California Correctional Peace Officers Association (Negrete) (PERB 1218S)

STATE
	OF
	CALIFORNIA
DECISION
	OF
	THE
PUBLIC
	EMPLOYMENT
	RELATIONS
	BOARD
VICTOR 	X. 	NEGRETE,
Charging
	Party,
v.
CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONAL
	PEACE
OFFICERS 	ASSOCIATION,
Respondent.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case
	No.
	LA-C0-72-S
PERB
	Decision
	No.
	1218-S
September
	18,
	1997
____________________
)
Appearances:	
Victor
	X.
	Negrete,
	on
	his
	own
	behalf;
	ChristineAlbertine,
	Attorney,
	for 	California 	Correctional
	Peace
	Officers
Association.
Before 	Caffrey,
	Chairman;
	Amador
	and
	Jackson,
	Members.
DECISION
JACKSON,
	Member:
	This 	case
	comes
	before 	the 	Public
Employment
	Relations
	Board
	(PERB
	or
	Board) 	on
	Victor
	X.
	Negrete's
(Negrete}
	appeal
	from
	a
	Board
	agent's
	dismissal
	(attached)
	of
	his.
unfair 	practice
	charge.
	As
	amended,
	the
	charge
	alleged
	that
	the
California 	Correctional
	Peace
	Officers 	Association 	(Association)
violated 	sections
	3515.7(g) 	and 	3519.5(b)
	of 	the
	Ralph
	C.
	Dills
Act
	(Dills
	Act)
1
when
	it
	settled
	a
	group
	of 	grievances, 	including
1
The
	Dills
	Act
	is
	codified
	at
	Government
	Code
	section
	3512
et
	seq. 	Unless 	otherwise 	indicated,
	all
	statutory 	references
herein 	are 	to 	the
	Government 	Code.
	Section
	3515.7
	provides, 	inrelevant 	part:
(g) 	An
	employee
	who
	pays
	a
	fair
	share 	fee
shall
	be
	entitled 	to 	fair
	and
	impartial
representation
	by
	the 	recognized 	employee
organization.
	A
breach 	of 	this 	duty 	shall
	bedeemed
	to 	have 	occurred
	if
	the 	employee
organization's 	conduct 	in 	representation 	is
arbitrary, 	discriminatory, 	or 	in 	bad 	faith.

one
	filed
	by
	Negrete,
	against
	the
	California
	Department
	of
Corrections.
Section
	3519.5
	provides, 	in 	relevant 	part:
(b) 	Impose
	or 	threaten 	to
	impose
	reprisals
on 	employees,
	to 	discriminate 	or 	threaten 	to
discriminate 	against
	employees,
	or 	otherwise
to 	interfere 	with, 	restrain, 	or 	coerceemployees 	because 	of
	their 	exercise 	of 	rightsguaranteed by
	this 	chapter.
The
	Board
	has 	reviewed
	the
	entire
	record
	in
	this
	case,
including 	Negrete's
	original
	and
	amended
	unfair 	practice
	charge,
the
	warning
	and
	dismissal
	letters,
	Negrete's 	appeal,
	and
	the
Association's
	response
	thereto.
	The
	Board
	finds 	the
	warning
	and
dismissal
	letters
	to
	be
	free
	from
	prejudicial 	error
	and
	adopts
them
	as 	the
	decision
	of
	the
	Board
	itself.
NEGRETE'S 	APPEAL
On
	appeal,
	Negrete 	argues
	that
	the
	Board
	agent
	erred
	in
dismissing
	his
	charge.
	Negrete 	contends
	that
	the 	expired
	1992-95
collective
	bargaining
	agreement
	(CBA)
	between
	the
	Association
	and
the
	state
	employer
	demonstrates
	that
	the
	Association's 	settlement
was
	without
	rational 	basis
	and
	completely devoid
	of 	honest
judgment.
ASSOCIATION'S 	RESPONSE
In
	its
	response, 	the 	Association
	contends
	that
	Negrete 	has
not
	identified
	any
	basis 	for 	granting 	his
	appeal.
	The
Association 	argues
	that
	the
	Board
	agent 	properly held
	that
Negrete
	failed 	to 	allege 	facts 	sufficient 	to 	support
	a
	prima
facie
	case
	for 	violation
	of 	the 	duty 	of
	fair
	representation.
2

DISCUSSION
As 	the 	Board 	agent.noted, 	the 	Board 	will 	find 	a 	violation 	of
the 	duty 	of 	fair 	representation 	only 	if 	the 	exclusive
representative's 	conduct 	is 	arbitrary, 	discriminatory, 	or 	in 	bad
faith. 	(Dills 	Act 	section 	3515.7(g); 	California 	State 	Employees'
Association 	(Morrow) 	(1987) 	PERB 	Decision No. 	614-S, 	proposed
decision 	at 	p. 	11.) 	On 	appeal, 	Negrete 	renews 	his 	argument 	that
the 	CBA 	clearly 	and 	unequivocally 	supports 	his 	grievance.
Negrete 	asserts 	that 	the 	Association 	acted 	arbitrarily 	and
without 	rational 	basis 	when 	it 	settled 	his 	grievance 	in 	a 	manner
which was 	not 	favorable 	to 	him. 	We 	disagree.
Although Ne.grete 	arguably 	suffered 	some 	harm due 	to 	the
group 	settlement, 	the 	settlement 	has 	every 	appearance 	of 	an
attempt 	to 	reconcile 	CBA 	language 	and 	longstanding 	past 	practice.
As 	the 	Board 	agent 	noted, 	the 	Association has 	a 	responsibility 	to
represent 	all 	the 	members 	of 	the 	bargaining 	unit. 	(California
School 	Employees 	Association 	and 	its 	Chapter 	107 	(Marguez) 	(1995)
PERB 	Decision No. 	1097, 	warning 	letter 	at 	p. 	4.) 	Accordingly, 	a
good 	faith, 	rational, 	and 	nondiscriminatory 	settlement 	agreement
which 	benefits 	some 	unit 	members 	and 	not 	others 	does 	not 	violate
the 	duty 	of 	fair 	representation. 	(Sacramento 	City 	Teachers
Association 	(Fanning, 	et 	al.) 	(1984) 	PERB 	Decision 	No. 	428 	at
p. 	8.)
3

ORDER
The
	unfair 	practice
	charge
	in
	Case
	No. 	LA-CO-72-S
	is
	hereby
DISMISSED
	WITHOUT
	LEAVE
	TO
	AMEND.
Chairman
	Caffrey
	and
	Member
	Amador
	joined
	in
	this
	Decision.
4

,.
STATE
OF
CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONS BOARD
Los
Angeles
Regional
Office
3
530
Wilshire Blvd.,
Suite
650
Los Angeles,
CA
90010-2334
(213)
736-3127
June
	27,
	1997
Victor.
	X.
	Neqrete
Re:
	Victor
	X.
	Negrete
	v.
	California
	Correctional
	Peace
	Officers
AssociationUnfair
	Practice
	Charge
	No. 	LA-CO-72-S
DISMISSAL
	AND
	REFUSAL
	TO
	ISSUE 	A COMPLAINT
Dear
	Mr.
	Negrete:
The
	above-referenced
	unfair 	practice
	charge,
	alleges 	the
California 	Correctional
	Peace
	Officers
	Association
	(CCPOA)
violated
	its
	duty 	of
	fair
	representation
	by
	settling
	your
grievance. 	This
	conduct
	is
	alleged 	to 	violate
	Government 	Code
section
	3519.5
	of 	the
	Ralph
	C.
	Dills
	Act
	(Dills
	Act
	or 	Act).
On
	June
	10, 	1997,
	I
	issued
	a
	warning
	letter
	advising
	you
	that
	the
above-referenced 	charge
	failed
	to
	state
	a
	prima
	facie 	case.
	You
amended
	the 	charge
	on
	June 	17, 	1997.
Your
	charge
	alleges 	that
	CCPOA
violated
	its
	duty 	of
	fair
representation
	when
	it
	settled
	a
	number
	of 	grievances
	which
concerned
	the 	proper 	anniversary 	date 	for 	the 	granting 	of
	Merit
Salary
	Adjustments
	(MSA)
. 1	
The
	grievances 	alleged 	the
anniversary 	date
	should
	be 	one
	year
	from
	the 	date 	the
	officer
started 	at
	the
	Academy,
	rather
	than
	one
	year
	from
	the 	date 	the
officer
	began working
	at
	an
	Institution.
	In
	its
	settlement
agreement
	with 	the 	State
	of
	California,
	CCPOA
	stated:
The
	parties
	agree
	that
	the 	intent
	of 	16.03(d)
and Appendix
	13
	is
	to 	describe
	how
	employees
get
	moved
	from 	Range
	"A"
	to
	Range 	"C".
	Since
Range
	"C"
	was
	created
	on
	June 	1, 	1989,
	thelanguage 	of 	16.03(d) 	and 	Appendix
	13
	only
applies 	to
	employees
	hired
	between 	June 	1,
1989
	and 	October 	1, 	1992.
The 	amended
	charge 	alleges 	contrary 	to
	CCPOA's
	settlement, 	the
creation 	of
	Range
	C
does 	not
	justify
	CCPOA's
	settlement 	agreement
with 	the 	State 	of 	California
	on
	the
	MSA
	issue. 	Attachment
	C
	to
Article
	16.01 	of 	the
	1988-1991
	MOU
	included 	the 	following 	example
of
	a
	salary
	movement:
1On
	January 	17, 	1997, 	William Horspool 	filed 	Unfair 	Practice
Charge 	LA-CO-71-S 	based 	on 	nearly 	identical 	facts.
(	
PETE
WILSON, Governor

LA-CO-72-8
Dismissal 	Letter
June 	27, 	1997
Page 	2
Sample 	Salary Movement 	for 	New Hires:
Event 	Hired 	Before
6/1/89
Hired After
6/1/89
Hire 	1694 	1694
Com. 	Acad. 	2476 	2336
Yr. 	after 	hire 	2600 	2600
You 	allege 	Attachment 	C demonstrates 	that 	employees 	hired 	both
before 	and 	after 	the 	creation 	of 	Range 	Con 	June 	1, 	1989, 	were
supposed 	to 	receive 	an 	increase 	a 	year 	after 	their 	hire 	date.
Thus, 	you 	argue, 	the 	contract 	clearly 	indicates 	the 	creation 	of
Range 	C is 	irrelevant 	to 	the 	determination 	of 	when MSAs 	should be
given.
However, 	the 	language 	of 	Attachment 	C to 	the 	1988-1991 	MOU, 	does
not 	demonstrate 	CCPOA acted 	arbitrarily. 	Although 	the 	sample
cited 	seems 	to 	indicate 	employees 	hired 	both 	before 	and 	after
June 	1, 	1989, 	would 	receive 	their MSA 	increase 	one 	year 	after
being 	hired, 	this 	was 	apparently 	not 	the 	parties' 	intention.
From 	1982 	to 	1997, 	the 	proper 	date 	for 	awarding MSAs 	changed
several 	times, 	and 	resulted 	in 	numerous 	grievances. 	The 	proper
date 	to 	award MSAs 	was 	an 	ongoing 	issue. 	In 	fact, 	even 	the
parties' 	1992-1995 	MOU made 	further 	attempts 	to 	clarify 	the 	MSA
issue. 	Article 	16.03(d) 	of 	the 	1992-1995 	MOU 	indicates:
For 	employees 	hired 	prior 	to 	10/1/92, 	MSA
dates 	for 	Correctional 	Officers, 	... 	are
calculated 	from 	initial 	appointment 	dates 	at
the 	Academy and 	not 	when 	appointed 	to 	Range 	B
at 	the 	institution.
Despite 	this 	new 	contract 	language, 	the 	confusion 	regarding 	the
proper MSA dates 	continued 	until 	the 	parties 	signed 	the
settlement 	agreement 	at 	issue 	here. 	It 	appears 	the 	parties 	did
not 	intend 	for 	all 	employees 	hired 	prior 	to 	10/1/92 	to 	receive
the 	MSA 	increase 	on 	the 	anniversary 	of 	when 	they 	started 	the
Academy. 	Rather, 	the 	parties 	decided 	to 	incorporate 	the 	parties'
past 	practices, 	so 	that 	the 	proper MSA 	dates 	for 	employees 	would
be 	clearly 	defined. 	The 	settlement 	agreement 	delineates 	four
separate 	groups 	of 	employees 	based 	on 	their 	hire 	dates, 	and
reconciles 	the 	parties' 	concerns 	over 	the 	proper MSA dates 	of
employees 	hired 	over 	a 	period 	of 	over 	twenty 	years.
Moreover, 	as 	stated 	in 	the 	June 	10, 	1997, 	warning 	letter,
the 	exclusive 	representative 	is 	charged 	with 	representing 	the
bargaining 	unit 	as 	a 	whole. 	CCPOA, 	as 	the 	exclusive
representative 	has 	considerable 	discretion 	in 	the 	representation

LA-CO-72-S
Dismissal 	Letter
June 	27, 	1997
Page 	3
(
of 	employees 	within 	the 	grievance 	procedure. 	(Los 	Rios 	College
Federation 	of 	Teachers 	(1996) 	PERB 	Decision 	No. 	1133.) 	CCPOA 	is
not 	expected 	or 	required 	to 	satisfy 	all 	members 	of 	the 	unit 	it
represents. 	Nor 	is 	CCPOA barred 	from 	making 	agreements 	which 	may
have 	unfavorable 	effects 	on 	some 	members. 	(See 	California 	School
Emgloyees 	Association 	and 	its 	Chagter 	107 	(1995) 	PERB 	Decision
No. 	1097.) 	In 	the 	instant 	charge, 	10 	individual 	employees 	filed
grievances 	against 	the 	State. 	CCPOA's 	settlement 	agreement 	with
the 	State 	resulted 	in 	the 	compensation 	of 	six 	of 	those 	employees.
It 	has 	not 	been 	established 	that 	this 	settlement 	was 	the 	result
of 	arbitrary, 	discriminatory 	or 	bad 	faith 	behavior 	by 	CCPOA 	and
as 	such 	violative 	of 	the 	Act. 	Thus, 	the 	charge 	does 	not
demonstrate 	a 	prima 	facie 	violation 	and 	must 	be 	dismissed.
Right 	to 	Aggeal
Pursuant 	to 	Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board 	regulations, 	you
may 	obtain 	a 	review 	of 	this 	dismissal 	of 	the 	charge 	by 	filing
an 	appeal 	to 	the 	Board 	itself 	within 	twenty 	(20) 	calendar 	days
after 	service 	of 	this 	dismissal. 	(Cal. 	Code 	Regs., 	tit. 	8,
sec. 	32635(a) .) 	Any 	document 	filed 	with 	the 	Board must 	contain
the 	case 	name 	and 	number. 	To 	be 	timely 	filed, 	the 	original 	and
five 	copies 	of 	such 	appeal 	must 	be 	actually 	received 	by 	the 	Board
itself 	before 	the 	close 	of 	business 	(5 	p.m.) 	or 	sent 	by
telegraph, 	certified 	or 	Express 	United 	States 	mail 	postmarked 	no
later 	than 	the 	last 	date 	set 	for 	filing. 	(Cal. 	Code 	Regs.,
tit. 	8, 	sec. 	32135.) 	Code 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	section 	1013 	shall
apply. 	The 	Board's 	address 	is:
Attention: 	Appeals 	Assistant
Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board
1031 	18th Street
Sacramento, 	CA 	95814
If 	you 	file 	a 	timely 	appeal 	of 	the 	refusal 	to 	issue 	a 	complaint,
any 	other 	party may 	file 	with 	the 	Board an 	original 	and 	five
copies 	of 	a 	statement 	in 	opposition 	within 	twenty 	(20) 	calendar
days 	following 	the 	date 	of 	service 	of 	the 	appeal. 	(Cal. 	Code
Regs., 	tit. 	8, 	sec. 	32635(b) .)
Service
All 	documents 	authorized 	to 	be 	filed 	herein 	must 	also 	be 	"served 11
upon 	all 	parties 	to 	the 	proceeding, 	and 	a 	"proof 	of 	service"
must 	accompany 	each 	copy 	of 	a 	document 	served upon 	a 	party 	or
filed 	with 	the 	Board 	itself. 	(See 	Cal. 	Code 	Regs., 	tit. 	8,
sec. 	32140 	for 	the 	required 	contents 	and 	a 	sample 	form.) 	The
document 	will 	be 	considered 	properly 	"served" 	when 	personally

LA-CO-72-S
Dismissal
	Letter
June
	27,
	1997
Page
	4
(
delivered 	or 	deposited
	in
	the
	first-class
	mail, 	postage
	paid
	and
properly
	addressed.
Extension 	of
	Time
A
	request
	for
	an
	extension
	of 	time,
	in
	which
	to
	file
	a
	document
with
	the
	Board
	itself,
	must
	be
	in
	writing
	and
	filed
	with
	the
Board
	at
	the
	previously
	noted
	address.
	A
	request
	for
	an
extension
	must
	be
	filed 	at 	least
	three
	(3)
	calendar
	days
	before
the
	expiration
	of 	the
	time
	required 	for
	filing
	the
	document.
The
	request
	must
	indicate
	good
	cause
	for
	and,
	if
	known,
	theposition
	of 	each
	other 	party
	regarding 	the 	extension,
	and
	shall
be
	accompanied 	by
	proof 	of
	service
	of 	the 	request
	upon
	each
party.
	(Cal.
	Code
	Regs.,
	tit.
	8,
	sec.
	32132.)
Final
	Date
If
	no
	appeal
	is 	filed
	within 	the
	specified
	time
	limits, 	the
dismissal
	will
	become
	final
	when
	the
	time
	limits
	have
	expired.
Sincerely,
ROBERT
	THOMPSON
Deputy General 	Counsel
By
Tammy
	L.
	damsel
Regional
	Director
Attachment
cc: 	Christine 	Albertine

STATE
OF
CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONS BOARD
Los
Angeles
Regional
Office
3530
Wilshire
Blvd.,
Suite
650
Los
Angeles,
CA
90010-2334
(213)
736-3127
June 	10,
	1997
Victor
	X.
	Negrete
Re:
	Victor
	X.
	Negrete 	v.
	California 	Correctional
	Peace
	Officers
AssociationUnfair
	Practice
	Charge
	No.
	LA-C0-72-S
WARNING
	LETTER
Dear
	Mr.
	Negrete:
The
	above-referenced
	unfair 	practice
	charge,
	alleges 	the
California
	Correctional
	Peace
	Officers 	Association
	(CCPOA)
violated
	its
	duty 	of
	fair
	representation
	by
	settling
	your
grievance.
	This 	conduct
	is
	alleged 	to
	violate
	Government 	Code
section
	3519.5
	of 	the
	Ralph
	C.
	Dills
	Act
	(Dills
	Act
	or Act).
My
	investigation
	revealed 	the 	following 	information.
Your
	charge
	alleges 	that
	CCPOA
	violated
	its
	duty 	of
	fair
representation
	when
	it
	settled
	a
	number
	of 	grievances
	which
concerned
	the 	proper 	anhiversary 	date
	for 	the 	granting 	of 	Merit
Salary
	Adjustments
	(MSA).
	The
	grievances
	alleged 	the 	anniversary
date
	should
	be 	one
	year
	from
	the 	date 	the
	officer 	started
	at
	the
Academy,
	rather
	than
	one
	year
	from
	the 	date 	the
	officer
	began
working
	at
	an
	Institution.
	Each
	officer 	typically
	spent	
six
weeks
	being
	trained
	at
	the
	Academy
	prior 	to
	being 	assigned
	to
	an
Institution.
You
	are
	employed
	as
	a
	Correctional 	Officer
	by
	the
	Department 	of
Corrections
	(Department).
	You
	began
	training 	at
	the
	Academy 	on
March 	16, 	1987, 	and
	reported 	to
	your
	institution
	on
	April 	27,
1987.
The 	Department 	and
	CCPOA
	have 	been
	parties 	to
	a
	number
	of
successive
	Memoranda
	of 	Understanding
	(MOUs),
	the
	last
	of 	which
expired
	on
	June 	30, 	1995.
	Article
	VII 	of 	the 	parties
	1982-1983
MOU
	stated 	the 	following 	with 	regard 	to 	Merit 	Salary Adjustments
(MSA) :
The
	State
	employer
	will
	recommend
	including
sufficient
	funds
	in 	the 	1982-1983 	Budget
	toenable 	employees,
	after
	completion 	of 	their
first 	year 	in
	a
	position, 	to 	receive 	annual
merit 	salary 	adjustments 	in 	accordance 	withGovernment 	Code 	Section 	19832 	and 	applicable
(
PETE
WILSON,
Governor

Department
	of 	Personnel
	Administration's
rules.
LA-CO-72-8
Warning
	Letter
June
	10,
	1997
Page
	2
(
Article
	VII,
	Section
	40
	of 	the
	parties
	1983-1985
	and
	1987-1988
MOUs
	contained 	the 	exact
	language
	above
	with 	regard
	to
	thegranting
	of
	MSAs.
	None
	of
	these
	Agreements
	describe 	the
anniversary 	date
	for
	MSA
	calculations.
	It
	appears
	however
	that
from
	1982
	through
	May
	31, 	1989,
	MSAs
	were
	granted
	on
	the
anniversary
	of
	the 	date
	an
	employee
	began 	working
	at
	the
institution.
Article
	16.01
	and
	16.03 	of 	the
	parties
	July
	1,
	1988
	thorough
	June
30,
	1991, 	Agreement
	established
	a 	new
	Classification
	Range
	"C"
for
	Correctional
	Officers. 	Prior 	to
	this
	Agreement,
	Correctional
Officers
	could 	not
	advance
	beyond
	Range
	"B". 	However,
	the
Agreement
	remained
	silent
	with 	regard
	to 	description
	of
	the
anniversary 	date 	for
	MSAs.
During
	1989,
	disputes 	arose 	regarding 	the
	proper
	anniversary
	date
for
	MSAs.
	That
	is,
	whether
	the 	anniversary date
	was
	one
	year
from
	the 	date 	the
	officer 	started 	at
	the
	Academy
	or
	one
	year
	from
the 	date 	he/she
	started 	at
	the
	Institution.
	The
	parties
	1992-
1995 	Agreement
	sought
	to 	resolve
	this
	dispute
	by
	noting
	in
Section 	16.03(d):
For 	employees
	hired
	prior
	to
	10/1/92,
	MSA
dates 	for 	Correctional 	Officers,
	Group
Supervisors,
	and
	Youth
	Counselors
	are
calculated
	from
	initial
	appointment
	dates
	at
the
	Academy
	and
	not
	when
	appointed 	to
	Range
	B
at
	the
	institution.
This
	new
	contract
	language
	did 	not,
	alleviate
	all
	of 	the 	disputesregarding
	MSA
	calculation.
	More
	specifically,
	between 	1989 	and
1996,
	at 	least
	ten
	(10)
	grievances
	were
	filed
	by
	CCPOA
	regarding
MSA
	anniversary 	dates.
	These
	grievances
	were
	filed, 	at 	least
	in
part,
	concerning
	officers
	such 	as 	yourself
	who
	were 	promoted
	to
Range
	C
before 	the
	1992-1995 	agreement
	was
	settled.
	Due
	to
	the
number
	of 	grievances
	filed,
	CCPOA
	attempted
	a
	large-scalesettlement 	of 	the 	issue.
On
	January 	1, 	1996, 	you
	filed
	a
	grievance 	asserting 	theDepartment
	failed 	to 	calculate
	your
	MSA
properly. 	Specifically,
you
	allege 	the 	Department 	used 	your
	hire 	date 	at 	the
	institutionrather 	than 	your
	start
	date 	at 	the
	Academy,
	in 	calculating 	your
MSA
	anniversary 	date.
	You
	cited Article 	16.03(d) 	above
	insupport 	of 	your 	allegation.
	CCPOA
	Chief 	Job 	Steward,
	Jeff 	Kent,
represented 	you
	in 	this 	matter.
	On
	January 	26, 	1996, 	the

LA-CO-72-S
Warning
	Letter
June
	10,
	1997
Page
	3
Department 	found
	some
	merit 	to
	your
	claim
	at
	Level
	II,
	butrefused
	to
	adjust
	your
	MSA
	date.
On
	February
	26, 	1996,
	CCPOA
	appealed 	your
	grievance
	to
	Level
	III.
Upon
	receiving
	no
	timely
	response
	from
	the
	Department,
	CCPOA
elevated
	your
	grievance
	to
	Level
	IV.
	On May
	6,
	1996,
	theDepartment's
	Chief
	Labor
	Representative,
	Mike
	Jaime,
	also
forwarded
	the 	grievance
	to
	Level
	IV.
On May
	13, 	1996,
	CCPOA
	representative
	Donald 	Benegas
	sent
	a
letter
	to
	you
	informing
	you
	of
	the
	status
	of
	your
	grievance.	
Mr.
Benegas
	informed
	you
	that
	CCPOA
	was
	in
	the 	process 	of
negotiating,
	at
	the
	main
	bargaining
	table,
	a
	settlement 	of
	all
MSA
	grievances
	filed.
	Mr.
	Benegas
	promised
	to
	inform
	you
promptly 	regarding
	any
	settlement
	of 	the
	issue.
On
	July
	16, 	1996,
	CCPOA
	and
	the
	Department
	entered
	into
	a
settlement
	agreement
	regarding 	the 	ten
	MSA
	grievances.
	The
settlement
	provided
	in 	relevant
	part:
The
	parties
	agree
	that
	the
	intent
	of 	16.03(d)
and 	Appendix
	13
	is
	to 	describe
	how
	employees
get
	moved
	from
	Range
	"A"
	to
	Range 	"C".
	Since
Range
	"C"
	was
	created
	on
	June 	1,
	1989,
	thelanguage
	of 	16.03(d)
	and Appendix
	13
	only
applies 	to
	employees
	hired
	between June 	1,
1989
	and
	October 	1, 	1992.
Due
	to 	this
	settlement, 	six
	of 	the 	ten 	grievances
	resulted
	in
monies
	owed
	to 	bargaining
	unit
	members.
	You
	were 	one
	of
	the
	fouremployees
	who
	did 	not 	receive
	an 	award,
	as
	you 	were
	hired
	prior
to
	June 	1, 	1989.
	CCPOA
	withdrew
	with
	prejudice
	your
	grievance
	as
part
	of 	the 	settlement
	agreement.
	CCPOA
	informed
	you
	of
	this
settlement
	by
	letter
	dated
	August 	2, 	1996.
	CCPOA
attempted
	to
answer 	your 	concerns 	over 	the 	settlement 	in
	letters
	dated
November
	14,
	1996
	and
	November 	22, 	1996.
	You
	are
	dissatisfied
with
	CCPOA's
	responses 	to 	date.
Based 	on
	the 	facts 	stated
	above,
	the 	charge 	as 	presently written
fails
	to 	state
	a
	prima
	facie 	violation
	of 	the 	duty 	of
	fairrepresentation, 	for 	the 	reasons
	stated
	below.
You
	assert
	CCPOA
	violated
	its
	duty 	of
	fair 	representation
	insettling
	the
	MSA
	grievances. 	Specifically,
	you
	allege
	CCPOA
failed 	to 	resolve 	the 	grievances 	in
	a
	timely
	manner and
	failed
	to
give 	you
	a
	reasonable 	explanation 	as 	to 	their
	reasoning 	in
settling
	your 	grievance.

LA-CO-72-S
Warning
	Letter
June 	10,
	1997
Page
	4
The
	duty 	of
	fair
	representation
	imposed
	on
	the 	exclusive
representative
	extends
	to
	grievance 	handling.
	(Fremont
	Teachers
Association
	(King) 	(1980)
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	125;
	United
	Teachers
of
	Los
	Angeles
	(Collins)
	(1982)
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	258.)
	In
	order
to
	state
	a
	prima
	facie
	violation
	of
	this
	section
	of
	EERA,
Charging
	Party
	must
	show
	that
	the
	Association's
	conduct
	was
arbitrary,
	discriminatory 	or
	in
	bad
	faith.
	In
	United
	Teachers
	of
Los
	Angeles
	(Collins), 	the 	Public
	Employment
	Relations
	Board
stated:
Absent 	bad
	faith,
	discrimination, 	or
arbitrary
	conduct,
	mere
	negligence
	or
	poor
judgment
	in
	handling
	a
	grievance
	does
	not
constitute
	a
	breach 	of 	the
	union's
	duty.
[Citations.]
A
union
	may
	exercise
	its
	discretion
	to
determine
	how
	far
	to
	pursue
	a
	grievance
	in
the
	employee's
	behalf
	as 	long
	as
	it
	does
	not
arbitrarily
	ignore
	a
	meritorious 	grievance
	orprocess
	a
	grievance
	in
	a
	perfunctory 	fashion.
A
union
	is
	also
	not
	required 	to 	process
	an
employee's 	grievance
	if
	the
	chances
	forsuccess 	are
	minimal.
In 	order 	to
	state
	a
	prima
	facie
	case 	of
	arbitrary
	conduct
violating
	the 	duty 	of
	fair
	representation,
	a
	Charging
	Party:
11
	•
	must
	at
	a
	minimum
	include
	an
	assertion
of
	sufficient 	facts
	from 	which
	it
	becomes
apparent
	how
	or
	in
	what 	manner
	the 	exclusive
representative's 	action 	or 	inaction
	was
without
	a
	rational 	basis 	or
	devoid 	of 	honestjudgment. 	(Emphasis
	added.)
11	
[Reed
	District
Teachers 	Association,
	CTA/NEA
	(Reyes) 	(1983)PERB
	Decision
	No.
	332,
	p.
	9,
	citing
	Rocklin
Teachers
	Professional 	Association
	(Romero)
(1980)
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	124.]
You
	assert
	the 	settlement
	agreement
	is 	arbitrary
	and 	devoid
	of
any
	rational 	basis.
	However,
	facts 	presented
	fail
	to 	supportsuch
	a
	finding. 	Prior 	to 	the
	1992-95
	MOU,
	contractual 	language
failed 	to 	specify 	the 	anniversary 	date
	upon 	which 	an
	MSA
	was
	tobe 	calculated.
	Such 	an 	omission 	resulted 	in
	a
	dispute 	regarding
the 	appropriate 	anniversary 	date 	for 	Correctional 	Officers,
	who
are 	required 	to 	attend 	an Academy.
From 	1982 	through 	June 	1, 	1989, 	Correctional 	Officers 	could 	move
up 	the 	classification 	ladder 	to
	Range 	B. 	Range 	B was
	achieved

LA-C0-72-S
Warning
	Letter
June
	10,
	1997
Page
	5
(
after
	one
	year
	at
	the
	institution.
	On
	June
	1,
	1989,
	the
	State
implemented
	a 	new
	salary
	range,
	Range
	C.
	With
	the 	implementation
of
	this
	new
	salary
	range,
	employees
	hired
	between June 	1,
	1989,
and
	October
	1,
	1992
	elevate 	to
	Range
	B
upon
	completion 	of
	the
Academy
	(six
	weeks
	after
	employment), 	and
	then
	elevate 	to
	Range
	C
upon
	the
	one
	year 	anniversary
	of
	the 	date 	the
	employee
	began
	the
Academy.
	Employees
	hired
	after
	October
	1,
	1992,
	move
	to
	Range
	C
on
	the 	anniversary
	of
	the 	date
	they
	started
	the
	institution.
CCPOA's
	settlement
	agreement
	attempts
	to 	address 	the
	creation
	of
Range
	C,
	and
	the
	parties'
	intent
	in 	entering
	into
	the
	1992-1995
MOU.
	Nothing
	in
	the
	facts
	presented
	demonstrates
	the
	parties
settlement
	was
	arbitrary,
	or
	devoid
	of
	rational 	basis.
	While
	an
employee
	may
	disagree 	with 	the 	exclusive
	representative'scharacterization,
	such
	dissatisfaction
	does
	not
	result 	in
	a
violation
	of 	the 	duty
	of
	fair
	representation.
	The
	dates
	agreed
upon
	and
	the
	settlement
	language
	are
	not
	ambiguous
	given
	thehistory
	of
	the
	MSA
	language,
	and
	the
	Article's
	failure
	to
	specify
the
	MSA
	anniversary
	date.
In 	analyzing
	whether 	an 	"honest
	judgment"
	has 	been
	made,
	PERB
does
	not
	judge 	whether
	the 	union's
	assessment
	was
	"correct,"
	butonly
	whether
	that
	judgment 	had
	a
	rational 	basis.
	(Sacramento
City
	Teachers
	Association
	(1984)
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	428.)Moreover,
	the
	union
	is
	charged 	with
	representing 	the
	bargaining
unit
	as
	a
	whole. 	Thus,
	a
	grievance 	with 	arguable 	merit
	may
	be
rejected
	or
	settled
	by
	the
	union
	if
	the
	grievant's 	victory
	would
damage
	the
	terms 	and
	conditions 	for
	the 	bargaining
	unit
	as
	a
whole. 	(Castro 	Valley 	Unified
	School
	District
	(1980)
	PERB
Decision
	No.
	149.)
	As
	the
	charge
	fails
	to 	present
	any
	otherfacts
	demonstrating
	CCPOA
	acted 	in
	an
	arbitrary
	manner
	in
settling
	the 	grievances, 	the
	charge 	as
	presently written
	fails
	to
state
	a
	prirna
	facie 	case.
For
	these
	reasons 	the 	charge, 	as 	presently 	written,
	does
	not
state
	a
	prirna
	facie 	case.
	If
	there 	are
	any
	factual 	inaccuracies
in 	this 	letter
	or 	additional 	facts
	which 	would
	correct 	the
deficiencies 	explained
	above,
	please
	amend
	the 	charge.
	The
amended
	charge 	should 	be
	prepared
	on
	a
	standard
	PERB
	unfair
practice
	charge
	form,
	clearly 	labeled
	First
	Amended
	Charge,
contain
	all
	the 	facts
	and
	allegations
	you
	wish
	to
	make,
	and
be 	signed 	under 	penalty 	of 	perjury
	by
	the 	charging 	party. 	The

LA-CO-72-8
Warning
	Letter
June
	10,
	1997
Page
	6
(
amended
	charge
	must
	be
	served
	on
	the 	respondent
	and
	the
	original
proof 	of
	service
	must
	be
	filed
	with
	PERB.
	If
	I
	do
	not
	receive
	anamended
	charge
	or
	withdrawal
	from
	you
	before
	June
	17, 	1997,
	I
shall
	dismiss
	your
	charge.
	If
	you
	have 	any
	questions,
	please
call
	me
	at
	(213)
	736-3008.
Sincerely,
Tammy
	L. 	-Samsel
Regional
	Director