State of California (PERB 1484S)

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STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD

CARLOS A. VELTRUSKI,
Case Nos. LA-CE-556-S

Charging Party, LA-CE-562-S

LA-CE-564-S

Vv. LA-CE-566-S
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, PERB Decision No. 1484-S

June 6, 2002

Respondent.

Appearances: Carlos A. Veltruski, on his own behalf; State of California (Department of
Personnel Administration) by Linda M. Nelson, Labor Relations Counsel, for State of
California.
Before Baker, Whitehead and Neima, Members.
DECISION

BAKER, Member: This case is before the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB
or Board) on exceptions filed by Carlos A. Veltruski (Veltruski) to an administrative law
judge’s (ALJ) proposed decision (attached) dismissing his unfair practice charge. The charge
alleged that various departments of the State of California (State) violated section 3519(a)! of
the Ralph C. Dills Act (Dills Act) by denying him employment because of his protected
conduct.

After reviewing the entire record in this case, including the proposed decision,

Veltruski’s exceptions, and the State’s response, the Board adopts the decision of the ALJ as

the decision of the Board itself in accordance with the following discussion.

'The Dills Act is codified at Government Code section 3512 et seq. Unless otherwise
indicated, all statutory references herein are to the Government Code.

DISCUSSION
In his exceptions to the proposed decision V eltruski argues that he was denied the
opportunity to present additional evidence and make additional arguments and contends that
the ALJ erred in finding that he was not a civil service employee.
A review of the record reveals that Veltruski was given ample opportunity to present
documentary and testimonial evidence. The ALJ repeatedly assisted Veltruski with
information about the hearing process, distinguishing between the different stages of the
hearing including the marking of evidence, Veltruski' s testifying about the evidence and oral
or written argument. The ALJ admitted into evidence 34 ofVeltruski's exhibits, most over the
State's relevance objections. The ALJ facilitated Veltruski's testimony about each of the
charges at issue in this matter, asking Veltruski questions to focus his attention and educe
testimony on the matters contained in the four separate complaints.
V eltruski' s claim in his exceptions that he identified three witnesses to testify on his
behalf is not supported by the record. The three names that he identified in his exceptions as
witnesses he wished to call on his behalf are not mentioned in the transcript. At the end of his
case-in-chief, he was not able to identify any appropriate additional witnesses. However, he
did suggest three other witnesses, including two interpreters' union representatives and one
attorney with whom he shared the details of his case. Neither of the union representatives
represented Veltruski in any way in his dealings with the State. Similarly, the attorney simply
reviewed his file for three weeks and apparently called PERB on Veltruski's behalf. The ALJ
correctly ruled the testimony of these individuals would be irrelevant to the issues in this case.
2

Veltruski was not denied due process before the ALJ. In the proposed decision, the
ALJ correctly found that as the charging party who introduced the exhibits into the record,
Veltruski had or should have had copies
of
the exhibits. Further, the ALJ noted that Veltruski
was informed at the beginning
of
the hearing, on November 27, 2001, that to review the
transcript he would be required to purchase it, apply for a waiver
of
costs, or review the
transcript at the PERB office in Los Angeles
if
he set up an appointment to do so. V eltruski
took no steps to review the transcript until February 11, 2002, three days after the due date
of
his brief. There is nothing in the record to indicate V eltruski attempted to purchase the
transcript or ever applied for a waiver.
Veltruski was not denied due process before the Board itself. From the record
in
this
case and based on his assertions, it is clear that Veltruski has many cases on appeal
with
this
Board and has had a number
of
contacts with PERB staff by telephone and e-mail. It is
difficult to determine when or in what manner he has requested to review the tapes
or
transcript in the case before us. Upon review, it is apparent Veltruski included a request to
review the transcript and tapes within the text
of
a document he labeled as a "request for
reconsideration"
of
the proposed decision which was received by the Board's Appeals Office
on March 6, 2002.
Even
if
Veltruski reviewed the transcript, he could make no argument which would
cure his failure to state a prima facie case. It appears Veltruski has confused the opportunity to
present "evidence" with the opportunity to present "argument." Although Veltruski disputes it,
the Board finds he was given ample opportunity to present evidence. Veltruski has also been
given an opportunity to present argument. He claims his ability to present argument has been
hampered by not having access to PERB's files. The Board agrees with the ALJ that as the
3

charging party, he has, or should have, each piece
of
documentary evidence submitted as each
piece was submitted by him. As to the transcript, the normal method is to purchase a copy
of
the transcript. He chose not to do so. He also chose not to file a request for a waiver
of
costs
to obtain a transcript. His attempts to review the transcript at PERB' s Los Angeles Regional
Office appear to have come in such an awkward manner that they never resulted in his review
of
the transcript.
Upon careful review and consideration, the Board concludes that any claim V eltruski
was denied access to the file would not alter the outcome
of
this case. His failure to present
evidence to establish a prima facie case cannot be cured through further argument whether that
argument refers to the transcript or not. As his charge was dismissed for failure to state a
prima facie case, on appeal the Board assumes that the essential facts alleged in the charge are
true. (San Juan Unified School District (1977) EERB Decision No. 12.2) Further argument
may be useful to help the Board decide what weight to give to evidence in this case,
but
it is
not necessary here. Even when all the evidence presented by Veltruski is viewed in the light
most favorable to his case, he has not established that he was a proper applicant or an
employee protected by the Dills Act.
The record as a whole makes it clear that Veltruski was not a civil service employee.
He did not take any civil service examinations and was not on any civil service lists. 	The State
correctly points out that on cross-examination, Veltruski conceded he was not on any civil
service lists. Veltruski's contention that he was appointed to various civil service positions
2 Prior to January 1978, PERB was known as the Educational Employment Relations
Board or EERB.
4

and that "even if they did not have all the formalities, those appointments were permanent after
1 year" under civil service rules is rejected.
ORDER
The unfair practice charges in Case Nos. LA-CE-556-S, LA-CE-562-S, LA-CE-564-S
and LA-CE-566-S are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
Members Whitehead and Neima joined in this Decision.
5

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
CARLOS A. VELTRUSKI,
Charging Party,
V.
ST ATE OF CALIFORNIA,
Respondent.
UNFAIR PRACTICE
CASE NOS. LA-CE-556-S
LA-CE-562-S
LA-CE-564-S
LA-CE-566-S
PROPOSED DECISION
(2/25/02)
Appearances: 	Carlos A. Veltruski, on his own behalf; State of California (Department
of Personnel Administration) by Linda M. Nelson, Labor Relations Counsel, for State of
California.
Before Fred D'Orazio, Administrative Law Judge.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
It is alleged in four consolidated complaints that five state agencies throughout
Southern California on eleven separate occasions denied employment to an applicant because
of his protected conduct. The state employer responds that it has never denied charging party
employment because of his protected conduct, and the complaints should be dismissed.
Carlos A. Veltruski (Veltruski) commenced the action in Case No. LA-CE-556-S on
June 23, 2000, by filing an unfair practice charge against the State of California (State). After
several amendments, the general counsel of the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB
or Board) issued a complaint on February 22, 2001. 1 The complaint alleges that Veltruski was
1 Among the respondent agencies in the initial complaint were the California
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board
(UIAB). Veltruski's motion to amend the initial unfair practice charge to include additional

an applicant for employment who engaged in protected conduct. Thereafter, the complaint
asserts, three State agencies retaliated against him on five separate occasions by denying him
employment. First, the complaint alleges, Veltruski, among other things, filed a lawsuit
against the California Department
of
Motor Vehicles (DMV) and the UIAB "to secure
economic benefits for prior employment." In response, the complaint asserts, the DOJ, which
represented the agencies in the lawsuit, denied Veltruski employment. Second, the complaint
alleges that Veltruski filed unidentified actions with the UIAB and informed the presiding
judge
of
the Los Angeles office
of
the UIAB "that he was an applicant for employment and
that when he became employed he would attempt to unionize employees for better working
conditions."
It
is alleged that the presiding judge later denied Veltruski employment with the
Los Angeles office
of
the UIAB. Third, the complaint aileges that Veltruski filed complaints
"against the [UIAB] before administrative agencies for employment benefits" and later
informed the presiding judge
of
the Orange County office
of
the UIAB "that he was an
applicant for employment" and "upon employment he would be active organizing employees
for better working conditions."
It
is alleged that the presiding judge later denied Veltruski
employment with the Orange County office
of
the UIAB. Fourth, the complaint alleges that
Veltruski "[tried] to improve salary and working conditions for himself and interpreters at the
[DMV] by filing actions against the [DMV] that included, but were not necessarily limited to;
claims before the [UIAB] and the State Personnel Board."
It
is alleged that the State later
retaliated against Veltruski by denying him employment in the City
of
Commerce office
of
allegations against DOJ and UIAB was denied by the regional attorney and the denial was
upheld by the Board. (State of California (2001) PERB Decision No. 1459-S.) In addition,
the regional attorney dismissed as untimely several allegations that occurred outside the
statute of limitations period. Veltruski appealed the dismissal and the Board rejected the
appeal as untimely. (State of California (2001) PERB Order No. Ad-309-S.)
2

the DMV. Fifth, the complaint alleges, Veltruski was denied employment in the
San Bernardino office
of
the DMV in retaliation for the conduct described above. The
complaint alleges that the State's actions violated the Ralph
C.
Dills Act (Dills Act)
section 3519(a).2
Veltruski commenced the action in Case No. LA-CE-562-S on March 20, 2001,
by
filing an unfair practice charge against the State. The general counsel issued a complaint on
April 26, 2001, alleging that Veltruski was denied employment by the State on two occasions
because
of
his protected conduct. First, the complaint alleges, Veltruski engaged in protected
conduct
by
filing an unfair practice charge, Case No. LA-CE-556-S, and by "trying to
improve salary and working conditions for himself and interpreters at the [DMV] by filing
actions against the [DMV] that included, but were not necessarily limited to claims before the
[UIAB] and the [SPB]." Thereafter, the complaint alleges, Veltruski was denied employment
by the DMV office in San Bernardino, in violation
of
section 3519( a). 	Second, the complaint
alleges that Veltruski informed the presiding judge in UIAB's Los Angeles office that he was
"an applicant for employment" and when he became employed he "would attempt to unionize
2 The Dills Act is codified at Government code section 3512 et seq. Unless otherwise
indicated, all statutory references are to the Government Code. In relevant part, section 3 519
states:
It shall be unlawful for the state to do any
of
the following:
(a) Impose or threaten to impose reprisals on employees, to
discriminate or threaten to discriminate against employees, or
otherwise to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees
because
of
their exercise
of
rights guaranteed by this chapter.
For purposes of this subdivision, "employee" includes an
applicant for employment or reemployment.
3

employees for better working conditions." As evidence
of
further protected conduct, the
compiaint aHeges that Veitruski filed actions against the UIAB before other administrative
agencies for "employment benefits," and he filed Unfair Practice Charge LA-CE-556-S. 	In
retaliation for this conduct, the complaint asserts, Veltruski was denied employment with the
UIAB office in Los Angeles, in violation
of
section 3519( a).
Unfair practice Case No. LA-CE-564-S was filed by Veltruski on June
5,
2001, and
the general counsel issued a complaint on September 24, 2001. As protected conduct, the
complaint alleges that Veltruski filed "actions with the [UIAB] for recovery
of
money and
benefits allegedly owed to him by the [DMV]." In retaliation, the complaint continues, the
presiding judge
of
the UIAB office in Inglewood refused to "consider his application for
employment," in violation
of
section 3519(a).3
The fourth consolidated complaint, Case No. LA-CE-566-S, was filed by Veltruski on
July
1,
2001, and similarly asserts that he suffered retaliation because
of
his protected
conduct. The complaint issued by the general counsel on September 10, 2001, alleges that
Veltruski engaged in protected conduct by filing unfair practice charges against various State
agencies, including the UIAB and the DMV. Thereafter, the complaint continues, Veltruski
suffered discrimination on three occasions when the UIAB office in La Palma, the California
Employment Development Department (EDD) and the California Labor Commissioner's
3 The regional attorney dismissed similar allegations in LA-CE-564-S that the
California Department
of
Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) violated the Dills Act when
it refused to hire Veltruski because
of
his protected conduct. The regional attorney also
dismissed an allegation that a representative of the DFEH told Veltruski that he could not
prove certain allegations against UIAB, and he should marry a United States citizen
if
he
wanted to become eligible to work in the United States. (See regional attorney letters to
Veltruski dated September 10 and 24, 2001.) The dismissal has been appealed to the Board
and there has been no decision to date.
4

Office (Labor Commissioner) in Los Angeles refused to consider his application for
employment. These actions, the complaint alleges, violated section 3519(a).4
The State filed timely answers to all complaints, generally denying all allegations and
asserting a number
of
affirmative defenses. Defenses and denials will be addressed below, as
necessary. A settlement conference was conducted in LA-CE-556-S on April 10, 2001, but
the matter was not settled. Apparently because settlement prospects seemed dim, no further
settlement conferences were held.
Meanwhile, during the course
of
the procedural history in these cases, Veltruski
petitioned the State Personnel Board (SPB) for a determination
of
his status as a civil service
employee and/or his status as a qualified applicant for employment. On August 21, 2001, the
State moved to place these consolidated cases in abeyance pending the outcome
of
the SPB
action. Among other things, the State argued that Veltruski's employment status has a direct
bearing on the complaints at issue here. Veltruski opposed the motion. In a ruling on
August 27, 2001, the undersigned denied the motion.because it is not clear that the SPB
petition would be determinative
of
the issues raised by the complaints in this proceeding, and
placing the complaints in abeyance would result in unnecessary delay.
4 The regional attorney dismissed other allegations in Case No. LA-CE-566-S that the
State retaliated against Veltruski when it refused to investigate charges that his private
employer, Kelly Services, discriminated against him for filing a worker's compensation claim.
The regional attorney also dismissed an allegation that the State violated the Dills Act when it
failed to process his application for permanent residency with the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS). (See regional attorney letters to Veltruski dated August 16 and
September 10, 2001.) This matter is currently before the Board as an appeal of a denial of an
extension of time to appeal the dismissal.
5

Two days
of
formal hearing were held in Los Angeles on November 27-28, 2001.
During the second day, the hearing was adjourned because Veltruski was unable to continue.5
At the time
of
adjournment, Veltruski had been given the opportunity to call witnesses and
present documentary evidence. He had completed his direct testimony, introduced
documents, and was unable to identify other witnesses who had relevant testimony to present
on his behalf. He was cross-examined for a short time by the State. Thus, it is determined
that Veltruski's case-in-chief had ended at the time the hearing was adjourned.
In a January 7, 2002, letter to the parties, the undersigned requested written argument
regarding whether Veltruski had established a prima facie case on some or all
of
the
allegations. The State submitted its argument on January 31, 2002. Veltruski submitted a
series
of
arguments, the last
of
which was received on February 11; 2002.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Background
From the early 1990s to approximately 1997, Veltruski performed services as an
interpreter for several State agencies, including the DMV, UIAB and EDD. Evidence
concerning the conditions under which Veltruski worked is limited. However, documentary
evidence
of
payment by the State for his services to EDD in 1991-1992 and 1996-1997
indicates that he was compensated based on submitted "invoices" or "billing forms;"
he
performed services only on specified dates; and he was considered a "vendor" who received
5 During a brief cross-examination, Veltruski said he had difficulty breathing and
complained of a rapid heartbeat and a dry mouth. A recess was taken and he called the
paramedics. The paramedics came to the hearing site, examined Veltruski and attributed his
symptoms to stress. They offered to take Veltruski to an emergency room, but he declined.
When the parties returned to the hearing room, the undersigned observed Veltruski and
concluded that he continued to exhibit similar symptoms of stress and out of an abundance of
caution adjourned the hearing.
6

payment under a "vendor's" number. 	Other documentary evidence indicates that Veltruski
received a Form 1099, misceilaneous income, from the DMV in 1996. The Form 1099
contains no deductions for federal income tax or health benefits. It states that payment was
for "nonemployee compensation." Indeed, the State has always considered Veltruski an
independent contractor. On June 29, 1999, Candy Wohlford (Wohlford), deputy director
of
DMV's communication programs division, responded to an inquiry Veltruski sent to Governor
Gray Davis: 	"As far as the DMV is concerned, you were an independent contractor, not an
employee
of
the department as you claim. Two separate [EDD] hearings were held in which
it was ruled that you were not an employee
of
the DMV." 	Veltruski's position on his
employment status has not been consistent in these proceedings. He has repeatedly insisted
he was an employee while perfonning services as an interpreter for the State. However, at
other times he has conceded that he was not a civil service employee. By the end
of
1997, the
State had stopped using his services as an interpreter.
During his service with the State, Veltruski became involved in numerous
employment-related disputes with various agencies. Although these actions need not
be
addressed here in detail, a brief summary
of
his claims provides a background for the
allegations in the consolidated complaints. For example, he filed several claims with the
UIAB. 	In a November 1996 UIAB claim, he sought benefits for a period in 1990-1991 when
he worked for a private employer, Mexican American Video Company. In February 1997, a
UIAB administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled that Veltruski could pursue the claim
retroactively and that he was entitled to benefits for the period in question. 	On April 30,
1997, Veltruski received another favorable ruling from the UIAB when an ALJ reversed an
earlier determination denying him services because he had not provided sufficient proof of
7

legal status to establish his right to work. Other UIAB claims involved DMV and UIAB as
employers. Further, in 1998, Veitruski submitted a claim to then Governor Pete Wiison
alleging that DMV owed him payment for work performed from 1990 to 1997. On behalf of
the Governor's office, Wohlford responded on November 10, 1998. She wrote that Veltruski
had been fully compensated, and any further contention that he had not been fully
compensated should be pursued at the State Board of Control. Veltruski next filed a
complaint with the Board of Control, but it was rejected. In late 1999 or early 2000, Veltruski
filed a complaint against the DMV with the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division,
and the matter was transferred to the U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hours Division.
The precise issue in the complaint is not clear in the record, nor is the final disposition of the
claim clear. At about the same time, Veltruski filed a lawsuit in federal court against the
DMV and the UIAB. Asked what the issue was in that case, Veltruski responded, "[i]t was
the retirement issue, employee issue, the immigration issue, the $1 million damages."
Apparently, the suit primarily involved issues related to Veltruski 's effort to acquire a
designated immigration status. In a February 29, 2000, letter to Veltruski regarding the
lawsuit, Deputy Attorney Matthew Botting (Botting) responded that immigration matters are
beyond the authority of the State; whether the State submits necessary forms on Veltruski's
behalf to INS in support of his petition for employment-based immigration is discretionary
under federal law and no State agency has elected to do so; Veltruski has at all times been an
independent contractor with the State and has never been an employee of the State; and
Veltruski's personal injury and civil rights claims are beyond the statute of limitations. 	Also
in 1999, Veltruski filed claims for benefits with the UIAB against the DMV and the UIAB.
8

UIAB administrative law judges dismissed the matters as moot, and the UIAB upheld the
rulings on appeai. 6
Unfair Practice Charge Number LA-CE-556-S
In or about February 2000, Veltruski testified that he spoke with Sylvia Diaz (Diaz), a
supervising attorney with DOJ, and "asked her to give me a job" as an interpreter or "expert,"
"an MBA," "terminology researcher," "accountant," or "expert auditor" assisting in the
preparation of cases for trial. Later in his testimony, he said he gave Diaz several
"possibilities." "I applied for the job, I requested the job, a position." According to Veltruski,
Diaz refused his request on "several occasions," and said she would not hire him because his
lawsuit was pending. Veltruski testified that at the time he spoke to Diaz, DOJ was in the
process of interviewing "[f]or attorneys, for assistants, for secretaries, for different positions."
In addition, Veltruski testified that at about the same time, he spoke to Botting and
Tom Shearer (Shearer), another DOJ attorney: "I explained to them that we could resolve this
issue for whatever amount of money, but I could go and work on their side. I could work in
favor of the State of California and prosecute other cases, instead of litigating with them in
state, federal court, or with other State Personnel Board, or PERB, whatever. And they
refused to hire me." According to Veltruski, Botting and Shearer said they would not hire
him because of the pending lawsuit. Veltruski said he responded, "[w]hat's wrong with that, I
said? What's wrong? I'm filing papers with you. I want to be your friend, just let's resolve
6 Although Veltruski filed other administrative claims, it is unnecessary to set forth the
details of each of these claims to resolve the issues presented by the consolidated complaints.
In addition, as more fully addressed below, the allegation that Veltruski's various claims and
lawsuits are protected conduct under the Dills Act need not be addressed here. Suffice it to
say that many claims were filed and V eltruski testified that his conduct in this regard was well
known.
9

this other issue, support me with the immigration. Precisely, I want you to hire me so we can
resolve the immigration issue at the same time, since you didn't do the right thing since 1991,
June 23, 1991."
On cross-examination, however, Veltruski became loud and evasive when questioned
about whether he actually applied for a position with DOJ. He was admonished on several
occasions to lower his voice and respond to questions. He testified that he spoke with Diaz
only on the telephone and left his resume with a secretary and Shearer. Asked if he had ever
taken a test for a civil service appointment, Veltruski responded that he considered his work
experience as an interpreter to be the equivalent of one thousand oral and written tests.
Veltruski also testified that Diaz told him there were vacancies in her office, but it was later
established that the only vacancies were for attorney positions.
Ricardo Munoz (Munoz) is the presiding ALJ at the UIAB's Los Angeles office. He
has known Veltruski since approximately 1996. At all relevant times, Veltruski testified,
Munoz was familiar with many of his various appeals, including his claim that he was an
employee, pay disputes, and the immigration issue. Munoz also was aware that Veltruski had
served as an interpreter for the UIAB in its Inglewood office. In fact, Veltruski testified, at
the time he "was on good terms" with Munoz, although Munoz "doesn't speak to me anymore,
he's avoiding talking to me, lately." According to Veltruski, in a discussion in or about June
2000, Munoz said he would not hire him as an interpreter because he (Veltruski) would then
claim employee status with UIAB and try to unionize interpreters. Veltruski also testified that
Munoz said he preferred other interpreters who work as independent contractors and do not
complain about lack of employee status.
10

In June 2000, Hazel Cash (Cash) was the presiding judge at the UIAB office in Orange
County. Cash knew Veitruski because he worked in the Orange County office and was
involved in an incident where he disagreed with another judge about the method of
interpreting testimony of an employee who spoke limited English. In brief, the judge and
Veltruski disagreed about whether he should interpret certain parts of the hearing or the entire
hearing. Veltruski's position was that he should interpret the entire hearing, even if the
employee spoke some English and the process took longer. Veltruski was opposed to the
judge's position. He testified: "Either I am ordered to interpret the whole session or not hired
as an interpreter, because I am put in a position where I am the expert, I am responsible for
not translating the whole context of the hearing."
After this incident, Veltruski testified, he told Cash he wanted to unionize the
interpreters and continue working in the Orange County office and any other office she would
recommend. He said he also asked to be hired as an "auditor" who observed hearings and
"give [his] opinion as an expert translator/interpreter about the quality of interpreting services
provided to non-English speaking persons." Veltruski said Cash called him a troublemaker
and refused to employ him again. "And from then on I was not hired again, I was not given a
job," Veltruski said.
Jimmy Gomez (Gomez) is a supervisor in the DMV's City of Commerce field office.
Veltruski testified that he went to that office on several occasions in June and October of 2000
and told Gomez he wanted to work as an interpreter, driver safety officer, auditor or
investigator. According to Veltruski, Gomez refused to hire him because of his past
experience and "all this filings that I made in the past." Veltruski testified further that Gomez
suggested he (Veltruski) was wrong about the scope of his rights, and that he (Veltruski) was
11

"barking up the wrong tree." 	Therefore, Veltruski concluded, Gomez refused to hire him
because of his protected activities.
Ruben Beauchamp (Beauchamp) is a supervisor at the DMV field office in San
Bernardino. Veltruski said he worked for Beauchamp when he was the supervisor in the
Irvine office, and Beauchamp knew him "quite well." At about the same time he spoke to
Gomez, Veltruski apparently had a similar conversation with Beauchamp. Veltruski said he
asked Beauchamp for a job as an interpreter, undercover agent, investigator, support services
aide, and administrative assistant to the driver safety officers. According to Veltruski,
Beauchamp told him he would not hire him because ofVeltruski's various complaints and "all
this violence" that you have created.
Unfair Practice Charge Number LA-CE-562-S
Kim Johnson (Johnson) is a manager in the San Bernardino DMV office. Veltruski
has known him for several years. In fact, Johnson hired Veltruski during the mid-1990s in the
West Covina office, and Veltruski said he trained under Johnson at various times during the
1990s. Veltruski said he informed Johnson on several occasions that he wanted to become a
State employee with full benefits.
In or about March 2001, Veltruski testified, he went to the San Bernardino office and
told Johnson, "I'm here to work, I want to work, and you know me, and I'm applying for a job
with you." According to Veltruski, Johnson said he would not hire him because of complaints
he filed against Beauchamp.7
7 The precise charges filed against Beauchamp are not clear in the record. Veltruski
testified only that he had filed "charges or allegations" against Beauchamp.
12

Another incident involving Munoz occurred during a discussion on February 28, 2001.
Veltruski said he went to Munoz's office and during a discussion he (Veltruski) mentioned
organizing interpreters. When the discussion turned to the possibility of employment for
Veltruski in the DIAB office in Los Angeles, Veltruski testified, Munoz again said he would
not hire him because he would then insist on receiving employee status. Veltruski further
testified that Munoz said he would block any attempt to hire Veltruski from a third party
provider of interpreters. According to Veltruski, he asked Munoz to sponsor him in his
attempt to acquire immigration status with the INS, but Munoz suggested he marry an
American citizen as a way to address his immigration status. Veltruski further testified that
Munoz suggested he marry Hillary Clinton and become famous as the spouse of a senator.
That afternoon, Veltruski said he went to the DFEH to file a complaint against Munoz, but he
was advised he would have difficulty proving Munoz made the statement attributed to him.
Veltruski said a DFEH representative also suggested he pay an American citizen to marry him
so he could get his "papers."
Unfair Practice Charge Number LA-CE-564-S
Francis Knipe (Knipe) is the presiding judge in the DIAB office in Inglewood.
Veltruski worked in that office during 1996-1997. Knipe knew Veltruski and they spoke to
each other on many occasions. According to Veltruski, Knipe generally was aware of the
various actions he filed against State agencies, and Veltruski had discussed at least one of the
cases with him. During a conversation, Veltruski testified, he told Knipe he wanted to be
hired as an independent contractor, organize interpreters, and acquire employee status.
At some point, Veltruski was asked to listen to and transcribe a tape of a hearing held
on May 4, 2000, in the Inglewood office. Veltruski did so and was not satisfied with the way
13

the hearing had been conducted. In a June 15, 2000, memo to Knipe explaining his
dissatisfaction with the proceeding, Veltruski wrote, "I have found serious problems with the
process, the way the interpreter Lucy Perez was asked to perform her job, the way the [ALJ]
conducted the hearing. I want to be appointed a state employee and be assigned to auditing
these types of cases to write a report on how interpreters can better perform their services,
obtain appointments of interpreters as State employees with all benefits and permit me to
unionize interpreters, work or improving their performance and continued training. I have
been fighting for interpreters rights for soine time and I want to request your support .... 11
It
appears that Veltruski's dissatisfaction with the way the hearing was conducted related to his
view that the issue under litigation had an impact on national security matters. At the hearing,
he testified that he wants to be an auditor "and coordinate between state and federal what
[Director of Homeland Security] Tom Ridge is doing now, or should be doing. I mean, he
should hire me as an expert here. 11
According to V eltruski, during a later conversation with Knipe, he (Knipe) advised
Veltruski that he should accept the fact that he is an independent contractor, and indicated he
would not hire him because he would immediately claim employee status. Veltruski
continued to seek work as an interpreter/auditor. Eventually, Veltruski said, Knipe wrote him
a brief letter stating that there were no openings for interpreters at the time.
Unfair Practice Charge Number 566-S
Blanca Mercado (Mercado), according to Veltruski, works for EDD and is in charge of
determinations regarding the status of individuals who are applying for employment and
unemployment benefits. Veltruski said Mercado knows "very well who I am, and the
expertise that I have in financial matters, accounting matters, and immigration issues."
14

Veltruski testified that he asked Mercado for a job, and she refused to hire him or
consider his appiication on the merits. Apparentiy, Veitruski had a conversation with
Mercado in which he explained various options to address his employment status as far as the
INS
is concerned. It appears that he told Mercado that an employer could submit an INS form
in support
of
an "alien labor certification" or he could receive a "national interest waiver" to
establish the requisite status. Throughout these proceedings Veltruski has insisted that his
work as an interpreter, undercover investigator, accountant and stock market specialist is in
the national interest and his immigration status could be resolved on that basis with assistance
from the State. Still, Veltruski said, Mercado denied his request for employment.
Lisa Cook (Cook) is the personnel manager in the La Palma field office
of
the UIAB.
According to Veltruski, she too knew him "very well." Testimony about Cook is limited.
Veltruski said only that she retaliated against him and declined to consider his request for
employment on the merits. Referring to Mercado and Cook, Veltruski testified that "there is a
conspiracy against me, and it is very well mounted, and these people don't realize that I am
very stubborn."
A.V. Ortenzi (Ortenzi) is a senior deputy labor commissioner in the discrimination unit
of
the Division
of
Labor Standards. On several occasions, Veltruski said, he visited Ortenzi's
office in Los Angeles to pursue a salary claim he had against the DMV and the UIAB.
Veltruski testified that Ortenzi refused to entertain his claims, and he told Ortenzi, "I know
more than what you know, why are you taking seven months to make a decision on this, and
then you are short staffed, in Los Angeles you don't have people, qualified people."
In or about June 2001, Veltruski said he asked Ortenzi "for a job," informing him that
"I can help because I like conducting research and investigation, I am bilingual, I am perfectly
15

qualified to help you in this discrimination complaint unit." Veltruski said Ortenzi refused to
consider his application on the merits. Veltruski also said Ortenzi was aware
of
his protected
conduct because he had informed him earlier that he was trying to unionize interpreters and he
was "fighting for the rights
of
interpreters."
ISSUE
Did the State discriminate against Veltruski as an applicant for employment,
in
violation
of
section 3519(a)?
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The consolidated complaints allege that the State discriminated against Veltruski as an
applicant for employment when various agencies refused to hire him because
of
this protected
activity. The State alleges in its motion to dismiss that Veltruski does not qualify as
an
applicant for employment under the Dills Act. There is no evidence, the State contends, that
Veltruski was ever on a civil service list that made him eligible to be hired, nor is there
evidence that he even applied for a civil service position or has ever taken a civil service
examination. Therefore, the State contends, Veltruski has not shown that he has suffered
harm and thus he has not established a prima facie case. Assuming that the State refused to
hire Veltruski, the State continues, federal law provides an absolute defense to it's actions;
that is, Veltruski was "out
of
legal status" and the State lawfully could not hire him until he
acquired such status.
In response, V eltruski reiterates his claim that he has suffered discrimination as an
applicant for employment under the Dills Act. He further contends he has been denied a
number
of
due process rights. Among other things, he contends he has not been informed of
the weight the undersigned has assigned to evidence presented at hearing. He contends he has
16

not been given the opportunity to review documentary evidence and transcripts
of
the hearing.
He contends he has not been given the opportunity to cross-examine the State's witnesses. He
contends he has not been permitted to present additional documents and testimony; he
contends he was not been permitted to present an oral argument at the hearing. He contends
the State has not complied with a directive to produce documents relevant to his service with
the State. And he contends PERB should complete the formal hearing. In addition, Veltruski
offers a lengthy narrative
of
events that are irrelevant to this proceeding. They range from
references to the so-called ENRON scandal to Arab terrorists to issues surrounding his
immigration status. These matters will not be considered here. Finally, Veltruski writes,
"I
propose that I be compensated with $50,000 cash by the CA State to resolve all the cases
before PERB, and that the CA agencies and officers involved apologize [to] me and write
letters to INS about my ample experience in the various areas as an investigator, auditor, court
and administrative assistant and that my services in the future will continue to serve the
National Interest."
The right to challenge employer practices as discriminatory is not without its limits.
The Dills Act provides that only "employees" or "applicants" for employment enjoy its
protections. Section 3519(a) provides that it is unlawful for the State to
Impose or threaten to impose reprisals on employees, to
discriminate or threaten to discriminate against employees, or
otherwise to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees
because
of
their exercise
of
rights guaranteed by this chapter.
For purposes
of
this subdivision, "employee" includes an
applicant for employment or reemployment.
The theory advanced by the consolidated complaints is that Veltruski suffered discrimination
as an applicant for employment.
17

To prevail on a charge
of
discrimination, Veltruski must establish that he engaged in
protected conduct, his activity was known to the various individuals in the agencies alleged to
have discriminated against him, and these individuals took adverse action against him because
of
such activity. (Novato Unified School District (1982) PERB Decision No. 210 (Novato).)
Unlawful motivation is essential to establish a prima facie case
of
discrimination. In the
absence
of
direct evidence, an inference
of
unlawful motivation may be drawn from the record
as a whole, as supported by circumstantial evidence. (Carlsbad Unified School District
(1979) PERB Decision No. 89.) From Novato and a number
of
subsequent cases, it has been
recognized that a variety
of
circumstances may justify an inference
of
unlawful motivation on
the part
of
the employer. (See e.g., Oakdale Union Elementary School District (1998) PERB
Decision No. 1246, p. 15.)
Once unlawful motive is established, the burden
of
proof shifts to the State to establish
that it would have taken the action complained
of
even in the absence
of
protected activities.
(Novato; Martori Brothers Distributors
v.
Agricultural Labor Relations Board (1981) 29
Cal.3d
721
[175 Cal.Rptr. 626] (Martori).) The State's action should not be deemed an unfair
practice unless the Board determines that "but for" Veltruski's protected conduct he would
have been employed. (Ibid.)
Adverse action is a key element in establishing a prima facie case
of
discrimination.
Absent evidence
of
an adverse action, there is no need to follow a Novato analysis even where
the employer's action resulted from an employee's protected conduct. (Palo Verde Unified
School District (1988) PERB Decision No. 689, p.
13
(Palo Verde).) In that case the Board
followed federal precedent holding that "a bad motive without effect is no more an unfair
labor practice than an unexecuted evil intent is a crime." (Palo Verde at p. 8, relying
on
18

NLRB v. Wright Line, a Division
of
Wright Line, Inc. (1980) 251 NLRB 1083 [105 LRRM
1179], enforcement granted
(1
st Cir. 1981) 662 F.2d 899 [108 LRRM 2513, 2516], cert. den.
(1982) 455 U.S. 989 [109 LRRM 2779] (Wright Line).) The test to determine
if
an employee
suffered an adverse action is an objective one: "[t]he test which must be satisfied is not
whether the employee found the employer's action to be adverse, but whether a reasonable
person under the same circumstances would consider the action to have an adverse impact on
the employee's employment." (Newark Unified School District (1991) PERB Decision No.
864, pp. 11-12 (Newark).)
I am aware
of
no PERB case that involves the application
of
these rules to an alleged
discriminatory refusal to hire an applicant for employment. However, the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) has addressed the issue. 8 Applying a Wright Line analysis to a
discriminatory refusal to hire an individual who submitted an employment application and a
test questionnaire, and identified himself as a union business agent who was seeking a
job
"in
order to organize its employees," the NLRB stated: "[t]he elements
of
a discriminatory
refusal-to-hire case are the employment application
...
the refusal to hire
...
a showing that
[the applicant] was or might be expected to be a union supporter or sympathizer, and further
showings that the employer knew or suspected such sympathy or support, maintained an
animus against it, and refused to hire the applicant because
of
such animus." (Aneco, Inc.
(1998) 325 NLRB 400 [157 LRRM 1177] (Aneco); citing Big E's Foodland (1979) 242 NLRB
8 Although the language
of
the Dills Act is not identical to the National Labor
Relations Act
(NLR~A.),
the Board looks to the NLRB's construction of the NLRA for
guidance in interpreting the various statutes it administers. (See e.g., Oakdale, pp. 18-19, fn.
8, citing McPherson v. PERB (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 293, 311 [234 Cal.Rptr. 428]; State of
California (Department of Corrections) (2001) PERB Decision No. 1435-S.)
19

963, 968 [101 LRRM 1422].) There was no dispute in Aneco that jobs were available and the
charging party actually applied for them.
The requirement that an applicant actually submit an application for an available
position is an important factor in establishing a prima facie case under a discriminatory
refusal to hire theory. In Irwin Industries (1998) 325 NLRB 796 [158 LRRM 1218] (Irwin),
the NLRB upheld an administrative law judge's finding that an employer did not discriminate
against applicants who applied for jobs and designated themselves as "volunteer union
organizer[ s]." In agreeing with the judge, the NLRB relied on the judge's finding that at the
time
of
the application, the employer "was not in a hiring mode," "there was no work
immediately available for [the applicants]," and the employer's established practice was not to
hire employees simply on the basis
of
the submission
of
applications with no follow up
contacts with the employer. (Irwin at p. 798.) In dismissing a similar case, the NLRB
stressed that the general counsel failed to establish that there were jobs available for new hires
at the time
of
the applications. (Bay Control Services (1994) 315 NLRB 30, fn. 2 [147 LRRM
1212] (Bay Control).)
Applying these cases to the allegations in the consolidated complaints, I conclude that
Veltruski has not established the elements
of
a prima facie case because there is no evidence
that he suffered an adverse action. There is no evidence that he submitted an application for
employment in accordance with civil service requirements. There is no evidence that he was
interviewed or competed in any way for a position in accord with civil service requirements.
There is no evidence that he was on an eligibility list. There is no concrete evidence that any
of the various State agencies named in the complaints even had vacant civil service positions
at the time Veltruski indicated he wanted to be hired as a State employee. Nor is there
20

evidence that other applicants were hired in place of Veltruski for any position in State civil
service.
The record shows only that Veltruski, on several occasions, merely indicated his desire
to work as a civil service employee and requested such a position in the context of his various
encounters with representatives of the charged agencies. The picture painted by Veltruski in
his testimony is that he had contact with various State agencies as a result of his work as an
interpreter and his numerous complaints, and he aggressively made it known to all that he
wanted to work for the State. But his testimony fails to establish that vacancies for positions
covered by the Dills Act existed, or that he formally applied for any such vacancy in accord
with established civil service procedures.
For example, it appears that Veltruski asked Diaz in a telephone conversation for
employment in settlement of a lawsuit. He testified that he told Diaz, "we can solve this
[lawsuit] and you can give me a job." Veltruski first said DOJ was interviewing for attorneys,
assistants, and "different positions," but his later testimony suggests that the only vacancies
were for attorneys. And there is no evidence that he was qualified for any position at DOJ or
that he took the necessary step of submitting an employment application, as is required under
established civil service procedures.
The same is true of Munoz's alleged refusal to hire Veltruski. Munoz knew V eltruski
as a result of his work as an interpreter in the past. It appears that the two men were well
acquainted and it was not uncommon for them to engage in wide-ranging discussions.
Munoz's suggestion that Veltruski marry Hillary Clinton is one indication of the kind of
discussions that occurred. In the context of these wide-ranging discussions, Veltruski said, he
made it known to Munoz that he wanted to work as a civil service employee with full benefits.
21

However, Veltruski has identified no vacant civil service position at UIAB, nor has he
estabiished that he submitted an application for employment. 9
Veltruski's discussions with Cash similarly were not in the form of a formal
application for employment. It appears that they occurred on the heels of a disagreement
between Veltruski and a judge about whether Veltruski should interpret the entire hearing or
only relevant parts of it. The incident prompted Veltruski to tell Cash he wanted to continue
working in the UIAB Orange County office and any other office she could recommend.
Veltruski viewed his work highly and was motivated by a desire to be an "expert
translator/interpreter" and audit hearings to evaluate the quality of interpreting in the office.
Against this background he merely asked Cash for such a job or a referral. There is no
evidence that a vacant position existed in the UIAB Orange County office, or that Veltruski
applied for a position for which he met minimum qualifications.
Veltruski requested a similar position (as that requested of Cash) from Gomez in the
DMV City of Commerce office. It appears from Veltruski's own testimony that he merely
went to that office on several occasions and told Gomez he wanted to work there. Gomez
may have told Veltruski that he was wrong about the scope of his rights and he was barking
up the wrong tree, but such comments are not unlawful. Once again, there is no evidence that
he formally applied for a vacant position.
The circumstances surrounding events in the San Bernardino office of the DMV are
similar. Beauchamp and Johnson served as supervisors in that office, and they were well
acquainted with Veltruski. According to Veltruski's testimony, he simply went to the
San Bernardino office and on different occasions informed Beauchamp and Johnson that he
9 The alleged refusal to hire Veltruski as an interpreter is addressed below.
22

wanted to work there. There is no evidence that a vacancy existed or that Veltruski submitted
an appiication.
Veltruski's request for employment in the UIAB Inglewood office came after he
transcribed a tape of a hearing. He found problems with the process and the way the
interpreter was asked to perform her duties. Accordingly, he testified, he told Knipe he
wanted to be appointed a State employee and assigned to auditing cases with the goal of
improving service. Although Veltruski said Knipe refused to hire him out of a concern that he
would argue for employee status for interpreters, he also testified that Knipe advised Veltruski
to accept his status as an independent contractor and eventually sent him a letter saying there
were no vacancies in the office at the time. 	There is no evidence that Veltruski actually
applied for a vacant position with Knipe.
Veltruski testified that Mercado refused his request for a job at EDD and Cook refused
to consider him for employment with the UIAB in La Palma. There is little evidence
surrounding these requests, except that he testified Mercado and Cook had mounted a
conspiracy against him. 	Once again, evidence that Veltruski applied for a vacant position is
lacking.
Veltruski's requests for employment at the Labor Commissioner's office came in the
context of a visit to pursue salary claims against the DMV and UIAB. 	When Ortenzi rejected
the claims, Veltruski asserted that he knew more than Ortenzi, rejection of the claims was
untimely, and the office was short-staffed and lacked quality people. Veltruski then asked
Ortenzi for a job, claiming that he could help the situation. But Veltruski has not established
that a vacancy existed in Ortenzi' s office or, even if it did, that he submitted an application.
23

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Veltruski asked several people in various
agencies for employment as a State employee. In some instances, he merely requested
employment during conversations with agency representatives because he wanted to work as a
State employee with full benefits. On other occasions, he considered the staffing
of
certain
State agencies inadequate and viewed the performance
of
certain State employees as sub-
standard. In yet other circumstances he volunteered that he had advanced skills as an
interpreter, auditor, investigator, undercover agent, or accountant and announced his
availability for employment.
However, a key element
of
a discriminatory refusal to hire case has not been
established because there is no evidence that Veltruski ever formally submitted an
"employrnent application" for a civil service position in any
of
the State agencies named in
the consolidated complaints. (Aneco at p. 400.) There is no evidence that any
of
the agencies
were "in a hiring mode" at the time Veltruski claims he applied. (Irwin at p. 798.)
Nor
is
there evidence that the agencies had "jobs available for new hires" at the time Veltruski says
he applied. (Bay Control at p. 30, fn. 2.) The process for hiring State employees is a formal
one. Ordinarily, a position must be announced, applications must be submitted, and other
well-established competitive steps must be followed. None
of
these events occurred here.
Nor is there evidence that other applicants were hired in positions for which Veltruski was
qualified.
Therefore, I conclude that Veltruski has failed to establish that he was a bona fide
applicant for a vacant civil service position within the meaning
of
section 3519(a). It is
further concluded that a reasonable person would not conclude on this record that Veltruski
24

has suffered an adverse action and thus he has not established an essential element of a prima
facie case of discrimination in hiring. 10 (Palo Verde at p. 12; Newark at pp. 11-12.)
Although it is true that the State ceased to use Veltruski's services as an interpreter,
the decision to do so does not effect the outcome here. Veltruski has not shown that he is
covered by the Dills Act as a result of his work as an interpreter, nor has he presented
evidence that other interpreters are covered by the Act.
For Veltruski to fall under the Dills Act, he must establish that he was a State
employee. Section 3 513( c) defines State employee as follows.
"State employee" means any civil service employee of the state,
and the teaching staff of schools under the jurisdiction of the
State Department of Education or the Superintendent of Public
Instruction, except managerial employees, confidential
employees, supervisory employees, employees of the
Department of Personnel Administration, professional
employees of the Department of Finance engaged in technical or
analytical state budget preparation other than the auditing staff,
professional employees in the Personnel/Payroll Services
Division of the Controller's office engaged in technical or
analytical duties in support of the state's personnel and payroll
systems other than the training staff, employees of the
Legislative Counsel Bureau, employees of the Bureau of State
Audits, employees of the office of the Inspector General,
employees of the board, conciliators employed by the State
Conciliation Service within the Department of Industrial
Relations, and intermittent athletic inspectors who are
employees of the State Athletic Commission.
The only category in this definition under which Veltruski arguably falls is that of "civil
service employee."
10 This conclusion is not intended to establish a strict requirement that every applicant
for employment must, at minimum, establish the existence of a vacant position for which he is
qualified and a submission of a formal application as a prerequisite for protection under the
Dills Act. I would not rule out the possibility that an employer may run afoul of section
3519(a), even absent these factors. 	Based on the evidence presented here, however, it is
concluded that Veltruski was not a bona fide applicant for employment under section 3519(a).
25

PERB cases that have addressed the question of employee status under section 3513( c)
argue against a finding that Veltruski is a State employee by virtue of his work as an
interpreter. In a case determining whether seasonal lifeguards are civil service employees, the
Board observed:
... The State of California "purchases" the services of
individuals in one of two ways: (1) contracting for needed
services, special skills and/or background; and (2) hiring an
individual as an employee. In none of the petitions before the
Board is there a contract between the individual and the state.
Rather, the individual is placed on the state payroll, in a state
civil service classification with a classification code number.
The individual may contribute to the retirement system, may be
eligible for a variety of employee benefits, is subject to state
discipline, and has a variety of employee rights. Therefore, all
of the individuals in the contested classifications are state
employees. 	[State of California (Department of Personnel
Administration) (1990) PERB Decision No. 787-S, p. 13
(DPA I); underlining in original.]
In DPA I, the Board also noted that the determination of civil service employee status within
the meaning of the California Constitution and the Dills Act must take other factors into
account. 11
... All personnel appointments other than the specific exempt
appointments are therefore part of the civil service system and
have some form of civil service status, whether it be seasonal,
limited term, permanent, part-time, or any other type. 	[DP A I at
p. 14; see also State of California (Department of Personnel
Administration) (1991) PERB Decision No. 871-S (DPA II).]
The Board has observed further that a personnel "appointment" is defined by section 18525,
as an "offer to and acceptance by a person of a position in state civil service ... " (State of
11 The Constitution Article VII, section 1, provides that the "civil service includes
every officer and employee of the state except as otherwise provided in Article VII,
section 4." Section 4 lists 13 exemptions, none of which are relevant here.
26

California (Department
of
Corrections (1997) PERB Decision No. 1224-S, pp. 6-7
(Department
of
Corrections).)
Although Veltruski provided services to the State as an interpreter and was paid for his
work, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that he ever held a civil service position.
There in no evidence, for example, that he was hired into a civil service classification with a
classification code number. There is no evidence that he applied for an announced vacancy
and participated in civil service testing procedures. There is no evidence that he was paid as a
civil service employee. There is no evidence that he received health and other benefits, as do
civil service employees. There is no evidence that retirement or social security contributions
were deducted from his paycheck. There is no evidence that federal or state taxes were
withheld from his paycheck. When the various State agencies decided to no longer use his
services, there is no evidence that he was terminated with any
of
the applicable due process
procedures ordinarily provided to civil service employees; he simply was not asked to serve as
an interpreter any longer. Factors such as these argue against a finding that Veltruski was a
civil service employee within the meaning
of
section 3513(c). (DPA I at p. 13; see Unit
Determination for the State
of
California (1981) PERB Decision No. 1 l0d-S, p. 5, adopting
recommendation
of
hearing officer.)
On the other hand, there is evidence that the State purchased Veltruski's services as an
independent contractor. Documentary evidence from 1996 indicates that Veltruski was
assigned a vendor's number and received payment based on invoices he submitted to EDD for
his services. Evidence related to his payment from DMV in 1996 shows that he received a
Form 1099, Miscellaneous Income. The form shows that Veltruski was paid for his services,
but it contains no deductions for taxes or medical and health care premiums. Further, despite
27

Veltruski's claims, the State has always considered him an independent contractor. On
June 29, 1999, for example, Wohlford responded to an inquiry sent to the Governor,
explaining to Veltruski that "as far as DMV is concerned, you were an independent contractor,
not an employee of the department as you claim." Factors such as these argue in favor of a
finding that Veltruski provided services to the State as an independent contractor. As the
Board observed in DP A I, contracting for services is one way for the State to purchase such
services, but an independent contractor does not necessarily acquire civil service employee
status by virtue of the contract. (DPA I at p. 13.)
In addition, Veltruski has not established that he ever received an appointment from
the State. Only "personnel appointments ... are ... part of the civil service system and have
some form of civil service status, whether it be seasonal, limited term, permanent, part-time,
or any other type." (DPA I at p. 14.) As noted above, a personnel "appointment" is defined
by section 18535, as an "offer to and acceptance by a person of a position in state civil
service." (See also Department of Corrections at pp. 6-7.) There is no evidence that Veltruski
received such an appointment.
Based on the foregoing, I conclude that Veltruski has not shown that he was a civil
service employee within the meaning of section 3513( c) during the time he provided services
to the State as an interpreter. Because there is virtually no evidence in the record regarding
the conditions under which other interpreters provided services to the State, their employment
status cannot be determined here. Therefore, Veltruski has not established that the decisions
made by various agencies to no longer purchase his services as an interpreter were covered by
the Dills Act.
28

V eltruski' s Due Process Claims
Veltruski argues that he has not been permitted to present additional documents and
testimony. However, a review of the record here shows that the opposite is true. At each
stage of the hearing process he was advised on the appropriate way to proceed. In a series of
prehearing letters from the undersigned to the parties, the elements of a prima facie case and
related matters were explained. During the hearing, Veltruski was given the opportunity to
present testimonial evidence, documentary evidence, and an inordinate amount of
"background" evidence of marginal relevance. 	On several occasions during his presentation
he was directed to focus the presentation of evidence on the specific allegations in the
complaints. For example, at the outset of the hearing, the process was explained and he was
informed that he needed to present evidence to support the allegations in the complaints. 12
Throughout the first day of hearing he was again informed that he needed to present evidence
to support the allegations in the complaints. 13 On the second day of hearing, he insisted on
presenting marginally relevant evidence that was cumulative, and he was informed again of
the need to address issues raised by the complaints. 14 Late on the second day of hearing, he
was again invited to present additional evidence that related to the allegations in the
complaints. 15 At the end of his testimony, he could identify no other witnesses who had
·re levant testimony to present. 16
12 Reporter's transcript (RT) Vol. I, pp. 7, 10.
13 	l	RT Vo. I, pp. 29, 64, 49-50, 94-95, 122-123.
14 	l	RT Vo. II, p. 25.
15 	1	RT Vo. II, p. 81.
16 	1	RT Vo. II, pp. 74-80.
29

In addition, Veltruski contends the State has unlawfully refused to provide him with
documents related to the complaints. Prior to the hearing, Veitruski filed a defective
subpoena duces tecum (SDT). Rather than attempt to have Veltruski cure the numerous
defects, the undersigned directed the State to provide "any available documents relating to
Mr. Veltruski's employment." The directive was designed to expedite the hearing process. 17
At the hearing, counsel for the State provided limited documents and made a good faith
representation that a search was conducted and no other documents could be found because
Veltruski was an independent contractor and the State does not maintain documents for more
than two years. 18 Although Veltruski contests the State's representation, I find no reason to
do so.
Veltruski also contends that he was not permitted to cross-examine the State's
witnesses or present an oral argument. It is true that the undersigned ALJ informed Veltruski
that he would be permitted to present an oral argument at the end of the proceeding.
However, the right to cross-examine the State's witnesses or present an oral closing argument
assumes that the charging party presents a prima facie case and the proceeding moves beyond
its case-in-chief. As explained elsewhere in this proposed decision that has not happened
here.
Finally, Veltruski argues that he has not been permitted access to the hearing transcript
or the exhibits. As the charging party who introduced the exhibits into the record, Veltruski
has or should have copies of the exhibits. Further, Veltruski was informed at the beginning of
the hearing, on November 27, 2001, that to review the transcript he would be required to
17 See August 27, 2001, letter from ALJ to the parties.
1s RT Vo l . I, pp. 11, 17.
30

purchase it, apply for a waiver of costs, or review the transcript at the PERB office in Los
Angeles "if [he] set up an appointment to do thaC'19 Veltruski took no steps along these lines
until on or about February 11, 2002, when he requested that he be permitted to review the
transcript. The request was more than two months after he was informed that he would have
to make an appointment to review the transcript; it was after an extension granted at
Veltruski's request from January 30 to February 8 to submit written argument; and it was after
the extended date for submission of written argument had passed. Based on these
circumstances, I conclude that Veltruski's request is untimely and, if granted, would serve
only to delay the proceeding.
PROPOSED ORDER
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions ofiaw, it is ordered that
the consolidated complaints and the underlying unfair practice charges in Case Nos.
LA-CE-556-S, LA-CE-562-S, LA-CE-564-S and LA-CE-566-S, Veltruski v. State of
California, are hereby dismissed.
Pursuant to California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 32305, this Proposed
Decision and Order shall become final unless a party files a statement of exceptions with the
Public Employment Relations Board (PERB or Board) itself within 20 days of service of this
Decision. The Board's address is:
19 	I	RT Vo. I,p. 8.
Public Employment Relations Board
Attention: Appeals Assistant
1031 18th Street
Sacramento, CA 95814-4174
FAX: (916) 327-7960
31

In accordance with PERB regulations, the statement
of
exceptions should identify
by
page citation or exhibit number the portions
of
the record,
if
any, relied upon for such
exceptions. (Cal. Code Regs., tit.
8,
sec. 32300.)
A document is considered "filed" when actually received before the close
of
business
(5
p.m.) on the last day set for filing or when mailed
by
certified or Express United States
mail, as shown on the postal receipt or postmark, or delivered to a common carrier promising
overnight delivery, as shown on the carrier's receipt, not later than the last day set for filing.
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, secs. 32135(a) and 32130.)
A document is also considered "filed" when received by facsimile transmission before
the close
of
business on the last day for filing together with a Facsimile Transmission Cover
Sheet which meets the requirements
of
California Code
of
Regulations, title 8,
section 32135( d), provided the filing party also places the original, together with the required
number
of
copies and proof
of
service, in the U.S. mail. 	(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, sec.
32135(b), (c) and (d); see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, secs. 32090 and 32130.)
Any statement
of
exceptions and supporting brief must be served concurrently with its
filing upon each party to this proceeding. Proof
of
service shall accompany each copy served
on a party or filed with the Board itself. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, secs. 32300, 32305,
32140, and 32135(c).)
32
FRED D'ORAZIO
Administrative
	Law
	Judge