California Union of Safety Employees (Eckstein) (PERB 0643S)

STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
ROBERT C. 	ECKSTEIN,
Charging 	Party,
v.
CALIFORNIA 	UNION OF 	SAFETY
EMPLOYEES,
Respondent.
Case 	No. 	S-CO-21-S
PERB Decision No. 	643-S
December 18, 	1987
Appearances; 	Anthony T. 	Caso, 	Attorney, 	Pacific Legal
Foundation, 	for Robert C. 	Eckstein; William L. Williams, 	Jr.,
Attorney, 	Policy Officers 	Research Association of 	California, 	for
the 	California 	Union 	of 	Safety Employees.
Before Hesse, 	Chairperson; 	Craib and Cordoba, 	Members.
DECISION
HESSE, 	Chairperson: 	Charging party, 	Robert C. 	Eckstein,
appeals 	the partial 	dismissal 	of his 	charge 	that 	California
Union of 	Safety Employees 	(CAUSE) 	violated 	the 	Ralph C. 	Dills
Act,1 specifically Government Code 	section 3519.5(b), 	when
it: 	(1) 	failed to give him an adequate 	explanation as 	to how
his 	fair 	share 	fee was 	expended by CAUSE; 	(2) 	deducted his 	fair
share 	fee 	without 	providing a mechanism 	for 	rebates 	prior 	to
deduction; 	(3) 	failed 	to conform the rebate procedures 	to
Government 	Code section 3 515.8; 	(4) 	paid agency fee monies 	to
1Formerly 	known 	as 	the 	State 	Employer-Employee 	Relations
Act, 	the 	Ralph C. 	Dills 	Act 	is 	codified at 	Government 	Code
section 	3512 	et 	seq. 	Unless 	otherwise 	indicated, 	all 	statutory
references herein 	are 	to 	the Government 	Code.
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the 	Police 	Officers 	Research Association 	of 	California
(PORAC)and 	California Association 	of 	Food 	and 	Drug 	Officials
(CAFDO) 	for 	activities 	unrelated 	to 	the 	negotiation or
administration of 	a 	collective bargaining agreement; 	and
(5) 	refused 	to provide 	a hearing 	on 	charging party's 	challenge
to 	the use of his 	fair 	share 	fee.
The general 	counsel 	issued a 	complaint 	on allegations 	1, 	2,
and 	3, 	but 	dismissed allegations 	4 	and 	5. 	We disagree.
Unlike 	the 	regional 	attorney, 	the 	Public Employment
Relations 	Board has 	the 	guidance 	of 	the 	United 	States 	Supreme
Court, 	as articulated 	in Chicago Teachers Assn. 	v. 	Hudson
(1986) 	475 US 	292. 	That 	decision sets 	forth certain procedural
requirements 	that 	must precede 	any deductions 	of 	an 	agency 	fee
or 	fair 	share 	fee.2 Charging party has 	stated 	a prima 	facie
case 	that 	certain procedures 	were 	not 	followed by 	CAUSE.
CAUSE, as exclusive representative, must provide an accounting of
all 	fees 	collected, 	including 	fees 	paid 	to consultants 	and
affiliates.
We 	also 	disagree 	with 	the 	regional 	attorney's 	assessment
that 	the 	monies 	expended by 	PORAC 	and 	CAFDO were 	necessarily
chargeable 	to 	charging party's 	agency 	fee. 	The 	determination
by 	the 	regional 	attorney 	relating 	to 	the 	PORAC 	and 	CAFDO
2The 	court 	held 	that 	nonmembers 	must 	be 	given 	notice 	and
adequate 	explanation of 	the basis 	of 	the 	fee prior 	to
collection, 	a 	reasonably prompt 	opportunity 	to challenge 	the
fee before 	an 	impartial 	decision maker, 	and 	an escrow account
for 	the 	amounts 	reasonably 	in dispute.
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portion of 	the 	fees 	and whether 	the 	fees 	were 	chargeable 	is 	a
factual 	finding, 	appropriately made 	only 	after 	an 	evidentiary
hearing. 	Certainly 	any 	accusation by 	charging party 	that 	CAFDO
and 	PORAC 	did 	not 	use 	the 	funds 	paid by agency 	fee 	payors 	in 	an
appropriate 	manner 	is 	part 	and parcel 	of 	an 	accusation 	that
CAUSE, 	the 	source 	of 	the 	funds 	to CAFDO and PORAC, 	used 	the
monies 	in an objectionable manner. 	We 	see 	no reason 	to
separate 	the 	challenge 	to CAUSE'S 	procedures 	for 	fixing 	the
amount 	of 	the 	agency 	fees 	from 	the 	challenge 	to 	the 	use by
CAUSE of 	those 	agency fees. 	We will, 	therefore, 	reverse 	the
partial 	dismissal 	in 	this 	case 	and 	order 	that 	the 	partial
complaint 	already 	issued be 	amended 	to 	include 	all 	allegations
made 	in 	the 	unfair 	practice 	charge.
ORDER
The 	Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board hereby ORDERS 	that
the partial 	dismissal 	of 	charges 	in Case 	No. 	S-CO-21-S be
REVERSED, 	and 	that 	the General 	Counsel 	issue 	a 	complaint
consistent 	with 	this 	opinion.
Members 	Craib 	and 	Cordoba 	joined 	in 	this 	Decision.
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