P. v. Stancil

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Filed 6/23/03 P. v. Stancil CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
SCOTT BLANE STANCIL et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
A098670
(Solano County
Super. Ct. No. FC189715)
The People appeal from an order setting aside an information pursuant to Penal
Code section 995 on the ground that the only evidence presented at the preliminary
hearing was obtained in violation of defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights. The People
contend the detention and search were permissible under In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th
68 and People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743. We agree, and vacate the trial court’s
order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 5, 2001, defendants Scott Stancil and Ronald Newhauser were both on
parole, and subject to search and seizure at any time of the day or night by any law
enforcement officer, with or without cause or consent. At approximately 11:00 p.m., a
Fairfield Police Department patrol officer saw their car make a lane change and a right

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turn without signaling.1 Thinking defendants had violated the Vehicle Code, the officer
pulled the car over and made contact with Newhauser, the driver, and Stancil, the
passenger. When he contacted dispatch, the officer was informed that Newhauser was on
parole. After confirming his parole status with Newhauser, the officer searched him,
finding needles, syringes, and plastic baggies containing methamphetamine. A second
officer pointed out another large package of baggies on the rear floorboard of the car,
which also contained methamphetamine. A search of the rest of the car uncovered an
electronic scale and additional clean baggies in the front driver’s door, along with
cameras, phones, and other equipment in the trunk.
After defendants were arrested, police learned Stancil was also on parole.2 A
search of his person uncovered a WalMart receipt and a room key to the Fairfield
Holiday Inn. In the motel room, police found, inter alia, a loaded handgun, currency, a
digital scale, several compact discs which matched Stancil’s WalMart receipt, and more
methamphetamine.3
Charged with various narcotics and firearm offenses, both defendants pled not
guilty. Newhauser’s motion to suppress, heard in conjunction with the preliminary
hearing, had been denied, although the magistrate found no violation of the Vehicle
Code.4 Defendants’ subsequent motion to set aside the information was granted,
however, with the court concluding that the initial detention of defendants’ vehicle
violated their Fourth Amendment rights in the absence of an “articulable suspicion of
1 An officer from the SOLNET task force had told the patrol officer “that they were doing an operation”
and asked him to stop the vehicle “if they did some type of violation.” SOLNET had received
information from a confidential informant that someone was dealing controlled substances out of an
unspecified room at the Holiday Inn in Fairfield, and defendants’ car had apparently been seen in the
vicinity. On cross-examination, the patrol officer who stopped defendants’ vehicle acknowledged that
traffic was light and no other drivers were impacted by defendants’ failure to signal.
2 Stancil had initially provided a false identity to police.
3 The motel manager did not identify Stancil as the person who had rented the room.
4 Vehicle Code section 22107 provides: “No person shall turn a vehicle from a direct course or move
right or left upon a roadway until such movement can be made with reasonable safety and then only after
the giving of an appropriate signal in the manner provided in this chapter in the event any other vehicle
may be affected by the movement.” (Italics added.)

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wrongdoing to focus on this car,” and rejecting the magistrate’s conclusion that the stop
was valid under Tyrell J., supra. The People timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
In reviewing the lower court’s ruling, we accept all express and implied factual
findings supported by substantial evidence, but independently evaluate those facts to
determine whether the search was reasonable within the meaning of the Constitution.
(People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673-674; see also People v. Laiwa (1983) 34
Cal.3d 711, 718.) We examine the totality of the circumstances in balancing the intrusion
on the individual’s privacy and the promotion of legitimate governmental interests,
including defendants’ parole search condition as “a salient circumstance” that “informs
both sides of that balance.” (United States v. Knights (2001) 534 U.S. 112, 118-119
(Knights).)
In In re Tyrell J., supra, our Supreme Court upheld a warrantless search of a
juvenile probationer, finding irrelevant the police officer’s ignorance of the minor
probationer’s search condition. (8 Cal.4th at pp. 73-74, 84-86 (Tyrell J.).) The court
concluded that “a juvenile probationer subject to a valid search condition does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy over his or her person or property.” (Id. at p. 86.) The
court declined to reach the minor’s argument that he had been improperly detained
“because the premise of the argument is flawed. The detention and pat-search of the
minor did not intrude on a reasonable expectation of privacy, that is, an expectation that
society is willing to recognize as legitimate. Accordingly, [the officer] did not act in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.” (Id. at p. 89.)
In People v. Reyes, supra, the Court extended the reasoning of Tyrell J. to adult
parolees, holding that a parole search need not be supported by reasonable suspicion that
the parolee is violating the law or a condition of parole.5 (19 Cal.4th at pp. 753-754.)
The Supreme Court explained: “The rationale of Tyrell J. can be stated succinctly.
5 While Reyes extended the reasoning of Tyrell J. to adult parolees, its facts did not present the issue of a
searching officer’s ignorance of the search clause before the search took place.

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When involuntary search conditions are properly imposed, reasonable suspicion is no
longer a prerequisite to conducting a search of the subject’s person or property. Such a
search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment as long as it is not
arbitrary, capricious or harassing.” (Id. at p. 752.) Thus no individualized or
particularized suspicion is required. (Id. at pp. 750, 753.)
Defendant Newhauser cites Knights, supra, 534 U.S. 112, which upheld a
warrantless search of a probationer’s home that was supported by reasonable suspicion.
The Knights court declined to decide, however, whether a probation search conducted
without individualized suspicion would satisfy the reasonableness requirement of the
Fourth Amendment. (Id. at p. 120, fn. 6.) The precedential value of Reyes, supra, is
therefore undiminished. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450,
455.) And while defendant Newhauser contends the holding of Tyrell J. is “fatally
undermine[d]” by Knights, supra, we reject “[t]his dubious logic—that an opinion
upholding the constitutionality of a particular search implicitly holds unconstitutional any
search that is not like it.” (534 U.S. at p. 117.) The case of U.S. v. Crawford (9th Cir.
2003) 323 F.3d 700 is not binding and is also distinguishable, because the court there
emphasized that the invasion of the defendant’s home weighed heavily in the evaluation
of whether the parole search conducted in that case was reasonable absent individualized
suspicion. (Id. at pp. 706-710.)
Defendants also rely on In re Martinez (1970) 1 Cal.3d 641, 646, decided more
than 30 years ago, in which the court determined that the search of a parolee could not be
upheld when the officers were unaware that the person was subject to a search condition.
That holding, however, “can no longer be regarded as controlling.” (People v. Lewis
(1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 662, 668.) As the Supreme Court subsequently noted in Tyrell J.,
supra, “at the time [the Martinez] decision was rendered, there existed no automatic
search condition imposed on parolees, inclusive of searches to be performed either by

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parole officers or law enforcement officers.”6 (8 Cal.4th at pp. 88-89.) Now, however,
search conditions are automatically imposed on every parolee. (Lewis, supra, at p. 668.)
As defendant Stancil candidly acknowledges, “[t]he implication in this Tyrell J. dicta is
that Martinez’s underlying premises are no longer viable.”
In Tyrell J. the Supreme Court approved the warrantless search of a probationer
when the searching officer was unaware of a search condition. There is no reason that a
different result should obtain in the case of a parolee. (Lewis, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 668-669.) In Reyes, supra, the Supreme Court noted: “Tyrell J.’s reasoning applies
with equal force to adults. In both cases the expectation of privacy is already reduced by
the absence of the warrant requirement. As a convicted felon still subject to the
Department of Corrections, a parolee has conditional freedom—granted for the specific
purpose of monitoring his transition from inmate to free citizen. The state has a duty not
only to assess the efficacy of its rehabilitative efforts but to protect the public, and the
importance of the latter interest justifies the imposition of a warrantless search
condition.” (19 Cal.4th at p. 752.) Balancing the individual and governmental interests
involved, the court further explained: “The level of intrusion is de minimis and the
expectation of privacy greatly reduced when the subject of the search is on notice that his
activities are being routinely and closely monitored. Moreover, the purpose of the search
condition is to deter the commission of crimes and to protect the public, and the
effectiveness of the deterrent is enhanced by the potential for random searches.” (Id. at p.
753.)
Thus an individual’s status as a probationer or parolee may be decisive in
determining whether a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. As the
Supreme Court has emphasized, “one must first have a reasonable expectation of privacy
before there can be a Fourth Amendment violation.” (Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 89.)
Nor do Woods, supra, or People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789 require a different
6 The Tyrell J. court also noted that “although the defendant in Martinez might have been subject to
search by his parole officer, he could reasonably expect to be free of arbitrary searches by police officers.
[Citation.]” (Supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 89.)

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result. Both of those cases involved the Fourth Amendment rights of individuals who
resided with or shared property with probationers subject to search conditions.
Defendants here, by contrast, were personally subject to search conditions as a condition
of parole, and therefore enjoyed significantly reduced privacy expectations under the
Supreme Court’s analytical approach in recent cases. (See, e.g., Robles, supra, at p. 798
[contrasting probationer’s “severely diminished expectation of privacy” with
“measurably greater privacy expectations” of those who share probationer’s residence];
Reyes, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 753; Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 85.) Defendants refer
to an assertion in Robles, supra, that “searches that are undertaken pursuant to a
probationer’s advance consent must be reasonably related to the purposes of probation.
[Citations.]” (23 Cal.4th at p. 797.) The United States Supreme Court, however, has
recently rejected the view that probation searches must be limited by such a requirement.
(Knights, supra, 534 U.S. at pp. 117-120.) The Robles court also emphasized the
importance of the special issues at play in residential searches. (Supra, at pp. 799-800.)
Those considerations are not applicable to the detention at issue here.7
Defendants contend that even though their expectations of privacy may have been
reduced by their parole search conditions, they were nevertheless protected from arbitrary
or capricious searches, including the detention of their vehicle under the circumstances
presented here. We disagree. In In re Anthony S. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1004,
taking guidance from People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 610, the court concluded a
search conducted pursuant to a condition of probation is arbitrary if the officer’s
motivation “is unrelated to rehabilitative and reformative purposes or legitimate law
7 We are aware that Supreme Court review is presently pending in People v. Sanders (2000) 84
Cal.App.4th 1211, review granted February 28, 2001, S094088, which involves whether the holding of
Tyrell J. should be reconsidered and whether it should be extended to adult parolees. The People concede
that their argument in the present case is dependent on the continuing validity of Tyrell J., supra, and
Reyes, supra. While defendant Newhauser contends the Supreme Court should overrule the holding of
Tyrell J., supra, and defendant Stancil maintains the Court’s subsequent decisions suggest the
resurrection of the “knowledge-first” rule, we must follow current Supreme Court authority in deciding
this appeal. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra.) We also decline defendant Stancil’s
invitation to “count the votes” by inferring the possible positions of the individual Justices of the Supreme
Court on this issue.

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enforcement purposes.”8 (See also People v. Cervantes (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1404,
1408; People v. Clower (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1741-1742.) In In re Anthony S.,
supra, police officers had executed probation searches at the homes of several gang
members to look for contraband. They had no evidence or suspicion of criminal activity
or violation of probation by the defendant or other gang members. (4 Cal.App.4th at p.
1002.) The court concluded the search was not arbitrary because the officers were
motivated by a legitimate law enforcement purpose. (Id. at p. 1004.) In discussing the
Supreme Court’s decision in Bravo, supra, where the police had received an anonymous
tip that an adult probationer was involved in the sale of narcotics but were unable to
secure any corroboration, the In re Anthony S. court also observed: “While law
enforcement efforts to obtain corroboration are to be lauded, corroboration is not
required.” (Id. at p. 1003, fn. 2.) The court rejected the argument that a random search of
a probationer is arbitrary, noting that were such a definition adopted, “the exception
would swallow the rule and there would be a requirement of some cause in addition to the
‘consent search term.’ ” (Id. at p. 1004.)
We conclude that defendants may not reinstate the individualized suspicion
requirement by characterizing this parole search as arbitrary. (See Reyes, supra, 19
Cal.4th at pp. 753-754 [parole search may be conducted randomly and without
particularized suspicion].) In this context, a search does not become arbitrary simply
because it is not based on specific suspicion. (In re Anthony S., supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1003-1004.) Nor have defendants shown the challenged search was unrelated to
legitimate law enforcement purposes. Police had received information that drug dealing
was occurring in an area where defendants’ car had evidently been seen. The patrol
officer stopped the vehicle after it failed to signal before changing lanes and making a
right hand turn. While these facts may have been insufficient to demonstrate probable
cause for the stop, no such particularized suspicion was required in this case because
8 Following Black’s Law Dictionary, the court treated the terms “arbitrary” and “capricious” as
synonymous. (In re Anthony S., supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 1004, fn. 3.)

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defendants were subject to search as a condition of parole. (See People v. Viers (1991) 1
Cal.App.4th 990, 994 [probationer subject to search condition had waived right to
complain detention was pretextual or lacked probable cause].)
Nor was there any evidence that the searches were motivated by personal
animosity or were conducted in a harassing manner. (See Clower, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1741-1742; Reyes, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 753-754.) “A mere legal or factual
error by an officer that would otherwise render a search illegal, e.g., a mistake in
concluding that probable cause exists for an arrest, does not render the search arbitrary,
capricious or harassing. . . . It is only when the motivation for the search is wholly
arbitrary, when it is based merely on a whim or caprice or when there is no reasonable
claim of a legitimate law enforcement purpose, e.g., an officer decides on a whim to stop
the next red car he or she sees, that a search based on a probation search condition is
unlawful.” (Cervantes, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1408.)
In Tyrell J., supra, it was undisputed on appeal that the officer acted without
knowledge of the probationer’s search condition and lacked probable cause to search
him. (8 Cal.4th at p. 75, fn. 1.) The search was upheld, however, based on the validly
imposed probation search condition and the probationer’s consequent absence of a
legitimate expectation of privacy. We conclude the parole condition at issue here was
likewise sufficient to legitimate the detention of defendants. (See Id. at p. 89; Cervantes,
supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1407-1408.)
DISPOSITION
The order setting aside the information is vacated and the case is remanded to the
trial court.
_________________________
Corrigan, J.
We concur:
_________________________
McGuiness, P.J.
_________________________
Pollak, J.

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