Elk Grove Unified School District (PERB 0856E)

STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
DR. 	KATHRYN JAEGER AND 	THE 	ELK
GROVE 	PSYCHOLOGISTS 	AND 	SOCIAL
WORKERS ASSOCIATION,
Charging Parties,
v.
ELK GROVE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Respondent.
)
)
)
)
) 	Case No. 	S-CE-1347
PERB 	Decision No. 856
December 	17, 	1990
)
)
)
)
)
)
Appearances: 	Mullen, 	Sullivan & Newton by James V. 	DeMera, 	III,
Attorney, 	for Dr. 	Kathryn Jaeger; 	Kronick, 	Moskovitz, 	Tiedemann &
Girard by Ann M. 	Freers, 	Attorney, 	for Elk Grove Unified School
District.
Before Hesse, 	Chairperson; 	Shank and Cunningham, 	Members.
DECISION
SHANK, 	Member: 	This 	case is before the Public 	Employment
Relations 	Board 	(PERB or Board) 	on appeal by Dr. 	Kathryn Jaeger
(Jaeger) 	of 	a Board agent's dismissal 	of an amended unfair
practice charge. 	In the amended unfair practice charge, 	Jaeger
and 	the 	Elk Grove 	Psychologists 	and 	Social Workers 	Association
(Association) 	allege 	that 	the 	Elk Grove 	Unified 	School 	District
(District) 	violated section 3543.5(a) 	and 	(c) 	of the Educational
Employment Relations Act 	(EERA or Act).1 Specifically, 	charging
1 EERA is 	codified at Government Code 	section 	3540 	et 	seq.
Unless 	otherwise 	indicated, 	all 	statutory references 	herein are
to the Government Code. 	Section 3543.5(a) 	and 	(c) 	states, 	in
pertinent part:
It 	shall be unlawful 	for a public 	school
employer to do any of 	the 	following:
_____ )

parties 	allege that: 	(1) 	the District discriminated against
Jaeger by dropping her from 	step 	7 	to 	step 	4 	of 	the 	salary
schedule; 	(2) 	the District failed to meet and negotiate in good
faith during the 	1989-90 	reopener negotiations; 	and 	(3) 	the
District 	unilaterally 	reduced 	Jaeger's 	salary 	level.
(a) 	Impose or threaten to 	impose reprisals
on employees, 	to discriminate or threaten to
discriminate against employees, 	or otherwise
to interfere with, 	restrain, 	or coerce
employees 	because 	of 	their 	exercise 	of 	rights
guaranteed by this 	chapter. 	For purposes 	of
this 	subdivision, 	"employee" 	includes an
applicant 	for employment 	or 	reemployment.
(c) 	Refuse or 	fail to meet and negotiate 	in
good 	faith with 	an 	exclusive 	representative.
For the reasons 	stated below, 	the Board affirms 	the Board
agent's 	dismissal 	of 	the 	alleged violation of 	section 	3543.5(a)
and (c).
FACTS
On April 	6, 	1990, 	Jaeger filed an unfair practice charge
alleging that 	the District violated 	section 	3543.5(c) 	of 	the
EERA. 	In her unfair practice charge, 	Jaeger alleged 	she was 	a
part-time 	school 	psychologist 	employed by the 	District. 	When
Jaeger was 	initially hired in September, 	1983, 	she was placed at
step 	4 	on the 	salary 	schedule. 	During the 	1983-84 	school 	year,
she worked three days per week and was paid 	60 percent of 	a 	full-
time 	salary. 	In the 	1984-85 	school year, 	Jaeger was moved to
step 	5 	on the 	salary 	schedule. 	She worked one day per week and
was paid 	20 	percent of 	a 	full-time 	salary. 	In the 	1985-86 	school
year, 	Jaeger was 	moved to 	step 	6. 	She worked two days per week
22

and was paid 40 percent of a 	full-time 	salary. 	During the 	1986-
87 and 	1987-88 	school years, 	Jaeger was on leave in Germany. 	In
the 	1988-89 	school year, 	Jaeger was moved to 	step 	7 	on the 	salary
schedule. 	She worked two 	and one-half 	days 	per week and was 	paid
50 percent of 	a 	full-time 	salary. 	During the 	1989-90 	school
year, 	Jaeger has worked the 	same 	two 	and one-half days per week
at the 	same 	salary 	level.
According to the charge, 	during the 	1989-90 	school year, 	the
District 	reviewed 	the placement 	of 	its 	certificated 	employees 	on
the 	salary 	schedules 	and 	determined 	that 	Jaeger 	had 	been
improperly advanced on the 	salary 	schedule. 	Pursuant 	to 	section
16.2.52 of the parties' 	collective bargaining agreement and the
District's 	review of 	its 	certificated employees, 	the District
dropped Jaeger from step 	7 	to 	step 	4 	of 	the 	salary 	schedule.
During 	the 	reopener negotiations 	during the 	1989-90 	school
year, 	the District proposed that 	section 	16.2.5 	of 	the collective
bargaining 	agreement 	be 	modified 	to provide 	that part-time
employees 	shall 	advance 	on the 	salary 	schedule 	one year only
after 	their part-time 	allocation had 	accumulated 	to 	100 	percent.
2Section 	16.2.5 	of 	the 	collective 	bargaining 	agreement
states:
2
Step 	advancement 	for 	current members 	of
school psychologist 	and 	social workers 	unit
shall be 	awarded on the basis 	of 	one
consecutive 	step per year 	for 	each 	school
year 	(75% 	of the number of days 	in the work
year) 	of 	service 	in the Elk Grove Unified
School 	District. 	Part-time employees 	shall
move 	on the 	schedule 	according to past
practice. 	(Emphasis 	added.)
W
-------------- -- -
3

The 	District 	also 	refused 	to 	change 	Jaeger's 	step placement 	from
step 	4 	to 	step 	7 	unless 	the Association agreed to the District's
request 	to 	modify 	section 	16.2.5. 	The Association rejected 	the
District's proposal. 	Subsequently, 	the parties reached an
agreement 	to 	leave 	section 	16.2.5 	unchanged 	in the 	collective
bargaining 	agreement.
On May 24, 	1990, 	the Board agent sent a warning letter to
Jaeger. 	The Board agent 	stated that, 	pursuant to Oxnard 	School
District 	(1988) 	PERB Decision No. 	667, 	an individual employee
does 	not have 	standing to 	file 	an unfair practice 	charge 	alleging
a violation of 	section 3543.5(c).
On June 	1, 	1990, 	an amended unfair practice charge was 	filed
by both 	Jaeger and 	the Association alleging 	a 	violation of
section 3543.5(a) 	and 	(c). 	The addition of the Association as a
charging 	party 	eliminated 	the 	standing 	problem 	regarding 	the
section 3543.5(c) 	violation. 	In addition to the 	section
3543.5(c) 	violation, 	the amended unfair practice charge alleged
that 	the 	District discriminated 	against 	Jaeger 	in violation 	of
3543.5(a) 	by reducing her 	salary 	level 	from 	step 	7 	to 	step 	4.
On June 	6, 	1990, 	the Board agent 	sent the charging parties 	a
dismissal 	letter wherein he 	dismissed 	the 	entire 	amended 	unfair
practice 	charge. 	In his discussion of the alleged 	section
3543.5(a) 	violation, 	the Board agent found that the charging
parties 	failed 	to 	allege 	any 	facts 	which 	established 	that 	Jaeger
engaged 	in protected activity. 	As 	there were 	no 	facts 	that
Jaeger 	exercised her rights 	under EERA, 	the 	Board 	agent
4

determined 	that 	the 	amended 	unfair practice 	charge 	failed 	to
state a prima 	facie violation of 	section 	3543.5(a) 	of EERA.
In his 	analysis 	of the alleged section 3543.5(c) 	violation,
the 	Board 	agent 	concluded 	the 	charging parties 	failed 	to 	allege
any 	facts 	to 	establish that 	the 	District 	failed to meet 	and
negotiate 	in good 	faith with the Association. 	In dismissing this
allegation, 	the Board agent 	limited his 	analysis 	to the
District's 	conduct 	during the 	reopener negotiations.
On June 25, 	1990, 	Jaeger filed an appeal of the dismissal.
Although the appeal 	is 	somewhat unclear, 	it appears 	to challenge
the dismissal of both the violation of 	section 3543.5(a) 	and 	(c) .
Notably, 	the Association did not 	join in the appeal. 	The Board
agent 	failed to 	address 	the allegation of unilateral 	change 	set
forth 	in the 	original 	and 	amended unfair practice 	charge.
DISCUSSION
1. 	Section 3543.5 fa) Violation
In Novato Unified School 	District 	(1982) 	PERB Decision
No. 	210, 	the Board 	set 	forth the test 	for discrimination and
retaliation. 	In order to establish a prima 	facie case, 	the
charging party must prove: 	(1) 	the employee engaged 	in protected
activity; 	(2) 	the employer had knowledge of 	such protected
activity; 	and 	(3) 	adverse action was 	taken against the 	employee
as 	a result of 	such protected activity. 	In the 	instant case,
there 	are 	no 	facts 	that Jaeger 	engaged 	in protected activity.
Accordingly, 	the 	Board affirms 	the 	Board agent's 	dismissal 	of 	the
discrimination 	allegation.
5

2. 	Section 3543.5(c) 	Violation:
As 	the 	Board 	agent 	pointed 	out 	in dismissing 	Jaeger's
original 	charge 	filed 	solely 	in her name, 	under Oxnard School
District, 	supra, 	PERB Decision No. 	667, 	an individual employee
does 	not 	have 	standing 	to pursue 	an unfair practice 	charge
alleging a violation of 	section 3543.5(c). 	Thus, 	Jaeger has no
standing 	to pursue 	an appeal 	of 	the dismissal 	of 	the 	section
3543.5(c) 	violation. 	The Association, 	the only party with the
standing to pursue an appeal 	of 	the dismissal 	of 	the 	section
3543.5(c) 	violation, 	has declined to do so. 	Therefore,
technically, 	that portion of 	the dismissal dealing with the
3543.5(c) 	violation is not before us.
Our dissenting 	colleague 	argues 	the 	Board has 	previously
held that once an appeal 	is 	filed, 	the Board is 	not 	constrained
from 	considering 	sua 	sponte 	legal 	issues 	not 	raised 	by 	the
parties when necessary to 	correct a mistake of 	law. 	The 	cases
cited 	to 	support 	this proposition3 are distinguishable 	from 	the
case under consideration. 	In those cases, 	the parties 	affected
by 	the Board's 	resolution of 	the 	issues were parties 	to 	the
appeal. 	In the 	instant case, 	the 	sole party with 	standing to
pursue the dismissal of the 	3543.5(c) 	violation has 	declined to
do 	so. 	While the Board may have discretion to 	examine 	the
propriety of 	the dismissal of the 	3543.5(c) 	violation, 	we 	find no
33Chairperson Hesse relies 	on the 	following 	cases: 	Apple-
Valley Unified School District 	(1990) 	PERB Order No. 	Ad-209a;
Mt. 	Diablo Unified School District 	(1983) 	PERB Decision No. 	373;
Fresno Unified School District 	(1982) 	PERB Decision No. 	208.
66

compelling 	interest 	to do 	so 	in a 	case where 	the 	only party with
any 	interest 	in pursuing the 	issue has 	indicated no 	such
inclination.
ORDER
The unfair practice 	charge 	in Case No. 	S-CE-1347 	is 	hereby
DISMISSED WITHOUT 	LEAVE 	TO AMEND.
Member Cunningham 	joined 	in this 	Decision.
Chairperson Hesse's 	concurrence/dissent begins 	on page 	8.
7

Hesse, 	Chairperson, 	concurring and dissenting: 	While I
agree with the majority's 	dismissal 	of 	the 	alleged violation of
section 	3543.5(a) 	of 	the Educational 	Employment Relations Act
(EERA or Act)1 , 	I 	cannot agree with the majority's dismissal of
the 	alleged violation of 	section 	3543.5(c) 	based on procedural
grounds. 	Instead, 	I would reverse the Public 	Employment
Relations 	Board 	(PERB or Board) 	agent's 	dismissal 	and 	find that
the 	allegations 	in the 	amended unfair practice 	charge 	state 	a
prima 	facie violation of 	section 	3543.5(c) 	based on a unilateral
change 	theory.
In dismissing the alleged violation of 	section 	3543.5(c),
the 	Board agent's 	analysis was 	limited to 	the 	Elk Grove 	Unified
School District's 	(District) 	conduct at the reopener
negotiations. 	While 	the Board agrees with the 	Board 	agent's
analysis 	that 	the 	District's 	conduct during 	reopener negotiations
does 	not 	constitute a refusal 	or 	failure 	to 	negotiate 	in good
faith, 	I 	find the Board agent 	failed to address 	the alleged
unilateral 	change 	in the 	original 	and 	amended unfair practice
charge. 	In the original and amended unfair practice charge, 	Dr.
Kathryn Jaeger 	(Jaeger) 	and the 	Elk Grove 	Psychologists 	and
Social Workers Association 	(Association) 	allege:
The 	District's 	conduct 	in unilaterally
reducing Dr. 	Jaeger's 	salary level 	from
step 	7 	to 	step 	4 	and express 	condition that
Dr. 	Jaeger would be recognized at 	step 	7 	only
if 	Section 	16.2.5 was 	changed 	in contract
negotiations, 	constitutes the District's
refusal 	or 	failure 	to meet and 	negotiate 	in
1EERA 	is 	codified at Government Code 	section 	3 540 	et 	seq.
8

good 	faith 	as 	required by Government Code
Section 3543.5.
In determining whether 	a party has 	failed or refused 	to 	bargain
in good faith, 	there are two applicable tests: 	(1) 	the per se
test; 	and 	(2) 	the totality of the circumstances test. 	While the
totality of 	the 	circumstances 	test 	looks 	to 	the 	entire 	course 	of
negotiations 	to 	see whether the parties 	have negotiated with 	the
required 	subjective 	intent to reach agreement, 	certain acts 	have
such potential 	to 	frustrate 	negotiations 	and undermine 	the
exclusivity 	of 	the 	bargaining agent 	that 	they 	are 	held 	to 	be
unlawful without any 	finding of 	subjective bad 	faith. 	These 	acts
are 	considered per 	se violations. 	(Pajaro Valley Unified 	School
District 	(1978) 	PERB Decision No. 	51.) 	An implementation of a
unilateral 	change 	in working 	conditions 	without 	notice 	and
opportunity to bargain is 	an example of a per 	se violation.
(Id.) 	While a unilateral 	change may involve the breach of 	a
collective bargaining agreement, 	PERB 	is 	concerned with those
unilateral 	changes 	in established policy which 	represent 	a
conscious 	or apparent reversal 	of 	a previous 	understanding,
whether the 	latter 	is 	embodied 	in a 	collective bargaining
agreement or evident 	from the parties' 	past practice. 	(Grant
Joint Union High School District 	(1982) 	PERB Decision No. 	196,
p. 	8.) 	Here, 	a prima facie case will be 	stated if the charging
parties' 	unfair practice 	charge alleges 	facts 	sufficient 	to 	show:
(1) 	the District breached or otherwise altered the parties'
collective 	bargaining agreement with 	regard 	to 	the 	salary 	levels
99

of part-time employees; 	and 	(2) 	those breaches 	amounted to a
change of policy. 	A change of policy has, 	by definition, 	a
generalized 	effect 	or 	continuing 	impact 	upon the 	terms 	and
conditions 	of 	employment of 	bargaining unit members. 	(Id, 	at
pp. 8-10.)
In the present 	case, 	charging parties 	allege that 	from 	1983
through 	1989, 	Jaeger was moved from step 	4 	to 	step 	7 of the
salary 	schedule. 	Jaeger progressed 	through 	the 	salary 	schedule
each year despite 	the 	fact that 	she worked 	less 	than 	full 	time
and was 	paid at 	60 percent 	salary during the 	1983-84 	school 	year,
20 	percent 	salary during the 	1984-85 	school year, 	and 	40 	percent
salary during the 	1985-86 	school 	year.2 During the 	1988-89
school year, 	Jaeger was 	moved to 	step 	7. 	She worked half 	time
and was paid at a 	50 percent 	salary 	level. 	Consistent with this
past 	history and pursuant 	to 	section 	16.2.5 	of 	the 	collective
bargaining agreement, 	charging parties 	allege 	Jaeger 	should
remain at the 	same 	salary 	level 	during 	the 	1989-90 	school 	year.
Charging parties 	also 	allege 	the 	District 	unilaterally 	reduced
Jaeger's 	salary 	level 	from 	step 	7 	to 	step 	4 	in violation of 	the
collective 	bargaining agreement.3 Based 	on these 	facts 	and 	the
Association's 	allegation that 	the 	District has 	refused 	or 	failed
to 	meet 	and 	negotiate with the Association regarding 	this
2During the 	1986-87 	and 	1987-88 	school years, 	Jaeger was 	on
leave 	in Germany.
3As 	the parties' 	collective bargaining agreement does 	not
include a provision for binding arbitration, 	deferral to
arbitration is 	not appropriate.
10

unilateral 	change, 	I 	find the allegations 	state a prima 	facie
violation of section 3543.5(c).
Although 	the 	amended unfair practice 	charge 	involves 	only
one part-time employee, 	the Board has held that a 	change 	in terms
and 	conditions 	of 	employment which affects 	only one 	or two
employees will be 	considered a breach of the duty to bargain 	if
the 	change reflects 	a 	change 	in policy with respect 	to 	employees
generally. 	(Jamestown Elementary School 	District 	(1990) 	PERB
Decision No. 	795.) 	Here, 	the alleged change in policy affects
the past practice with regard 	to 	all part-time 	employees.
Therefore, 	I 	find the amended unfair practice 	charge 	states 	a
prima 	facie 	violation of 	section 	3543.5(c) 	based on a unilateral
change 	theory.
Although 	the 	amended unfair practice 	charge was 	filed
jointly by Jaeger and the Association, 	the appeal of the Board
agent's 	dismissal was 	filed by Jaeger. 	As 	Jaeger did 	not have
standing 	to 	file 	an unfair practice 	charge 	alleging a violation
of 	section 3543.5(c), 	the majority also argues 	that Jaeger does
not have 	standing 	to 	file 	an appeal 	of 	the 	Board agent's
dismissal of the alleged 3543.5(c) 	violation. 	However, 	once an
appeal 	is 	filed, 	the Board has held that 	it 	is not constrained
from 	considering 	sua 	sponte 	legal 	issues 	not 	raised by 	the
parties when necessary to 	correct a mistake of 	law. 	(Apple
Valley Unified School District 	(1990) 	PERB Order No. 	Ad-209a;
Mt. 	Diablo Unified School District 	(1983) 	PERB Decision No. 	373;
Fresno Unified School District 	(1982) 	PERB Decision No. 	208.)
11

EERA 	section 	3541.3(i) 	provides 	that 	the 	Board 	shall 	have
the 	power and duty 	to 	investigate 	unfair practice 	charges 	and
take 	such action and make 	such determinations 	as 	the 	Board deems
necessary to 	effectuate the policies 	of 	EERA. 	Additionally, 	PERB
Regulation 	32320(a) 	provides 	that 	the Board may take 	such 	other
action as 	it 	considers proper 	in reaching a decision. 	The
language 	of 	these provisions 	provides 	authority 	that 	the 	Board 	is
not 	precluded 	from reviewing unappealed matters. 	(See 	Rio 	Hondo
Community College District 	(1979) 	PERB Decision No. 	87.)
The present 	case 	involves 	the 	review of 	a 	Board 	agent's
dismissal, 	which 	is 	governed by PERB Regulation 	32635.4 In
4PERB 	Regulations 	are 	codified at 	California 	Code 	of
Regulations, 	title 8, 	section 31001 	et seq. 	PERB Regulation
32635 	states:
(a) 	Within 20 days 	of the date of 	service of
a dismissal, 	the 	charging party may 	appeal
the dismissal 	to the Board 	itself. 	The
original 	appeal 	and 	five 	copies 	shall 	be
filed 	in writing with 	the 	Board 	itself 	in 	the
headquarters 	office, 	and 	shall be 	signed by
the 	charging party or 	its 	agent. 	Except 	as
provided 	in section 32162, 	service and proof
of 	service 	of 	the appeal 	on the respondent
pursuant 	to 	section 	32140 	are required.
The appeal 	shall:
(1) 	State the 	specific 	issues of procedure,
fact, 	law or rationale to which the appeal 	is
taken;
(2) 	Identify the page or part of the
dismissal 	to which each appeal 	is 	taken;
(3) 	State the grounds 	for each 	issue 	stated.
(b) 	Unless good cause is 	shown, 	a charging
party 	may 	not 	present 	on 	appeal 	new 	charge
allegations 	or 	new 	supporting 	evidence.
12

contrast to PERB Regulation 32 3005 governing exceptions 	to a
Board agent's proposed decision, 	PERB 	Regulation 	32635 	does 	not
contain 	a provision that 	"an exception not 	specifically urged
(c) 	If the charging party files 	a timely
appeal of the refusal, 	any other party may
file with the 	Board 	itself 	an original 	and
five copies 	of 	a 	statement 	in opposition
within 20 	days 	following the date of 	service
of 	the appeal. 	Service and proof of 	service
of 	the 	statement pursuant 	to 	section 	32140
are 	required.
5PERB Regulation 32300 	states:
(a) 	A party may 	file with the 	Board 	itself
an original 	and 	five 	copies 	of 	a 	statement of
exceptions 	to 	a Board agent's 	proposed
decision 	issued pursuant 	to 	section 	32215,
and supporting brief, 	within 20 days
following the date of 	service 	of 	the decision
or as provided 	in 	section 	32310. 	The
statement of 	exceptions 	and briefs 	shall 	be
filed with 	the 	Board 	itself 	in 	the
headquarters 	office. 	Service and proof of
service of 	the 	statement 	and brief pursuant
to 	section 32140 	are required. 	The 	statement
of 	exceptions 	or brief 	shall:
(1) 	State the 	specific 	issues 	of procedure,
fact, 	law or rationale to which each
exception is taken;
(2) 	Identify the page or part of 	the
decision to which 	each exception 	is 	taken;
(3) 	Designate by page 	citation or exhibit
number the portions of the record, 	if any,
relied upon 	for 	each 	exception;
(4) 	State the grounds 	for each exception.
(b) 	Reference 	shall be made 	in the 	statement
of 	exceptions 	only to matters 	contained 	in
the record of 	the 	case.
(c) 	An exception not 	specifically urged
shall be waived.
" . .
13

shall be waived." 	The difference 	in these regulations 	reflect
the 	inherent 	differences 	between the 	Board procedures 	for
proposed decisions 	and dismissals. 	In an appeal 	of 	a Board
agent's 	proposed decision, 	the parties 	may 	file 	exceptions 	to a
Board agent decision 	(PERB Regulation 32300), 	a motion for
reconsideration 	(PERB Regulation 	32410), 	and an appeal to the
appropriate court of appeal 	(EERA Section 3542). 	In an appeal 	of
a 	Board agent's dismissal, 	however, 	the parties may file an
appeal 	to a Board agent dismissal 	(PERB Regulation 	32635)6 and a
motion for reconsideration 	(PERB Regulation 32410). 	However,
unlike an appeal of 	a proposed decision, 	the parties 	to 	the
Board's 	decision not to 	issue 	a 	complaint 	cannot 	appeal 	the
decision to the 	court of 	appeal. 	(EERA section 3542(b).)
Pursuant 	to 	EERA section 	3541.3(i) 	and PERB 	Regulations
32320(a) 	and 	32635, 	the Board's review of an appeal of a Board
agent's 	dismissal 	is 	not 	limited by the 	language 	in the 	appeal 	or
the party 	filing the appeal.7 Rather, 	the Board's 	review is 	de
novo. 	(See Los Angeles 	School 	District Peace Officer's
6Pursuant to PERB Regulation 32640(c), 	the decision of a
Board agent to 	issue a 	complaint 	is 	not appealable to the Board
itself 	except 	in accordance with 	section 	32200, 	which 	states 	that
the 	Board 	itself will 	not 	accept 	the 	appeal 	unless 	the Board
agent 	joins 	in the appeal.
7However, 	in United Teachers 	- Los Angeles 	(1989) 	PERB
Decision No. 	738, 	the charging parties 	filed an appeal 	solely to
assure 	that they had exhausted their administrative 	remedies. 	In
fact, 	the charging parties' 	appeal 	stated that the dismissal was
proper on the 	grounds 	that 	the 	charge 	failed to 	state 	a prima
facie 	case. 	As 	the 	charging parties were 	requesting the 	Board
affirm the dismissal of 	their charge, 	the Board held that 	the
appeal was 	not 	in compliance with PERB 	Regulation 	32635.
14

Association 	(1987) 	PERB Decision No. 	627.) 	The Board may, 	and
should, 	examine the entire unfair practice charge(s) 	to determine
whether the 	allegations 	state 	a prima 	facie violation of 	the Act.
(See 	Riverside 	Unified School 	District 	(1986) 	PERB Decision
No. 	562a.)
In reviewing the amended unfair practice 	charge, 	I 	find that
the 	allegations 	state a prima 	facie violation of 	section
3543.5(c) 	based on a unilateral change theory. 	Finally, 	as 	an
individual 	employee does 	not have 	standing to 	file 	an unfair
practice charge alleging a violation of 	section 3543.5(c), 	the
complaint 	should 	name the Association as 	the proper 	charging
party. 	(See Oxnard School 	District 	(1988) 	PERB Decision
No. 	667.)
15