Simerley v. Golden Gate Bridge Highway and Transp. Dist.

1
Filed 8/11/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
LYNETTE SIMERLEY et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
GOLDEN GATE BRIDGE
HIGHWAY AND
TRANSPORTATION DISTRICT,
Defendant and Respondent.
A173588
(City & County of San Francisco
Super. Ct. No. CGC25622935)
Tracy Simerley and his wife, Lynette Simerley,1 sued Golden Gate
Bridge Highway and Transportation District (District) for injuries Tracy
sustained while working as a seaman on a ferryboat owned by the District.
Lynette appeals from the trial court’s decision to grant the District’s
demurrer to her loss of consortium claim on the ground that loss of
consortium is unavailable under general maritime law or the Jones Act
(46 U.S.C.A. § 30104). We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
It is undisputed that federal maritime law governs the issue presented
in this appeal. Historically, federal courts have developed an “ ‘ “amalgam of
traditional common-law rules, modifications of those rules, and newly created
rules” that forms the general maritime law.’ ” (The Dutra Grp. v. Batterton
1 For clarity’s sake, we will refer to the individual Simerleys by their
first names. We mean no disrespect in doing so.

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(2019) 588 U.S. 358, 360–361 (Batterton).) Beginning in the 20th century,
however, Congress began enacting federal maritime statutes to provide
greater protection for seamen. These statutes included the Jones Act, which
was enacted in 1920 and created a statutory cause of action for seamen to sue
their employers for negligence. (Batterton, at p. 366; Atlantic Sounding v.
Townsend (2009) 557 U.S. 404, 415 (Townsend).) The Jones Act did not
expressly eliminate the causes of action or remedies that existed under
general maritime law prior to its enactment, such as claims for personal
injury “unseaworthiness.” (Townsend, at pp. 415–416; Batterton, at p. 362.)
But because an admiralty court “is not free to go beyond” the limits set by
Congress, questions arose about the types of relief available to maritime
plaintiffs under general maritime law. (Miles v. Apex Marine Corp. (1990)
498 U.S. 19, 24 (Miles).)
In a trio of cases—Miles, Townsend, and Batterton—the United States
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a plaintiff’s requested relief
was available under general maritime law in light of these legislative
enactments. (Miles, supra, 498 U.S. at pp. 27, 32–33; Townsend, supra, 557
U.S. at p. 407; Batterton, supra, 588 U.S. at pp. 360–361.) This case presents
a similar question.
Lynette and Tracy initiated this action by filing a complaint against the
District in March 2025. The complaint alleged the District employed Tracy
as a “seaman” within the meaning of the Jones Act.2 As alleged in the
2 The complaint also alleged that Tracy was “ ‘a member of a crew’
within the meaning of” the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation
Act (LHWCA). (33 U.S.C.A. § 902(3)(G).) “The LHWCA provides benefits for
all marine workers except a master or ‘a member of a crew of any vessel.’
The Jones Act provides coverage for ‘seamen.’ It is firmly established that
the terms are interchangeable and that the criteria for establishing each are

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complaint, Lynette’s claim for loss of consortium was based on the second
cause of action for “[u]nseaworthiness,” which alleged the vessel and its gear,
crew, and equipment were “unsafe, unseaworthy, and unfit[,]” resulting in
injuries to Tracy. The complaint also asserted causes of action for negligence
under the Jones Act and for “[m]aintenance, [f]ound, and [c]ure.”
The District demurred to the loss of consortium claim. Citing Miles,
supra, 498 U.S. 19, the District argued that the Jones Act did not permit
recovery of non-pecuniary damages, which would include loss of consortium.
It further contended that under Batterton, supra, 588 U.S. 358, loss of
consortium claims were not legally available to spouses of injured seamen
under the Jones Act or general maritime law. The Simerleys opposed the
demurrer, contending general maritime law gave Lynette a common law
remedy for loss of consortium, and the Jones Act did not foreclose such a
remedy for spouses of injured seamen. They claimed the Supreme Court’s
decision in Townsend, supra, 557 U.S. 404 “make[s] clear” that Miles and the
other authority relied on by the District do not support the District’s position.
They further argued that Batterton was “neither on point nor instructive.”
The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. The
court first concluded there was no loss of consortium recovery under the
Jones Act. Then, applying the “framework” established in Batterton, the
the same.” (White v. Valley Line Co. (5th Cir. 1984) 736 F.2d 304, 305, fn. 2.)
Thus, as alleged in the complaint, Tracy is a seaman covered by the Jones Act
and not a maritime worker covered by the LHWCA. (See Harbor Tug &
Barge Co. v. Papai (1997) 520 U.S. 548, 553 [“the LHWCA and the Jones Act
are ‘mutually exclusive’ ”].) Lynette does not allege otherwise. This
distinction is important because, as we will explain, Lynette relies on
authority that the Supreme Court has found applicable only to longshoremen.

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court concluded there was no remedy for loss of consortium for claims of
unseaworthiness under general maritime law.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review and Appealability
We review an order sustaining a demurrer de novo, exercising our
independent judgment on whether the complaint states a cause of action as a
matter of law. (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d
120, 125.) In determining whether the complaint, liberally construed, states
facts entitling the plaintiff to relief, we assume the truth of all material
properly pleaded facts, without crediting contentions, deductions, or legal
conclusions. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) We must affirm if
the complaint is insufficient on any ground specified in the demurrer.
(Stearn v. County of San Bernardino (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 434, 439–440.)
Lynette has the burden on appeal to demonstrate the trial court erred in
sustaining the demurrer. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000)
81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.)
Lynette prematurely appealed from the order sustaining the demurrer
without leave to amend, rather than from a judgment of dismissal. (See
Estate of Dito (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 791, 799 [an order sustaining a
demurrer without leave to amend is not itself an appealable order, but an
appeal may be taken from the subsequent judgment or order of dismissal].)
Nevertheless, where the trial court’s ruling effectively disposed of the action,
the respondent does not challenge the appealability of the order, and the
appeal has been fully briefed, we may, in the interests of judicial economy,
treat the appeal as taken from a judgment of dismissal. (Id. at pp. 799–800;
Hedwall v. PCMV, LLC (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 564, 571.) That is the case

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here. Accordingly, we will amend the order to make it an appealable
judgment of dismissal. (Estate of Dito, at pp. 799–800.)
B. Analysis
Focusing on whether loss of consortium is available under general
maritime law, Lynette contends the dispositive question on appeal is whether
Congress intended the Jones Act to abrogate the common law tort remedy for
loss of consortium. She answers this question in the negative, relying on
cases that were decided before Miles, Townsend, and Batterton, and she
further argues her loss of consortium claim satisfies the “straightforward
rule” established by the Supreme Court in Townsend. Lynette’s contention
fails under Batterton, which was decided after Townsend and clarified the
test for determining whether the relief requested by the plaintiff is available
under general maritime law. As we will explain, Batterton requires us to
determine whether the requested relief has traditionally been available for
the “particular claims involved.” (Batterton, supra, 588 U.S. at p. 361.)
Although Lynette appears to challenge Batterton’s reasoning and suggests
Townsend does not require her “to demonstrate that [her husband’s]
unseaworthiness claim and the consortium remedy were historically used in
tandem,” this court is bound by the reasoning of Batterton. (See People v.
Superior Court (Williams) (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 688, 702–703.)
1. The Test Developed in Miles, Townsend, and Batterton Applies
Here.
The Supreme Court first addressed the conflict between remedies
available under general maritime law and federal maritime statutes in Miles,
supra, 498 U.S. 19. There, a seaman was killed by a fellow crew member
while aboard a ship. (Id. at pp. 21–22.) The decedent’s mother sued the
ship’s owner, alleging negligence under the Jones Act for failure to prevent

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the assault and “unseaworthiness” under general maritime law for hiring a
crew member unfit to serve. (Ibid.) The latter claim is one of strict liability
and arises from a shipowner’s duty to provide a “seaworthy” ship. (Id. at p.
25.) One of the questions the Court considered was whether the plaintiff
could recover for loss of society and punitive damages based on her general
maritime law claim for unseaworthiness, even though non-pecuniary
damages are precluded under the Jones Act. (Miles, at pp. 21–22, 32.)
The Supreme Court concluded the plaintiff could not recover such
damages, reasoning that it would be “inconsistent with our place in the
constitutional scheme” to award greater damages “in a judicially created
cause of action in which liability is without fault than Congress has allowed
in cases of death resulting from negligence.” (Miles, supra, 498 U.S. at pp.
31–33.) In so holding, the Court relied on the principle that when Congress
“ ‘speak[s] directly to a question, the courts are not free to “supplement”
Congress’ answer so thoroughly that the Act becomes meaningless.’ ” (Id. at
p. 31; see also id. at p. 27 [“Congress retains superior authority in these
matters, and an admiralty court must be vigilant not to overstep the well-
considered boundaries imposed by federal legislation”].) The Court noted
that the maritime legislation was “a manifestation of congressional intent ‘to
achieve “uniformity in the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 26;
see Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc. (1970) 398 U.S. 375, 401,
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Garris v. Norfolk
Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. (4th Cir. 2000) 210 F.3d 209, 226, fn. 4.)
Thus, the Court emphasized the need to “restore a uniform rule applicable to
all actions for the wrongful death of a seaman, whether under [Death on the
High Seas Act (DOHSA)], the Jones Act, or general maritime law.” (Miles, at
p. 33.)

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Nearly two decades later, the Supreme Court clarified the scope of
Miles in Townsend, supra, 557 U.S. 404. In Townsend, an injured seaman
sued his employer for willful failure to provide maintenance and cure under
general maritime law. A “maintenance and cure” cause of action is distinct
from a negligence cause of action and arises from “the vessel owner’s
obligation to provide food, lodging, and medical services to a seaman injured
while serving the ship.” (Townsend, at pp. 407–408.) The seaman sought
punitive damages. (Ibid.) The Court held that punitive damages are
available for maintenance and cure claims under general maritime law. (Id.
at pp. 407–408.)
In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered two factors: (1)
whether the relief sought has been historically available under general
maritime law; and (2) whether “Congress has enacted legislation departing
from this common-law understanding.” (Townsend, supra, 557 U.S. at pp.
407, 414–415.) For the first factor, the Court concluded that courts have long
awarded punitive damages under general maritime law prior to the
enactment of the Jones Act, including for maintenance and cure claims. (Id.
at pp. 409–414.) On the second factor, the Court noted that the “Jones Act
does not address maintenance and cure or its remedy.” (Id. at pp. 420, 417.)
Because the Jones Act created a statutory cause of action for negligence but
did not eliminate the pre-existing common-law cause of action for
maintenance and cure, the Court concluded that the Jones Act did not bar
punitive damages for such claims. (Id. at pp. 415–416, 418.)
The Court rejected the petitioners’ argument that the availability of
punitive damages in the case was controlled by the Jones Act under Miles,
supra, 498 U.S. 19. (Townsend, supra, 557 U.S. at pp. 418–419.) The Court
confirmed that “[t]he reasoning of Miles remains sound” but explained that

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Miles “grapples with the entirely different question whether general
maritime law should provide a cause of action for wrongful death based on
unseaworthiness. By providing a remedy for wrongful death suffered on the
high seas or in territorial waters, the Jones Act and DOHSA displaced a
general maritime rule that denied any recovery for wrongful death.”
(Townsend, at pp. 420, 419.) The Court in Miles was therefore called upon “to
decide whether these new statutes supported an expansion of the relief
available under pre-existing general maritime law to harmonize it with a
cause of action created by statute.” (Townsend, at p. 419.) In contrast, the
case before the Court in Townsend involved a cause of action and remedy that
were “well established before the passage of the Jones Act.” (Id. at p. 420.)
More recently, in Batterton, the Supreme Court considered whether a
Jones Act seaman could recover punitive damages on a claim that the
seaman was injured as a result of the vessel’s unseaworthiness. (Batterton,
supra, 588 U.S. at pp. 361, 378.) The Court said resolution of the question
was governed by Miles and Townsend. (Batterton, at p. 369.) It noted that
Miles established that courts “ ‘should look primarily to . . . legislative
enactments for policy guidance,’ while recognizing that [courts] ‘may
supplement these statutory remedies where doing so would achieve the
uniform vindication’ of the policies served by the relevant statutes.”
(Batterton, at p. 369.) And in Townsend, the Court “justified [its] departure
from the statutory remedial scheme based on the established history of
awarding punitive damages for certain maritime torts, including
maintenance and cure.” (Batterton, at p. 369.) Accordingly, the Court in
Batterton considered (1) “whether punitive damages have traditionally been
awarded for claims of unseaworthiness” and (2) “whether conformity with
parallel statutory schemes would require such damages” to maintain

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uniformity. (Ibid.) The Court also considered whether it was “compelled on
policy grounds to allow punitive damages for unseaworthiness claims.”
(Ibid.)
After considering these factors, the Court concluded the plaintiff could
not recover punitive damages on a claim of unseaworthiness. (Batterton,
supra, 588 U.S. at p. 377.) First, the Court concluded “unseaworthiness did
not traditionally allow recovery of punitive damages” because the plaintiff
“present[ed] no decisions from the formative years of the personal injury
unseaworthiness claim in which exemplary damages were awarded.” (Id. at
p. 372.) Next, the Court concluded that allowing plaintiffs to recover punitive
damages for unseaworthiness claims was not “required to maintain
uniformity with Congress’s clearly expressed policies.” (Id. at pp. 372–374.)
Finally, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that punitive damages
were justified on policy grounds. (Id. at pp. 374–377.) Its reasoning was
based in part on the fact that while personal injury unseaworthiness claims
existed prior to the passage of the Jones Act, “unseaworthiness in its current
strict-liability form is our own invention and came after passage of the Jones
Act,” and as such “it would exceed [the Court’s] current role to introduce
novel remedies contradictory to those Congress has provided in similar
areas.” (Id. at pp. 374, 362–366.)
In sum, Batterton essentially reaffirmed the two-step framework
established in Townsend to determine whether the relief requested is
available under general maritime law and added a third step based on
whether “policy grounds” nevertheless compel the requested relief.
(Batterton, supra, 588 U.S. at pp. 361, 369.) The Court further clarified that
the analysis is “based on the particular claims involved.” (Id. at p. 361; see
id. at p. 369 [noting “the importance of viewing each claim in its proper

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historical context”].) Indeed, the Court concluded that some of the cases
relied on by the plaintiff did not support his position that punitive damages
were traditionally available because those cases involved maintenance and
cure claims, whereas the plaintiff had brought a claim for personal injury
unseaworthiness. (Id. at p. 371.)
Neither party devotes much attention to Batterton in their briefing,
even though this case, like the Batterton case, raises the question of whether
the relief requested is available under general maritime law for a personal
injury unseaworthiness claim brought by a Jones Act seaman. Lynette
argues Batterton is not “directly on point” because it “did not follow the
straightforward rule . . . mapped out in Townsend” and rested on policy
grounds that “shed no light on the consortium issue.” As a result, she
contends, we must “ ‘make an independent determination’ ” of the question
raised on appeal. She asserts that a pre-Miles decision, American Export
Lines, Inc. v. Alvez (1980) 446 U.S. 274 (Alvez), and the canon of admiralty
law it relied on control this determination.3
3 Lynette also cites cases that she claims have “started marking out
Batterton’s limits,” but those cases are distinguishable. (See, e.g., Ranger v.
Alamitos Bay Yacht Club (2025) 17 Cal.5th 532, 542 [concluding Batterton
was inapplicable where the question raised on appeal concerned the causes of
action that could be asserted by the plaintiff, rather than the available
remedies]; Evans v. John Crane, Inc. (D.Del. Oct. 24, 2019, C.A. No. 15-681
(MN)) 2019 U.S.Dist. Lexis 184048, at *12 & fn. 6 [distinguishing Batterton
in a case concerning the application of DOHSA to “indivisible injuries”]; Kirk
v. Superior Marine Ways, Inc. (S.D.W.Va. Feb. 25, 2025, Civ. A. No. 3:23-
0728) 2025 U.S.Dist. Lexis 33678, at *13 [distinguishing Batterton on ground
that it involved a seaman, not a longshoreman].) Moreover, we are not bound
by the decisions of the lower federal courts. (People v. Bradley (1969) 1
Cal.3d 80, 86.)

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We are unpersuaded that the Batterton test does not control here.
First, on questions of federal law, we are bound by the “ ‘ratio decidendi’ ” of
United States Supreme Court decisions. (People v. Superior Court
(Williams), supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at pp. 702–703.) “ ‘The ratio decidendi is the
principle or rule which constitutes the ground of the decision, and it is this
principle or rule which has the effect of a precedent.’ ” (Santa Monica
Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1026, 1033,
italics omitted.) It includes “a judicial decision’s reasoning,” which “allows
[the decision] to have life and effect in the disposition of future cases” (Ramos
v. Louisiana (2020) 590 U.S. 83, 104), and statements “necessary to the
decision” (Western Landscape Construction v. Bank of America (1997) 58
Cal.App.4th 57, 61), but not dictum (United Steelworkers of America v. Board
of Education (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 823, 834, superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in California School Employees Assn. v. Bonita Unified
School Dist. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 387, 401).
The factors the Batterton Court considered and the standards it applied
in determining whether the requested relief was available under general
maritime law were necessary to the decision (Batterton, supra, 588 U.S. at
pp. 361, 369, 377), and thus they constitute binding precedent. (Western
Landscape Construction v. Bank of America, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 61;
see Sands v. Morongo Unified School Dist. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 863, 872
[California Supreme Court concluded it must follow the “Lemon test”
developed by the United States Supreme Court for “establishment clause
cases”]; General Motors Corp. v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th
1736, 1741 [“[t]he city’s tax scheme also fails the ‘internal consistency test’
explained in [United States Supreme Court cases], all of which are binding on
this court”].) Contrary to Lynette’s contention, Batterton’s holding did not

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rest solely on policy grounds and was instead based on all three factors
discussed above. (See Batterton, at pp. 372, 377.) We see no reason why the
Batterton test would be inapplicable here, as it is designed to determine the
remedies available under general maritime law and is derived from
Townsend and Miles, the latter of which concerned a different remedy than
that at issue in Batterton. (Batterton, at pp. 361, 369; Miles, supra, 498 U.S.
at pp. 32–33.)
Even if the relevant language in Batterton is dictum, “it is a compelling
policy of the Supreme Court which should not be ignored.” (Youngblood v.
Gates (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1302, 1313; see Sierra Club v. Environmental
Protection Agency (D.D.C. 2003) 322 F.3d 718, 724 [“ ‘carefully considered
language of the Supreme Court, even if technically dictum, generally must be
treated as authoritative’ ”, italics omitted]; Nettles v. Grounds (9th Cir. 2016)
830 F.3d 922, 938 (conc. opn. of Hurwitz, J.) [“carefully considered” Supreme
Court dicta “should be followed absent compelling reasons to the contrary”],
disagreed with on other grounds in Camacho Lopez v. Lowe (M.D.Pa. 2020)
452 F.Supp.3d 150, 159.)
Second, Miles and Batterton reflect a shift away from the principles
relied on by Alvez. The Court in Alvez held that the wife of a harbor worker
(not a Jones Act seaman) could recover damages for the loss of her husband’s
society.4 (Alvez, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 276.) In so holding, the Court relied on
Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet (1974) 414 U.S. 573, which held that the
4 Although Alvez characterizes the husband as a “harbor worker”
(Alvez, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 276), Lynette claims the husband in Alvez was
actually a “ ‘Sieracki seaman.’ ” She argues that California law treats
Sieracki seamen and Jones Act seamen the same “in all material respects.”
For the reasons explained below, we do not find Alvez controlling here
regardless.

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widow of a longshoreman could recover for loss of consortium in a maritime
wrongful death action. (Alvez, at p. 281.) The Alvez Court also relied on the
canon of admiralty law that “ ‘ “it better becomes the humane and liberal
character of proceedings in admiralty to give than to withhold the remedy,
when not required to withhold it by established and inflexible rules.” ’ ” (Id.
at pp. 281–282.) Batterton subsequently made clear, however, that courts,
when exercising their common-law authority, must give “deference to the
policies expressed in the statutes governing maritime law.” (Batterton,
supra, 588 U.S. at p. 377; see id. at p. 361 [“[w]hen exercising its inherent
common-law authority, ‘an admiralty court should look primarily to these
legislative enactments for policy guidance’ ”].) Thus, the Batterton test “is
indicative of a major shift in the Supreme Court’s approach to developing
general maritime law” from courts “ ‘us[ing] [their] power to protect seamen
from injury’ ” to “courts now giv[ing] ‘deference to the policies expressed in
the statutes governing maritime law.’ ” (Mullinex v. John Crane Inc.
(E.D.Va. 2022) 606 F.Supp. 3d 289, 293.)5 Miles also reflects this shift in the
5 At oral argument, counsel for Lynette contended that the conclusion
reached by some lower federal courts, including Mullinex, that Miles and
Batterton reflect a “major shift” in maritime jurisprudence was erroneous.
Counsel further argued that these courts “misused” the uniformity principle
cited in Miles and Batterton and wrongly concluded as a result that they had
no power to provide remedies more favorable than those codified by Congress.
According to counsel, the uniformity doctrine does not require Congress and
the courts “to speak in one voice” but rather refers to federal preemption of
contradictory state maritime law. However, neither Batterton nor Miles
indicated that the uniformity principle they relied on in reaching their
holdings concerned federal preemption of state law. Rather, the second
Townsend/Batterton factor considers whether the requested relief is required
to “promote a ‘uniform rule applicable to all actions’ for the same injury,
whether under the Jones Act or the general maritime law.” (Batterton supra,
588 U.S. at p. 374, quoting Miles, supra, 498 U.S. at p. 33, italics added; see

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development of general maritime law, as it limited the applicability of Gaudet
to its facts, noting that “Gaudet did not consider the preclusive effect of the
Jones Act for deaths of true seamen.” (Miles, supra, 498 U.S. at pp. 31–32;
see id. at p. 31 [“The holding of Gaudet applies only in territorial waters, and
it applies only to longshoremen.”].)
Accordingly, we will apply the Townsend/Batterton factors to determine
whether Lynette may recover for loss of consortium under general maritime
law. Before doing so, we will briefly address Lynette’s suggestion that non-
pecuniary damages are available under the Jones Act for a “nonfatal injury.”
2. Loss of Consortium Is Not Available Under the Jones Act.
Although Lynette spends the majority of her briefing discussing the
availability of loss of consortium under general maritime law, at one point in
her opening brief she contends the trial court ignored her argument that “the
Jones Act has always guaranteed nonpecuniary compensation for . . . those
who suffer non-fatal injuries.” She distinguishes Miles on the ground that it
involved a wrongful death claim. To the extent Lynette is suggesting loss of
consortium is available under the Jones Act itself, we disagree.
At the time Miles was decided, the Jones Act stated that a seaman or
their personal representative may bring an “action for damages” for personal
injury or wrongful death where the seaman was injured in the course of his
employment. (Former 46 U.S.C.A. § 688(a).) Although “the Jones Act [did]
not explicitly limit damages to any particular form,” the Court in Miles
Miles, at p. 33 [“[t]oday we restore a uniform rule applicable to all actions for
the wrongful death of a seaman, whether under DOHSA, the Jones Act, or
general maritime law”].) Moreover, Mullinex merely reflects Batterton’s
conclusion that “the special solicitude” courts traditionally gave seamen “has
only a small role to play in contemporary maritime law.” (Batterton, at p.
377; see Mullinex v. John Crane Inc., supra, 606 F.Supp. 3d at p. 293.)

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concluded the Jones Act “makes applicable to seamen the substantive
recovery provisions of the older [Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA)].”
(Miles, supra, 498 U.S. at p. 32.) In concluding that “[t]here is no recovery for
loss of society in a Jones Act wrongful death action,” the Court noted that
“the language of the FELA wrongful death provision is essentially identical to
that of Lord Campbell’s Act,” which was interpreted as providing recovery
only for pecuniary loss. (Ibid.) “Incorporating FELA unaltered into the Jones
Act, Congress must have intended to incorporate the pecuniary limitation on
damages as well.” (Ibid.)
While Miles focused on the wrongful death provisions in FELA and the
Jones Act, Batterton, which involved non-fatal injuries, similarly concluded
that the “Jones Act adopts the remedial provisions of FELA.” (Batterton,
supra, 588 U.S. at p. 372.) It did so when considering the second
Townsend/Batterton factor after having concluded that punitive damages
were not historically available for personal injury unseaworthiness claims.
(Id. at pp. 372–374.) The Court cited federal Supreme Court cases that it
characterized as holding that the damages available under FELA were
limited to pecuniary loss resulting from “the worker’s injury or death.”
(Batterton, at p. 372, italics added.) The Court then noted that the lower
federal courts “have uniformly held that punitive damages are not available
under the Jones Act” based on FELA. (Batterton, at p. 373.) It declined the
plaintiff’s request to reconsider those cases, “because of the absence of
historical evidence to support punitive damages.” (Ibid.) “It is enough for us
to note the general consensus that exists in the lower courts and to observe
that the position of those courts conforms with the discussion and holding in
Miles” and “promote a ‘uniform rule applicable to all actions’ for the same
injury, whether under the Jones Act or the general maritime law.” (Id. at pp.

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373–374.) Thus, Batterton indicates not only that the relief available under
the Jones Act is limited to pecuniary losses regardless of whether the injuries
suffered by the seaman were fatal, but also that the consensus of the lower
courts regarding the relief available under the Jones Act controls where the
requested relief was not traditionally available under general maritime law.
Consistent with Batterton, federal courts have consistently held that
the limitations on damages for Jones Act wrongful death claims extend to
Jones Act claims for non-fatal injuries. (See Kopczynski v. The Jacqueline
(9th Cir. 1984) 742 F.2d 555, 560; Michel v. Total Transp. (5th Cir. 1992) 957
F.2d 186, 191; McBride v. Estis Well Service, L.L.C. (5th Cir. 2014) 768 F.3d
382, 388 [“[e]ven though Miles was a wrongful death action, no one has
suggested why its holding and reasoning would not apply to an injury case”];
Horsley v. Mobil Oil Corp. (1st Cir. 1994) 15 F.3d 200, 202–203 [concluding
damages for loss of society was unavailable under the Jones Act for non-fatal
injuries based in part on federal cases indicating that loss of society was
unavailable under FELA], disagreed with on other grounds in In re Osage
Marine Servs. (E.D.Mo. Mar. 5, 2012, No. 4:10-CV-1674 (CEJ)) 2012 U.S.Dist.
Lexis 28433, at *5–7; In re Plaquemine Towing Corp. (M.D.La. 2002) 190
F.Supp.2d 889, 891; In re J.A.R. Barge Lines, L.P. (W.D.Pa. 2004) 307
F.Supp.2d 668, 671 [“when a wrongful death or personal injury claim is
brought under the Jones Act, there can be no recovery for nonpecuniary
losses”].) Lynette offers no authority to the contrary.6
6 In the sole case on which Lynette relies in her appellate briefing,
Boyle v. Pool Offshore Co., Div. of Enserch Corp. (5th Cir. 1990) 893 F.2d 713,
718–719, none of the issues raised on appeal concerned the availability of
non-pecuniary damages under the Jones Act. (Boyle, at pp. 717–720.) “It is .
. . axiomatic that cases do not stand for propositions not presented or
decided.” (People v. Annin (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 591, 606.) At oral

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In any event, the plain language of the Jones Act precludes loss of
consortium claims for non-fatal injuries. (See Leslie H. v. Superior Court
(2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 340, 347–348 [“ ‘ “ ‘plain language’ ” ’ ” of federal
statute controls its meaning].) The Jones Act states, “A seaman injured in
the course of employment or, if the seaman dies from the injury, the personal
representative of the seaman may elect to bring a civil action at law . . .
against the employer.” (46 U.S.C.A. § 30104(a).) Thus, where, as here, the
seaman suffers non-fatal injuries, the Jones Act does not authorize anyone
other than the injured seaman to bring a civil action. (See Turner v. Victoria
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 99, 114 [concluding the phrase “ ‘bring an action’ ” refers to
“ ‘the initiation of legal proceedings in a suit’ ”].) This necessarily excludes
loss of consortium claims, which can only be brought by the spouse of the
injured party. (LeFiell Manufacturing Co. v. Superior Court (2012)
55 Cal.4th 275, 284; see Igneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques (2d Cir.
1963) 323 F.2d 257, 266 [concluding the Jones Act does not authorize
recovery by the seaman’s wife for loss of consortium because the statute
“authorizes only the seaman himself (not his wife) to ‘maintain an action for
damages at law’ ”], overruled on other grounds in Alvez, supra, 446 U.S. at p.
276.)
argument, counsel for Lynette claimed there was a “split in authority” on this
issue but cited only Barrette v. Jubilee Fisheries, Inc. (W.D.Wash. Aug. 11,
2011, Case No. C10-01206 MJP) 2011 U.S.Dist. Lexis 89514. Contrary to
counsel’s assertion, Barrette held that loss of consortium was available under
general maritime but not under the Jones Act. (Id. at *3, 18.)

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3. Loss of Consortium Is Not Available Under General Maritime
Law for Personal Injury Unseaworthiness Claims.
Having concluded the Jones Act does not provide for loss of consortium
for non-fatal injuries, we turn to the Townsend/Batterton factors to determine
whether loss of consortium is available under general maritime law. Since
the analysis depends on “the particular claims involved” (Batterton, supra,
588 U.S. at p. 361), we begin by noting that on appeal Lynette focuses on the
cause of action for unseaworthiness. Our de novo review is limited to the
issues that have been adequately raised in Lynette’s brief. (Reyes v. Kosha
(1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 451, 466, fn. 6.) As such, the questions we decide are
whether loss of consortium has been historically available under general
maritime law for personal injury unseaworthiness claims and whether the
remedy “is required to maintain uniformity with Congress’s clearly expressed
policies.” (Batterton, at p. 372.)
In arguing that her loss of consortium satisfies “ ‘Townsend’s first
step,’ ” Lynette relies on Morgan v. Almars Outboards, Inc. (D.Del. 2018)
316 F.Supp. 3d 828 (Morgan), in which a federal district court concluded that
“loss of consortium has been available to maritime plaintiffs since well before
[] the Jones Act itself.” (Id. at p. 841.) But none of the cases Morgan cited as
support for this conclusion establishes that loss of consortium was
“traditionally available for breach of the duty of seaworthiness.” (Batterton,
supra, 588 U.S. at p. 370, italics added; see Morgan, at p. 841.)
Cutting v. Seabury (D.Mass. 1860) 6 F.Cas. 1083 involved the death of
a minor on a whaling voyage. (Id. at p. 1084.) The minor’s father sued the
minor’s employer for loss of “the ‘services, comfort and society’ of his child.”
(Ibid.) The opinion does not indicate that the father’s claim was based on the
unseaworthiness of the vessel; rather, it appears his cause of action was

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based on the defendants knowingly hiring a minor. (See id. at p. 1085
[“[k]nowledge of the minority seems to be essential to the maintenance of
such an action”].)
In New York & Long Branch Steamboat Co. v. Johnson (3d Cir. 1912)
195 F.740, a passenger on a steamboat sued the charterers of the steamboat
after she was injured in a collision between the steamboat and another
vessel. (Id. at p. 740.) Her husband asserted a claim for loss of consortium.
(Ibid.) The jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, and the Third Circuit
affirmed. (Id. at pp. 740, 742.) However, the wife’s cause of action was for
negligence, not unseaworthiness. (Id. at p. 740.)
Morgan also relied on Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, supra, 414
U.S. 573 and Alvez, supra, 446 U.S. 274, which were decided in 1974 and
1980, respectively. (Morgan, supra, 316 F.Supp. 3d. at p. 841.) As previously
mentioned, Gaudet held that the decedent’s wife could recover for loss of
consortium in a maritime wrongful death action. While the case was an
action for unseaworthiness, the husband was a longshoreman, not a Jones
Act seaman. (Gaudet, at pp. 574–575.) Approximately six years later, the
Alvez Court relied on Gaudet in holding that an injured harbor worker’s wife
could recover loss of society under general maritime law, reasoning that there
was “no apparent reason to differentiate between fatal and nonfatal injuries
in authorizing the recovery of damages for loss of society.” (Alvez, at pp. 275–
276, 281.)
Despite its holding, Alvez noted that as of 1963, “there was no clear
decisional authority sustaining a general maritime law right of recovery for
loss of society.” (Alvez, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 280; see ibid. [“it was far from
evident that the rule . . . entitling a longshoreman to maintain an action for
unseaworthiness, would extend to permit recovery for loss of society by his

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spouse”]; Igneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, supra, 323 F.2d at pp. 265–
266 [noting in 1963 that there were no maritime cases pertaining to recovery
for loss of consortium aside from two district court decisions denying such
recovery]; Doyle v. Graske (8th Cir. 2009) 579 F.3d 898, 906 [“[l]oss-of-
consortium damages were not definitively recognized under general maritime
law in any context until [Gaudet]”].)
Alvez and Gaudet themselves do not provide the requisite historical
evidence. First, Miles limited Gaudet’s applicability to its facts. (See Miles,
supra, 498 U.S. at pp. 31–32 [“The holding of Gaudet applies only in
territorial waters, and it applies only to longshoremen.”].) Moreover, Alvez
and Gaudet are not decisions “from the formative years” of personal injury
unseaworthiness claims. (See Batterton, supra, 588 U.S. at p. 372 [finding no
tradition of allowing punitive damages because the plaintiff presented “no
decisions from the formative years of the personal injury unseaworthiness
claim in which exemplary damages were awarded”]; id. at pp. 363–367
[explaining the evolution of unseaworthiness claims in the late 19th and
early 20th centuries “toward remedying personal injury”].)
Finally, Morgan cited a relatively recent case in which a federal district
court concluded that loss of consortium claims were cognizable prior to the
enactment of the Jones Act. (Morgan, supra, 316 F.Supp. 3d at p. 841, citing
Barrette v. Jubilee Fisheries, Inc., supra, 2011 U.S.Dist. Lexis 89514.) We do
not find Barrette persuasive, as the cases it relied on do not constitute “a
clear historical pattern” of awarding loss of consortium for personal injury
unseaworthiness claims. (Batterton, supra, 588 U.S. at p. 370, fn. 6.) In
addition to Cutting, New York & Long Branch Steamboat Co., and Gaudet,
Barrette relied on The E.B. Ward Jr. (E.D.La. 1885) 23 F. 900 and The
Schooner Robert Lewers Co. v. Kekauoha (9th Cir. 1902) 114 F. 849.

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(Barrette v. Jubilee Fisheries, Inc., at *17.) The E.B. Ward, Jr., however, was
a negligence action, not an unseaworthiness action. (The E.B. Ward, Jr., at
pp. 901–902.) And in The Schooner Robert Lewers Co., it does not appear the
court relied on general maritime law in concluding the wife of the decedent
was entitled to damages for the death of her husband. (The Schooner Robert
Lewers Co., at pp. 850–854; see In re Air Crash Off Long Island, New York, on
July 17, 1996 (2d Cir. 2000) 209 F.3d 200, 222, fn. 10 [noting that “general
maritime law was irrelevant to the outcome” in The Schooner Robert Lewers
Co.], disagreed with on other grounds in Helman v. Alcoa Global Fasteners,
Inc. (9th Cir. 2011) 637 F.3d 986, 992.) Regardless, one case is not enough to
establish the requisite historical record. (See Batterton, at p. 370, fn. 6.)
Citing Townsend and Alvez, Lynette contends the District had the
burden to identify cases establishing that loss of consortium damages were
historically unavailable for unseaworthiness claims. Lynette takes the cited
portions of Townsend and Alvez out of context. In reaching its holding, the
Court in Alvez did not “ ‘look primarily to the[] legislative enactments for
policy guidance’ ” or consider whether the requested relief had been
traditionally available for the claim asserted. (Batterton, supra, 588 U.S. at
pp. 361 369; see id. at p. 370, fn. 6; Alvez, supra, 446 U.S. at pp. 281–282.)
Thus, Alvez did not decide which party had the burden on the first
Townsend/Batterton factor. While the Townsend Court noted the defendants
did not “identify any cases establishing that such damages were historically
unavailable for breach of the duty of maintenance and cure,” it did so only
after discussing cases that indicated maintenance and cure cases
traditionally allowed for recovery of the requested relief. (Townsend, supra,
557 U.S. at pp. 413–414, 418.) Given this context, the Court in Townsend

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was not suggesting the defendants had the initial burden to establish that
the requested relief was historically unavailable for certain claims.
In any event, the Supreme Court in Batterton effectively placed the
burden on the plaintiff to produce historical evidence that punitive damages
were allowed in unseaworthiness actions. (Batterton, supra, 588 U.S. at
p. 372 [concluding “unseaworthiness did not traditionally allow recovery of
punitive damages” because the plaintiff “present[ed] no decisions from the
formative years of the personal injury unseaworthiness claim in which
exemplary damages were awarded”]; see also Spurlin v. Air & Liquid
Systems Corporation (S.D.Cal. 2021) 537 F.Supp. 3d 1162, 1180 [“the
relevant question before the Court is whether Plaintiffs have presented
historical evidence that non-pecuniary losses . . . have been traditionally
recoverable under a general maritime law negligence action”]; Payne v.
General Electric Company (E.D.Cal. Sept. 26, 2025, No. 2:20-cv-01198-TLN-
AC) 2025 U.S.Dist. Lexis 190500, at *27 [“[a]bsent a showing from Plaintiffs
that a clear historical pattern exists, the Court finds [the defendant] is
entitled to summary judgment on the loss of consortium claim”].)
Accordingly, the lack of evidence before us establishing that loss of
consortium was traditionally available in personal injury unseaworthiness
claims is “practically dispositive.” (Batterton, supra, 588 U.S. at p. 371; see
Elorreaga v. Rockwell Automation, Inc. (N.D.Cal. July 7, 2022, Case No. 21-
cv-05696-HSG) 2022 U.S.Dist. Lexis 121911, at *13–14 [noting circuit courts
consistently do not find loss of consortium damages to be available under
general maritime law].)
Further, because the Jones Act bars recovery for loss of consortium,
conformity with the federal statutory scheme counsels against the
availability of such damages here. (See Batterton, supra, 588 U.S. at p. 359

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[noting that because punitive damages are not available under the Jones Act,
allowing punitive damages for unseaworthiness claims “would be contrary to
Miles’s command that federal courts should seek to promote a ‘uniform rule
applicable to all actions’ for the same injury, whether under the Jones Act or
the general maritime law”]; see id. at p. 374 [“a claim of unseaworthiness . . .
serves as a duplicate and substitute for a Jones Act claim”].)
Lastly, Lynette offers no policy grounds that weigh in favor of allowing
her to recover for loss of consortium. (See Batterton, supra, 588 U.S. at p. 374
[considering and rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that punitive damages
were justified on “policy grounds”].) As the Batterton Court held, “our
overriding objective is to pursue the policy expressed in congressional
enactments, and because unseaworthiness in its current strict-liability form
is our own invention and came after passage of the Jones Act, it would exceed
our current role to introduce novel remedies contradictory to those Congress
has provided in similar areas.” (Ibid.)
There being no evidence that loss of consortium was historically
available in personal injury unseaworthiness actions, coupled with the
observation that a parallel statutory scheme does not allow for recovery of
loss of consortium, we conclude loss of consortium is unavailable in this case.
Therefore, the trial court did not err in sustaining the District’s demurrer to
Lynette’s loss of consortium claim.7
7 In light of this conclusion, we need not and do not address Lynette’s
argument that the trial court’s reliance on Prickett v. Bonnier Corporation
(2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 891 was misplaced. “[B]ecause we are reviewing the
trial court’s ruling and not its reasoning, we may affirm on any ground
supported by the record regardless of whether the trial court relied upon it.”
(Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th
953, 960.)

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III. DISPOSITION
The order sustaining the District’s demurrer to the loss of consortium
claim is affirmed.
_________________________
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
BANKE, Acting P.J.
_________________________
SMILEY, J.
Simerley et al. v. Golden Gate Bridge Highway & Transportation
District/ A173588

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A173588/ Simerley et al. v. Golden Gate Bridge Highway &
Transportation District
Trial Court: Superior Court for the County of San Francisco, No.
CGC25622935
Trial Judge: Hon. Christine Van Aken
Counsel: McGuinn, Hillsman & Palefsky, John Ralph Hillsman for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Peacock Piper Tong + Voss LLP, Glen Richard Piper,
Juliette Bowen McCullough, and Albert Edward Peacock
III for Defendant and Respondent.

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