Los Angeles Unified School District (Watts) (PERB 0527E)

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STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD

HOWARD O. WATTS. | )
Complainant, ) Case No. LA-PN-84
Vv. )’ PERB Decision No. 527
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT. October 2, 1985

Respondent.

wet WL LL

Appearances; Howard 0. Watts, on his own behalf.

Before Hesse. Chairperson; Jaeger and Burt. Members.
DECISION
JAEGER. Member: On July 18. 1984. Howard O. Watts filed a
complaint with the Los Angeles regional office of the Public
Employment Relations Board (PERB) alleging that the Los Angeles
Unified School District (District) had violated the public
notice provisions of the Educational Employment Relations Act

(EERA)*

when, at its board of education meeting of June 18.
1984. it passed a motion endorsing the concept of comparable
worth as a policy to be pursued by its negotiators in upcoming
labor negotiations. On October 5, 1984. the regional office

dismissed Mr. Watts' complaint for failure to state a prima

facie case. Mr. Watts now appeals.

'The EERA is codified at Government Code section 3540
et seg. The public notice provisions of that legislation are
set forth at section 3547.

For 	the 	reasons which follow, 	we 	reverse 	the 	dismissal 	and
remand 	the 	matter 	to 	the General 	Counsel 	for 	further 	action.
DISCUSSION
In complaint No. 	LA-PN-84, Mr. Watts alleges that, 	in
anticipation of 	upcoming 	labor 	negotiations, 	the District's
board 	of 	education adopted 	a 	resolution which 	provides 	as
follows:
As 	the 	Board 	of 	Education approaches
negotiations 	for 	the 	1984-85 	school 	year
with the various 	bargaining units, 	it 	shall
continue 	to 	subscribe 	to 	the 	philosophical
position 	adopted 	and 	implemented 	last 	year
of 	seeking 	to 	identify 	those 	employment
classifications 	which 	are 	filled
predominantly by women 	and will 	seek 	salary
adjustments, wherever appropriate, 	to
address 	perceived 	wage 	discrepancies 	and
inequities. 	The 	identification of 	such
employment 	classifications 	shall 	not 	imply
that 	unlawful 	discrimination 	exists 	and
shall 	not 	preclude 	or 	discourage 	the
identification and 	remediation 	of 	any 	other
types 	of 	pay disparities.
A 	similar 	resolution was 	adopted 	in 	the 	preceding year.
Based 	on 	that 	action, 	the District's 	negotiators 	pursued 	and
achieved 	changes 	in wage 	rates 	designed 	to 	give 	effect 	to 	the
policy of 	comparable worth.
Mr. 	Watts alleges that, 	once again, 	the District 	is
formulating 	its 	bargaining 	position 	through 	the 	pretextual
format 	of 	a 	"philosophical 	position." 	Notwithstanding 	this
pretextual 	form, 	he 	asserts, 	the 	resolution on comparable worth
is 	in truth a 	part 	of 	the District's 	statement 	of 	its 	initial
bargaining position and, 	as 	such, 	should 	have 	been 	sunshined.
N	2

On October 	5, 	1984, 	a 	regional 	representative at PERB's
Los Angeles 	regional 	office 	issued 	a 	dismissal 	of 	the 	complaint
on the 	grounds 	that 	no prima 	facie 	case 	had 	been 	stated. 	He
reasoned 	that 	the 	EERA public 	notice 	provisions 	call 	only 	for
the 	sunshining 	of 	bargaining proposals, 	and 	that 	the motion 	in
question was 	not 	such a proposal. 	It 	contains 	no 	specific
language 	that would 	permit 	a 	concrete 	counterproposal 	by an
employee 	organization. 	It 	only endorses 	a 	concept which
neither 	requires 	nor 	expects 	a 	response.
On appeal. 	Watts argues that, 	in passing the motion, 	the
District 	adopted 	a 	position which 	expressly 	deals 	with 	the
subject 	of wages 	and 	is 	intended 	to 	shape 	the 	District's
negotiating position on that 	subject. 	Thus, 	assuming 	the
District 	failed 	to permit public 	response 	to 	the plan, 	argues
Watts, 	it violated 	its 	obligation under 	the EERA's 	public
notice provisions. 	We agree.
We 	find 	that 	the 	Los 	Angeles 	regional 	representative
applied 	an unduly 	restrictive 	definition 	of 	"initial 	proposal"
as used 	in EERA section 3547 when he 	stated 	that, 	to 	be 	such, 	a
proposal 	must 	be 	couched 	in 	specific 	language which would
permit 	a 	concrete 	counterproposal.
Significantly, 	an examination of 	the 	proposals which the
District 	di
- d 	submit 	to 	the 	public 	notice 	process 	(copies 	of
which Mr. 	Watts 	submitted with his 	charge) 	reveals 	that 	these
"official" 	initial 	proposals 	are 	no more 	specific 	than the
W

comparable worth motion here at 	issue. 	For 	example, 	the
initial 	proposal 	sunshined 	by the District 	in 	1984 	prior 	to
commencement 	of 	negotiations 	with 	its 	instructional 	aides
states 	in full 	as 	follows:
The District 	proposes 	no 	changes 	to 	the
current 	Unit 	B Agreement 	except 	to modify
health 	and welfare 	plans 	(Article XIV,
Health and Welfare) 	to reduce costs, 	improve
efficiency, 	and 	hold 	District 	expenditures
to no more 	than 1983-84 	levels.
Modifications 	may 	include 	use 	of 	Preferred
Provider Organizations, 	flexible 	benefits
plans, 	and a formula 	to determine 	increase
(or decrease) 	in capped benefits.
By comparison, 	the 	comparable worth resolution directs 	the
District's 	negotiators 	to
. 	. 	. 	identify those employment
classifications 	which are 	filled
predominantly by women and 	[to] 	seek 	salary
adjustments 	. . . 	to 	address 	perceived 	wage
discrepancies 	and 	inequities.
While we 	are 	satisfied 	that 	the 	comparable worth 	resolution
qualified 	as 	an 	initial 	proposal 	for 	purposes 	of 	section 	3547,
there 	is 	no 	indication 	in the 	record 	as 	to whether 	the 	regional
representative 	did 	investigate 	to 	determine 	whether 	the
complaint 	satisfies 	the 	remaining 	requirement 	to 	state 	a 	prima
facie violation of 	section 3547. 	That 	is, 	the regional
representative, 	in his 	letter of dismissal, 	is 	silent as 	to
whether 	the District 	did 	or 	did 	not 	in fact 	"present" 	the
comparable worth motion at 	a 	public 	meeting 	as 	required 	by 	the
statute. 	We 	conclude 	that 	this 	determination 	is 	appropriately
made 	by 	the 	regional 	office 	pursuant 	to 	its 	usual 	investigatory

procedures. 	We will 	therefore 	order 	that 	the 	case 	be 	remanded
for 	that 	purpose.
ORDER
For 	the 	foregoing reasons, 	the Board 	REVERSES 	the 	dismissal
of Case No. 	LA-PN-84 	and 	remands 	the matter 	to 	the General
Counsel 	for 	further 	investigation.
Chairperson Hesse 	and Member 	Burt 	joined 	in 	this 	Decision.
UT