P. v. Corder

Filed 12/19/16 P. v. Corder CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
BRIAN BOSEMAN CORDER et
al.,
Defendant and Appellant.
B261370
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
PA073839)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Dalila Corral Lyons, Judge. Affirmed.
John A. Colucci, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Brian Boseman Corder.
Lynda A. Romero, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Frederika Carmouche.

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David H. Goodwin, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Stephon Crutchfield.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, David A. Wildman, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
This case involves charges against defendants and
appellants Brian Boseman Corder, Fredericka Carmouche,
and Stephon Crutchfield, based on an attack on Corder’s
wife, GiGi. In count 1, Corder and Carmouche were found
guilty of conspiracy to commit murder.1 (Pen. Code, 182,
subd. (a)(1).)2 All three defendants were found guilty of
willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder in
count 2 (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a)), torture in count 4
(§ 206), and mayhem in count 5 (§ 205).3 Carmouche and
Crutchfield were convicted of burglary in count 3.4 (§ 459.)
1 Crutchfield was found not guilty in count 1.
2 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise specified.
3 Defendants were found not guilty of aggravated
mayhem in count 5, but were convicted of the lesser offense
of mayhem.
4 The burglary charge against Corder in count 3 was
dismissed pursuant to a section 995 motion.

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The jury also found true the allegations that Carmouche and
Crutchfield personally inflicted great bodily injury on the
victim (§12022.7, subd. (a)), and that Carmouche personally
used dangerous and deadly weapons within the meaning of
section 12022, subdivision (b)(1), in counts 2 and 3.5
The trial court sentenced Corder to 25 years-to-life in
count 1, and imposed and stayed sentences pursuant to
section 654 in counts 2, 4, and 5. Carmouche was also
sentenced to 25 years-to-life in count 1, with the sentences in
counts 2–5 and the section 12022, subdivision (b)(1), and
section 12022.7, subdivision (a) enhancements imposed and
stayed under section 654. Crutchfield was sentenced to life
in prison in count 2, plus three years for personal infliction
of great bodily injury, with sentences imposed and stayed
under section 654 in counts 3–5.
All three defendants contend the trial court erred in
allowing the jury to consider a natural and probable
consequences theory of aiding and abetting the attempted
premeditated murder in count 2, and in refusing to require
the victim to review documents that she stated would not
help refresh her memory. Corder and Carmouche further
contend: (1) the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte
instruct on lesser included offenses of conspiracy to commit
murder; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the jury to
consider both an act subsequent to the target offense and the
agreement itself as overt acts in furtherance of conspiracy to
5 The jury found not true allegations that Crutchfield
personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon.

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commit murder; (3) their convictions for torture are not
supported by substantial evidence; and (4) they were
prejudiced by cumulative errors at trial. Finally, Corder
separately contends the trial court erred in prohibiting a
defense witness from testifying in his Marine Corps uniform,
and in excluding evidence that Corder suffered from
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).6
We affirm the judgment.
FACTS
Prosecution
GiGi and Corder’s Relationship
GiGi, the victim, had been married to Corder for about
six years at the time of the charged offenses. GiGi lived in
an apartment in Canoga Park. Corder was an active duty
member of the Marine Corps, stationed in San Pedro.
Corder came home when he could.
GiGi and Corder had a rocky, sometimes violent,
marriage. Corder tackled and punched GiGi once when she
6 In his opening brief, Corder joins in any contentions
of his codefendants that accrue to his benefit. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.200 (a)(5).) Subsequent to filing her opening
brief, Carmouche joined in several of the contentions listed
above, providing additional argument by letter, filed with
the court on May 17, 2016.

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confronted him about e-mails he had sent to other women.
GiGi’s mother witnessed Corder straddling GiGi and
punching her in the face. Corder tried to kill them both once
by repeatedly turning off the car engine on a freeway, and
then zigzagging between lanes. Corder threatened GiGi in
their frequent arguments, saying things like: “Bitch, I’m
done with you, I’m fucking going to kill you,” and “You’re
fucking not going to wake up tomorrow morning. You’re
dead tonight.” Corder told GiGi he would end up in jail for
hurting her. GiGi admitted responsibility for some of the
violence. She once hit Corder with a broom after he verbally
abused her.
In March 2012, GiGi told Corder she was pregnant.
Corder was irate. He told GiGi, “This is bad. This is all bad.
This is going to kill us.” He also said, “Oh, my God, you need
to have an abortion. We can’t have this baby. This will kill
us.” He sent GiGi text messages threatening her and telling
her to get an abortion. Corder threatened to stop paying the
rent and the bills when GiGi told him that she would not get
an abortion. They began receiving “three day” notices
because Corder had not paid the rent. GiGi called Corder’s
commanding officer and informed him that Corder had
threatened her, pressured her to have an abortion, and
stopped paying their bills. Corder’s attitude changed
completely after the call. He apologized.

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The Attack
GiGi, four months pregnant on June 15, 2012, was
suffering from severe nausea. She contacted Corder that
morning, asking him to come home and help her. He said
that he would come as soon as he could, but he did not
return. GiGi continued to text and call him throughout the
day, becoming very angry. She texted Corder: “If you don’t
come back and make this right, you will regret it, I promise
you.”
Someone pounded on the front door of GiGi’s
apartment around 10:00 o’clock that evening. GiGi went to
see who it was and saw a finger covering the peephole,
something Corder would often do, so she unlocked the door.
She went back to bed, thinking that Corder heard her
unlocking it and would come in. Instead, she heard the door
close. She texted Corder, “Where are you? Did you just
come and leave? What happened?” Corder eventually called
GiGi and told her he had not been at the door. He said he
was at school and would be back soon.7
Around midnight, GiGi heard someone throwing rocks
at her patio doors, something Corder would do when he
forgot his keys. She turned on the outside light and saw
Corder, who waved at her. GiGi turned off the light and
went to open the front door for Corder. She was naked
because she had just thrown up on her clothing.
7 Corder attended the Los Angeles Film and Recording
School.

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When GiGi opened the door, Crutchfield burst through
and tackled her to the ground “like a linebacker.” He
straddled GiGi and punched her in the face relentlessly.
GiGi fought back. She screamed for help. She screamed
that she was pregnant, and called Corder’s name. She
thought Crutchfield was going to rape her.
Carmouche came into the apartment behind
Crutchfield. She rummaged through the kitchen cabinets,
pulling out various objects, including candelabras, a Pyrex
dish, and a frying pan, which she then used to hit GiGi on
the head. GiGi was in terrible pain. She was afraid for her
life and for her baby. Crutchfield continued to punch GiGi
on her face and chest while Carmouche hit GiGi’s head.
GiGi screamed, “My husband’s coming. I’m pregnant. Help
me.” Someone responded, “Your husband’s not coming,
bitch.” GiGi screamed and begged for help throughout the
attack. One of her attackers said, “The bitch won’t die.” As
this was happening, GiGi saw Corder sitting on the bed. She
only saw his legs, but she was certain it was Corder. GiGi
was hit in the face with a frying pan and lost two teeth. She
believed that both Corder and Carmouche hit her with the
frying pan at different times during the attack.
Carmouche grabbed GiGi’s neck and wrenched it so
hard it went numb. Carmouche grabbed GiGi’s face, tilted
GiGi’s head sideways, and sliced GiGi’s throat repeatedly
with pieces of a broken Pyrex dish. She stabbed GiGi’s
breasts. GiGi thought she was going to die, and that her
attackers would not stop until they believed she was dead.

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She played dead to protect her baby. Carmouche covered
GiGi’s nose and mouth with her hands until GiGi passed out.
When GiGi regained consciousness, she was lying on
her bedroom floor surrounded by broken glass. She crawled
to the phone on the nightstand and called her mother for
help. The call ended when someone hit GiGi over the head
and she blacked out a second time.
GiGi’s mother called 911 at 12:52 a.m. She told the
dispatcher that her daughter had just called and was being
attacked.
Kathy Aguirre was visiting her family in an apartment
in the same building where GiGi resided. She heard a very
loud thump and a woman screaming for help. The woman
also screamed that she was pregnant. Aguirre called the
police at 12:41 a.m. They arrived soon afterward.
Jane Hankins, who also lived in the building, heard
loud yelling, thumping, and glass breaking. A woman yelled,
“Get out, get out, get out,” at least 50 times. “It was very
severe, emotional yelling.” Hankins called 911 at 12:37 a.m.
She told the dispatcher that someone was “just screaming
their head off.” After she hung up the phone, the door to
GiGi’s apartment slammed shut and Hankins heard
someone sobbing.
The police called Hankins to get the security code for
the building at 12:51 a.m. She could not remember the code,
so she went to open the door. As she was going to the door, a
man yelled, “Help. Somebody call 911.” She thought the
man was GiGi’s husband or boyfriend.

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Los Angeles Police Officer Jeffrey Johnson and his
partner arrived at the apartment at around 12:40 a.m. The
front door was partially open. GiGi was lying on the floor,
covered in blood, with injuries to her head. Corder was
tending to her. GiGi repeatedly asked about her phone and
her dog. She did not answer the officers’ questions. The
officers observed red stains on: the wall over GiGi’s bed; her
pillow; the nightstand; a folding knife and pink bowl on the
nightstand; the carpeting, bedding, sliding glass door, and
blinds; broken chair legs, one of which was found on the bed;
a phone on the kitchen counter; a frying pan; a broken
candelabra; a shoeprint in the kitchen; a fan; the exterior
door knob; and outside of the apartment. There were broken
fixtures and furniture, including a fan and a chair. There
was broken glass throughout the apartment. Broken teeth
were discovered near the bed. It looked as if an “extreme
struggle” had taken place.
Forensic Nurse Examiner Sandra Wilkinson examined
GiGi at the Northridge Hospital emergency room on June 16,
2012. She observed numerous cuts on GiGi’s body, linear
abrasions on her back, blood smears on the soles of her feet,
and two missing fingernails, which were likely defensive
wounds. GiGi had multiple cuts on both hands, which also
appeared to be defensive wounds. GiGi had subconjunctival
hemorrhages consistent with strangulation, a deep incision
beside her right eyebrow, bruising to the neck and jaw, and
numerous shallow and deep incisions. She sustained a cut
close to the right carotid artery, which could have been fatal

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had the carotid artery been severed. GiGi’s lips were
swollen; she had missing teeth, as well as a cut that created
a total separation from her lip to her nose. There was a deep
cut on GiGi’s right upper chest. Her entire body was
smeared with blood.
The Investigation
Interviews of GiGi
Detective Rene January and her partner interviewed
GiGi at 8:25 p.m. on June 16, 2012. The interview took place
in the hospital, about an hour after GiGi was awoken from
an induced coma. A breathing tube had just been removed
from GiGi’s throat, and she was having difficulty speaking.
GiGi was still groggy and felt “drugged.” She said she
“didn’t know right from left.”
GiGi told the detectives Corder had been outside
throwing pebbles at the sliding glass door. She did not know
there were people waiting to attack her. She was “99.999
percent” certain Corder had not done this to her. She said a
man and a woman attacked her. Both of them had cut her
with sharp objects. The man and the woman were hurting
her simultaneously at one point in the attack.
Later, GiGi’s mother asked her what had happened.
GiGi said three people came into her apartment. Two of the
people were strangers, but she thought the third person was
Corder. Her vision was blurred, so she could not be certain.

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The female attacker kept saying, “Just die. Just die.” GiGi
thought the female attacker also said, “The bitch won’t die.
The bitch won’t die.” GiGi said she was naked when she was
attacked.
GiGi’s mother called the police to inform them that she
was more alert and could remember additional details.
Detective January conducted a second interview on June 18,
2012. Corder had been arrested by that time. GiGi told
Detective January that Corder was sitting on the foot of the
bed as her attackers were beating her. GiGi did not see
Corder’s face, but she had been married to him for years and
knew his legs and pants.8 She was certain Corder had been
there.9
GiGi described the man who attacked her as Black
with a short afro and buggy eyes. She thought he might
have had some hair on his chin. He was about five feet six
inches, or five feet eight inches, and in his 20s or 30s. The
female attacker was a thin Black woman with short
8 Other witnesses had seen Corder wearing shorts.
Hankins said that Corder was wearing shorts when he called
out for someone to help GiGi. GiGi’s mother said that
Corder was wearing shorts with blood on them at the
hospital.
9 GiGi testified that at the time of the first interview
she was having trouble accepting the fact her husband had
done this to her. She had also originally told the police she
put a robe on before answering the door because she was
embarrassed about being naked.

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straightened black or brown hair. She was about five feet
six inches to five feet seven inches tall. The woman wore
blue denim capri pants with a belt, gloves, a pink shirt with
writing and glitter on it, and a denim jacket that was shorter
than her pink shirt. GiGi said the woman was wearing latex
gloves, which she felt on her face during the attack.
GiGi thought her husband was outside during the
initial attack, because he had just thrown pebbles at the
sliding glass door. She told her attackers that her husband
was outside. They responded, “Your husband is not coming,
bitch. Die, bitch, die.” Once she was on the ground, the first
male attacker was “[p]unching her furiously, like a maniac.”
GiGi remembered being hit with a skillet, a Pyrex dish, and
five glass candelabras. The woman dropped the Pyrex dish
on GiGi’s head, and then picked up pieces of the glass. She
grabbed GiGi’s face, tilted her head sideways, and tried to
slit her throat repeatedly. She looked GiGi in the eyes and
stabbed her breasts.10
Interview of Corder
Los Angeles Police Detectives Maria Dingman and
Macchiarella spoke to Corder at Northridge Hospital on
June 16. Corder said he had last spoken to GiGi at about
11:00 p.m. Corder went from the Marine base to his father’s
10 GiGi inconsistently stated that the female attacker
only beat her on her head and cut her throat.

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home, and then attended a class from 8:30 p.m. to 11:30 p.m.
He arrived at the apartment at about 12:15 a.m.
During the interview, Detective Macchiarella viewed
text messages on Corder’s telephone. He asked Corder to
show him a text message from “Fame.”11 Corder said he
deleted it.
Interview of Crutchfield
Detective Richard Moakley interviewed Crutchfield on
June 16. Crutchfield said he had been at school for a
morning class and spent the rest of the day with a friend.
He did not mention going to GiGi’s apartment.
Carmouche and Corder’s Medical Examinations
Dr. William Jou treated Carmouche at the emergency
room at Kaiser Panorama City Medical Center around
1:00 p.m. on June 16. Carmouche said she had cut her knee
and hands when she fell on broken glass approximately 11
hours earlier.
Nurse Wilkinson examined Corder on June 16. She
noted that there was blood on his hands, fingernails, and
penis. He had superficial cuts.
11 “Fame” was a name used by Crutchfield.

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The Relationship of the Three Defendants
Corder met Carmouche and Crutchfield at the Los
Angeles Film and Recording School in Hollywood, which
they all attended. On April 17, 2012, Carmouche texted
Corder, “Morn, Lovely. Yes, I have been drawn to you since
day one. We should def get together soon and chill. I have a
good feeling about you . . . .” On May 4, 2012, Carmouche
texted, “What are your turn-ons?” Corder replied, “Sexy
outfits and touching, i.e., massages, oral, et cetera. All
relaxing things like that.” Carmouche sent texts to various
people indicating that she and Corder were in a romantic
relationship. On June 11, 2012, Carmouche texted
Crutchfield that she loved Corder and would do “dumb shit”
for him. On June 13, 2012, she texted Corder, “Believe no
matter what I will take care and protect you” and “I wld do
everything for you.” Carmouche texted a friend the same
night, threatening to kill the friend if he interfered with her
relationship with Corder. She texted, “Yes tht was a threat.
I love Brian. Nothing will keep me from him. If u r willing
to wrk around tht, then we are fine.” Carmouche texted
Crutchfield around noon on June 16, 2012, “We’re so close
and I really do love Brian. I have never actually loved any
man before and for me to do dumb shit.” There were text
messages between the three defendants in the days before
GiGi was attacked.

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Defendants’ Whereabouts Prior to the Attack
Records of the Los Angeles Film and Recording School
indicated that all three defendants were enrolled, but that
none had attended classes during the first week of June
2012. They were later dropped from their courses. On June
15, 2012, Corder’s identification badge was used to enter the
school at 8:32 p.m. Still photographs from the school’s
surveillance cameras showed Corder entering the lobby at
10:03 p.m., and walking around inside the building at 10:36
pm. Corder’s cell phone records indicated that his phone
was near the school at 10:00 p.m. and that it was used to call
Crutchfield’s phone.
Carmouche’s cell phone records indicated that her
phone was near GiGi’s apartment at 10:08 p.m., 10:40 p.m.,
and 10:41 p.m. Crutchfield’s phone records placed his phone
at the film school at 11:26 p.m. and 11:30 p.m. In a deleted
text Crutchfield sent to Corder at 11:31 p.m. on June 15, he
wrote, “Outside.” Video surveillance from the school showed
Crutchfield entering the building at 11:32 p.m. The
surveillance video showed Corder in the film school at 11:27
p.m., and leaving the building at 11:35 p.m.
Defendants’ Whereabouts and Communications
Following the Attack
Cell phone records showed calls of 30-second duration
between Carmouche and Crutchfield at 12:53 a.m. and

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12:55 a.m. on July 16. Ten telephone calls were placed from
Carmouche’s phone between 12:53 a.m. and 1:51 a.m.,
including one to Crutchfield. Phone records showed that
Crutchfield’s phone was still in Canoga Park at 12:54 a.m.
Corder’s phone received several text messages between
3:53 a.m. and 4:33 a.m., including a message from
Crutchfield at 4:33 a.m. There was an 11-minute call
between Corder and Crutchfield at 4:22 a.m.
Physical Evidence
On June 20, 2012, four swabs that showed a positive
reaction for possible blood were collected from a 2005 silver
Jaguar. The Jaguar was owned by Corder’s father and
Corder drove it regularly. Also collected were swabs of
possible biological material from the mouth of a water bottle,
the mouth of a plastic bottle in the rear left foot space, the
textured grip of an airsoft pistol found in the car, and the
rear-facing edge of the front right backrest. Corder’s
clothing, including his boots, socks, green swimming trunks,
and white plaid shorts, were collected for analysis.
Criminalist Monica Zielinski took swabs from the
screen and keypad of the cell phone recovered from GiGi’s
kitchen counter for DNA testing. She also took a reference
sample of GiGi’s blood, and buccal swabs from Corder,
Carmouche, and Crutchfield.
Criminalist King Chow sent samples from bloodstains
from the rear center seat of Corder’s car, the right seat, the

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interior right door, and the rear bumper; white, green and
yellow shorts; gray and black Air Jordan shoes; a steel
folding knife; and a frying pan for DNA testing. All of the
items had reddish stains and a preliminary test for blood
yielded positive results.
DNA analyst Stephanie Sivak initially received six
items of evidence, including two swabs from the cell phone
and the reference samples from GiGi and defendants. She
later received four samples from stains in the Jaguar, two
samples from red stains on a knife, two samples from red
stains on a frying pan, one sample from a red stain on a pair
of shorts, and one sample from a red stain on a right shoe.
The red stain from the rear center seat of the Jaguar
matched Carmouche’s DNA profile. A stain from the front
right seat contained a mixed profile, with Carmouche as the
major contributor and GiGi as a minor contributor. The red
stain on the rear bumper matched GiGi’s DNA profile. The
red stain from the interior right door of the car and the stain
on the shorts both matched Crutchfield’s DNA profile. The
stain from the handle of the frying pan matched Carmouche
as the major DNA contributor and GiGi as the minor
contributor. The red stains on the bottom of the frying pan
matched GiGi’s DNA profile. The red stain on the right shoe
contained a mixture of DNA profiles, including GiGi’s DNA
profile as the major contributor and Carmouche’s as the
minor contributor.
On June 20, 2012, 29 fingerprints were lifted from the
Jaguar. The prints from the outside of the trunk were

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Carmouche’s fingerprints, prints from the inside of the
passenger door were Crutchfield’s, and prints from inside
the driver’s side front door pocket were Corder’s.
A search of Carmouche’s residence yielded a wig with
reddish-brown hair, a pink tank top, and a pair of black
jeans.
Crutchfield’s Defense
A forensic print specialist testified that prints from the
folding knife found in GiGi’s apartment did not match
Crutchfield’s fingerprints.
Crutchfield’s mother, his aunt, and the assistant
principal from his high school testified to his good character.
Crutchfield testified on his own behalf. He met Corder
and Carmouche in a class at the Los Angeles Film and
Recording School. He believed Carmouche had a romantic
interest in Corder, but the feeling was not mutual. Corder
told Crutchfield that GiGi was mistreating him and hitting
him. Corder and Crutchfield agreed that Crutchfield would
scare GiGi so that Corder could “rescue” her. The plan was
for Corder to throw stones at the patio doors so that GiGi
would unlock the front door for Crutchfield to get inside the
apartment. Corder said he thought he could make GiGi
appreciate him more by playing the hero. Crutchfield knew
GiGi was pregnant and believed that Corder wanted the
baby.

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Carmouche was not originally included in the plan to
scare GiGi. Crutchfield asked her if she wanted to
participate on the night of the attack, and Carmouche
agreed. Crutchfield and Carmouche did a “test run” that
night to familiarize themselves with the building.
Crutchfield covered the peephole on GiGi’s apartment door
with his finger so she would not see him.
After the test run, Carmouche and Crutchfield
returned to the film school, where they had been earlier that
evening. Defendants drove from the school to GiGi’s
apartment building. As they were waiting for GiGi to open
the apartment door, Crutchfield saw that Carmouche was
carrying a folding knife, but he did not say anything about it
to her. He also noticed that Carmouche was wearing gloves.
When GiGi opened the door, Crutchfield punched her,
and she stumbled backward. He punched GiGi again and
straddled her, punching her several more times. In total,
Crutchfield punched GiGi about six or seven times. He felt
sick to his stomach because he did not like what he was
doing.
Crutchfield heard Carmouche say, “Get her, get her.”
She also said, “Your husband is not coming, bitch.”
Crutchfield was attacked by GiGi’s dog, so he ran into
another room, where he could not see what Carmouche was
doing. He heard glass breaking several times.
Crutchfield and Carmouche left the apartment and ran
to Corder’s car, which was parked a few blocks away. When
they got back to the car, Corder asked what happened to

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GiGi. Crutchfield said he did not know. Carmouche did not
say anything.
Crutchfield did not want to kill GiGi. He never agreed
to cut her neck. He thought he would help Corder’s
relationship with GiGi by roughing her up. The situation
escalated when GiGi fought back.
Corder’s Defense
Monda Fakhroo testified that she was visiting friends
at the apartment building where GiGi lived on June 15 or
16, 2012. Fakhroo saw a Black man jump over a fence. The
man asked if anyone heard his wife screaming.
Marine Sergeant Lonel Springs met Corder when they
were stationed together at Camp Pendleton in 2005. They
served in Fallujah together. On one occasion, Springs had
seen GiGi hit Corder with a broom, which she held like a
baseball bat. Corder had a reputation for being level-
headed, calm, cool, and collected.
DISCUSSION
Attempted Premeditated Murder—Natural and
Probable Consequences
The jury convicted defendants of attempted willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder. The court instructed
the jury it could find defendants guilty of attempted murder

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as direct perpetrators, direct aiders and abettors, or as
aiders and abettors under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (CALCRIM Nos. 400 [Aiding and
Abetting: General Principles]; 401 [Aiding and Abetting:
Intended Crimes]; 403 [Natural and Probable
Consequences]; and 600 [Attempted Murder].) It further
instructed the jury that, if it found defendants guilty of
attempted murder, it must next determine whether the
attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated.
(CALCRIM No. 601.)
Defendants contend the trial court’s instructions were
deficient under People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 (Chiu),
which held that an aider and abettor may not be convicted of
first degree premeditated murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. (Id. at p. 166.) Defendants
assert Chiu should be equally applicable to attempted
premeditated murder, because otherwise a defendant could
face a life sentence without a jury finding either a personal
intent to kill or premeditation. According to defendants, the
verdict does not reflect which theory or theories the jury
relied upon in reaching its verdicts, and their convictions for
attempted premeditated murder must be reversed. (Id. at
p. 167 [reversal is required where court instructs on a legally
incorrect theory, unless there is a basis in the record to find
that the verdict was based on a legally correct ground].)
Defendants acknowledge that People v. Favor (2012) 54
Cal.4th 868 (Favor) is contrary to their argument, and that

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the Chiu court distinguished Favor, but nonetheless argue
Favor conflicts with Chiu, and should be reconsidered.
Although defendants’ briefs are not explicit, we assume
their contention under the reasoning of Chiu is that the
attempted murder conviction may stand, but the finding of
premeditation and deliberation must be stricken. Chiu does
not preclude conviction of murder for an aider and abettor
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine; the
case precludes liability for first degree murder. With this
understanding, we turn to our resolution of the merits of the
contention.
Our Supreme Court has granted review to resolve the
issue (People v. Mateo, review granted May 11, 2016,
S232674), which it describes in its “Pending Issues
Summary” (last updated December 2, 2016) as follows: “In
order to convict an aider and abettor of attempted willful,
deliberate and premeditated murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, must a premeditated
attempt to murder have been a natural and probable
consequence of the target offense? In other words, should
People v. Favor[, supra,] 54 Cal.4th 868 be reconsidered in
light of Alleyne v. United States (2013) ___ U.S. ___ [113
S.Ct. 2151] and People v. Chiu[, supra,] 59 Cal.4th 155?”
(Pending Issues Summary, California Supreme Court (Dec.
2, 2016) <http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/DEC0216crim
pend.pdf> [as of Dec. 5, 2016].)
We need not weigh in on the merits of the issue for two
reasons. First, we are required to follow Favor, and do so.

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23
(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d
450, 455.) Second, we are satisfied on this record that
Carmouche and Crutchfield are either direct perpetrators or
direct aiders and abettors in the attempted premeditated
murder. Third, and as to Corder, his conviction of
conspiracy to commit murder establishes, as a matter of law,
that he had the specific intent to kill.
Carmouche was a direct perpetrator of the attempted
murder. After beating and stabbing GiGi mercilessly in the
head and chest, she sliced GiGi’s throat numerous times and
then held her hands over GiGi’s nose and mouth until GiGi
lost consciousness. It cannot be seriously argued that
Carmouche was convicted of attempted murder on an aiding
and abetting theory rather than as a direct perpetrator.12
She assaulted the victim in a variety of ways, including
cutting her throat, while verbally stating an express intent
to kill. The jury had no reason to resort to the natural and
probable consequences doctrine as to Carmouche, nor did the
prosecutor rely on that theory. Carmouche’s conviction of
attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder is
not dependent on the continued validity of the holding in
Favor.
12 Carmouche admits that her attorney conceded this
in closing argument, but asserts that “trial counsel also
argued [she] was an aider and abettor at points during the
offense during his closing argument.” The record cite that
Carmouche provides in support of this assertion shows that
counsel argued Carmouche aided and abetted a burglary,
which is irrelevant to her role in the attempted murder.

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24
As to Crutchfield, we hold that the record, including
his own testimony, demonstrates that he was either a direct
perpetrator or a direct aider and abettor. The instructions
on natural and probable consequences were superfluous as
to Crutchfield’s case. We reach this conclusion based on the
following portion of People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111,
1120 (McCoy):
“[T]he dividing line between the actual perpetrator and
the aider and abettor is often blurred. It is often an
oversimplification to describe one person as the actual
perpetrator and the other as the aider and abettor. When
two or more persons commit a crime together, both may act
in part as the actual perpetrator and in part as the aider and
abettor of the other, who also acts in part as an actual
perpetrator. Although Lakey was liable for McCoy’s actions,
he was an actor too. He was in the car and shooting his own
gun, although it so happened that McCoy fired the fatal
shots. Moreover, Lakey’s guilt for attempted murder might
be based entirely on his own actions in shooting at the
attempted murder victims. In another shooting case, one
person might lure the victim into a trap while another fires
the gun; in a stabbing case, one person might restrain the
victim while the other does the stabbing. In either case, both
participants would be direct perpetrators as well as aiders
and abettors of the other. The aider and abettor doctrine
merely makes aiders and abettors liable for their
accomplices’ actions as well as their own. It obviates the
necessity to decide who was the aider and abettor and who

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25
the direct perpetrator or to what extent each played which
role.”
Crutchfield’s conduct falls within the examples of a
direct perpetrator and direct aider and abettor set forth in
McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at page 1120. (See People v.
Delgado (2013) 56 Cal.4th 480, 487 [citing the examples in
McCoy with approval].) By his own admission in his
testimony, it was Crutchfield who first rushed into the
apartment and overwhelmed GiGi. Crutchfield rendered
GiGi helpless by repeatedly punching her. He punched GiGi
on her face and chest while Carmouche hit GiGi’s head,
demonstrating that the two acted together in committing the
attempted murder. Significantly, the jury found that
Crutchfield personally inflicted great bodily injury, a finding
consistent with his role as a direct perpetrator whose
conduct facilitated Carmouche’s attempts to murder GiGi.
Proof of Crutchfield’s guilt did not call into play the doctrine
of natural and probable consequences.
We reach the same conclusion as to Corder, but for
different reasons. Corder was convicted in count 1 of
conspiracy to commit murder, meaning the jury found that
Corder had the requisite mental state of premeditation as a
matter of law. (People v. Cortez (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223, 1226
[conspiracy to commit murder is necessarily conspiracy to
commit premeditated first degree murder].) Corder concedes
in his opening brief that his conviction of conspiracy to
murder undermines his contention, although he makes

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26
additional arguments to avoid this problem, which we
discuss and reject later in this opinion.
The doctrine of natural and probable consequences did
not apply factually to any of defendants. The trial court’s
decision to instruct on the doctrine was the type of
instructional defect amounting to a technical error, which
does not constitute ground for reversal. (See People v. Cross
(2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 67; People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th
238, 282.) The prosecutor did not rely on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine at all as to Carmouche, and
for good reason, as she unquestionably was a direct
perpetrator. As to Crutchfield and Corder, the prosecutor
argued direct aiding and abetting, but did not rely on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, which she
discarded as “just an alternate theory the judge read to you.”
The prosecutor emphasized Corder’s guilt on the attempted
murder charge under the conspiracy to commit murder
charge in count 1.
We are satisfied “there is a basis in the record to find
that the verdict [of premeditation and deliberation] was
based on a valid ground.” (Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 167,
citing People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1128–1129,
and People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 69–71.) Carmouche
and Crutchfield were either direct participants or direct
aiders and abettors under any interpretation of the evidence,
with no basis for instructions on natural and probable
consequences. The jury’s conviction of Carmouche and
Corder on the charge of conspiracy to commit murder

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27
establishes their mental state of premeditation and
deliberation as a matter of law. We conclude that if Favor is
ultimately overruled by our Supreme Court, the result in
this case will remain the same.
Conspiracy to Commit Murder—Overt Acts
Corder and Carmouche contend their convictions for
conspiracy to commit murder must be reversed because two
of the overt acts alleged to have been made in furtherance of
the conspiracy to commit murder were invalid. They argue
that it is impossible to know whether the verdicts were
based on proper overt acts because the jury is not legally
required to unanimously agree regarding which overt acts
have been committed, and in this case the verdict forms did
not indicate which acts formed the basis for the verdicts. We
need not discuss the merits of the contentions, because any
error is harmless.
The Law of Conspiracy
“‘A conviction of conspiracy requires proof that the
defendant and another person had the specific intent to
agree or conspire to commit an offense, as well as the specific
intent to commit the elements of that offense, together with
proof of the commission of an overt act “by one or more of the
parties to such agreement” in furtherance of the conspiracy.’
[Citations.]” (People v. Johnson (2013) 57 Cal.4th 250, 257

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(Johnson).) A defendant cannot be convicted unless at least
one overt act is alleged and proved by the prosecution; the
existence of an agreement in the absence of an act done in
furtherance of that agreement is insufficient to impose
liability. (§ 184; People v. Brown (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d
1361, 1367 (Brown).)
“‘“[A]n overt act is an outward act done in pursuance of
the crime and in manifestation of an intent or design,
looking toward the accomplishment of the crime.”
[Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Johnson, supra, 57 Cal.4th at
p. 259.) An overt act must be performed before the
commission of the offense that was the object of the
conspiracy. (Brown, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 1369.) An
act committed after the commission of the offense provides
insufficient evidence to support a conviction. (Id. at
pp. 1367–1370.) It is not necessary that each of the
conspirators committed the overt act, or that the act be an
element of a crime or an attempt to commit a crime. (Id. at
p. 1369.) Although the jury must be in agreement that an
overt act occurred, it is not required to agree as to the
particular act committed. (People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th
1124, 1131, 1133.)
A conviction of conspiracy does not require that the
object of the unlawful agreement be completed. (Johnson,
supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 257.) In general, a conspiracy
ends “when the substantive crime for which the
coconspirators are being tried is either attained or defeated.
[Citations.] It is for the trier of fact—considering the unique

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29
circumstances and the nature and purpose of the conspiracy
of each case—to determine precisely when the conspiracy
has ended.” (People v. Saling (1972) 7 Cal.3d 844, 852.)
Proceedings
The jury was instructed regarding conspiracy to
commit murder under CALCRIM No. 563. The instruction
identified the following overt acts: (1) Defendants created a
plan to kill GiGi; (2) Corder drove Carmouche and
Crutchfield to GiGi’s residence; (3) Corder used his
relationship with GiGi to get her to open the door to her
residence so that Carmouche and Crutchfield could enter
and attack her; (4) Carmouche and Crutchfield beat and
stabbed GiGi using numerous weapons stating, “The bitch
won’t die”; and (5) Corder drove Carmouche and Crutchfield
from GiGi’s residence after they attempted to kill her. The
jury was also told that: “The People do not have to prove
that any of the members of the alleged conspiracy actually
met or came to a detailed or formal agreement to commit
that crime. An agreement may be inferred from conduct if
you conclude that members of the alleged conspiracy acted
with a common purpose to commit the crime. [¶] . . . The
overt act must be more than the act of agreeing or planning
to commit the crime, but it does not have to be a criminal act
itself.”
In closing argument, the prosecutor argued that
circumstantial evidence strongly suggested Corder returned

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30
to GiGi’s apartment to “finish the job.” She stressed that the
evidence showed Corder was the person who hit GiGi over
the head in a final attempt to kill her when she was phoning
her mother for help:
“Then defendant Carmouche took her gloved hand and
put it over [GiGi’s] nose and mouth, moving it back and
forth, trying to suffocate GiGi. Then GiGi lost consciousness.
“The next thing she knows, she’s crawling over to that
bed side table where she had kept her cell phone so that she
can call for help.
“She gets to her cell phone. She is able to call her
mom, and you heard the 911 call -- well, you heard Denise
Byrd’s 911 call where she’s telling the police that her
daughter GiGi just called her, and that during that phone
conversation, the phone goes dead.
“So while GiGi is on the phone, she gets hit with
something. She gets hit so hard she loses consciousness yet
again. So how did that happen? Who knocked GiGi out?
Who hung up the phone? Who placed that phone on the
kitchen where officers found it?
“We know it wasn’t GiGi. There’s not a trail of blood
leaving [sic] leading from where she was to the kitchen.
“Who is the likely person here?
“The likely person is Brian Corder. He is the
individual who dropped off Carmouche and Crutchfield two
blocks away, and he goes back to the house to finish the job.
He gets there. He sees that GiGi is on the phone. He
realizes he has to do something. He takes whatever object

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31
he could find -- we don’t know what it is. Close to the bed
was a big wooden chair leg. And he hits her, and that’s how
she loses consciousness.
“He ends the conversation and he places that phone in
the kitchen.”
Soon afterward, the prosecutor discussed the
significance of overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy,
stating to the jury: “remember you only have to find that
[defendants] committed one. There is a laundry list, but
they only need to commit one overt act.” She then identified
the alleged overt acts that the jury was to consider, and
discussed the evidence in support of each one.
Corder’s counsel attempted to combat the prosecutor’s
theory:
“[T]he fly in the ointment in this case for the
prosecution is the fact that [Corder] came back. He jumped
over the fence, as Monda Fakroo said, asking, ‘did you hear
my wife scream,’ and disappeared. This is before the
ambulances came, before anybody came. He returned.
Evidence that he is not intending to kill her.”
Corder’s counsel continued:
“Now, all of a sudden, it changes to the fact that he
came back and he hit her with a chair leg. How ridiculous is
that? I mean, if he wanted to kill her and he received
information that his buddies failed, and he wasn’t in that
apartment, which he wasn’t -- the evidence is pretty
conclusive, in my opinion, as to that -- then why not take off?
Why go back and risk it?”

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32
In rebuttal, the prosecutor responded:
“Someone knocks her out. Someone ends the phone
call. Someone takes that phone and moves it to the kitchen
counter. We know it wasn’t defendant Carmouche or
defendant Crutchfield because they are not just going to sit
around watching her crawl to the phone and then make a
phone call. They are going to get out of there as soon as
they’re done.
“We know it’s not GiGi because there’s no blood trail,
and, as you can see from the photos, she was covered in
blood.
“We know it’s not the police officers, because the phone
is on the kitchen counter when they arrive. There was
testimony to that effect.
“Now the defense didn’t present any reasonable
alternative for the only person left in the scenario who
possibly could have knocked GiGi out and moved the phone.
That’s defendant Brian Corder.”
The jury convicted Corder and Carmouche of
conspiracy to commit murder, but found Crutchfield not
guilty. The verdict forms did not indicate which specific
overt acts, if any, the jury unanimously agreed upon.
Discussion
Corder and Carmouche challenge their convictions of
conspiracy to commit murder by arguing that (1) Overt Act
Number 1 merely alleged the agreement itself, rather than a

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33
step in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (2) Overt Act
Number 5 occurred after the conspiracy was complete.13
There is no need to discuss the merits of either argument
because the convictions of attempted murder establish the
existence of an overt act as a matter of law.
Even if the trial court erred by allowing the jury to
consider Overt Act Numbers 1 and 5, any error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. “[A] reviewing court must
conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury based its
verdict on a legally valid theory.” (People v. Chun (2009) 45
Cal.4th 1172, 1201 (Chun).) A court may do so not only
where “‘the jury verdict on other points effectively
embraces’” the one at issue but also where “‘it is impossible,
upon the evidence, to have found what the verdict did find
without finding this point as well.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at
p. 1204.)
Our Supreme Court has held that “[c]ommission of the
target offense in furtherance of the conspiracy satisfies the
overt act requirement.” (People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th
72, 121; see also People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 966
[overruled on another ground in People v. Hill (1998) 17
Cal.4th 800].) Although the murder itself was not
completed, the jury convicted defendants of attempted
murder, which “requires the specific intent to kill and the
13 No objection was raised in the trial court to these
overt acts. The Attorney General has not argued Corder and
Carmouche have forfeited the issue, and we resolve it on
grounds other than forfeiture.

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34
commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward
accomplishing the intended killing.” (People v. Lee (2003) 31
Cal.4th 613, 623 (Lee).) It is clear that the jury’s guilty
verdict with respect to attempted murder “effectively
embraces” the issue of whether an act was completed in
pursuance of the conspiracy (Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at
p. 1201), and demonstrates definitively that “‘“an outward
act [was] done in pursuance of the crime and in
manifestation of an intent or design, looking toward the
accomplishment of the crime.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]”
(Johnson, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 259). The overt act
requirement is satisfied, as a matter of law, by Corder and
Carmouche’s convictions of attempted murder. For these
same reasons, any error in instructions on overt acts 1 and 5
was necessarily harmless.14
14 Carmouche’s counsel expressly conceded in
argument to the jury that there was no question the overt
acts were committed. He also stated, “[Did Carmouche]
inflict great bodily injury? [¶] Come on. Look at the
pictures. I will not sit here and insult your intelligence and
say she didn’t. She did. No question about it.” “The blood?
. . . They went in there to rough her up. That should be no
surprise.” He also stated that Carmouche had “obviously”
hit GiGi with a frying pan, as supported by the DNA
evidence.

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35
Conspiracy to Commit Murder—Lesser Included
Offenses
Corder and Carmouche contend the trial court erred in
failing to sua sponte instruct on lesser included offenses of
conspiracy to murder, including conspiracy to commit
assault, assault with a deadly weapon, and assault with
force likely to produce great bodily injury. There is a split of
authority as to whether allegations of overt acts are to be
considered in determining if there are lesser offenses of
conspiracy under the accusatory pleading test. People v.
Fenenbock (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1688, 1707 (Fenenbock)
held that overt act allegations are not properly considered
for determining whether there are lesser offenses of
conspiracy. People v. Cook (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 910, 918
(Cook) reached the opposite conclusion, holding that the
pleading of overt acts puts a defendant on notice of the facts
alleged and may be considered in determining whether
lesser forms of conspiracy were committed under the
accusatory pleading test. We need not choose between the
holdings in Fenenbock and Cook, or attempt to parse the
analyses in the cases, because any error in failing to instruct
on conspiracy to commit a lesser included offense is
nonprejudicial given the jury’s verdict finding defendants
guilty of willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder.15
15 Earlier in this opinion, we have upheld defendants’
conviction of willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder
against other challenges.

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36
Failure to instruct sua sponte on a lesser included
offense in a noncapital case does not require reversal “unless
an examination of the entire record establishes a reasonable
probability that the error affected the outcome.” (People v.
Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 165 (Breverman).) “Error
in failing to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense is
harmless when the jury necessarily decides the factual
questions posed by the omitted instructions adversely to
defendant under other properly given instructions.” (People
v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 646.) This type of error is
prejudicial “only if, ‘after an examination of the entire cause,
including the evidence’ (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13), it appears
‘reasonably probable’ the defendant would have obtained a
more favorable outcome had the error not occurred ([People
v.] Watson [(1956)] 46 Cal.2d 818, 836).” (Breverman, supra,
at p. 178, fn. omitted.)
By convicting Corder and Carmouche in count 2 of the
willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder of
GiGi, the jury necessarily found each had the specific intent
to kill required for conspiracy to commit murder, rather than
some lesser intent. (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733,
739 [“‘[a]ttempted murder requires the specific intent to kill
and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward
accomplishing the intended killing’”]; Lee, supra, 31 Cal.4th
at p. 623.) The jury’s verdict unambiguously shows that
Corder and Carmouche acted with the specific intent to kill,
rather than an intent to commit some lesser form of assault.

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37
We also conclude any error was harmless given the
strength of the conspiracy charge against Corder and
Carmouche. Unlike Crutchfield (who had no apparent
personal motive to kill GiGi), Corder and Carmouche had an
independent motive to kill GiGi—to eliminate her and the
unborn baby in order to carry on their romantic relationship.
There is no credible evidence that Crutchfield and
Carmouche agreed to merely assault GiGi as part of a far-
fetched plan by Corder to win back her affection, a result
that would have been at odds with Corder’s desire to
terminate the pregnancy and Carmouche’s intent to foster
her romantic interest in Corder. “In determining whether a
failure to instruct on a lesser included offense was
prejudicial, an appellate court may consider ‘whether the
evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively
strong, and the evidence supporting a different outcome is so
comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable probability
the error of which the defendant complains affected the
result.’ (People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 177;
see also People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 621 [error
harmless when evidence supporting lesser offense was
weak].)” (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 870.) This
is such a case.
Scope of Cross-Examination
Crutchfield, joined with brief comment by Corder and
Carmouche, argues that GiGi’s refusal on three occasions

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38
while testifying to review certain documents because she
believed the documents would not refresh her memory was a
deliberate attempt to evade cross-examination in violation of
the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses and
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Crutchfield
specifically contends that “[i]t was error to allow [GiGi] to
refuse to look at a document and see if it would trigger her
memory, and . . . it was error not to allow the defense to
introduce that prior statement so the jury could evaluate
whether it was true and whether GiGi was being hostile to
the defense, a fact which the jury could properly consider in
evaluating her testimony.”
GiGi’s testimony covered approximately 327 pages of
reporter’s transcript. She was subjected to extensive cross-
examination. The three instances disputed by defendants do
not arguably result in a violation of their rights to confront
and cross-examine a witness. Defendants also cannot
establish prejudice, as a detective testified to GiGi’s
statements as to two of the disputed matters, and the
detective was never questioned as to the third. The
contention is entirely without merit.
Proceedings
During Crutchfield’s cross-examination of GiGi, she
answered numerous questions and reviewed documents five
times to refresh her memory at counsel’s request before she
declined to review a document because it would not assist

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39
her recollection. Her memory was successfully refreshed
twice. When questioned about her statements to police with
respect to Crutchfield’s knowledge of Carmouche’s
participation in the attack, GiGi stated that reviewing a
transcript would not refresh her memory:
“[Crutchfield’s counsel]: Didn’t you previously tell the
detectives that while Mr. Crutchfield was straddling you,
beating you, he didn’t know that Ms. Carmouche was hitting
you over the head with items?
“[GiGi]: How would he not know? He’s straddling me
and she’s hitting me in the head. That doesn’t even make
any sense.
“[Carmouche’s counsel]: Objection. Nonresponsive.
Motion to strike.
“The Court: Sustained. Stricken.
“[Crutchfield’s counsel]: Did you tell the detectives
that, though?
“[GiGi]: Not that I remember.
“[Crutchfield’s counsel]: Would it refresh your
recollection to look at the --
“[GiGi]: No.
“[Crutchfield’s counsel]: Your Honor, may I read the
transcript to her?
“The Court: No. She said it would not help her refresh
her recollection. Go on to the next question.”
Following this, Crutchfield’s counsel asked GiGi
whether reviewing documents would refresh her memory
three more times, and she agreed that it might. In two

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40
instances, reviewing the documents was helpful. In another
instance, counsel withdrew her question. Counsel then
questioned GiGi regarding whether she made statements to
the police with respect to Corder:
“[Crutchfield’s counsel]: Three different occasions in
the first interview with the detectives, you told them you
were afraid and they better get [Corder] before he gets to
and kills or hurts whoever did this to you?
“[GiGi]: I don’t remember that.
“[Crutchfield’s counsel]: Would it refresh your
recollection?
“[GiGi]: I don’t remember.
“[Crutchfield’s counsel]: Would it refresh your
recollection to look at the transcript?
“[GiGi]: No. No.
“The Court: She said no. Next question.
“[Crutchfield’s counsel]: Is the Court going to allow me
to impeach her with her statement?
“The Court: No, because she said she doesn’t
remember.”
“[Crutchfield’s counsel]: Did you tell the detectives on
the first interview that you were 99.999 percent sure that it
wasn’t [Corder]?
“[GiGi]: I don’t remember that. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [¶]
“[Crutchfield’s counsel]: Would it refresh your
recollection to review the transcript?
“[GiGi]: No, because I don’t remember it.”

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41
Soon afterwards, the court recessed for the day. Out of
the presence of the jury, the court reminded the defense that
“I don’t remember” was not necessarily an inconsistent
statement that would open the door to impeachment.
The next day Crutchfield’s cross-examination of GiGi
continued. At sidebar, counsel expressed concern regarding
whether she would be permitted to impeach GiGi with
statements that GiGi could not remember making to police.
“[Crutchfield’s counsel]: In light of GiGi’s previous
testimony, I don’t want to be in a position where we’re not
allowed to impeach her with Detective January’s testimony,
based on a lot of things she said that she could not
remember. She also did not even care to or agree to look at
some of the defense documents in trying to refresh her
recollection. She just won’t look at it to see.
“The Court: Because she said if you presented such a
document, that it would not refresh her recollection. [¶] She
is not required to look at anything unless she says it would
assist her in refreshing her recollection. If a witness says it
will not help her refresh her recollection, that’s it. [¶] So it
is not that she’s refusing to look at the document. She said
two or three times that looking at a document would not
refresh her recollection.
“[Crutchfield’s counsel]: And it is my perception, based
on her previous testimony through the trial, that that’s her
position, saved just for the defense. [¶] I understand
emotionally why she would not want to assist us, but she is
not being that uncooperative with the [Deputy] District

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42
Attorney. I don’t think there is a time where she will tell the
[Deputy] D.A., ‘no, it won’t refresh my recollection.’
“The Court: You’re speculating. There hasn’t been a
time where the [Deputy] District Attorney has asked her to
refresh her recollection and she says whether it would help
her or not. [¶] Did you ever ask her to refresh her
recollection?
“[Prosecutor]: No. [¶] My understanding is she
already stated she was super out of it and on drugs, and just
came off a breathing tube during the first interview, and she
doesn’t remember what she told detectives, and counsel
keeps asking her, and she doesn’t remember.
“[Crutchfield’s counsel]: So is it the court’s position the
court will allows us, for things she says she didn’t remember
and/or didn’t remember and it wouldn’t refresh her
recollection to look at a document, will we be allowed to
introduce her statements through the detective?
“The Court: You cannot impeach her unless there is an
inconsistent statement. Her saying ‘I don’t remember’
occasionally, based on what I have heard so far, it is not
deliberately evasive. It is not intentionally trying to -- that
is my opinion and my finding, that I do not find when she
says ‘I don’t remember,’ given the circumstances in this case,
it is very clear to me that she is not being deliberately
evasive. [¶] So it is not -- ‘I do not remember that word’
does not necessarily equate to inconsistent. It does in
certain cases. Not in this case.”

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After continuing discussion on the issue, the trial court
reiterated: “I just want to make sure you’re clear, [counsel].
[¶] At this point I do not find the witness is being
deliberately evasive when she answers ‘I don’t remember’ or
‘I don’t know.’ I have not seen that at all. I have been
watching her very clearly. [¶] In this case, more than any
other, I have not seen any hint of that. She’s very forthright.
She does not appear to be intentionally falsifying the ‘I don’t
knows,’ or trying to avoid the answer.”
Law
“The Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution grants a criminal defendant the right to
confront adverse witnesses.” (People v. Lopez (2012) 55
Cal.4th 569, 573.) “‘Cross-examination may expose facts
from which jurors can appropriately draw inferences about
the reliability of a witness, including the possibility of bias.
The trial court, however, has wide latitude to restrict such
cross-examination, and such testimony is properly barred
unless the defendant can show the prohibited cross-
examination would have produced a significantly different
impression of the witness’s credibility.’ (People v. Brady
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 560; see People v. Smith (2007) 40
Cal.4th 483, 513.)” (People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th
830, 866.)
“The trial court has broad discretion under Evidence
Code section 765 to exercise control over interrogation of

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witnesses and protect them from undue harassment or
embarrassment. (People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 Cal.4th 147,
175 [(Tafoya)]; [People v.] Spence [(2012)] 212 Cal.App.4th
[478,] 517 [(Spence)].) On appeal, we apply the abuse of
discretion standard in reviewing a trial court’s exercise of its
authority under Evidence Code section 765. (Tafoya, at
p. 175; Spence, at p. 517.)” (People v. Chenault (2014) 227
Cal.App.4th 1503, 1514.)
Feigned memory loss does not implicate the
constitutional right to cross-examine witnesses. “The
circumstance of feigned memory loss is not parallel to an
entire refusal to testify. The witness feigning memory loss is
in fact subject to cross-examination, providing a jury with
the opportunity to see the demeanor and assess the
credibility of the witness . . . . ‘[T]he traditional protections
of the oath, cross-examination, and opportunity for the jury
to observe the witness’s demeanor satisfy . . . constitutional
requirements.’ (United States v. Owens [(1988)] 484 U.S.
[554,] 560.) In the face of an asserted loss of memory, these
protections ‘will of course not always achieve success, but
successful cross-examination is not the constitutional
guarantee.’ (Ibid.)” (People v. Gunder (2007) 151
Cal.App.4th 412, 420 (Gunder).)
Discussion
Based on the above authorities, we reach the following
conclusions. First, GiGi was subject to constitutionally

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adequate cross-examination designed to demonstrate her
bias and lack of recollection. After over 300 pages of
examination in the reporter’s transcript, we have no
difficulty in finding compliance with the Sixth Amendment.
Second, even if GiGi feigned a lack of memory by
refusing to attempt to refresh her recollection, defendants’
constitutional rights were not violated. (Gunder, supra, 151
Cal.App.4th at p. 420.)
Third, defendants point to no precedent in support of
their contention that the trial court must require a witness
to review a document to refresh her memory after the
witness has stated that such review will not be helpful. The
trial court did not abuse its considerable discretion to control
the mode of questioning when it ruled GiGi was not evasive
in the few instances in which she declined to attempt to
refresh her recollection.
Fourth, the jury was able to observe GiGi’s demeanor
when she testified that she could not remember what she
said to the police. The jurors were able to make their own
determination as to whether her answers were credible. The
trial court instructed the jury pursuant to CALCRIM No.
226 to consider how well a witness could perceive the subject
matter of her testimony, the ability of a witness to remember
and describe what happened, the behavior of a witness while
testifying, the attitude of a witness about the case and about
testifying, and whether a witness made prior consistent or
inconsistent statements. This instruction provided the jury
with the necessary tools to assess GiGi’s several refusals to

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consider refreshing her memory, and afford that conduct
whatever weight it deserved.
Fifth, defendants cannot establish prejudice. (People v.
Byron (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 657, 676 [Confrontation
Clause violations are subject to federal harmless-error
analysis under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18,
24]; see People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 709
(Ledesma).) Detective January specifically testified to the
statements that were the subject of the last two unsuccessful
requests to refresh GiGi’s recollection, and the detective was
not even asked about the first statement in dispute. The
jury therefore heard testimony regarding two of the prior
statements, and defendants made no attempt to bring out
the third statement.
Evidence Supporting Torture Convictions
Carmouche contends that there is insufficient evidence
to support her conviction for torture because the evidence
did not demonstrate that she intended to cause cruel or
extreme pain or suffering for the purpose of revenge,
extortion, persuasion, or any sadistic purpose. Corder joins
in her contention, arguing that if the evidence is insufficient
to support Carmouche’s torture conviction, his conviction as
an aider and abettor must also be reversed. Substantial
evidence supports both convictions.

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Law
In assessing a claim of insufficiency of evidence, the
appellate court’s task is to review “the whole record in the
light most favorable to the judgment . . . to determine
whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence
which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26
Cal.3d 557, 578.) The federal standard of review is to the
same effect: under principles of federal due process, review
for sufficiency of evidence entails not the determination
whether the reviewing court itself believes the evidence at
trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but,
instead, “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt.” (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S.
307, 319–320.) Where substantial evidence supports the
jury’s finding, and other circumstances support a contrary
finding, the jury’s finding will not be reversed. (People v.
Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.)
Section 206 provides: “Every person who, with the
intent to cause cruel or extreme pain and suffering for the
purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any sadistic
purpose, inflicts great bodily injury as defined in Section
12022.7 upon the person of another, is guilty of torture. [¶]

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The crime of torture does not require any proof that the
victim suffered pain.”
“‘Courts have interpreted intent to inflict “cruel” pain
and suffering as intent to inflict extreme or severe pain.’
(People v. Burton (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 447, 452
[(Burton)].)” (People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412,
1426 (Hamlin).) “‘Absent direct evidence of such intent, the
circumstances of the offense can establish the intent to
inflict extreme or severe pain.’ (Burton, supra, 143
Cal.App.4th at p. 452.)” (Hamlin, supra, at p. 1426.) It is
not necessary that the defendant cause prolonged pain, or
intend to do so. (Id. at p. 1427.) “A jury may consider the
severity of the wounds in determining whether defendant
intended to torture. (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408,
432–433.)” (Burton, supra, at p. 452.) “‘[A] jury may [also]
infer intent to cause extreme pain from a defendant who
focuses [her] attack on a particularly vulnerable area, such
as the face, rather than indiscriminately attacking the
victim.’ [Citation.]” (Hamlin, supra, at pp. 1426–1427.)
Intent can be reasonably inferred when the defendant
“deliberately strikes [her] victim on an area of the body that
is already injured.” (Id. at p. 1430.) “‘[S]carring and
disfigurement constitute strong circumstantial evidence of
intent to inflict severe pain and suffering.’ (People v. Baker
(2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1224.)” (Burton, supra, at
p. 452.)

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Discussion
Crutchfield rushed GiGi, punching her multiple times
and knocking her to the floor. Carmouche knew that
Crutchfield had hit GiGi in the head and continued to do so,
yet she attacked GiGi mercilessly, using various weapons to
batter, bruise, stab, and slash GiGi’s injured face and her
breasts. She focused her attack on these specific, vulnerable
areas of the body, attacking repeatedly. GiGi’s wounds were
severe. She lost fingernails while trying to ward off her
attackers. Carmouche hit GiGi in the head with a frying
pan, knocking out two of her teeth. She sliced GiGi’s neck
numerous times and then covered her mouth and nose until
she lost consciousness. Following the attack, GiGi was put
in a medically induced coma, requiring a breathing tube.
Her face and neck were permanently scarred, as the jury
recognized when it convicted defendants of mayhem. (See
People v. Newby (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1347 [mayhem
requires a finding that the victim sustained “a permanent
disfiguring injury”].) These facts strongly support the jury’s
finding that Carmouche intended to torture GiGi.
We are not persuaded by the cases Carmouche relies
upon to argue that torture requires more than the facts of
this case demonstrate. That there are other cases in which
the injuries suffered were more severe and the acts
committed even more horrifying is of no moment. “There is
no question there are cases in which the acts of torture were
more gruesome. However, ‘[w]hen we decide issues of

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sufficiency of evidence, comparison with other cases is of
limited utility, since each case necessarily depends on its
own facts.’ (People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 516.)”
(People v. Odom (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 237, 248.) The facts
of this case amply support a finding of intent to torture.
Finally, there was substantial evidence that
Carmouche tortured GiGi “for the purpose of revenge,
extortion, persuasion, or [another] sadistic purpose.” (§ 206.)
Evidence was presented that Carmouche was infatuated
with Corder. She told him she would do anything to protect
him. She told Crutchfield she would do “dumb shit” on
Corder’s behalf. GiGi was Corder’s wife and was carrying
his child. It would be reasonable for the jury to infer that
Carmouche took sadistic pleasure in torturing and
permanently disfiguring a perceived rival. Her
concentration on GiGi’s face and breasts in a way that
permanently disfigured and scarred GiGi further
corroborates this inference. In light of the facts, we conclude
that Carmouche and Corder’s torture convictions were
supported by substantial evidence.
Witness Attire
Corder next argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by requiring a fellow Marine who testified on his
behalf to appear in civilian clothing. Corder argues that his
witness, Lonel Springs, was prevented from presenting
himself in the best possible light, which would have

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51
increased his credibility with the jury. He asserts that as an
on-duty Marine, Springs should have been permitted to wear
his uniform. We conclude that, even if the trial court abused
its discretion, Corder’s contention fails because he has not
established prejudice.
Proceedings
At trial, the prosecution objected when Springs
presented himself for testimony dressed in his Marine Corps
uniform. The prosecutor argued that, under Evidence Code
section 352, it would be prejudicial to allow the witness to
wear his uniform. She asserted that Corder was attempting
to use Springs’s military service to bolster his credibility and
sway the jury.
Corder’s counsel responded that wearing the uniform
would not be prejudicial: “That’s what he is. So he is
wearing his uniform. Whatever the Marines’ issue is, it is a
Marines’ issue. It is not for this court to decide.”
The court questioned Corder’s counsel regarding the
decision to have Springs wear his uniform:
“The Court: Why is he wearing a uniform to testify in
a civilian case?
“[Corder’s counsel]: I gave him the option of what he
wanted.
“The Court: Did you give him the option, or did you tell
him to wear it?
“[Corder’s counsel]: I gave him the option.

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“The Court: Did he ask you whether he should wear it
or not?
“[Corder’s counsel]: Yes.
“The Court: And you said yes?
“[Corder’s counsel]: Yes.”
The court ruled: “Under [Evidence Code section] 352, I
think that his wearing a uniform is, first of all, inappropriate
in a civilian trial. [¶] Secondly, I agree with the People. I
think that it will -- it was worn, in my opinion, given
especially what you just told me, to allegedly add credibility
to his testimony, and the wearing of the uniform, I think,
adds nothing to the nature of his testimony. He allegedly
witnessed an incident of domestic violence . . . in a private
setting, not in an official capacity as a Marine. Even if he
did, this trial has nothing to do with his being a Marine. [¶]
So I think it is more prejudicial than probative. It would
mislead the jury and it is not appropriate.”
Corder’s counsel stated that he would ask Springs
whether it was a violation of Marine Corps policies or
procedures to wear his uniform. The court said that it did
not know whether it was a violation or not, but noted that it
was a violation for police to testify in their uniforms
regarding a private matter. Regardless, the court was not
going adjudicate matters of Marine Corps rules and
procedures. The court was concerned solely with the impact
on testimony.
Corder’s counsel responded: “His whole testimony will
take about five minutes, Your Honor. If the uniform changes

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-- I will be surprised if that changes anybody’s mind on the
facts of the case.”
Later, Corder’s counsel reported that he had spoken
with Springs, who said the Marines permitted Springs to
testify in a uniform. The trial court did not change its
ruling.16
Springs testified that he and Corder met in the
Marines in 2005, when they were stationed at Camp
Pendleton. They served in Fallujah together. Springs and
his wife became friends with Corder and GiGi when they
returned to the United States, and saw them daily from 2006
until 2010. Springs recounted an incident in which he
witnessed GiGi hit Corder with a broom, swinging it as if it
was a baseball bat. Corder did not retaliate. Springs had
never seen Corder act violently toward GiGi. He had last
seen Corder in 2010. Corder had a reputation in the
Marines for being “calm, cool, and collective [sic].” He had
“helped [Springs] with [his] temper.”
Springs’s testimony spanned four pages of transcript.
None of the parties elected to cross-examine him.
16 Corder was allowed to address the court and stated,
without any support, that Springs was on-duty and required
to wear a uniform. Although Corder mentions his
statement, on appeal he does not argue that Springs was
required to wear his uniform at the hearing.

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Discussion
We see no reason to delve into the merits of the issue.
Given the weight of the evidence in this case, the argument
that it was prejudicial error to refuse to allow Springs to
testify in uniform borders on the absurd.
Springs’s testimony was very brief. The jury knew that
Springs and Corder were Marines, and that Springs vouched
for Corder’s character. It was undisputed Corder and GiGi
had a volatile relationship, and GiGi had testified to hitting
Corder with the broom. Springs was not a percipient
witness. His testimony had nothing to do with the attack on
GiGi or Corder’s role in it. We see absolutely no possibility
Corder would have obtained a more favorable result had
Springs testified in uniform.
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Evidence
Corder also contends that the trial court erred in ruling
“that no mention could be made of PTSD, [and] opining that
it was not a defense to any of the charges.” He argues that
trial counsel’s failure to seek to have the PTSD evidence
admitted on the ground that it supported a “diminished
actuality” theory of defense—i.e. that Corder lacked the
specific intent required to commit the charged crimes—was
not forfeited because counsel was reacting defensively to “the
pressure to state the relevance pre-trial [sic] and the court’s
assertion that there was no PTSD defense to any of the

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charges,” and also because the argument was futile in light
of the trial court’s ruling.17 Alternately, Corder argues he
was prejudiced by counsel’s ineffective assistance in failing
to seek admission of PTSD evidence on this basis. We
disagree with Corder’s characterization of the trial court’s
ruling, and conclude there is no merit to his claim that trial
counsel was pressured into abstaining from making a futile
argument. Nor can we agree that defendant has established
ineffective assistance of counsel, as trial counsel was not
given an opportunity to explain his strategic decisions on the
record, and Corder fails to establish that it is reasonably
probable that the outcome of the trial was negatively
affected by counsel’s tactical choice.
Proceedings
With respect to the trial court’s ruling, the following
colloquy took place at a pretrial hearing on the prosecution’s
motion to exclude mention of PTSD:
“The Court: The People are seeking to exclude any
reference to defendant Corder has [sic] PTSD, or -- [Corder’s
17 “[PTSD] evidence is admissible for the sole purpose
of showing . . . ‘whether or not the accused actually formed a
required specific intent, premeditated, deliberated or
harbored malice aforethought, when a specific intent crime
is charged’ (§ 28, subd. (a)) . . . .” (People v. Cortes (2011) 192
Cal.App.4th 873, 908, italics omitted.)

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counsel], are you going to introduce evidence of defendant
having post-traumatic stress disorder?
“[Corder’s counsel]: I may. I may, based on cross-
examination of GiGi and what is developed at the trial. It
may come in. I don’t think the court can rule on that issue
pretrial. I think it will have to rule as it is confronted during
the trial.
“The Court: No. I need to know about it now. [¶]
First of all, what is the relevance of his PTSD?
“[Corder’s counsel]: Well, there’s text messages that
refer to GiGi saying ‘My husband died in Fallouja [sic].’ She
texted that. [¶] I think that would be relevant based on
those text messages that are going to come out. [¶] One of
the prosecution’s theories, as the court is well aware, is that
Mr. Corder did not want the child, and therefore he decided
that he was going to kill GiGi because of that. [¶] They had
a series of text messages. . . . It lasted most of a particular
day and maybe into a second day about two months before
this incident in which GiGi expresses how upset she is with
Mr. Corder, and Mr. Corder is explaining his side of it, and
in that, one of those text messages, she said ‘My husband
died in Fallouja [sic].’ [¶] Well, what does that mean? I
want to find out what that means.
“The Court: How is that relevant?
“[Corder’s counsel]: It is relevant to explain what she’s
talking about there, that he has -- it is all part of the case,
whether he has PTSD or not. We’re not offering it as a

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defense or anything like that, but we’re offering it as part of
the facts of the case.
“The Court: [Prosecutor]? How is it relevant that the
defendant had PTSD?
“[Prosecutor]: I just didn’t want it coming out as some
sort of a defense. If [Corder’s counsel] is saying he just
wants to question GiGi about the messages and what she
meant . . . and basically referring to the fact that he came
back a different person, I don’t have an issue with that.
“The Court: Is that your intent?
“[Corder’s counsel]: Yes. That’s it.
“The Court: So you are going to introduce evidence
asking GiGi to clarify the text message?
“[Corder’s counsel]: Yes. That’s all.
“The Court: You have no objection to that?
“[Prosecutor]: I don’t have an issue with that. I just
didn’t want an expert at the last second talking about some
type of psychological defense that I had never heard of.
“The Court: There is no such defense.
“[Corder’s counsel]: There will be no expert coming in.
I can represent that.”
The trial court asked if either Carmouche or
Crutchfield objected to admission of PTSD evidence on this
limited basis. Carmouche’s counsel noted that there were
many text messages and he would not know whether he
would object until a specific issue arose. The trial court
reiterated that the evidence would only be admitted in the
limited context of the single text they had discussed.

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Corder’s counsel stated, “Among other things, it may relate
to the other issues that come up. But there is no expert
evidence.”
The court responded: “In addition to the expert
evidence, I’m not allowing you to go into a detailed
explanation of his PTSD condition. . . . I know the People
are not objecting for you to probe into the clarification of the
text messages that are going to be introduced, but we’re not
going to be sidetracked with regards to that medical
condition.” The court allowed the introduction of PTSD
evidence for the limited purpose discussed.
Discussion
The record demonstrates that the court did not rule
that all PTSD evidence was inadmissible, as Corder
represents. The court allowed Corder to present evidence of
his text message for the specific purpose mentioned by
defense counsel. It is clear that Corder’s counsel had no
intention of presenting a diminished actuality defense on the
basis of PTSD evidence, and was not pressured by the trial
court in this regard. We view the trial court’s statement
that “[t]here is no such defense,” and its prohibition on
broader admission of the evidence as reassurance to the
prosecution that Corder’s counsel was not seeking to admit
the PTSD evidence as a defense pretrial and would not be
allowed to ambush the prosecution with the defense
midtrial. Corder’s counsel similarly reassured the

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prosecutor that he would not be calling an expert witness to
testify regarding PTSD. The trial court did not err in its
statements, nor did it force counsel into a position where he
could not comfortably press for admission on a diminished
actuality theory prior to trial. We cannot conclude the court
abused its discretion in ruling that the defense would not be
allowed to present evidence of a defense that it expressly
eschewed. (See People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 292
[“A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is
reviewable for abuse of discretion”].)
We reject Corder’s contention that counsel was
constitutionally ineffective. (People v. Williams (1998) 61
Cal.App.4th 649, 657.) To establish a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was both deficient and prejudicial, i.e., that it is
reasonably probable that counsel’s unprofessional errors
affected the outcome. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466
U.S. 668, 687, 693–694; Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at
pp. 216–217.) “The Sixth Amendment guarantees competent
representation by counsel for criminal defendants[, and
reviewing courts] presume that counsel rendered adequate
assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment
in making significant trial decisions.” (People v. Holt (1997)
15 Cal.4th 619, 703, citing Strickland v. Washington, supra,
466 U.S. at p. 690; People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450,
513.) If the record sheds no light on why counsel acted or
failed to act in the challenged manner, we must reject the
claim on appeal unless counsel was asked for an explanation

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and failed to provide one, or there could be no satisfactory
explanation for counsel’s performance. (People v. Mendoza
Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266.)
On this record, we cannot conclude that counsel was
ineffective for failing to seek admission of PTSD evidence to
show that Corder lacked specific intent to commit the
crimes. The record is silent as to the reason for counsel’s
tactical choice. We have no way of knowing whether counsel
had Corder examined for PTSD and if an expert would have
been willing to testify to his condition. There is simply no
ground for concluding counsel’s performance was deficient.
Cumulative Error
Corder and Carmouche argue the errors alleged, even
if not individually prejudicial, are prejudicial when taken
together. There was no cumulative error, as any error was
inconsequential. (See People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997,
1075.)

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
KRIEGLER, Acting P.J.
We concur:
BAKER, J.
KUMAR, J.
 Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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