P. v. Sargeant

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Filed 3/29/07 P. v. Sargeant CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
LARRY BRANT SARGEANT,
Defendant and Appellant.
A112220
(Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. C149313)
Defendant Larry Sargeant was charged with and convicted of one count of
vandalism of a place of worship after he attacked a religious statue with an axe. He
contends the court erred by failing to hold a second hearing to determine whether he was
competent to stand trial, that the statutory prohibition against vandalizing a place of
worship applies only to real property, that he was denied an adequate restitution hearing,
and that the court improperly imposed an upper term sentence based on facts not found
by a jury. We reverse as to the sentence and remand for resentencing based on
Blakely/Cunningham1 error. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
B ACKGROUND
The Offense
A large statue of Jesus Christ stands in the visitor center at the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter Day Saints in Oakland. Visitors gather around the statue to pray, read
1 Blakely v. Washington (2006) 542 U.S. 961; Cunningham v. California (2007)
549 U.S. __ [127 S.Ct. 856].

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scripture, and listen to narrations about the life and teachings of Christ. The Mormon
missionaries who staff the center pray there daily.
On December 9, 2004, defendant entered the visitor center, placed a written
proscription against the making of graven images at the feet of the statue, and struck the
statue repeatedly with an axe, severing a thumb and several fingers.
One missionary received a superficial injury from a flying fragment. Another
missionary fainted. Others wrestled defendant to the floor and seized the axe, while a
visitor seized a large knife from defendant’s tool belt.
Defendant testified that God had commanded him to “ ‘break off the thumbs and
fingers of the statue that the [M]ormons false prophets have made’ ” and to “ ‘break off
both the arms also.’ ” Jesus Christ had ordained him “president, prophesier, revelator,
and high priest of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints” and given him a “deed
of ownership to all the properties” belonging to the church. The Heavenly Father
ordained him a prophet.
In 1985, defendant was convicted of felony vandalism when at God’s directions he
severed the thumbs and fingers of a statue at the Mormon church’s Los Angeles visitor
center. The Los Angeles incident occurred shortly after defendant was released from the
Salt Lake County Jail, where he was incarcerated for felony vandalism after breaking the
thumbs and fingers off of another church statue.
The Legal Proceedings
Defendant was charged with one count of vandalism of religious property, and the
Los Angeles offense was alleged as a prior conviction. (Pen. Code, § 594.3, subd. (a).)2
The court, Judge Smith presiding, initiated a competency inquiry, before the
preliminary examination. Dr. Fred Rosenthal reported that defendant was incompetent to
stand trial. Dr. Rosenthal described defendant as “a man who holds to completely
irrational beliefs; he cannot entertain the idea that he has a mental disorder or that his
attempts to convince others of his position vis-à-vis his legal situation are completely
2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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hopeless. Therefore there can be no doubt that at present Mr. Sargeant could not be
mentally competent to stand trial.” Dr. Mark Saunders also evaluated defendant. He
believed defendant’s performance on the MacCat-CA psychological assessment
instrument, designed to judge an individual’s “ability to seek, identify, weigh and balance
information and make informed decisions[,] . . . suggests that [defendant] has a basic
understanding of participant roles and legal processes that may lead to a legal resolution
and there is some indication that he can implement that understanding under certain
conditions. [¶] Taken from a different point of view, it appears that Mr. Sargeant’s
internal resources and abilities may not be sufficient to meet competency requirements.”
Dr. Saunders concluded that tests and findings “suggest substantial impairment in
numerous abilities required for meaningful participation in legal proceedings. While
Mr. Sargeant’s basic knowledge of the legal process and the choices available to him is
quite adequate, symptoms consistent with an affective disorder interfere with his
reasoning and judgment which will adversely affect his ability to interact and plan
appropriately. The fact that he intends to act as his own attorney further exacerbates his
vulnerabilities. He is likely to make poor, if not irrational judgments in weighing the
costs and benefits of alternative legal options. [¶] It is likely that additional treatment in a
trial competency program would assist in furthering Mr. Sargeant’s functioning with
respect to the skills and abilities required to aid in his defense.”
Pursuant to section 1368, a competency hearing was held on May 19, 2005.
Judge Hurley presided. Although defendant was representing himself in the criminal
proceedings, he was represented by appointed counsel in the competency hearing. All
parties asserted that he was competent. Defendant correctly identified his attorney, the
judge, the prosecutor and their respective roles. He accurately described the charges
against him, the nature of the competency and trial proceedings and the possible
consequences if he were found guilty. He explained that he initially wanted to represent
himself but had recently changed his mind and decided it would be better to have an
attorney. He also discussed the 1985 felony vandalism trial in Los Angeles when he
acted as his own attorney. He described for the court a jury instruction that was given in

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that trial that said defendant could not be convicted of vandalism if he believed he owned
the church property. Defendant said he would cooperate with his lawyers in the Oakland
prosecution even if such a defense was not available and the instruction was not given.
The court concluded defendant was competent and said: “This is not a close issue.
[Defendant] is clearly lucid. He understands in every way. He doesn’t understand it as a
lawyer might, but I would be hard put to find a law student who would understand better
than he does his situation. He knows his maximum. He knows what it’s all about. He’s
been through it before, apparently. He appears lucid about the issues before me as to
whether or not he understands the nature of the charges, the nature of the proceeding.
Seems more than willing to go forward and assist counsel. [¶] He’s come to the
realization now that it’s better to have a lawyer, but anybody who decided on a Faretta
[Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806] was right. He understands far better than the
average person representing himself in pro per in a criminal matter, from what I can tell.
He may not understand everything. He may not get the law that he wants, but I don’t
think the law is quite that simple about: you think it’s true, you can do what you
want. . . . [¶] Anyway, this issue is not particularly close. I’ve considered the reports.
But at this point, it is clear to me he is not [section] 1368. He is mentally competent.
Even if there were not a presumption on what I have as the evidence, I find him mentally
competent.”
On August 2, 2005, the court (Judge Conger presiding) proposed a plea bargain
under which defendant would plead guilty in return for a suspended sentence, a grant of
probation and restitution. As conditions of probation he would be required to return to
his home in Washington and stay away from Alameda County and property of the
Mormon Church.
Defendant rejected the offer. He explained he was willing to go to trial, that
Jesus Christ would testify in his defense, and that he had a right to destroy Mormon
property because the Lord deeded it to him in 1964. He also wanted the court to convey
him a “valid deed to the Mormon Church property.”

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After extended discussion about the terms of a plea bargain, the court expressed
doubt that defendant possessed the capacity to assist counsel with his defense. The court
suspended the proceedings and, over defendant’s objection, appointed Doctors Rosenthal
and Saunders to again evaluate defendant. Defendant’s counsel emphasized his belief
“that Mr. Sargeant is competent to stand trial in that he understands the nature of the
proceedings and he is able to assist counsel in the defense of his case.”
Dr. Rosenthal reevaluated defendant on August 25, 2005, this time finding him
competent. “Currently Mr. Sargeant is calm and able to respond in a reasonable manner.
His mood is expansive and he firmly denies that he has any mental problems. Outside his
delusional thinking, Mr. Sargeant remains generally appropriate, with no indication of
serious cognitive or memory deficits. From a review of the court proceedings on
August 2, 2005, it was evident that Mr. Sargeant has an adequate understanding of his
case while continuing to think in his distorted and convoluted manner. In fact,
Mr. Sargeant seems to be quite clever in argument with the court even though his
reasoning is distorted. Mr. Sargeant is aware of his charges and while he firmly believed
his behavior was justified, he is also aware that he is charged with criminal actions. Thus
although Mr. Sargeant continues to have a significant mental illness for which apparently
he has not had treatment since he was in his thirties, he is now able to comprehend his
legal situation sufficiently to be considered mentally competent to stand trial.”
Dr. Saunders continued to be of the opinion defendant was not competent. He
concluded that tests and interviews “suggest that substantial impairment in specific
abilities required for meaningful participation in legal proceedings. Mr. Sargeant’s grasp
of the basic knowledge and strategic reasoning skills and abilities required to participate
in legal proceedings is quite adequate. Symptoms of a psychotic disorder, namely a fixed
delusional system, (1) interfere in weighing the costs and benefits of his alternatives and
(2) may constrain him in how he uses counsel’s advice and direction and/or his own
abilities. The use of medication is not likely to remove that delusional system.
Medication would make it less likely for Mr. Sargeant to act destructively in the
community. [¶] It is likely that additional treatment in a trial competency program would

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assist in furthering Mr. Sargeant’s functioning with respect to the skills and abilities
required to aid in his defense.”
The court considered that the two reports were “conflicting in terms of the issue of
whether or not [defendant] should be found competent to stand trial,” with “one of the
doctors indicat[ing] that you are so competent.” In light of the stipulation that defendant
was competent, however, Judge Conger concluded there was no issue to be determined.
She accepted the stipulation, and reinstated the criminal proceedings.
A jury found defendant guilty of the sole count charged and the court sentenced
him to the three-year upper term. Defendant was ordered to pay a $600 restitution fine
with another $600 fine imposed and stayed pending completion of parole, and to pay
actual restitution “as outlined in the Probation Department’s restitution claim form in the
total amount of $4,173.68.” This appeal timely followed.
D ISCUSSION
I. The Evidence Did Not Mandate a Second Competency Trial
Defendant contends the trial court erred by not holding a second hearing into his
competency after he was reexamined by Doctors Rosenthal and Saunders. His contention
is unpersuasive.
Legal Standards
The court is required to suspend criminal proceedings and hold a competency
hearing, sua sponte when necessary, if there is substantial evidence a defendant may be
incompetent to stand trial. (§ 1368; People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1163;
People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 882.) “[E]ven though section 1368 is phrased in
terms of whether a doubt arises in the mind of the trial judge and is then confirmed by
defense counsel . . . , once the accused has come forward with substantial evidence of
incompetence to stand trial, due process requires that a full competence hearing be held
as a matter of right. . . . [¶] ‘Substantial evidence’ has been defined as evidence that raises
a reasonable doubt concerning the defendant’s competence to stand trial.” (People v.
Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 737-738; Howard, supra, at p. 1163.)

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In this case defendant does not challenge the initial finding that he was competent,
but instead contests the court’s decision not to hold a second hearing to determine
whether he remained competent. “When, as here, a competency hearing has already been
held and the defendant was found to be competent to stand trial, a trial court is not
required to conduct a second competency hearing unless ‘it “is presented with a
substantial change of circumstances or with new evidence” ’ that gives rise to a ‘serious
doubt’ about the validity of the competency finding. [Citation.] More is required than
just bizarre actions or statements by the defendant to raise a doubt of competency.
[Citations.] In addition, a reviewing court generally gives great deference to a trial
court’s decision whether to hold a competency hearing. As we have said: ‘ “An
appellate court is in no position to appraise a defendant’s conduct in the trial court as
indicating insanity, a calculated attempt to feign insanity and delay the proceedings, or
sheer temper.” ’ ” (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 33, italics added; accord,
People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 220.) At this juncture, moreover, “the trial court
may appropriately take its personal observations into account in determining whether
there has been some significant change in the defendant’s mental state.” (People v. Jones
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1153.) We review whether the determination not to hold a
second competency hearing was supported in substantial evidence. (People v. Huggins
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 220.)
Analysis
Here, the facts did not compel the court to hold a second competency hearing.
Initially, the two doctors’ opinions provided Judge Hurley substantial evidence requiring
a section 1368 hearing. Notwithstanding the parties’ agreement that it was unnecessary,
Judge Hurley properly held a competency hearing and found defendant competent to
stand trial. (See People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508, 521 [trial court may not
proceed once a doubt arises as to the defendant’s competency].)
Defendant’s contention that the evidence mandated a second competency hearing
fails for the reasons discussed in People v. Huggins, supra, 38 Cal.4th at page 220.
There, defense counsel expressed concerns about his client’s competency at the start of

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the penalty phase, several years after the prior competency proceedings. (Ibid.) The
Supreme Court explained, “Although the fact of the prior competency determination did
not by itself establish defendant’s competency . . . , a second competency hearing was
required only on a showing of substantial change of circumstances or new evidence
casting a serious doubt on the validity of the prior finding [citation]. The prior finding
was based on a thorough inquiry into defendant’s competency, and the evaluations made
at that time and the verdict of competency must be viewed as a baseline that, absent a
preliminary showing of substantially changed circumstances, eliminated the need to start
the process anew.” (Ibid.)
The Supreme Court made this point also in People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th
876, where it wrote: “[D]efendant fails to mention an important fact critically
undermining his claim: the trial court had already declared a doubt as to defendant’s
competence at the time of the arraignment, had suspended proceedings, and had
defendant examined by two psychiatrists. The parties submitted the matter, and the trial
court found defendant legally competent. ‘Once a defendant has been found competent
to stand trial, a second competency hearing is required only if the evidence discloses a
substantial change of circumstances or new evidence is presented casting serious doubt
on the validity of the prior finding of the defendant’s competence.’ ” (Id. at p. 954.)
Here, there is no evidence of substantially changed circumstances or new evidence
casting serious doubt on the prior finding of competence. Defendant’s behavior during
the hearings before Judge Conger was not materially different from his earlier
presentation in terms of his evident understanding of the proceedings and ability to assist
his counsel. As Dr. Rosenthal noted and the hearing transcripts confirm, defendant
continued to think in a distorted and convoluted manner. But a defendant’s distorted and
convoluted thought processes do not require a court to conclude he is incompetent to
stand trial. “More is required than just bizarre actions or statements by the defendant to
raise a doubt of competency.” (People v. Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 33.) Nor does
defendant’s unwillingness to plead no contest constitute a change of circumstances or
new evidence that required a second competency trial. Defendant is presumed to be

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competent, and his personal decision not to plead no contest, although for reasons that
might seem bizarre, does not undermine that presumption. (People v. Stanley (1995)
10 Cal.4th 764, 806 [the defendant’s refusal to present mitigating evidence not substantial
evidence of incompetence]; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1029-1033 [same];
People v. Guzman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 915, 964-965 [refusal to present mitigating evidence
and preference for death penalty].) Finally, although Dr. Saunders found defendant
incompetent in his second evaluation, this finding was not substantially different from his
initial assessment. In his second examination, Dr. Rosenthal found defendant was now
competent to stand trial. Although Judge Conger had concerns stemming from her
impressions of his tactical decisions and courtroom behavior, defendant’s tactics and
behavior had not changed significantly since Judge Hurley found he was competent. A
second competency hearing was therefore not required.
II. The Court Properly Construed Section 594.3, Subd. (a)
Section 594.3, subdivision (a), provides: “Any person who knowingly commits
any act of vandalism to a church, synagogue, mosque, temple, building owned and
occupied by a religious educational institution, or other place primarily used as a place of
worship where religious services are regularly conducted or a cemetery is guilty of a
crime punishable by imprisonment in the state prison or by imprisonment in the county
jail for not exceeding one year.” Defendant contends the court erroneously denied his
motion for judgment of acquittal because he vandalized personal property (statue) and
there was not substantial evidence supporting a conclusion that he vandalized real
property. The claim fails because section 594.3 encompasses vandalism to real and
personal property.
“When interpreting a statute, ‘we turn first to the language of the statute, giving
the words their ordinary meaning.’ [Citation.] If the language permits more than one
reasonable interpretation, then the court looks ‘to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the
ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public
policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which
the statute is a part.’ [Citation.] In the end, ‘[w]e must select the construction that

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comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to
promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an
interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences.’ ” (People v. Rubalcava (2000)
23 Cal.4th 322, 328.)
Defendant contends that by specifying acts of “vandalism to a church, synagogue,
mosque,” etcetera, the Legislature intended to narrow the statute’s application to damage
to realty and exclude personalty. But the statutory language does not imply this
limitation. As a matter of common sense, vandalism “to” a place of worship can readily
be understood to include damage to religious or other artifacts within it. We find it hard
to imagine that defacing church texts, vestments or reliquaries with graffiti would not
ordinarily be understood as an act of vandalism against, or to, the church itself. If we
were to accept defendant’s construction of the statute damaging a trailer or portable
building used as a place of worship would not be within the scope of section 594.3.
Even if the statutory language admits some ambiguity when taken in its ordinary
sense, that the Legislature intended a broader meaning is evidenced by its use of the word
“vandalism.” Section 594 defines vandalism. It provides that “(a) Every person who
maliciously commits any of the following acts with respect to any real or personal
property not his or her own . . . is guilty of vandalism: [¶] (1) Defaces with graffiti or
other inscribed material. [¶] (2) Damages. [¶] (3) Destroys.” (Italics added.)
Section 594.3 in turn, applies to “any act of vandalism” i.e., damage, defacement or
destruction of real or personal property, to a specified place of worship. Construing
section 594.3 in the context of the entire statutory scheme (People v. Rubalcava, supra,
23 Cal.4th 322), we reasonably conclude that the Legislature intended it to apply to
personalty as well as realty. Indeed, it is hard to fathom any purpose for limiting the
scope of section 594.3 to acts causing damage to religious structures but not to their

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contents—items which may have as much as or more intrinsic religious import than the
structures themselves.3
III. Defendant Waived a Restitution Hearing
Defendant contends the court erroneously imposed $4,173.68 in victim restitution
without affording him a hearing to contest the amount of restitution. The claim was
waived by defendant’s failure to request a hearing below.
Background
The probation department submitted a restitution claim seeking total restitution of
$4,173.68, of which $1,806.96 was to repair the statue and $2,366.72 for emergency
room and ambulance costs incurred on behalf of the church member who fainted during
the attack. The claim form was signed under penalty of perjury and supported with an
itemized list of medical expenses.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel said: “In terms of the restitution, we
would submit it on the amount of [$]1,806.96 for the statue. But in terms of the
ambulance ride or the other amount of [$2,366.72], first of all, I don’t believe that there is
enough information in the probation report or from the Probation Department . . . that
indicates that that cost was associated with this incident. And second of all, I don’t
believe that Mr. Sargeant should be liable for that. He was convicted of the
[section] 594.3, and I think should be liable for the damage he caused to the statue, and
that alone only. [¶] So I’ll submit it on that.” (Italics added.) A church representative
then spoke on behalf of the church. He said, “I’m a little insulted that they objected to
the medical costs incurred, that this young lady has remains [sic] traumatized, and her life
has forever changed for what has happened here. She was actually pinned underneath
[defendant] during the fracas, trying to get him to stop, and that is something that we
think should be considered.” After the prosecutor argued for an aggravated term and
restitution to cover the full medical expenses, defense counsel again submitted the matter.
3 In light of this conclusion, we need not and do not consider whether the court
erred in failing to instruct the jury that the People were required to prove the vandalized

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Analysis
Defendant relies on People v. Foster (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 939, 944 and People
v. Scroggins (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 502, 508, to argue he was entitled to dispute the
amount of restitution at a hearing because he lodged an objection. Those cases hold that
a defendant is entitled to a hearing on the amount of restitution if he requests one.
Although defendant objected to imposition of the claimed medical costs, he submitted the
matter without requesting a hearing. He has therefore waived the claim for purposes of
appeal. (See Foster, supra, at p. 944 [failure to object waived any error in amount]; cf.
Scroggins, supra, at p. 508 [defendant requested hearing].)
IV. Blakely/Cunningham Error
On January 22, 2007, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Cunningham v. California, supra, 549 U.S. __ [127 S.Ct. 856]. The court held that
California’s determinate sentencing law violates a defendant’s right to a jury trial and the
necessity of proof beyond a reasonable doubt by allowing trial courts to find facts in
support of aggravating factors used to impose an upper term sentence. Here, the trial
court imposed the aggravated term based on factors not found by a jury: that the crime
involved an act of great violence and callousness towards the many people in the vicinity;
that defendant was armed with the axe and knife; that the manner in which the crime was
committed indicated a depth of planning; that defendant had engaged in violent conduct
now and in the past, indicating a serious danger to society; defendant’s willingness to
commit similar attacks in the future; and his unsatisfactory performance on probation.
Because the court’s reliance on these facts that were not found by a jury implicates
Cunningham, we reverse as to the sentence and remand to the trial court for resentencing.
statue was a fixture, as opposed to personal property.

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D ISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed as to the sentence and the case is remanded to the trial
court for resentencing. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
_________________________
Siggins, J.
We concur:
_________________________
McGuiness, P.J.
_________________________
Pollak, J.

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