument that Estrada should
apply only where retroactivity would not require additional
proceedings in the trial court, concluding that such additional
proceedings would not “impose an insurmountable burden on
trial courts” and was not an impediment to applying the Estrada
rule. (People v. Francis, supra, at p. 77.)
People v. Benefield (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 51 (Benefield)
applied the above-articulated principles in the context of a
juvenile court proceeding. In that case, a juvenile defendant had
been convicted in adult court of certain crimes and sentenced to
prison. (Id. at p. 55.) Before the defendant’s judgment was final,
the Legislature both enacted and amended a statute that
provided that a minor could not be sentenced to state prison
unless he had been evaluated by the California Youth Authority
(CYA) and found by a court, after considering the CYA’s
recommendations, to be an unsuitable subject for commitment to
the CYA. (Id. at p. 57.) The Court of Appeal concluded that
because under the amended law the minor could be committed to
a CYA facility, instead of to prison, the amendments “would
operate to benefit, and in effect impose a lighter punishment

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upon” the minor. (Ibid.) Therefore, the “rationale of In re
Estrada is reasonably applicable,” and the court thus set aside
the minor’s state prison sentence and ordered compliance with
the amended statute. (Id. at p. 59.)
B. Proposition 57 Applies Retroactively
Applying the principles articulated in Estrada, Francis,
and Benefield, we conclude that Proposition 57 should apply
retroactively in the present case. As we have said, when Reyes
committed his offenses, a transfer to adult criminal court was
governed by the former version of section 707, under which Reyes
was “presumed to be not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with
under the juvenile court law.” (Former § 707, subd. (c), italics
added.) The juvenile court was required to transfer Reyes to
adult criminal court unless it concluded he was “fit and proper” to
remain in juvenile court under “each and every one of the [five
statutory] criteria. (Former § 707, subd. (c), italics added.)
Under Proposition 57, in contrast, there is no statutory
presumption of unfitness, and the juvenile court may weigh the
statutory factors as it deems appropriate. Accordingly, a minor is
more likely to be found suitable to remain in juvenile court under
the current law than he was under the law that applied at the
time Reyes committed his offenses.
The consequences for a minor of being tried in adult
criminal court, rather than in juvenile court, are profound.
Under the statutory guidelines that governed Reyes’s sentencing
in adult criminal court, Reyes was sentenced to an indeterminate
term of 28 years to life in state prison. In contrast, under the
juvenile law, Reyes would have been held in a juvenile facility,
and ordinarily could not have been confined beyond his 25th
birthday. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 607, subd. (f), 707, subd. (b),

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731, subd. (a)(4), 1769, subd. (c), 1771, subd. (b).) Accordingly,
Proposition 57 may have the effect of significantly reducing a
minor’s time in custody.
Further, there are significant differences between the adult
and juvenile systems. “The juvenile delinquency system is not
primarily concerned with punishing juvenile offenders; rather, it
is concerned with rehabilitating them. (In re J.W. (2015)
236 Cal.App.4th 663, 667.)” (S.V. v. Superior Court (2017)
13 Cal.App.5th 1174, 1180-118.) “ ‘Minors under the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court as a consequence of delinquent conduct shall,
in conformity with the interests of public safety and protection,
receive care, treatment, and guidance that is consistent with
their best interest, that holds them accountable for their
behavior, and that is appropriate for their circumstances.”
(§ 202, subd. (b).) The minor’s rehabilitation and the concomitant
protection of public safety are important considerations in the
juvenile justice system.” (In re J.W. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 663,
667–668.) Thus, the effect of Proposition 57 is to “lessen[]
punishment”—or, indeed, to eliminate punishment—to which
Reyes may be subject within the meaning of Estrada. (See
Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 744.)
The People urge that Estrada does not apply to the present
case because “no provision of Proposition 57 reduces the penalty
for any particular crime.” (Italics added.) We do not agree.
Proposition 57 changes the procedure by which minors accused of
committing any of 30 specifically-identified crimes, including
attempted murder, burglary, and assault with a firearm, are
evaluated for transfer to adult criminal court. (§ 707, subd. (b).)
It thus potentially mitigates the consequences with regard to 30
“particular” crimes committed by minors. We can conceive of no

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reason why a statutory amendment that reduces the
consequences imposed for a single specific crime should be
applied retroactively, but a statutory amendment that potentially
reduces the consequences imposed for many specific crimes
should not.
The People also contend that Estrada does not apply to the
present case because there is “no certainty under the new law
that a minor will receive a mitigated penalty.” Although we
agree with the People’s factual contention—there can be no
dispute that, under Proposition 57, the juvenile court retains
discretion to order Reyes transferred to adult criminal court—we
do not agree that Estrada does not apply in these circumstances.
To the contrary, as we have said, in Francis the Supreme Court
specifically held that Estrada applied even though the
amendment at issue did not “revoke one penalty and provide for a
lesser one but rather vests in the trial court discretion to impose
either the same penalty as under the former law or a lesser
penalty.” (Francis, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 76.) Thus, the fact that
the application of Proposition 57 in the present case might—but
will not necessarily—result in lesser punishment does not
preclude application of the Estrada rule.
C. Failure to Provide Reyes a Hearing Under the
Amended Statute Is Not Harmless Error
The People contend that even if Proposition 57 applies
retroactively, denying Reyes a new juvenile court hearing under
the amended statute cannot prejudice him because there is no
reasonable probability he would have obtained a different
outcome had the new version of section 707 been in effect. We do
not agree.

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Under the law as it existed in 2014, a minor accused of
attempted murder could remain in juvenile court only if the court
found him suitable under all five suitability factors. (See
Discussion, § I(A), ante.) The juvenile court found that Reyes was
suitable to be adjudicated in juvenile court with regard to two
suitability factors, and unsuitable under the remaining three
suitability factors. Thus, the juvenile court’s findings precluded
adjudication in the juvenile court. Under current law, in
contrast, the juvenile court has discretion to weigh the five
factors in any manner it deems appropriate, and thus even if the
juvenile court were to adopt its prior findings, it could conclude
Reyes should not be transferred to adult criminal court.
Moreover, since Reyes’s transfer hearing in 2014, section
707 has been amended to include explanatory material that may
alter the juvenile court’s evaluation of the relevant factors. For
example, section 707, subdivision (a)(2)(A)(ii), now provides that
when evaluating criminal sophistication, “the juvenile court may
give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to,
the minor’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical,
mental, and emotional health at the time of the alleged offense,
the minor’s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and
consequences of criminal behavior, the effect of familial, adult, or
peer pressure on the minor’s actions, and the effect of the minor’s
family and community environment and childhood trauma on the
minor’s criminal sophistication.” And section 707, subdivision
(a)(2)(E)(i) now provides that when evaluating the circumstances
and gravity of the alleged offense, the juvenile court “may give
weight to any relevant factor, including but not limited to, the
actual behavior of the person, the mental state of the person, the
person’s degree of involvement in the crime, the level of harm

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actually caused by the person, and the person’s mental and
emotional development.”
In the present case, the juvenile court found Reyes
unsuitable with regard to the criminal sophistication factor
because Reyes had engaged in some prior planning activity:
“There was some planning to go [do] this [crime]. I’m not quite
sure I would use the term sophisticated to describe it, but there
was, if you will, a scheme in mind and developed prior to the
actual acts.” The court also found Reyes unsuitable with regard
to the circumstances and gravity of the offense, noting that the
shooting “was . . . not necessarily very sophisticated, but it is
brutal.”
Under the amended law, the juvenile court may conclude
that other factors, such as Reyes’s immaturity, impetuosity, or
failure to appreciate risks, outweigh the significance of planning
activity, and thus may conclude that Reyes is suitable with
regard to the criminal sophistication factor. Or, the court may
conclude that factors such as Reyes’s mental state or mental and
emotional development outweigh the brutality of the crime, and
thus that Reyes is suitable with regard to the circumstances and
gravity of offense factor.6 Accordingly, we conclude that
depriving Reyes of a hearing under the amended statute is not
harmless error.
6 Of course, the juvenile court may, after considering all
relevant factors, reach the same conclusion that Reyes’s criminal
sophistication weighs against his adjudication in juvenile court.

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III.
At This Juncture, We Decline to Decide the
Penal Code Section 654 Issue
Having concluded that this matter must be remanded for a
transfer hearing, we now briefly address Reyes’s alternative
contention on appeal that his sentence was imposed in violation
of Penal Code section 654.
When a single ground raised by appellant is dispositive of
an appeal, whether to address additional alternative grounds is
within the discretion of the appellate court, to be exercised in the
interests of judicial economy. (See, e.g., People v. Blackington
(1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1216, 1219 [addressing appellant’s
additional contentions “concerning issues which presumably will
arise on retrial of the case”; Apple, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd.
(2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1, 15 [“ ‘The principal reason for an
appellate court to decline to review alternative grounds for a trial
court decision is judicial economy. . . .’ ”]; Zevnik v. Superior
Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 85 [same].) For the reasons
that follow, we decline to reach the Penal Code section 654 issue
at this juncture.
First, if this matter remains in the juvenile court for
sentencing after a further transfer hearing, Reyes will be subject
to a juvenile court disposition, rather than an adult sentence. In
that case, the Penal Code section 654 issue will be moot.
Second, the Penal Code section 654 issue was not explicitly
addressed below, and thus we cannot determine with certainty
whether the trial court intended to stay the count 3 sentence
pursuant to Penal Code section 654. Our Supreme Court has
explained that “[t]o facilitate meaningful appellate review, the
better practice is for trial courts to state on the record their

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reasons for concluding that multiple offenses are or are not
separately punishable under section 654.” (See People v.
Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 316, fn. 6.) Although in some
circumstances we would presume the court did not intend to stay
the sentence on count 3, we decline to reach the issue here
because there are further uncertainties about the sentence that
was intended. Specifically, the reporter’s transcript and minute
order reflect different sentences. The reporter’s transcript of the
January 15, 2016 hearing states that the entire sentence
associated with count 3—i.e., the mid-term sentence of three
years, plus the four-year and three-year enhancements—is to run
“concurrent to count two.” The minute order of the same date,
however, states that the mid-term of three years is to run
concurrent to count 2, and the count 3 enhancements are stayed.
Accordingly, we cannot determine with certainty what sentence
the trial court intended to impose on count 3. If Reyes is
returned to adult criminal court for sentencing, these issues can
be addressed there.
For all of these reasons, we decline to decide the Penal
Code section 654 issue.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is conditionally reversed and the case is
remanded to the juvenile court to hold a transfer hearing in
accordance with Welfare and Institutions Code section 707,
subdivision (a), as amended by Proposition 57.
If the juvenile court determines on remand that Reyes
should not be transferred to adult criminal court, the court shall
hold proceedings to determine the proper disposition pursuant to
applicable law.
If the juvenile court determines that Reyes should be
transferred to adult criminal court pursuant to section 707, the
matter shall then be returned to that court for resentencing. At
that time, the court shall determine whether the count 3 sentence
is to be stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654 or,
alternatively, is to run concurrent to the count 2 sentence, and
shall impose sentence accordingly.
Because we have not reached the Penal Code section 654
issue on the merits, neither party shall be precluded from raising
Penal Code section 654 error in any subsequent appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
EDMON, P. J.
We concur:
LAVIN, J. BACHNER, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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