California School Employees Association (Mrvichin) (PERB 0661E)

STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
GEORGE V. 	MRVICHIN,
Charging 	Party,
v.
CALIFORNIA 	SCHOOL 	EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION,
Respondent.
Case No. 	LA-CO-416
PERB Decision No. 	661
April 1, 	1988
Appearances; 	George V. 	Mrvichin, 	on his own behalf; 	Marci 	B.
Seville, 	Attorney, 	for California School 	Employees Association.
Before Hesse, 	Chairperson; 	Porter, 	Craib and Shank, Members.
DECISION AND 	ORDER
This 	case 	is before 	the 	Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board
(Board) 	on 	appeal by Charging 	Party of 	the 	Board 	agent's
dismissal, 	attached hereto, 	of his 	charge 	that 	the California
School 	Employees 	Association 	violated 	section 	3543.6(b) 	of 	the
Educational 	Employment 	Relations 	Act. 	We have 	reviewed 	the
dismissal 	and, 	finding 	it 	to be 	free of prejudicial 	error,
adopt 	it 	as 	the 	Decision of 	the Board 	itself.
The unfair practice charge 	in Case 	No. 	LA-CO-416 	is hereby
DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE 	TO AMEND.
By 	the 	BOARD
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STATE Of CALIFORNIA 	GEORGE DEUKMEJIAN, Governor
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
SACRAMENTO REGIONAL OFFICE
1031 18TH STREET, SUITE 102
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 	95814
(916) 322-3198
November 19, 	1987
Mr. 	George V. Mrvichin
RE: 	Mrvichin v. 	California School Employees Association.
Unfair Practice Charge No. 	LA-CO-416. 	First Amended Charge
Dear Mr. Mrvichin:
You have 	filed 	a 	charge 	against 	the California 	School 	Employees
Association 	(CSEA) 	alleging that 	it violated the Educational
Employment Relations Act 	(EERA) 	by failing to properly
represent you 	in 	regard to grievances 	and unfair practice
charges which you filed. 	Specifically, 	you assert that CSEA:
(1) 	repeatedly refused to provide you 	assistance 	regarding
numerous 	grievances you have 	filed 	against the employer;
(2) 	refused to 	respond to your 	suggestions 	regarding 	the CSEA's
bylaws, 	its constitution and its negotiations; 	(3) violated its
own Policy 	606 	by referring your 	communications 	to 	the
Grievance Committee to Field Representative Manuel Armas;
(4) 	wrongly sent you a PERB Notice of Appearance showing that 	a
CSEA 	attorney was 	representing you 	in 	an unfair 	practice charge
against 	the District; 	and 	(5) 	engaged in collusion with the
District 	against your 	interests.
You were 	informed by Jorge Leon's 	letter of October 	6, 	1987
(attached) 	that the above-referenced charge did not 	state a
prima 	facie violation 	and would be dismissed 	if you did 	not
either amend the charge or withdraw it by October 	16, 	1987. 	On
October 	21, 	1987 you filed the first 	amended charge 	in this
case which did 	not 	provide 	any 	additional 	information
concerning 	the 	allegations 	contained 	in the original 	charge.
For 	this 	reason, 	the allegations contained in the original
charge 	as 	reiterated 	in the 	first 	amended charge 	are hereby
dismissed based on the 	rationale contained 	in Mr. 	Leon's
October 	6, 	1987 letter.

Mr. 	George V. Mrvichin
November 19, 	1987
Page 	2
The 	first 	amended charge also focuses on CSEA's failure to
provide 	representation 	for you during 	an 	informal conference on
PERB Case Nos. 	LA-CE-2548 and LA-CE-2571. 	This informal
conference was held on October 	5, 	1987 and both charges were
withdrawn the following day. 	According 	to the first 	amended
charge you entered 	a 	request concerning CSEA representation
with Mr. 	Armas on September 	18. 	You were informed by Mr. 	Armas
in a phone call on or about October 	1, 	1987 that you would be
receiving 	"future advisement" 	regarding 	the 	informal PERB
hearing but 	that he would be there. 	The 	informal conference
was 	held on October 	5, 	with no one 	representing CSEA in
attendance.
As stated in Mr. 	Leon's 	letter of October 6, 	1987, 	in order to
state a prima facie case of 	a union's 	failure to comply with
its duty of 	fair 	representation, 	the charge must state facts
which demonstrate that 	the exclusive 	representative has 	handled
a matter in an arbitrary, 	discriminatory or 	in a bad faith
manner. 	Under United Teachers of Los Angeles 	(Collins) 	(1983)
PERB Decision No. 	258 mere negligence or poor judgment 	in
handling of 	a grievance does not constitute a breach of 	the
union's duty. 	The first 	amended charge in this case does not
state a prima facie violation of 	the duty of fair
representation for two reasons. 	First, 	there are no facts
alleged 	in the 	first 	amended charge which 	indicate that 	the
failure to the CSEA representative to 	appear 	at the 	informal
conference was the result of bad faith, 	discriminatory, 	or
arbitrary conduct.
Second, 	there is no obligation on the part of the exclusive
representative to provide 	representation for 	a member of 	the
bargaining 	unit 	in extra-contractual matters 	not under 	its
exclusive control. 	San Francisco Classroom Teachers'
Association (Chestangue) 	(1985) 	PERB Decision No. 	544;
California State Employees' Association (Darzins) 	(1985) PERB
Decision No. 546-S.
In Hawkins v. Babbock and Wilcox Co. 	(1980) 	(U.S. DC, N. Ohio)
105 	LRRM 	3458,1 involving 	an employee who 	alleged 	that 	the
union 	should have 	advised 	him 	regarding 	administrative 	and
judicial 	remedies 	to 	alleged discriminatory conduct 	by his
employer, 	the District court ruled:
The National Labor Relations Act,
authorizing unions 	to 	represent employees 	in
1PERB 	has 	followed decisions 	of 	the federal courts 	and
the National 	Labor Relations 	Board 	interpreting the National
Labor Relations Act 	involving 	the duty of 	fair representation.
Firefighters Union v. 	City 	of Vallejo 	(1974) 	12 Cal.3d 608 	[116
Cal.Rptr. 507]; and see SEIU. Local 99 (Kimmett) 	(1979) PERB
Decision No. 106.

Mr. 	George V. Mrvichin
November 19, 	1987
Page 3
the creation 	and 	administration of
collective 	bargaining 	agreements with
employers, 	together with the correlative
duty of fair representation, 	however, 	is
limited to 	the collective bargaining
agreement process. 	. 	. 	. 	The union's duty
of 	fair 	representation 	is 	restricted to 	the
context of 	the collective bargaining
agreement 	and does 	not 	extend 	to 	legal
remedies 	available outside of 	the employment
context. 	See 	International 	Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers v. Foust. 442 U.S. 42,
101 LRRM 2365 (1979); Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171, 	64 LRRM 2369 	(1967); Humphrey v.
Moore. 	375 U.S. 	335, 	55 LRRM 2031 	(1964);
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman. 345 U.S. 330, 331
LRRM 2548 (1952).
In the present case, 	the defendant union was
not under 	any duty to 	advise 	the plaintiff
of 	its 	legal 	rights 	outside the context of
the collective bargaining 	agreement. 	The
union had no duty to 	act 	as 	an attorney at
law advising 	the plaintiff 	of 	all 	possible
alternatives of 	legal 	recourse.
Similarly, 	a federal district court has 	stated:
In the typical fair representation case, 	it
is 	asserted that 	the union has 	breached 	its
duty to 	represent 	the employee 	fairly as
regards a employment contract. 	However, 	in
such cases 	it 	is 	expressly provided by law
that the union shall 	be 	the exclusive
representative of 	all 	the employees 	in the
unit 	for 	the purposes 	of 	collective
bargaining 	in 	respect 	to 	rates 	of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment. 	. 	. 	. 	Thus, 	in
the typical fair 	representation case, 	the
union has the 	right, 	derived from law or
from its constitution, 	to 	represent the
employee exclusively 	in certain classes 	of
cases. 	This 	right 	imposes a correlative
duty to perform diligently the duties 	of 	its
agency, 	and not 	to engage 	in conduct which
is arbitrary, 	discriminatory or 	in bad
faith. 	Vaca v. 	Sipes. 	supra. 	Such is not
the case here.

Mr. 	George V. Mrvichin
November 19, 	1987
Page 4
The statute provides that a petition for
certification of 	eligibility to 	apply for
adjustment 	assistance may be 	filed either 	by
a group of employees or by their union.
. 	. 	. 	Therefore, [the union] had no
exclusive right, 	nor correlative duty to
file on behalf of plaintiffs 	in their
proposed class. 	Plaintiffs could have filed
for themselves. 	Lacy v. Local 287. United
Automobile. Aerospace, 	and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America 	(1979) 	(U.S.
DC, S. Dist. 	Ind.) 	102 LRRM 2847. 	(Emphasis
added.)
Based on this 	rationale 	and that contained 	in the October 	6,
1987 	letter 	these charges 	are hereby dismissed.
Right to Appeal
Pursuant to Public Employment Relations Board 	regulations, 	you
may obtain a 	review of 	this dismissal of 	the charge by filing
an appeal 	to the Board 	itself within twenty 	(20) 	calendar days
after 	service of 	this 	dismissal 	(California Administrative
Code, 	title 8, 	section 32635(a)). 	To be timely filed, 	the
original 	and five copies 	of 	such appeal must be actually
received by the Board 	itself 	before the close of 	business
(5:00 p.m.) 	or sent by telegraph, 	certified or Express United
States mail 	postmarked no 	later than the 	last date set 	for
filing 	(section 32135). 	Code of Civil Procedure section 	1013
shall apply. 	The Board's address is:
Public Employment 	Relations 	Board
1031 	18th Street
Sacramento, 	CA 95814
If you file a timely appeal of the refusal to issue a
complaint, 	any other party may file with the Board 	an original
and five copies 	of 	a 	statement 	in opposition within twenty
calendar days 	following 	the date of 	service of 	the appeal
(section 32635(b)).
Service
All documents 	authorized 	to be 	filed herein must 	also be
"served" upon all parties to the proceeding, 	and a 	"proof of
service" must 	accompany each copy of 	a document 	served upon a
party or 	filed with the Board 	itself. 	(See section 32140 	for
the 	required contents 	and a 	sample form.) 	The document will 	be
considered 	properly 	"served" 	when personally delivered 	or
deposited 	in the 	first-class mail 	postage paid 	and properly
addressed.

Mr. George V. Mrvichin
November 19, 	1987
Page 5
Extension of Time
A request 	for 	an extension of 	time 	in which to 	file 	a document
with 	the 	Board 	itself must 	be 	in writing 	and 	filed with the
Board at 	the previously noted 	address. 	A request 	for 	an
extension must be filed 	at 	least 	three calendar days 	before the
expiration of 	the time 	required for 	filing 	the document. 	The
request must 	indicate good cause for and, 	if known, 	the
position of 	each other party regarding 	the extension, 	and 	shall
be 	accompanied by proof 	of 	service of 	the 	request upon each
party (section 32132).
Final Date
If no appeal 	is 	filed within the specified time limits, 	the
dismissal will become final when the time 	limits 	have expired.
Sincerely,
John Spittler
Acting 	General 	Counsel
By
Robert 	Thompson
Regional Attorney
Attachment
cc: 	Christine Bleuler
1373d

STATE Of CALIFORNIA 	GEORGE 	DEUKMEJIAN, Governor
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
SACRAMENTO REGIONAL OFFICE
1031 18TH STREET, SUITE 102
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 	95814
(916) 322-3198
e
October 6, 	1987
Mr. 	George V. Mrvichin
RE: 	Mrvichin v. 	California School Employees Association. 	Case
No. LA-CO-416
Dear Mr. Mrvichin:
You have 	filed 	a 	charge 	against 	the California 	School 	Employees
Association 	(CSEA) 	alleging that 	it violated the Educational
Employment Relations Act 	(EERA) 	by failing to properly
represent you 	in 	regard to grievances 	and unfair 	practice
charges which you filed. 	Specifically, 	you assert that CSEA:
(1) 	repeatedly refused to provide you 	assistance 	regarding
numerous grievances you have filed against the employer; 	(2)
refused 	to 	respond 	to your 	suggestions 	regarding 	the CSEA's
bylaws, 	its constitution and its negotiations; 	(3) violated its
own Policy 	606 by 	referring your communications 	to 	the
Grievance Committee to Field Representative Manuel Armas; 	(4)
wrongly sent you 	a PERB Notice of Appearance showing 	that 	a
CSEA attorney was 	representing you 	in 	an unfair 	practice charge
against the District; 	(5) 	engaged in collusion with the
District 	against your 	interests.
My 	investigation 	revealed 	the 	following 	information. 	You 	are
employed 	as 	an Athletic Trainer by the Chino Unified School
District 	and have been so employed for 	some ten years. 	Your
duties 	include 	training 	and conditioning 	student 	athletes 	in
injury prevention, 	issuance of 	safety equipment 	to 	students 	and
administering 	first 	aid. 	Between September 	1986 	and
June 23, 	1987, 	you filed some 50 grievances against the
District 	alleging 	numerous contract 	violations. 	During 	that
period you 	also 	filed 	two unfair 	practice 	charges 	against 	the
District. 	Throughout this time, 	you have requested that the
CSEA provide 	assistance 	in the 	resolution of 	both 	the
grievances 	and the charges.

Mr. George V. Mrvichin
October 6, 	1987
Page 2
1. 	Refusals to provide assistance with your grievances.
As of April, 	1987, 	many of the grievances you filed had reached
the third 	level 	pursuant 	to the contract grievance procedure.
The CSEA 	local chapter had 	refused 	to 	pursue the grievances 	on
your 	behalf 	because, 	according 	to CSEA 	representative Manuel
Armas, 	the grievances did not 	"state valid claims." You
appealed Armas' determinations 	pursuant 	to CSEA's 	Policy 	606
and on April 	15, 	1987, 	the Grievance Committee upheld the
refusal 	to pursue the grievances.
On April 28, 	1987, you were "reprimanded, 	libeled, 	and
slandered" by Mr. 	Reynoso, Assistant Principal at Chino High
School, where you work. 	Later that day, Ms. 	Small, Classified
Personnel Director, 	sent you a 	letter 	regarding a
reclassification of your 	position. 	You 	advised Chapter
President Mr. 	Warren about these matters. 	Mr. 	Warren said,
"Don't worry." Also on this date, 	you 	filed an unfair practice
charge 	against CSEA for 	failure to 	properly 	represent you
(LA-CO-413).
On May 7 	and 	8 you 	reported 	further 	"harassment" 	and 	alleged
contract violations by the District 	to Mr. Warren. 	On May 11,
13, 	and 	14 you reported further 	alleged violations by the
District.
On June 	1, 	1987, 	you sent 	a 	letter to Warren asking why he was
failing 	to 	assist 	you with 	the 	alleged 	contract 	violations 	by
District 	and why he was 	"acting 	as 	though Mr. 	Mrvichin had been
expulsed 	[sic] 	from the union."
On June 2, 	1987, 	Mr. Warren came to your work area at about
noon. 	He gave you papers which you 	had 	presented 	to CSEA,
including copies 	of your grievances 	and said, 	"I want 	to talk
to you." You told him you'd prefer to talk later. 	He said, 	"I
want 	to 	talk to you now. 	I don't want 	to talk to you anymore.
Here's your papers. 	From now on, 	go through Mr. 	Fields. 	I
hope you get 	fired." Later 	that day, 	CSEA Representative Mr.
Fields 	notified you that Mr. 	Armas would 	represent you 	in your
grievances. 	On June 17, 	1987, Mr. Armas notified you that he
had 	reviewed your 	grievances 	filed 	to 	date 	and 	had 	determined
that 	the grievances did not 	present 	contract violations.

Mr. George V. Mrvichin
October 6, 	1987
Page 3
2. 	Failure to Respond to your 	suggestions 	regarding 	the CSEA
bylaws, constitution, 	and its negotiations.
On May 5, 	1987, 	you sent Mr. Warren a letter making certain
recommendations on upcoming negotiations with the District, 	and
suggesting changes 	in the CSEA by-laws and constitution. 	To
date, 	CSEA has not 	responded to your suggestions. 	On May 25,
1987 you sent Mr. 	Warren a 	letter suggesting a member 	"Bill of
Rights."
3. 	Violation of CSEA Policy 606.
On May 6, 	1987 you 	sent 	a grievance appeal 	to CSEA Director 	of
Field Operations. 	The Director 	referred this matter 	to Manuel
Armas, 	CSEA Field Representative. 	You allege that this
referral 	to 	the Field Representative violates 	Policy 	606.
which provides, 	in part:
.1 	General: 	Notwithstanding the provisions of
Item 605, 	if a Chapter refuses to provide
assistance 	and/or request 	state assistance 	for 	a
member 	confronted by a disciplinary action 	from
the district 	of 	employment 	or 	any adverse
employment condition, 	the member may appeal 	the
Chapter's 	refusal 	and 	request 	assistance 	from the
State Association.
.4 	Action Upon Receipt of Appeal: 	The Director,
Field Operations 	shall 	cause the matter 	to be
thoroughly 	and 	immediately 	investigated 	by 	a
Field Representative. 	The 	investigation by the
concerned FR 	shall 	be 	conducted without 	delay 	and
submitted 	to 	the DFO together with the
conclusions 	and 	recommendations of 	the FR.
.5 	Determination After Investigation: 	The
appeal 	and 	report of 	investigation will 	be
submitted 	to 	the President 	and Executive Director
for determination of a course of 	action. 	If time
permits, 	the matter will be submitted to the
Board of Directors for action. 	If time does not
• 	• 	• 	• 	• 	•
• 	•

Mr. 	George V. Mrvichin
October 	6, 	1987
Page 	4
permit 	Board consideration, 	the President 	and
Executive Director will determine the course of
action 	and cause 	it 	to be 	fully implemented. 	A
report will 	then be 	rendered 	to 	the Board of
Directors 	at 	its next meeting 	and a 	final 	report,
if 	required, 	will ultimately be presented to 	the
Board. 	The 	appellant 	and concerned Chapter
President will be advised of 	the determined
course of 	action.
4. 	Wrongly sending you 	a PERB Notice of Appearance.
On May 20, 	1987, 	you received a PERB Notice of Appearance
regarding LA-CO-413 which erroneously stated the 	title of 	the
case. 	Rather 	than indicating 	"Mrvichin v. 	CSEA," 	the Notice
stated, 	"CSEA #102 	(George Mrvichin) 	v. 	Chino Unified School
Dist." 	The notice 	indicated that Ms. 	Christine Bleuler would
be 	representing CSEA in the matter. 	On 	approximately May 25,
1987, 	you sent Ms. 	Bleuler a 	letter asking that she explain the
notice. 	On June 3, 	1987, Ms. 	Bleuler sent you a 	letter
advising you that 	the case name 	in the Notice was 	a mistake,
and 	explaining 	that 	she was 	representing CSEA 	in 	the charge
which you 	filed 	against 	the Association 	rather 	than
representing you. 	She also 	sent 	a corrected Notice.
5. 	Engaging 	in collusion with the District 	against your
interests.
On June 17, 	1987, Mr. Armas provided you with a copy of a page
from 	a 	charge which you had 	filed 	against 	the District
(LA-CE-2571), 	a case to which you note the CSEA "is not a
party." 	You 	allege that the 	fact 	that Armas had 	in his
possession a copy of 	the charge demonstrates 	that 	there 	is 	some
form of 	collusion between the District 	and 	the CSEA.
ANALYSIS
Charging 	Party has 	alleged that 	the 	exclusive 	representative
denied 	Charging 	Party the 	right 	to 	fair 	representation
guaranteed 	by EERA 	section 3544.9 	and 	thereby violated 	section
EERA 3543.6(b). 	The duty of 	fair 	representation 	imposed on the
exclusive 	representative extends 	to 	grievance handling.
Fremont Teachers Association 	(King) 	(1980) 	PERB Decision
No. 	125; United Teachers of Los Angeles 	(Collins) 	(1983) PERB
Decision No. 	258. 	In order to state a prima facie violation of
this 	section of 	the EERA Charging 	Party must 	show that 	the

Mr. 	George V. Mrvichin
October 6, 	1987
Page 5
Association's conduct was 	arbitrary, 	discriminatory, 	or 	in bad
faith. 	In United Teachers of Los Angeles (Collins). 	Id.. 	the
Public Employment Relations Board 	(PERB) 	stated:
Absent bad faith, discrimination, 	or
arbitrary conduct, 	mere negligence or poor
judgment 	in handling 	a grievance does not
constitute a breach of the union's duty.
A union may exercise 	its 	discretion to
determine how far to pursue a grievance in
the employee's behalf as 	long 	as 	it does not
arbitrarily ignore 	a meritorious 	grievance
or process a grievance in a perfunctory
fashion. 	A union is 	also not 	required to
process an employee's grievance if the
chances for success 	are minimal.
In order 	to 	state 	a prima 	facie case 	alleging 	arbitrary conduct
violative of 	the duty of 	fair 	representation the Charging 	Party:
. 	. 	. must, at a minimum, 	include an
assertion of 	sufficient 	facts 	from which 	it
becomes 	apparent 	how or 	in what manner 	the
exclusive 	representative's 	action or
inaction was without 	a 	rationale basis or
devoid of honest 	judgment. 	Reed District
Teachers Association, 	CTA/NEA 	(Reyes) 	(1983)
PERB Decision No. 	332, 	citing Rocklin
Teachers 	Professional 	Association 	(Romero)
(1980) PERB Decision No. 	124.
1. 	Refusals to provide 	assistance with your grievances.
The 	investigation disclosed 	that 	the 	CSEA 	refused 	to 	assist 	you
in 	processing your 	grievances 	because 	they did 	not 	"state valid
claims." 	The charge does not present 	and 	the 	investigation
failed 	to yield 	any 	facts which would 	indicate 	that 	the CSEA
refused 	to provide 	assistance 	in pursuing your 	grievances 	for
arbitrary, 	discriminatory, 	or bad faith reasons. 	As noted
above, 	a union is not 	required to process 	an employee's
grievance if the chances for success are minimal. 	United
Teachers of Los Angeles 	(Collins), 	supra. 	For these reasons,
this 	allegation does not 	present 	a prima 	facie case of 	an EERA
violation.
• 	• 	• 	• 	• 	• 	• 	• 	• 	• 	• 	• 	• 	• 	• 	•

Mr. 	George V. Mrvichin
October 6, 	1987
Page 6
Mr. 	Warren's alleged comments of June 2, 	1987 	to you that he
did 	not wish 	to 	talk to you 	any more 	and 	that 	he 	hoped you
would be 	fired 	appears 	to be 	an expression of 	personal
sentiment. 	Standing 	alone, 	the statement does 	not 	rise to 	the
level of 	arbitrary, 	bad faith, 	or discriminatory conduct, 	since
there 	is 	no evidence that 	there was 	any effect 	on CSEA's
actions 	regarding you 	or 	on your 	relationship with your
employer. 	The charge does 	not 	present 	any 	information to
demonstrate 	that Warren communicated 	his 	sentiment 	to 	any other
person in the CSEA, 	that his comment otherwise 	led CSEA to 	fail
to exercise its duties to you, 	or that 	it 	led CSEA to engage 	in
arbitrary, 	bad faith, 	or discriminatory conduct toward you.
For these reasons, 	this allegation does not present a prima
facie case of 	an EERA violation.
2. 	Failure to 	respond to your 	suggestions 	regarding 	the CSEA
Bylaws, constitution, 	and its negotiations.
In El Centro Elementary Teachers Association 	(1982) 	PERB
Decision No. 	232, 	the PERB noted that:
. 	. 	. 	the duty of fair representation
implies 	some consideration of the views of
various groups of employees 	and 	some 	access
for communication of those views, 	but there
is no 	requirement that 	formal procedures 	be
established. 	(Id., 	p. 	15-16.)
While the CSEA has 	a duty to consider the views of 	its members
it does not have a 	specific obligation to 	respond to their
suggestions. 	Its 	failure to 	respond to your 	suggestions,
therefore, 	does not 	appear to violate any duty it has toward
you. 	The charge does 	not present 	any other 	facts 	to
demonstrate that CSEA engaged 	in bad faith, 	arbitrary, 	or
discriminatory conduct 	in this matter. 	If 	its 	failure to
respond 	to your 	comments can be characterized 	as 	negligent
conduct, 	that 	is not enough to breach its duty. 	United
Teachers of Los Angeles (Collins), 	supra.
3. 	Violation of CSEA Policy 606.
You 	assert 	that CSEA violated 	the policy when 	the Director 	of
Field Operations 	referred your 	grievances 	appeal 	on May 	6 	back
to Field Representative Manuel Armas. 	This 	procedure 	appears
to be specifically permitted by section 	606.4. 	Its 	action does
not 	appear 	to violate 	any other provision of 	Policy 	606,

Mr. George V. Mrvichin
October 	6, 	1987
Page 	7
therefore, 	this 	allegation does not present 	a prima 	facie case
of 	a violation of 	the EERA.
4. 	Wrongly sending you 	a 	PERB Notice of Appearance.
You 	assert 	that CSEA sent you 	a Notice of Appearance 	form
containing errors. 	The harm to you of this action 	is 	not
clear. 	CSEA, 	through Ms. 	Bleuler corrected the errors within
approximately five days 	of receiving your 	letter 	asking 	for 	an
explanation. 	Its 	action does not 	appear to constitute
discriminatory, 	bad faith, 	or arbitrary conduct. 	For these
reasons, 	this allegation does not present a prima 	facie case of
an EERA violation.
5. 	Engaging 	in collusion with the District against your
interests.
Based on the 	fact 	that Mr. 	Armas 	revealed to you 	that 	he had 	in
his 	possession a copy of 	a charge which you filed 	against 	the
District 	and which you did not 	serve upon the CSEA, 	you 	assert
that 	the CSEA must be in collusion with the District. 	First,
there 	are no 	facts 	that 	indicate that Armas 	received 	the charge
from the District. 	Assuming that he did, 	however, 	Charging
Party has 	not cited 	an authority which 	requires 	the District 	to
maintain the confidentiality of charges 	filed against 	it. 	To
the contrary, 	charges 	filed with the PERB are considered public
documents. 	Government Code section 6252 	(d). 	As such, 	they
are 	available 	for 	public 	inspection. 	Government 	Code 	section
6253. 	The District was under no obligation to maintain the
secrecy of the charge. 	In light of the fact that 	as of 	the
date of Mr. 	Armas' 	revelation, 	you had by then 	filed 	two
charges 	against 	the District and one against the CSEA, 	it does
not 	seem unusual 	that 	CSEA 	and 	the District would 	communicate
about 	these matters. 	Furthermore, 	you had 	requested 	that CSEA
assist you 	in pursuing the charges 	against the District. 	Other
than 	the 	fact 	that 	CSEA had 	apparently gotten a 	copy of 	the
charge 	from the District, 	the charge does not 	reveal 	that 	the
CSEA has 	engaged 	in 	any collusive 	conduct with 	the 	District
against your 	interests. 	For these reasons, 	this 	allegation
does not 	state a prima 	facie case of 	an EERA violation.
For 	these 	reasons, 	the charge as presently written does not
state a prima 	facie case. 	If you feel 	that there are any
factual 	inaccuracies 	in this 	letter or 	any additional 	facts
which would correct 	the deficiencies explained 	above, 	please

Mr. 	George V. Mrvichin
October 	6, 	1987
Page 8
amend 	the charge 	accordingly. 	The 	amended charge 	should 	be
prepared 	on 	a 	standard 	PERB unfair 	practice charge 	form clearly
labeled 	First Amended Charge, 	contain 	all 	the 	facts 	and
allegations you wish to make, 	and be 	signed under 	penalty of
perjury by the 	charging 	party. 	The 	amended charge must 	be
served 	on 	the 	respondent 	and 	the 	original 	proof 	of 	service must
be 	filed with PERB. 	If 	I 	do not 	receive 	an amended charge or
withdrawal from you before October 	16, 	1987, 	I 	shall dismiss
your 	charge. 	If you have 	any questions on how to 	proceed,
please call me at 	(916) 	323-8015.
Sincerely,
Jorge A. Leon
Staff 	Attorney
0941d