Norwalk-La Mirada Unified School District (PERB A038E)

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STATE OF CALIFORNTA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD

NORWALK-LA MIRADA UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT,

Employer, APPELLANT,

and Case No. LA-CE-165

TEACHERS ASSOCIATION OF NORWALK-LA MIRADA, PERB Order No. Ad-38

Employee Organization. Administrative Appeal

Ne ae Ne ee Nee Neel See Seer Ne” Sema” Saree” Sacer”

June 19, 1978

Appearances: Eric Bathen, Jr., Attorney for Norwalk-La Mirada
Unified School District; Charles R. Gustafson, Attorney (Galiano,
Hanson and Gustafson) for Teachers Association of Norwalk-La Mirada.

Before: Gluck, Chairperson; Cossack Twohey and Gonzales, Members
OPINION
Norwalk-La Mirada Unified School District (hereafter District)
appeals the withdrawal with prejudice of an unfair practice charge
filed on August 17, 1977, by Teachers Association of Norwalk-La Mirada
(hereafter Association).

- The facts concerning the underlying charge are as follows.
Essentially the unfair practice charge alleged that the District
had reassigned a counselor to a teaching position because of his
organizational activities. The District claimed that the reassign-
ment was due to a decline in average daily attendance. Subsequent
to a Public Employment Relations Board (hereafter Soard) hearing ~
held on November 28 through December 9, 1977, the District returned
the employee to his counseling position. The Association thereupon

requested withdrawal of the charge without prejudice pursuant

to Board rule 35015.1 The District objected to the withdrawal and
requested the issuance of a written decision. It asserted that a
decision in this case would establish useful precedent in the matter
of reassignment of members of a negotiating unit. On February 16,
1978, the PERB hearing officer accepted the withdrawal with prejudice.
On March 6, 1978, the District appealed the withdrawal to the
Board itself. The Association opposes this appeal on the ground
that the case is now moot. By way of its charge, the Association
sought to have the employee reinstated to his counseling position.
That remedy was effectuated voluntarily on the part of the District
prior to a ruling by the hearing officer.
We sustain the hearing officer's decision to allow the with
drawal. We note here that the charge alleges a specific set of
facts regarding discrimination against an individual employee.
Whenever such discrimination is alleged, each case is supported
by its own unique facts as to the employee, his organizational
1cal. Admin. Code, tit. 8, sec; 35015 provides:
The charging party may file a with
drawal of the charge which shall be
in writing, signed by the party or
its agent, and state whether the party
desires the withdrawal to be with or
without prejudice. If the formal
hearing has commenced, the withdrawal
shall be with or without prejudice
according to the discretion of the
Board. The withdrawal shall be allowed;
except if the formal hearing has
commenced, the respondent may file
objections to the withdrawal on the
basis of which the Board may refuse to
allow the withdrawal.
-2-

activities,
	and
	his
	employment
	situation.
	Contrary
	to
	the
	District's
argument,
	the 	circumstances
	presented 	in
	this
	case
	do
	not 	provide
us
	with
	a
	broad
	legal 	principle
	applicable 	in 	future
	cases 	before
the
	Board. 	Rendering
	a
	decision
	to
	obtain 	useful
	precedent
	is
	not
imperative 	here.
ORDER
The
	hearing
	officer's
	allowance
	of 	the
	withdrawal
	with
	preju-
dice
	of
	the
	unfair 	practice
	charge
	filed	
by	
Teachers
	Association 	of
Norwalk-La Mirada
	again~'!::: 1'Jorw:aJ~:La
	Mirada
	Unified
	School
	District
is
	sustained.
~
Cossack
	er
-3-

STATE
	OF
	CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC
	EMPLOYMENT
	RELATIONS
	BOARD
In 	the
	Matter
	of:
TEACHERS
	ASSOCIATION
	OF
	NORWALK-LA MIRADA
Charging
	Party,
vs.
NORWALK-LA MIRADA
	UNIFIED
	SCHOOL
	DISTRICT,
Respondent.
)
)
)
)
) 	Case 	No. 	LA-CE-165
Ruling
	on
	Charging
	Party's
Withdrawal 	and 	Respondent'
Objections
	to
	Hi
thdrawal
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
_____________________ )
BACKGROUND
The
	formal
	hearing
	in
	the
	above-entitled matter
	concluded
	on
December
	9, 	1977.
On
	February 	10, 	1978,
	Charging
	Party
	filed
	with 	the
	PERB
	a
withdrawal
	of
	the 	unfair 	practice
	charge,
	which
	stated
	as
	follows:
Charging
	party,
	Teachers
	Association 	of
	Norwalk-La 	Mirada, 	hereby 	withdraws
	its
	unfair 	practice
	charge
herein without 	prejudice 	pursuant 	to 	Regulations
	35015.
Also 	on
	February 	10, 	1978, 	Respondent
	filed
	a
	letter
	objecting
to 	the 	withdrawal 	and
	requesting
	a
	decision 	following 	the 	submission
of 	briefs.
	The
	letter,
	in 	part, 	stated:
The
	District,
	as
	well
	as 	the 	Charging 	Party
	and
yourself,
	have 	already 	spent
	a 	tremendous 	amount
	oftime 	and 	energy 	on
	this 	case 	and we 	would not 	like 	tosee
	all 	of 	that
	time 	and 	energy wasted 	and
	receive
	no
decision. 	A decision would
	set 	considerable 	precedentand 	serve 	as 	an 	invaluable 	guide when
	districts 	reassigncotmselors 	or 	others 	who 	are 	part 	of 	the 	bargaining 	unit.

RULING
PERB
	Regulation
	35015
	states
	as
	follows:
The
	charging
	party
	may
	file
	a
	withdrawal
	of 	the
charge
	which
	shall
	be
	in writing,
	signed
	by
	the
party 	or
	its
	agent,
	and
	state
whether
	the
	partydesires
	the
	withdrawal
	to
	be
	with
	or
without
prejudice.
	If
	the
	formal
	hearing
	has
	commenced,
the
	withdrawal
	shall
	be
	with
	or
without
	prejudice
according	
to	
the
	discretion
	of
	the
	Board.
	The
withdrawal
	shall
	be
	allowed;
	except
	if
	the
	formal
hearing
	has
	connnenced,
	the 	respondent
	may
	file
objections
	to 	the 	withdrawal
	on
	the
	basis 	of
which
	the
	Board
may
	refuse
	to 	allow 	the 	withdrawal.
Since
	the
	formal
	hearing
has 	concluded,
	it
	is
	the 	Board's
discretion
	(1)
	to 	accept 	or
	reject
	the 	withdrawal;
	and 	(2)
	if
	the
withdrawal
	is
	accepted, 	to 	designate
	whether 	the 	withdrawal
	is
with 	or without
	prejudice.
It
	is
	found
	that
	the 	reasons
	set
	out
	in
	Respondent's
	letter
objecting 	to
	the 	withdrawal 	are 	not
	sufficient
	to 	warrant 	the
issuance
	of	
a Recommended
	Decision.
	It
	is
	also
	concluded
	that
since
	Charging
	Party
	has
	not
	set
	for~h
	any
	basis
	why
	the 	withdrawal
should
	be
	without 	prejudice,
	the withdrawal
	will
	therefore
	be
accepted with
	prejudice.
An
	appeal
	from
	this 	ruling
	may
	be
	made
	within 	ten
	(10)
calendar
	days
	of 	receipt 	of 	this
	communication,
	stating
	the 	facts
upon which
	the 	appeal
	is
	based,
	and
	filed
with 	the 	Executive
Assistant
	to 	the
	Board, 	Mr.
	Stephen 	Barber,
	at
	923 	12th
	Street,
Suite
	201, 	Sacramento,
	CA
	95814. 	Copies
	of
	any
	appeal 	must 	be
served
	upon
	the
	other 	party 	to 	this 	action, 	with
	an
	additional
copy
	to 	the
	Los 	Angeles 	Regional 	Office.
DATF.D:~,, 	//;
/f.lfj	
WILLIAM'P~ktnl
Gen(tal
Cou.J;1
s 	,
	/~/~	
)
/	
;
' 	I	
/2 	I
By . 	z	
ivf/-David 	ch 	ossberg
	_
He~ficer
	-
l	
/·
. / 	f~
____
~

RULING
PERB Regulation 35015 states as follows:
The charging party may file a with.drawal of the
charge which shall be in writing, signed by the
party or its agent, and state whether the party
desires the withdrawal to be with or without
prejudice. If the formal hearing has commenced,
the withdrawal shall be with or without prejudice
according to the discretion of the Board. The
withdrawal shall be allowed; except if the formal
hearing has commenced, the respondent may file
objections to the withdrawal on the basis of
which the Board may refuse to allow the withdrawal.
Since the formal hearing has concluded, it is the Board's
discretion (1) to accept or reject the withdrawal; and (2) if the
withdrawal is accepted, to designate whether the withdrawal is
with or without prejudice.
It is found that the reasons set out in Respondent's letter
objecting to the withdrawal are not sufficient to warrant the
issuance of a Recommended Decision. It is also concluded that
since Charging Party has not set fcY-th any basis why the withdrawal
should be without prejudice, the withdrawal will therefore be
accepted with prejudice.
An appeal from this ruling may be made within ten (10)
calendar days of receipt of this communication, stating the facts
upon which the appeal is based, and filed with the Executive
Assistant to the Board, Mr. Stephen Barber, at 923 12th Street,
Suite 201, Sacramento, CA 95814. Copies of any appeal must be
served upon the other party to this action, with an additional

STATE
	OF
	CALIFORNIA
DECISION
	OF
	THE
PUBLIC
	EMPLOYMENT
	RELATIONS
	BOARD
REDDING
	ELEMENTARY 	SCHOOL
	DISTRICT,
Employer,
	APPELLANT,
and
REDDING
	TEACHERS
	ASSOCIATION,
CTA/NEA,
Employee
	Organization.
)
)
)	
Case 	Nos.
	S-R-437
s-uc-s
PERB
	Order
	No. 	Ad-39
Administrative
	Appeal
June
	21,
	1978
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Appearances: 	Robert
	G.
	Walters,
	Attorney 	(Biddle, 	Walters
	and
Bukey)
	for
	Redding
	Elementary 	School
	District;
	John
	Minoletti
and
	Jack 	Polance, 	Attorneys
	(Barr
	and
	Minoletti) 	for
	Redding
Teachers
	Association,
	CTA/NEA.
Before
	Gluck,
	Chairperson;
	Gonzales
	and
	Cossack
	Twohey, 	Members.
OPINION
This
	is
	an
	appeal 	by 	the
	Redding
	Elementary 	School
	District
(hereafter 	District)
	from
	the 	executive
	assistant
	to 	the
Board's 	rejection
	of 	the
	District's
	exceptions 	to 	the 	hearing
officer's
	proposed
	decision 	dated 	January 	3,
	1978,
	in 	the
above-captioned 	case.
FACTS
The
	hearing
	officer's
	proposed
	decision
	found
	that 	certain
employees 	were
	not
	management 	employees
	within 	the
	meaning
	of
the 	Educational
	Employment
	Relations 	Act.
1 The
	executive
lGov. 	Code
	sec.
	3540
	et 	seq.

assistant
	to
	the 	Board's
	rejection
	of 	exceptions
	was
	on
	the
ground
	that
	they
	were
	not
	timely
	filed.
On
	January
	5,
	1978,
	the
	proposed
	decision
	of 	the 	hearing
officer
	was
	received
	by
	the
	District.
	This
	proposed
	decision
contained 	notice
	of 	the
	District's
	right
	to
	file
	exceptions.
It
	stated:
The
	parties
	have
	seven
	(7)
	calendar
	days
from
	receipt
	of
	this
	proposed
	decision
	in
which
	to
	file
	exceptions 	in 	accordance 	with
section
	33380
	of 	the 	Board's
	rules
	and
regulations.
	If
	no
	party
	files
	timely
exceptions,
	this
	proposed
	decision
	will
become
	final
	on
	January
	16, 	1978,
	and
	a
Notice 	of 	Decision
	will
	issue
	from
	the
	Board.
In
	addition,
	the
	Sacramento
	regional
	director's
	cover
letter
	of
	January 	3, 	1978,
	to 	the 	hearing
	officer's
	proposed
decision 	indicated.that
	any
	party
	to 	the 	proceeding 	could
	file
a
	statement 	of 	exceptions
	and
	stated:
An
	original
	and
	four 	copies 	of 	the 	statementof 	exceptions
	must 	be
	filed
	with 	the
	Board
within
	seven
	(7)
	calendar
	days
	after
	receipt
of 	the 	proposed
	decision
	as 	provided 	in
section
	33380
	of 	the
	EERB's
	rules
	and
regulations 	(Part
	III,
	title
	8, 	Cal.
	Admin.
Code)
.
As
	noted, 	the 	hearing
	officer's
	proposed
	decision
	was
received
	by
	the
	District
	on
	January 	5,
	1978.
	Therefore, 	the
last
	day
	for 	exceptions 	to
	be
	filed
	with 	the
	Public
Employment
	Relations
	Board 	(l~-erea£ter 	Board)
	was
January 	12, 	1978.
2
The
	District's
	statement 	of 	exceptions
2cal.
	Admin. 	Code,
	tit.
	8, 	sec.
	33020
	states 	that:
File 	with 	Board. 	"File 	with 	the 	Board" 	or
"FiJe 	with 	the 	regional 	office"
	means
personal 	delivery 	or 	actual 	delivery
	by
certified	
mail 	to 	the 	Board.2

was
	actual]
y
	received
	at
	the
	Board
	heariqu_~:=:__!:eE_~
__in
	Sacramento
	on
January
	13,
	1978.
	On
	January 	16,
	1978,
	the 	executive
	assistant
to
	the
	Board,
	pursuant
	to
	rules
	33380 	and
	33390,
3
issued 	the
Board
	order
	declaring
	the
	proposed
	decision
	of 	the 	hearing
officer
	to	
be	
the
	final
	decision.
DISCUSSION
In
	its
	appeal,
	the
	District
	contends
	that,
	read
	together,
rules
	32130 4
and 	33380 5
result
	in
	a
	one-day
	"grace
	period"
in 	the
	total
	time
	in
	which
	an
	appellant
	may
	file
	a
	timely
statement
	of
	exceptions.
	Specifically,
	the
	District
	argues
that
	reading
	these
	two
	sections 	together
	results
	in
	starting
the
	appeal
	period 	"the
	day
	after
	the
	day
	after 	receipt."
By
	commencing
	the 	seven-day
	period 	for
	filing
	its
	statement
of 	exceptions
	o~
	January 	7,
	1978,
	the
	District
	argues,
	its
filing
	on
	January 	13, 	1978,
	would 	have
	been
	within 	the 	noticed
seven-day 	period 	for
	filing
	a
	statement 	of 	exceptions
	and 	was
therefore
	timely.
3cal.
	Admin.
	Code,
	tit.
	8,
	sec.
	33380 	and 	33390.
4
cal.
	Adrnin.
	Code,
	tit.
	8, 	sec.
	32130
	states 	that:
Computation
	of
	Time. 	In 	computing 	any
period 	of 	time 	under
	these 	rules
	and
regulations,
	the 	period 	of 	time 	begins 	to
run
	the
	day
	after
	the 	act
	or 	occurrence
referred 	to.
Seal.
	Adrnin. 	Code,
	tit.
	8, 	sec.
	33380(a)
	states 	that:
(a) 	A
party
	may
	file
	with 	the
	Board 	an
original
	and
	four 	copies 	of
	a
	statement 	of
exceptions 	to 	the 	proposed 	decision,
	and
supporting 	brief, 	within 	seven 	calendar 	days
after 	recejpt 	of 	the 	propose 	decision
....
3

The
	District
	concedes
	that
	under
	the 	Board's
	present
interpretation
	of
	these 	rules
	the 	period 	in
	which
	the
	District
could
	file
	a
	timely 	statement
	of
	exceptions
	ended
	on
January
	12,
	1978,
	but 	argues
	that
	this 	interpretation 	is
incorrect.
	We
	disagree.
	The
	application
	of
	rule
	32130
	and
rule
	33380 	caused
	the 	appeal
	period 	in
	this
	case
	to
	commence
January
	6,
	1978;
	the
	"act
	of 	occurrence"
	to
	which
	rule
	32130
refers
	is 	receipt	
by	
the
	District
	of 	the
	proposed
	decision
	on
January
	5,
	1978.
The
	Board 	has
	previously
	counted
	the
	seven-oay
	time
	period
referred
	to
	in
	rule
	33380 	as
	beginning 	the
	day
	after
	the
receipt
	by
	the
	parties
	of 	the 	proposed
	decision.
6
In
	its
	statement 	of
	exceptions,
	the
	District
	also
	contends
that
	the 	seven-9ay
	filing
	period 	for
	filing
	a
	statement 	of
exceptions 	in
	rule
	33380
	was
	too
	short
	and
	created 	hardships
for 	the
	parties.
	That
.rule
	was
	adopted 	by	
the
	Board 	as
	a
	part
of
	title
	8, 	California
	Administrative
	Code,
	following 	duly
noticed 	public 	hearings
	and
	in 	accordance 	with 	the
Administrative
	Procedure 	Act.
7
It
	was
	determined
	that
	the
specified
	time 	allowed 	for
	parties
	to
	file
	a
	statement 	of
exceptions
	was
	adequate.
	The
	vast 	majority 	of
	parties
	who 	have
filed
	statements 	of 	exceptions 	to
	a 	Board
	agent's
	proposed
6see, 	for 	example, 	Los 	Angeles 	Unified 	School
	District(11/8/77)
	EERB
	Order 	No.
	Ad-19.
7Gov. 	Code,
	tit.
	2, 	div. 	3, 	part 	1, 	ch. 	4.5, 	sec. 	11371
et 	seq.
4

decision
	have,
	in
	fact,
	complied
	with
	the 	seven-day
	time
requirement.
The
	District
	also
	argues
	that
	the~_l:,oard
'_s_
	r:ules_:rg;gaxding
deadlines
	and
	the
	definitions
	of
	such
	things
	as
	"service,"
"filing,"
	and
	"receipt"
	are 	confusing
	and
	urges 	"a
	more
	relaxed
view
	toward
	deadlines
	and
	the
	like."
	Experience 	with
	the
	rule
fails
	to 	support
	that
	argument.
	The
	overwhelming
	number
	of
filings
	have
	been
	in
	strict
	accordance 	with
	the
	rule's
requirements.
. 	8
Finally,
	we
	note
	that
	the
	District
	did
	not
	avail
	itself
	of
the 	opportunity
	to 	request
	an
	extension
	of
	time
	in
	which
	to
file
	a
	statement
	of
	exceptions.
ORDER
The
	decision
	issued
	by
	the 	executive
	assistant
	to 	the
Board,
	PERB
	Decision·No.
	HO-R-49,
	declaring
	the 	hearing
officer's
	proposed
	decision
	to
	be
	final,
	is
	affirmed.
Jerilou
	Cossack
	Twohey, 	Member,
	dissenting:
I
	disagree 	with 	the 	majority's-conclusion 	that
	the 	executive
assistant
	properly 	rejected
	the
	District's
	exceptions 	to
	the
hearing
	officer's
	proposed
	decision.
_g
In.
	her 	dissent,
	Member 	Cossacl< 	Twohey
	refers	
to
	t:he	
seven-·day_appeal 	period
provided
	by
	rule
	3J180_and_indtcated
	that
	the
Board
	"tacitly
	determined"
	that
	seven 	days 	was 	an
	inadequate
period
	when
	it
	modified
	this 	rule 	effective
	March 	20, 	1978.
This 	is
	not
	correct.
	A
majority 	of 	the 	Board 	modified
	rules
33380 	and 	35030
	in 	order 	to 	consolidate
	and
	provide 	uniformitybetween 	the 	appeal 	procedures
	and
	timelines
	from
	hearing
officer 	decisions
	on
	representation
	and
	unfair 	practice 	cases.In 	addition, 	the 	tirnelines 	were
	originally 	devised 	in 	order 	to
expedite 	the 	establishment 	of 	negotiating 	units 	at 	the
inception 	of 	the 	EERA. 	However, 	rapid 	processing 	of 	casesbecame 	impractical 	when 	the 	Board 	docket 	grew 	longer. 	Therewas 	then 	no 	need 	to 	continue 	the 	shorter 	appeal 	timelines.
.
5

On
	January
	5, 	1978,
the
	District
	received 	the 	hearing
	officer's
proposed
	decision.
	The
	District's
	exceptions
	were
	actually
	received
by
	the
	Board
	on
	January
	13, 	1978,
	one 	day
	late
	under
	the 	then-
existing
	rules
	governing
	filing
	of 	exceptions,
This
	is
	yet
	another 	case,
	of
	which
	there
	have 	been
	many, 1
in
	which
	a
	majority 	of 	the
	Board
	has
	mechanically
	applied
	an
unreasonable
	rule
	so
	as 	to
	deny 	a
	party 	appellate
	review.
I
	agree 	with 	the
	Districtrs
	counsel
	that
	the
	seven 	days
provided
	in 	the
	rule
	itself
	did 	not
	afford
	sufficient
	time
	within
which
	to 	review 	the
	facts
	and
	issues 	of
	the 	case, 	confer
	with
	the
school
	district,
	hold
	a
	meeting
	of
	the 	school 	board,
	and
	write
the
	exceptions 	themselves.
	_In
	fact
	on March	
8,	
1978
	the
	Board
considered
	this
	deficiency
	among
	others,
	and
	modified 	the
	rule
so
	that
	the
	parties
	now
have 	twenty 	days
	within
	which
	to
	file
exceptions.
	Thus,
	contrary
	to 	the
	majority's 	assertion 	in
this
	case, 	the
	Board
	has
	tacitly
	determined
	that
	the 	time	
speci-
fied	
in
	this
	now-repealed
	rule
	was
	not 	adequate.
I 	do
	not 	advocate
	permitting
	parties
	to
	ignore 	the 	time
requirements
	established
	by
	the 	Board's
	rules
	and
	regulations.
However,
	neither
	should 	the 	basic
	purposes
	of 	the
	EERA
	be	
under-
mined	
by
	slavish
	adherence 	to
	rules
	which 	have
	shown
	themselves
to 	be 	unreasonable
	and
	unrealistic.
	Rather, 	the 	long-established
legal 	principle 	of not 	permitting
	minor
	procedural 	defects 	to
preclude 	the 	examination
	of
	an
	actual 	controversy
	by 	an
	appellate
body 	should
	prevail.
2
1Manteca
	Unified 	School
	District
	(8/5/77)
	EERB
	Decision
No. 	21; 	San
	Francisco 	Unified 	School
	District
	(9/8/77)
	EERB
Decision
	No. 	23; 	Santa Ana
	Unified 	School
	District
	(10/28/77)
EERB
	Decision
	No. 	36; 	Anaheim 	Union 	High School
	District(3/16/78)
	PERB
	Order 	No. 	Ad-27; 	and Lincoln 	Unified 	School
District
	(5/30/78)
	PERE
	Order No. 	Ad- 	5.
2Pesce 	v. 	De~artment 	of Alcoholic 	Beverage 	Control 	(1958)
51 	Cal.2d 	310, 	31 	; 	See 	also 	Gibson 	v. 	Unemployment 	Insurance
Appeals 	Board 	(1973) 	9 Cal.3d 	494 	and 	Flores 	v. 	Unemployment
Insurance Appeals 	Board 	(1973) 	30 	Cal.App.3d 	681.
6

This
	principle
	is
	especially 	applicable
	to
	controversies
arising
	under
	the
	EERA.
	Unlike
	most
	other
	arenas
	of
	litigation,
the
	parties 	in
	a
	disputed 	case
	under
	the
	EERA
	enjoy
	an
	ongoing
relationship
	which 	does
	not 	terminate with 	the
	completion
	of
	the
litigation.
	Continuing
	relationships
	_con_ciucive
	to
	successful
	and
harmonious 	problem
	solving--the
	essence
	of
	collective 	negotiations--
demand
	that
	the
	parameters
	of
	the
	relationship
	have 	been
	fairly
defined.
	When
	a
	dispute
	has 	been
	unfairly
	denied
	a
	full
	hearing
by
	the
	Board
	entrusted
	with
	its
	resolution,
	the
	future
	harmonious
relationship
	of 	the
	parties
	is
	jeopardized.
The
	problem
	in
	the
	instant
	case, 	the
	composition
	of 	the
negotiating 	unit, 	is
	one
	at
	the 	very
	heart 	of
	this
	harmonious
relationship.
	It
	is
	the 	cornerstone 	of 	the 	obligation
	to
negotiate
	and
	further
	determines 	the 	parameters
	of
	this 	obliga-
tion.3	
Permitting
	a
	minor
	procedural
	defect 	to
	forestall
	the
3
section
	3540
	of
	the
	Act
	declares
	it
	to
	be
	the
	purpose
	of
this 	Act". ,.to
	promote
	the
	improvement
	of
	personnel
	management
and 	employer-employee
	relations
...
by
	providing	
a	
uniform
	basisfor 	recognizing 	the
	right 	of 	public
	school
	employees
...
to
	select
one 	employee
	organization
	as 	the 	exclusive 	representative 	of
	the
employees
	in
	an
	appropriate
	unit,
....
" 	To
	effectuate 	this
	policySections
	3543.S(c)
	and
	3543.6(c)
	of 	the
	Act
	impose 	a
	mutual
	obli-gation
	on 	an 	employer 	and 	an 	employee
	organization 	respectively
to
	meet 	and
	negotiate 	in
	good
	faith.
	Section 	3540.l(h) 	of 	the
Act
	in 	turn 	defines
	meeting 	and
	negotiating
	as
	"
...
meeting, 	con-
ferring, 	negotiating,
	and
	discussing
	by
	the 	exclusive 	representative
and
	the 	public 	school 	employer
	in
	a 	good
	faith 	effort
	to 	reachagreement
	on
	matters 	within 	the 	scope
	of 	representation
....
"
Section 	3540.l(e) 	defines 	exclusive 	representative
	as" ...
the
employee
	organization recognized 	or
	certified
	as 	the 	exclusive
negotiating 	representative 	of
...
employees
	in
	an
	appropriate
unit
....
"
	Finally, 	Section 	3543.2 	of 	the 	Act 	defines 	those
matters 	within 	the 	scope
	of 	representation.
7

Board's
	consideration 	of
	the
	District's
	position
	on
	this
	funda-
mental 	disagreement
	raises
	the
	genuine
	possibility
	that
	the
disagreement
	will
	fest~r
	and
	perhaps
	distort
	and
	poison
	the
entire
	negotiating
	relationship.
	Accordingly,
	I
	dissent.
8