PERB Decision No. 0449H•Regents of the University of California (California State Employees Association) (PERB 0449H)
Regents of the University of California (California State Employees Association) (PERB 0449H)
PERB Decision No. 0449HCalperbDec 4, 1984
Full text
STATE o~ CALIFORNIA DECISION OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD aaa CALIFORNIA STATE EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION, Charging Party, v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ____________________ ) Case No. SF-CE-84-H PERB Decision No. 449-H December 4, 1984 Appearances: Michael R. Bogen and Nadia Tesluk for the California State Employees' Association; Milton H. Gordon, Attorney for Regents of the University of California. Before Jaeger, Morgenstern and Burt, Members. DECISION AND ORDER JAEGER, Member: The California State Employees' Association (CSEA) excepts to the dismissal of certain portions of its unfair practice charge against the Regents of the University of California following a formal hearing conducted by an administrative law judge for the Public Employment Relations Board. The Board has reviewed the entire record, including the proposed decision attached hereto, and CSEA's exceptions and, finding no prejudicial error in the administrative law judge's findings of fact or conclusion of law, adopts the proposed decision as its own and ORDERS that said portions of the charge are DISMISSED. Members Morgenstern and Burt joined in this decision.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOY.MENT RELATIONS BOARD aaa CALIFORNIA STATE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, Charging Party, v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA; Respondent. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) __________________ ) Unfair Practice Case No. SF-CE-84-H PROPOSED DECISION ( 4/11/84) Appearances: Michael Bogan and Nadia Tesluk, representatives for California State Employees Association; Milton Gordon, attorney, for Regents of the University of California. Before: Fred D'Orazio, Administrative Law Judge. PROCEDURAL HISTORY The California State Employees Association (hereafter CSEA or Charging Party) filed this unfair practice charge against the Regents of the University of California (hereafter University or Respondent) on September 18, 1981. The charge alleged that the University Art Museum (hereafter Museum or UAM) systematically discriminated and retaliated against four employees because of their protected activities -in violation of section 357l(a) of the Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act (hereafter HEERA or Act).l lThe HEERA is codified at Government Code section 3560,
During a long procedural history, the charge was dismissed once and amended several times. The charge was also amended at the outset of the formal hearing as well as during the hearing itself. An informal conference was held on November 5 and 6, 1981, but the case was not settled. The University filed its answer on November 25, 1981. The answer generally denied the charges and asserted affirmative defenses which will be dealt with below. A pre-hearing conference was conducted by the undersigned on March 15, 1982, and the formal hearing commenced on March 22, 1982. Fourteen days of hearing were conducted between March 22 and June 1, 1982. After several extension, the briefing schedule was completed on February 1, 1983 and the case was submitted. PROCEDURAL HISTORY FACTS I. Background. Prior to July 1, 1981, the University Art Museum was divided into two departments where the events in question here took place. The shop department performed duties such as constructing and tearing down walls for exhibits, building et seq. All statutory references hereafter are to theGovernment Code unless otherwise noted. 2
crates to hold art work, etc. It was supervised by Andre Johnson, who reported directly to Ron Egherman, assistant director for administration. Egherman reported to Jim Elliott, director of the Museum. Two full-time career employees worked under Johnson. They were John O'Neil and Laurie Clausen. The preparation department performed duties associated with installing· art exhibits. These included assignments such as lighting, matting, video, etc. Barney Bailey was the chief preparator and supervisor of the preparation department. He reported directly to David Ross, the assistant director and chief curator. Ross reported to Elliott. There were two full-time career preparators in the department. They were Adrienne Wong and Bobbie Shalk. In general, employees in the shop department were paid a little more than employees in the preparation department. Nina Hubbs, a designer, also worked in the Mus~um. She was a liaison between the curatorial staff and the shop and preparation departments. Both departments relied heavily on what are referred to as "on,-call" workers. As the name suggests, these are people who are called to work on short notice. They may work for as little as a half day or as long as several days at a stretch, depending on the needs of the Museum. While they are paid the same as full-time employees, on-call workers do not receive other benefits. 3
The need for on-call workers is determined by the peak-and-valley nature of the work in the Museum. For example, several employees may be necessary to prepare and install a large exhibit, but they may not be needed while the exhibit is shown. They may again be needed when it is time to take down the exhibit, but they may not be needed during the lull that occurs between exhibits. Thus, the need for on-call workers is determined largely by the exhibit schedule. Use of on-call workers is a relatively new concept at the UAM, although it is a common practice at museums in general. Egherman instituted the practice in approximately 1978. As a result of layoffs and other cutbacks on July 1, 1981, there was a reorganization in the UAM. The shop department was eliminated and Johnson, Clausen and O'Neil were laid off. The chief preparator position was eliminated and a new posit~on, head of installation and design, created. Hubbs filled that position, and Bailey was demoted to a full-time preparator position. He no longer was considered a supervisor. He served as a lead person instead. Shalk was offered a half-time preparator position in place of her full-time career slot, but chose to resign for personal reasons. Wong was cut back to a half-time preparator. The Museum continued to use on-call workers. Egherman, the assistant director of administration, and Elliott, the director of the UAM, retained their positions. 4
The assistant director and chief curator position was eliminated as a result of the reorganization and Ross was laid off. II. Adrienne Wong. Adrienne Wong began working in the Museum as a work-study student in 1975. A~ter she graduated in March of 1976, she worked as a senior museum preparator on an on-call basis until January 1979, when she became a full-time preparator. From April 1979 to November 1979, Wong was granted a leave of absence to go to Japan where Daniel Kelly, previously an on-call preparator in the UAM, was an artist-in-residence. Kelly and Wong had a personal relationship. Wong actually wanted to quit the UAM to go to Japan to be with him, but Bailey, her immediate supervisor, persuaded her to take a leave of absence instead. Bailey felt at that time that Wong, who possessed more experience than Shalk, had certain abilities which made her valuable to the UAM and he was prepared to hold her position open. When Wong left for Japan, she and Shalk had a good working relationship. A. Wong's Return from Japan and the Events of 1980. While Wong was in Japan, Bailey worked extensively with Bobbie Shalk, at that time the only other full-time preparator on the staff. At some point after her return, Wong formed the opinion that there had developed a redistribution of responsibilities in the preparation department. It appears 5
that Wong was displeased that, in her absence, Bailey had come to rely on Shalk to perform key duties in the department. In a sense, Wong felt Shalk had replaced her as the lead preparator. Shalk testified that Wong became moody and unpredictable after her return from Japan. And Bailey testified that he i'ncreasingly found himself in the position of trying to mediate a rivalry that was rapidly developing between Wong and Shalk. In essence, it was his view that Wong felt betrayed. On May 29, 1980, Wong asked Bailey for a clarification of her role within the department and an accurate description of her job duties. Wong's contention was that the job description cards were about 10 years old and no longer accurately reflected the duties of employees in that position. Wong testified that she talked to other preparators, in both full-time and casual on-call status, about he~ concerns in this area. However, Wong's chief concern was personal in nature. Of primary concern was the fact that certain lighting duties had been taken away from her, sometimes at the last minute, and given to Shalk. This was particularly upsetting to Wong, who considered herself to be an expert in lighting. Additionally, at about this time, Wong spoke to Bailey and voiced her opinion that, based on the work she was performing, she should be reclassified to a higher position. This request was based in large part on the lighting duties, which she 6
considered to be higher level work. As will be more fully explained below, Bailey ultimately rejected Wong's request for reclassification. On May 30 Bailey gave Wong a good evaluation and recorrnnended her for a 7 1/2 percent merit increase. He said that, while there were some problems with Wong's work, she was basically doing a good job. Also, compared to other museums in the Bay Area, preparators at UAM were underpaid and B~iley thought it unfair to give an underpaid employee, who was basically doing a good job, a bad evaluation with little or no raise. Bailey's evaluation was further affected in part by the fact that Wong had just returned from Japan .and was undergoing some personal difficulty, stemming from, among other things, a death in the family. On the other hand, Bailey testified that there were some problems with Wong, but he felt they were not typical of her work. On June 26 and 27, 1980, Wong spoke with Joe Toby, an analyst in the University's personnel department, about two issues which were of primary concern to employees in the department. First, she raised with Toby the so-called wage-lag problem, which essentially means that preparators in the UAM were paid less than employees in comparable positions in other Bay Area museums. Second, she raised with Toby the fact that on-call preparators did not receive fringe benefits. Wong said she discussed the meeting with other employees in the UAM and 7
with Bailey, who also stood to gain if the wage-lag issue was pursued successfully. According to Wong, Toby and Bailey, as well as the employees, were receptive to her inquiries, especially the pay inequity situation, as pay for preparators was lagging about 15 percent behind the pay for comparable positions in other Bay Area museums. During· the summer and fall of 1980, and into 1981, she continued to meet with Toby and with representatives of the UAM.2 During these meetings the issues relating to clarification of responsibilities, job description cards, wage inequities, and layoffs were discussed. Wong testified that employees in the department were aware that these discussions were ongoing. However, except for the wage-lag matter, it seems that i.f other employees knew of these discussions, their awareness was in the vaguest sense, and, at least for issues other than the wage-lag, the record does not estabiish that Wong acted as an appointed representative of other workers. For example, at the hearing Wong testified at great length that 2For example, on July 16, 1980, Wong met with Toby and David Ross to discuss a proposed job description card that she prepared. On July 11, 1980, Wong, Shalk and Bailey met and discussed wage inequities. On July 25, 1980, Wong and Kelly met with Toby and discussed job descriptions and wage inequities. In addition, in July 1980, Wong submitted, among other things, her version of a correct job description card to Egherman. The card was submitted in conjunction with her contention that she should be reclassified. 8
a burning issue in the department concerned the lack of clarification of duties and responsibilities of workers. In contrast, Shalk, Wong's co-worker and only other career preparator, testified convincingly that, aside from isolated incidents, she was not aware that a problem existed with clarification of duties. Shalk's testimony was corroborated by Mary Kate Murphy, an on-call preparator. More9ver, Toby's version of these meetings is a little different. Although he concedes that the wage lag problem was discussed, he said the focus of the meetings during this period was on Wong, as an individual. She wanted to be reclassified to the scene technician position; she wanted to do some personal training at the Oakland Art Museum; and she complained about her November evaluation, to be described below. With respect to Bq~ley, Wong complained to Toby that he· was erratic and didn't give people enough information to do th~ir jobs. She said Bailey favored certain people and she was not one of them. By this time, Bailey had already talked to Toby about the problems he was having with Wong, so Toby was well aware of both sides of the story. These discussions continued into 1981 and it appears that Toby tried to mediate the situation. He was unsuccessful and at some point he began to advise Bailey as to what his options were as a supervisor with respect to dealing with Wong. 9
In September of 1980 Wong formally proposed to Bailey that she be granted a six-month employee development program which included two projects: (l} a lighting internship at the Oakland Museum, and (2) a video course to assist in performing video work. The lighting internship program involved working at the Oakland Art Museum revamping the lighting system and researching low voltage. Bailey rejected the proposal because the UAM had just researched low voltage and purchased $3,000 worth of low voltage fixtures. Thus, he saw no benefit to the UAM from this part of the proposal. Also, he said Wong wanted to take a private tutorial in video. Bailey thought it was a better idea for both Wong and Shalk to take a class rather than a private tutorial.3 Wong then presented the proposal to Ross and Egherman. It was similarly rejected. By October 1980 the relationship between Wong and Bailey was rapidly deteriorating. According to Wong's te~timony, she had been given the lead role in lighting for the Marioni 3An example of the problems Bailey had working with Wong at this time is evidenced by the situation surrounding drafting the employee development proposal. Bailey asked Wong to submit a written proposal. Three weeks went by but no proposal was forthcoming. On a Friday Wong asked Bailey if she could have Monday off to draft the proposal. Bailey refused because they were in the midst of preparing for an exhibit and Wong was needed at work. Also, Bailey felt three weeks was long enough. On Monday morning Wong called the Museum to say she would not be reporting to work. She said she was tired from staying up all night to draft her proposal. 10
Exhibit and Shalk had been given the lead role in video. Wong said Bailey, without apparent justification, claimed her work was unacceptable and suggested terminating her if she didn't improve. For several weeks therafter, according to Wong, he assigned her menial cleanup chores. This prompted Wong to have a meeting with Ross, where she said she was not being treated equally and she would file a discrimination suit if it didn't stop. In November 1980 Bailey, who stood to benefit from any readjustment which came out of pursuing the wage-lag issue, became dissatisfied at the slow pace with which ~he matter was moving. He decided to get involved.4 He met with Ross, Egherman and Elliott, and took the lead role in putting together a package to argue for increased wages for preparators. He was assisted by Wong and Shalk, and together they eventually developed a proposal. This effort.took a considerable period of time because the issue had systemwide ramifications and the material needed to be gathered from other campuses. Eventually Bailey unsuccessfully presented the 4In April of 1980 Bailey had encouraged Wong and Shalk to seek union assistance with the wage-lag problem.· He apparently felt union representation would be more effective due to any expertise the Union might bring to the issue. He took steps to contact a union, he met with AFSCME representatives, and he reported back to_Wong and Shalk. Despite these efforts by Bailey, Wong claims that Bailey, in an attempt to discourage union participation, told her and Shalk that AFSCME's dues were $100 per month. . 11
proposal for increased wages to a systemwide board established to consider such matters. Wong and Shalk accompanied him and assisted him in the presentation.5 A few days later, on November 3, 1980, Wong received what she described as an unfair performance evaluation. She complained to Ross that she objected to the evaluation and intended to file a grievance. The evaluation rated Wong as "unsatisfactory" in two areas: (1) Installation and (2) Collection Study/Storage. She was rated as "improvement needed" in four categories: (1) Packing/ Shipping/Receiving, (2) Collection/Delivery of works in the Local Area, (3) Related Services, and (4) Other. In the "Comments" section of the evaluation, Bailey wrote that Wong refused to carry out his requests and accept responsibility when an assignment was delegated to her. He said that her lack of ability to communicate with others, especially quring a task which involved two or more employees, had had a negative impact on her work. In addition, Bailey wrote that her, . bad temper has had deteriorating consequences to the morale of the preparation staff. He further accused her of causing "unnecessary stress" in the unit because of her "defiance." 5The so-called wage-lag board is made up of appointees who hear proposals and arguments as to wage inequities. It is constituted on a systemwide basis and meets periodically. 12
In support of his comments, Bailey attached to the evaluation a September 16 memo from Bailey to Ross regarding Wong's refusal to participate in a meeting during the Hartley Exhibit, and a July 15 memo from Bailey to Wong about her refusing to attend another meeting during another exhibit. Also attached to the evaluation was a November 3 memo about Wong taking too long to perform an assignment. This latter memo incorporates by reference an October 22 memo wherein Bailey questioned Wong about disappearing from the work location. In the July 15 memo, Bailey wrote that Wong's "direct defiance" in refusing to attend a meeting resulted in her being unprepared for circumstances that followed. He informed Wong that, as the supervisor, he would determine job responsibilities. In her rebut~al statement, submitted after a one-month stress-related absence, Wong conceded th 9t Bailey requested the meeting, but she, •.. felt the priority of [her] time was needed for the MFA Lighting Installation. Wong wrote that she requested a meeting with Ross to determine priorities. At the hearing, Wong testified that she had other duties to attend to that day, and Ross once told her not to spend her efforts on time-wasting projects. Shalk's testimony confirmed Bailey's to the extent that Wong did not attend the meeting. 13
In the September 16 memo to Ross, issued during the Hartley Exhibit, Bailey again complained that Wong refused to attend a staff meeting, despite the fact that he explained the meeting was important and it had been delayed several times for her sake. He further wrote that, ... as a supervisor I refuse to accept this form of protest. He told Ross that he intended to, ... press the issue to the fullest the next time [he is] put in this position. In rebuttal, Wong asserted that she did not refuse to participate in the meeting. She explained that she was consistently pressed for answers to lighting problems which she did not have. In an attempt to avoid dealing with Bailey on the matter, she claimed it needed to be resolved by the chief curator. Bailey's November 3 memo to Wong referenced th~ October 22 memo which stated that she disappeared from work without telling him. He apparently had asked her to let him know before leaving in the future so he could avoid questioning her judgment. He docked her 2.5 hours for her absence. The November 3 memo cites another incident where her disappearance at the last minute "taxed the exhibition." In her rebuttal Wong claims she did not walk out of one of the exhibits (Joan Jonas). With respect to the other (Avedon), she asserted that she walked out because she was "emotionally 14
upset" after an argument with Bailey. Both Bailey and Shalk confirmed that Wong walked out of the Avedon Exhibit. And Bailey convincingly testified she told him "fuck you" before leaving. After Bailey returned from his vacation in January 1981, they discussed the fact that there were problems in the department~ and they agreed to attempt to work them out more amicably in the future. Wong said she asked Bailey if he wanted to discuss the evaluation, and he refused, saying he intended to withdraw it.6 Bailey denied telling Wong he would withdraw the evaluation. He said that, because of the problems in the department, especially his relationship with Wong, he put a tremendous amount of time and energy into the evaluation and had deep concerns about the impact it would have on Wong. Specifically, he was concerned about the deteriorating relationships in the department and felt a negative evaluation would make things worse. Meetings to mediate the situation had been unsuccessful. Further, he was concerned because he thought the evaluation might affect Wong's heart condition. After returning from an absence due to stress, Wong wore a heart monitor. And, according to Bailey, he received a letter 6As will more fully be discussed below, the evaluation appeared in Wong's personnel file in June 1981. 15
from Wong's psychologist saying that Wong should not be working in the Museum until she felt better. This too gave him reason for concern, as he felt the evaluation would cause her more stress. Bailey discussed all of this with Toby before proceeding to issue the evaluation. In sum, Bailey testified that, given all that he went through in drafting the evaluation~ it would have been absurd for him to simply agree to then withdraw it and insert nothing in its place. I credit Bailey on this point and find that he never agreed to withdraw the evaluation. As more fully explained below in the credibility section, Wong was not a particularly believable witness, while Bailey was more impressive on the stand. Furthermore, it makes no sense that Bailey would draft the detailed evaluation, knowing fully that Wong would certainly disagree with it, only to withdraw it at the slightest protest. This is especially true given the unplea 9 ant atmosphere in the department at the time; that is, the relationship between Wong and Bailey had deteriorated greatly and there was little hope that Wong would quietly accept the evaluation or that things would get better. Bailey, who was concerned about the situation, was well aware of this and, further, had to be aware of the fact that the. hard feelings would not evaporate simply because he agreed to withdraw the evaluation. I ·agree that it would have been absurd for him to draft such an evaluation and then almost immediately withdraw 16
it at the slightest protest, inserting nothing in its place. Indeed, I find that he did not do so. Meanwhile, by the end of 1980 the relationship between Wong and Shalk had worsened. Shalk testified that Wong became secretive about lighting information. This presented a problem, because Wong was supposed to be serving as the lead person on lighting and, in a loose sense, training Shalk. By March 1981, Shalk wrote a letter about Wong to Bailey in which she said she had to let off some steam. In the letter, she told Bailey she was tired of trying to compromise with Wong with no response, and she complained of Wong's "sullen and defiant" moods. In short, she wrote that she was "pissed off."7 B. The Events of 1981 1. The Layoffs In January of 1981 Museum management found its~lf in the midst of a severe financial crisis. The Museum had overspent its budget and, for the first time in over 40 years, the Berkeley campus faced a. deficit of about $2 million. This meant that there would be less money from student fees and 70thers who worked with Wong described her in the same way. For example, Mary Kate Murphy, a preparator in the Museum, described Wong as moody, downcast and glum. Also, she corroborated Shalk's testimony that Shalk and Wong did not get along well. 17
tuition channeled to the Museum. Also, fund raising efforts had not gotten off to a quick start and a cash-flow problem existed. Organizationally, the Vice Chancellor's office has budgetary control over the UAM. A meeting of management officials from the Museum and the Vice Chancellor's office was held in January to discuss the crisis. As of that date, the expected deficit was approximately $197,000. In general terms, what emerged from the meeting was a request that the Museum cut its budget by approximately $300,000 to $400,000 for 1981-82. Approximately 70 to 80 percent of this would be accomplished by permanent staff reductions. On March 18, 1981, Elliott responded to the Vice Chancellor's office in a lengthy memo. In essence, the memo suggested that a $300,000 cut was too severe, and any cuts that were made needed to be done in stages. Neverthele 9 s, Elliott sought to comply. He set forth a proposal which broke the budget into two components, the "core" component and the "program" component. The core component was that part which would rely on general funding. Even if no additional funds were raised by other means, the Museum would still be able to function on the core component. The program component was that part which would fluctuate depending on the amount of income available from outside sources. Naturally, if the Museum received more program money it would be richer, but at worst it 18
could function on the core component. Further, in his memo, Elliott stressed his concern for staff members who might have to be laid off and with the morale of those who remained. Communications continued between representatives from the Museum, Elliott and Egherman, and representatives of the Vice Chancellor's office. There were several meetings and lengthy memoranda exchanged on the subject. Several options emerged and were considered. It appears that these exchanges eventually took on the flavor of negotiations, with both sides setting forth their positions and various options. Museum representatives argued for the highest possible budget. In addition, part of this process included consideration of the impact fund raisers would have on the budget. This process continued for the first six months of 1981, and a great deal of uncertainty existed during this period.8 Egherman said that paring down costs was a difficult job. To make up $300,000, he said he couldn't just cut a few dollars here and a few dollars there, but rather the whole structure and character of the Museum had to be changed. Thus, cuts were made in administration, curatorial, and in the Pacific Film 8Various options were discussed during this ~eriod. For example, one plan called for 1.5 full-time positions in the Museum. Another called for two positions, and yet another called for three positions. However, it appears that during this process no one really knew with certainty how much money there would be or how many positions would finally be allotted to the staff. 19
Archives. A new concept in the allocation of space was developed. For example, gallery B, which was highly labor-intensive because it was designed for exhibitions, would no longer be used. Instead, the permanent collection was put in gallery B, and changing exhibitions in other galleries which had lower ceilings ·and were easier to light and to install. Also, admission would be charged and the number of exhibits reduced. The final budget emerged on June 3. It was $1.15 million. As stated, this figure was arrived at after much negotiation between the Museum representatives, Egherman and Elliott, and representatives of the Chancellor's office. Employees were kept informed at various steps along the way. They knew the $1.15 million had been agreed to, but they didn't know how the money would be allotted. Egherman testified that he committed to the Viqe Chancellor's office during the negotiations that as much money as possible would be put into programs because that is what the fund raisers wanted. One issue which kept surfacing during the budget process was the concerns of fund raisers, donors, and those who gave endowments to the Museum. They wanted assurances that the University was committed to funding the Museum so that their contributions would go towards a quality operation. The final budget, including the layoffs, was announced on 20
June 24, 1981. The equivalent of 9.38 full-time positions were eliminated. However, this affected 14 or 15 employees because some were part-time. The Museum was reorganized. The shop department was eliminated and all of its career employees-- Johnson, O'Neill and Clausen--were laid off. A new department was set up to do the work the shop and preparation departments did in the·past. Hubbs was named head of that department. Her position in design was not filled. Additionally, the budget provided for the equivalent of two other full-time positions. Bailey retained one full-time position, but he was demoted from chief preparator to a non-supervisory lead person slot. Hubbs testified that she offered Bailey the full-time position because of his experience and the fact that she felt a little uneasy about taking over the supervision of the combined preparation and shop departments. Wong was reduced from full-time prep~rator to a .50 preparator. Shalk had been offered the .50 position based on her seniority over Wong, but she declined and resigned. The remaining .50 position was allotted to on-call workers. Hubbs reasoned that this would give her the flexibility needed to employ on-call workers to handle the peaks and valleys of the exhibition season. Also available for this purpose was some on-call money from the program budget. David Ross, the chief curator was laid off. Every department except security was hit by the layoff. 21
Although it was the chancellor's office that eventually imposed the final budget, Hubbs had the primary authority to decide how to allocate the two full-time positions. For example, rather than have l.~ career positions, she could have decided to use all the money for the two positions for only on-call employees, or she could have devised some other arrangement.· After consulting with Toby, Ross and Egherman, she settled on 1.50 caree~ positions and .50 on-call. Bailey played no role in this decision or in the layoffs. In fact, he didn't even know they were coming. The layoffs were effective July 1, 1981. Meanwhile, in May 1981 Jim Elliott, director of the UAM, called a meeting of all staff to announce that there would be layoffs. Elliott explained that the layoffs were necessary due to cutbacks in funding from the Berkeley campus. Wong testified that she had no reason to question the vali9ity of Elliott's explanation. Immediately after Elliott's May 13 announcement, but before the cuts were implemented, Wong and Kelly undertook a campaign to secure employment for themselves in the face of this muse~rn-wide layoff. Wong set up a meeting with Elliott and told him of the role she had filled in the department and the functions she had performed. She raised with him the idea that she and Kelly continue to receive work. Wong first proposed, in essence, that she receive a .50 preparator's slot and .50 22
on-call time. Alternatively, she proposed that Kelly be given the .50 on-call time if she couldn't have it. In making this proposal, Wong was aware of the fact that if she and Kelly received this work, it would be to the exclusion of all other employees who were also facing a layoff. Elliott directed Wong to Ross who, in turn, directed her to Nina Hubbs, the new head of installation and design.9 Wong, in fact, had several discussions with Hubbs about future employment. It had been announced that there was a likelihood that 1.5 positions would be available, and once again the thrust of Wong's comments to Hubbs was to secure as much of this work as possible for herself and for Daniel Kelly. She claims that Hubbs, on June 3, and again on June 5, offered her a .50 position and told her that Shalk, who actually had more seniority than Wong, would be offered the other .SO position. On June 8, according to Wong, Hubbs offered her a .SO position and a .50 casual on-call position, Shalk having decided to leave the UAM by this time. Wong further testified that Hubbs said Kelly could have the .50 casual on-call position if Wong didn't want it. Hubbs' version of these conversations is somewhat different. Hubbs denied making the offers. She said she told Wong 9wong also went to Toby and pursued the possibility of securing a position for herself and for Kelly. 23
that Shalk had more seniority and thus was entitled to the remaining .50 slot. But if Shalk declined, Wong was next in line and could have it. According to Hubbs, Wong said she was interested, and she also raised the fact that Kelly was interested in a .50 job or other work. Hubbs denied that she offered Wong the .50 position, plus .50 worth of other on-call work. This would add up to a full-time job and Hubbs said she was not in a position to offer that. In the end, Wong said she was interested in the .50 position.10 I credit Hubbs' testimony on this point. Hubbs knew Bailey would get one full-time job. There was only one other .50 slot available. Hubbs could not have offered Wong a .50 position until after Shalk declined the same position since the layoff of career employees is based on seniority and Shalk was senior to Wong. More importantly, it is not believable that Hubbs would offer either Wong or Kelly a .50 on-call positi_on, since such an offer would limit the number of employees Hubbs could call to work at any one time and thus reduce the flexibility needed to handle the fluctuating workload in the Museum. It does not seem even remotely possible that Hubbs, who struck me as a conscientious and thoughtful manager, would have tied her own hands in this regard. This is especially true since it was lOApparently, Bailey did not figure into these discussions, although Hubbs and Bailey talked about Bailey's situation at other times. 24
Hubbs' stated philosophy at the time to preserve this flexibility by using the remaining .50 position for on-call employees. Committing this amount of on-call work to any one employee would have completely undermined her ability to cover the work during exhibitions. 2. The June 12 Letter On June 12, 1981, Bailey gave Wong the following memo: My request for information from you, details on a light test was denied. After which you suggested I do it myself. You then denied a request for the name of the person I needed to contact to obtain the information I needed to complete the project myself. When I asked you why you were so defiant youranswer was you didn't like the way I "handled" the attempt to correct our wage lag. This abstract defiance and your leaving for the day (returning after speaking to David Ross) because you don't "feel well" and that "you don't have to takeanything from me" is inexcusable. This is by far not the first incident of its kind or the first caution to you that it is inexcusable. Shortly after she received this memo, on approximately June 16, Wong made her first contact with CSEA, and a meeting was held on June 29 to discuss the memo, among other things.11 llThe original memo used the word "warning" in the last sentence in place of the word "caution." At some point,probably before the meeting with CSEA representatives, the word "warning" was changed to "caution." The change was made by Bailey at Toby's suggestion. The effect of the change was to make it clear that the letter did not constitute corrective action and thus could not be used to support a subsequent disciplinary action. 25
There had been a situation in the Museum where light bulbs were burning out too fast. These bulbs were sent to facilities management to be checked. Since Bailey had not heard anything from facilities management for about a month, he told Wong to call and check it out. Wong got off the telephone and said that she had to tak~ some "stuff" down to facilities management.· Bailey said, "what stuff?" She said, "specifications." Bailey repeatedly asked what specifications, but she would not say anything except "specifications," even though she knew precisely what specifications were requested. Wong then said, "if you want to do it, do it yourself." Bailey said, "okay, I will. What's the number." Wong had called facilities management and had been transferred to the appropriate individual. When Bailey asked for the number, instead of giving him the number or name of the person she had been talking to, she gave him the original number, which meant that when Bailey called he had to get transferred himself. Bailey called the number, eventually got transferred, and a man at the other end of the line explaihed he needed certain specifications. Bailey told him the specifications had been sent in a month ago. At this point, the person in facilities looked in his file, confirmed that what Bailey said was true, and said, "okay, we'll get back to you." That was the end of it. Significantly, Wong was present and in fact was the one who gave these specifications to the 26
facilities management people approximately a month ago when they visited the museum to check out the problem. Thus, she was at all times aware of the specifications Bailey wanted. Bailey summed up the incident as follows. He said that Wong frequently would make a response to him which was sufficiently vague to be confusing or incomplete, but not so incomplete -as to be completely nonresponsive. He described this as passive defiance. Wong eventually filed a grievance under SPP section 280. As more fully explained below, the University rejected the grievance because the memo did not constitute "corrective action" within the meaning of the SPP and therefore was not grievable under section 280.12 3. The June 16 Performance Evaluation On June 16, 1981, Wong received her performance evaluation covering the period July 1, 1980 to July 1, 1981. Bailey rated her as "unsatisfactory" in three categories, and "improvement needed" in four categories.13 He also attached comments. 12The facts surrounding the University's res~onses to the grievances filed by all the discriminatees in this case, and the charging party's arguments in relation to each grievance, are 0 set forth in Section VI, infra. 13 11 Unsatisfactory" ratin~s were in Response to Supervisor (and co-workers); Packing/Shipping/Receiving; and Installation. "Improvement Needed" ratings were in Collection/Storage; Collection/Delivery; Related Services (such as handling art work for loan on campus); and Others (such as safe handling of art). 27
which were generally critical of Wong's ability to get along with co-workers, and of her general attitude about her job. Bailey did not include written specific incidents to support his comments. The evaluation further states that Wong made improvements since her last evaluation. However, the evaluation contains more negative checks in the various categories than in the prior evaluation. Bailey explained this inconsistency. He said that essentially Wong was erratic in her work. While she improved temporarily, she ultimately regressed in the overall ratings. He further explained that Wong would not sit down with him to discuss the evaluation, so the specifics in support of these ratings were never discussed. At first Bailey testified that, since there had been no discussion, he has no recollection of what these specifics were. However, when pressed, he recalled several specifics to support his "Comments" in the evaluation. Specifically, he said that he once told Shalk to tell Wong, who was going out to pick up some lamps, to stop by a certain manufacturer's place of business and pick up a ladder. Shalk did so, but Wong said she didn't have time and she didn't want to talk to Shalk about it. Then she left. As a result, the equipment was not picked up, and someone else had to make a separate trip to get the ladder. Also, Bailey cited the example of the Pomodoro Exhibition when Wong kept telling him 28
that he was assigning her "shit work." Further, he said there were at least three or four times when Wong gave Shalk an extremely hard time which consequently affected everybody's performance. He also cited the incident when he asked Wong for specifications about the light bulbs and she wouldn't give them to him. Bailey said that on another occasion he asked her to clear off a matting table. She gave him a long memo wherein she asked him where he wanted her to put certain items. She listed these items in a long list, but they were basically just little odds and ends that were on the table and didn't have any specific place to go; she should have known where to put them. The odds and ends were such things as little pieces of paper, etc. He termed her memo "ridiculous." A day later she came back with another memo specifying a list of similar items and asked Bailey where to put them. On the third day she gave him yet another memo in which she said that she had decided to put all these little odds and ends under the table until it was decided exactly where they should go. Bailey said that's exactly what he wanted her to do in the first place, but it took three memos and three days to do a job that should have been done in half an hour. He said that this affected the installation and all aspects of her work because it wasted time. Another point of contention stemming from the evaluation involved the fact that her lighting responsibilities were not specifically reflected on the evaluation, even though she had 29
done lighting during the evaluation period. Bailey said that her lighting responsibilities were covered under the area of installation. He also said that at least three people, including Shalk and himself, and as many as five people when the on-call workers were considered, also did lighting at the time. Thus, Wong's.percentage of time in lighting was not great. Bailey's comments also incorporated by reference the October 1980 evaluation. I have already found that Bailey never agreed to withdraw the October 1980 evaluation. When he was the chief preparator, it was Bailey's practice to keep evaluations in his desk along with other personnel information. After the reorganization, he transferred his files and responsibilities over to Nina Hubbs and showed her where he kept the personnel files. He'was informed that the personnel files should be kept upstairs in another office. Hubbs then transferred all the personnel files, incfuding Wong's, into the business office files. It was apparent at this point that Wong learned that the October 1980 evaluation had not been withdrawn. The evaluation was discussed at the June 29 meeting in Toby's office. Present were Toby, Bailey and Wong, who was represented by Nadia Tesluk of CSEA. Also discussed was the June 12 letter regarding "specifications." This was the first time Wong was represented by CSEA. 30
4. The July 14 Grievance. On July 14, 1981, Wong filed a grievance about her layoff. The grievance charged that the University's layoff regulations (SPP section 760) had been violated because, .•. the department does not document the layoff with either a lack of funds or a lack of work. · Additionally, Wong complained in the grievance that casual ~mployees were "being retained to do the same work." Lastly, the grievance asserted that the layoff was part of a continuing "series of punitive actions" including the June 12 "letter of warning" and the June 28 evaluation. 5. The July 16 and 20 Letters Regarding Keys Nina Hubbs returned from vacation on July 13 as the new supervisor of the installation and design department. As mentioned earlier, Hubbs became the supervisor of Barney Bailey and Adrienne Wong, and Bailey no longer had supervisory responsibility for Wong. He did, however, serve as a lead person and had a great deal of contact with Wong in this capacity. As part of this transition, Hubbs established new procedures for the use of building keys. Keys would no longer be taken home, but would be left at "control," the security desk, prior to leaving for the day. On July 15, she met with Bailey, Wong, and Gary Garvin, another employee, and directed them to follow this new 31
procedure. Reasons for the new procedure were based largely on her concern for the security of the art work. In the past, problems had been created when keys were left at home or lost. In addition, those people who worked part-time were absent from the Museum for long periods of time during which their keys might be required. Hubbs' policy on keys applied to the entire staff. Two hours after Hu.bbs announced this directive, Wong left the Museum without leaving her keys at control. At the end of the day, when turning in her keys, Hubbs discovered that Wong was the only employee who had not done so. Hubbs chose not to discuss the matter with Wong. Instead, on July 16, 1981, she wrote Wong a letter of reprimand citing the incident. On the next day that Wong was scheduled to work, Monday, July 20, she again forgot her keys. Rather than tell Hubbs that she left her keys at home, Wong went directly to control and attempted to get a second set. This prompted Hubbs to write Wong a second letter of reprimand on the subject of keys. Both letters simply reminded Wong of the newly-established procedure and said that if she continued to neglect this responsibility her key privileges would be rescinded. In addition, the July 20 letter asserted that the keys were University property and their removal from the Museum constituted misappropriation of University property, which is 32
subject to corrective action. Both of these letters were given to Wong on Monday, July 20. In the past, others had lost their keys, but were not reprimanded. For example, Bailey once lost his keys prior to June 1981, before this procedure was established. There was no evidence that this had occurred under the new procedure. Wong filed grievances about both of the memos related to the key issue. On September 2, 1981, Elliott responded by. letter assuring her that the security reasons prompted the memos and they were not a reprisal for use of the grievance procedure. 6. The July 1981 Memos Dealing with Lighting Files, Use of Xerox Machine, and Other Copying of Files. On July 14 Hubbs tried to locate the lighting files that were normally kept in a filing cabinet in Wong's desk. The information in these files was needed to prepare a new budget for the department. When she could not locate the iiles Hubbs asked Wong if she knew where they were. Wong replied "usually they are kept in my desk." In fact, Wong had taken the files home. The next day, July 15, Hubbs had a meeting with Bailey, Wong and Garvin and they discussed the issue of the keys and consolidation of files. Hubbs anounced that she intended to consolidate the working files from the old shop, preparation and design departments in her office, including the lighting 33
files. Also, Hubbs said that, in order to clean up the files before consolidation, any extraneous material would be thrown out. Wong became extremely concerned that some of the information that she had in these files might be discarded, and this would hurt her attempts at a reclassification. Wong apparently felt that her work in lighting could be documented by reviewing her research in this area, which was included in these files. Two. days later, on July 17, Hubbs again looked for the lighting files in Wong's desk. Again she could not locate the specific files she needed. Hubbs became increasingly concerned about the whereabouts of the files. On Friday evening, July 17, at 6:30 p.m., Hubbs called control and requested that Adrienne Wong, Barney Bailey, and Daniel Kelly be denied access to the Museum offices from that time through 8:30 a.m., Monday, July 20. The hours included only the time during which those individuals did not normally work. Normal work hours for these employees were to begin again on Monday at 8:30 a.m. She did ~his in order to determine who was responsible for the removal of lighting files. Hubbs' intention was to see if anyone would attempt to return the files over the weekend. On Monday, July 20, Wong arrived at work early to copy the files, knowing that Hubbs wanted them.14 A security guard· told her to leave the building and not to return until 8:30 a.m. When Wong arrived at work later that morning she 34
brought several files with her and Hubbs asked her where the remainder of the files were. Wong responded, Oh, I thought that I told you that I had them at home. And Hubbs said, No, you didn't tell me that you had them at home. • · [Y] ou told me that usually they were kept in your desk and they're not in your desk. Hubbs then requested that Wong prepare a list of all the files that she kept at home, and Wong did so. On July 20, 1981, Hubbs gave Wong a letter of warning. The letter states in relevant part: On July 14, i981 I asked you if you knew where the lighting files were. You replied, "Usually they are kept in my desk." Since they were at that time in your personal possession, this was an intentionally evasive and deceptive answer. You did not at any time inform me that you had any files at home. On July 15 I specifically requested that all catalogues, pamphlets, files, etc. were to be kept in my office and were to be removed only with my permission. At that time you should have informed me that you had materials in your possession. 14wong says that she had concern that if the files were consolidated, what she considered her personal information would be thrown out, because Hubbs wanted to get rid of the extraneous material. This explanation is questionable. Hubbs asked her only to consolidate certain files. If there were extraneous material in these files that were Wong's personal materials, she could simply have removed this material and submitted the files to Hubbs for consolidation as requested. Since she ·didn't·do this, the logical inference is that she was, in fact, copying University files for her own use. 35
The files you brought in this morning you removed from the office once again without my permission. All lighting files are to be kept in the grey file cabinet in my office unless I specifically request or give permission for them to be removed. I want all of the files you have listed (and any others that may have escaped your memory) on the attached memo returned tomorrow morning before 9 a~. These files are the property of the University. Removal of them without supervisorial permission constitutes a mtsappropriation of University property and is grounds for immediate dismissal under Staff Personnel Policy 740.11. The next day, on July 21, Hubbs learned that Wong had been copying the files on Monday evening during non-work hours. This concerned Hubbs because she had not requested copies of the files. She wanted the originals. Hubbs was informed that Wong had copied a large amount of files with the Museum Xerox machine over a period of three to four hours. Hubbs felt that this was costly and inappropriate. Eventually what Hubbs received were copies, not the originals.15 Again, Hubbs felt that Wong was being deceptive and not behaving in an honest manner. She then wrote the following memo to Wong on July 21: It has been brought to my attention that on July 20 at 7:30 pm and July 21 at 7:30 am you were using the xerox machine in this building to copy files. As I have not requested copies of any files from you, I 15wong claims the originals were her own work product and developed on her own time. She said Hubbs had no right to them; however, she consented to make copies available anyway. It is my understanding that the charging party now considers these files in the nature of "gifts" to the Museum. 36
assume that you were copying files for your own personal use. In the future, please request permission from me before copying any files that are University property. Also, while the use of the xerox machine for personal business is a privilege we all make occasional use of, it is a privilege that due to abuse by one or two individuals may be rescinded at any time. On Friday, July 24, 1981, Wong came into Hubbs' office at approximately 11:00 a.m. and questioned Hubbs about her policy on copying files. Hubbs explained that she should ask permission before copying any material from a file so that in the event that the file was lost she could identify who had it last. Hubbs reiterated the content of her July 21 memo where she stated that in the future Wong should secure permission before copying UAM files. A few hours later Wong returned to Hubbs' office, removed a file from a cabinet and, without permission, began copying it. This time, however, Wong copied the file by hand as Hubbs looked on. Wong's actions prompted Hubbs to issue yet another letter of reprimand on July 31, 1981. In the letter Hubbs related the events leading up to July 24 and the hand-copying incident which occurred on that day. Hubbs wrote that Wong "deliberately chose to ignore [her] instructions." The memo also stated that Hubbs looked on the incident as an example of "surreptitious behavior," which is a form of "dishonesty" ~nd "insubordination." Wong claims that Hubbs' instructions about 37
securing permission applied only to Xeroxing files, not hand-copying files. With the assistance of CSEA, Wong filed grievances challenging the three memos. In each instance Elliott _upheld the action taken by Hubbs, informing Wong that the files contained confidential information and that it was the supervisor'~ responsibility to monitor their use. In response to the July 31 letter of reprimand, Elliott again upneld the action. He informed Wong that the memos represented the culmination of her "complete and dogged" disregard for her supervisor's regulations concerning use of the files. 7. The Davis Painting Incident Works of art are frequently transported by the elevator at the UAM. The elevator has a gate which must be closed before it will move from floor to floor. As with most elevators, it is possible to call the elevator to a particular fl?or by pressing a button. However, the elevator at the UAM cannot be called in this way unless the gate is closed. There is no dispute that it is unsafe for a work of art to travel unattended on the elevator from floor to floor. Therefore, it is a well-established policy at UAM, that works of art not be left unattended on the elevator with the gate closed, thus permitting them to be called from another level. A major concern is that workers who carry tools use the elevator, and if they don't notice the work of art there is a 38
risk that the tools may accidentally come in contact with the art and damage it. On August 17, 1981, Wong placed a valuable Davis painting unattended on the freight elevator and closed the doors. According to Hubbs, the painting was such that a person not familiar with minimalist art may not recognize it as a work ot art. This would create more danger to the art. The painting was called to another floor where a worker from the physical plant got on and rode with the painting to another gallery. Mary Smiley witnessed Wong's actions. She testified that on August 17 she was working with Wong. They were to leave the elevator area to help Bailey move a large crate. Prior to doing so, Wong opened the elevator door, moved the cart carrying the painting onto the elevator, and deliberately closed the door. Smiley told Wong she hoped it was still there when they got back, and Wong laughed. She testified that she did not attempt to stop Wong because, Adrienne is fairly notorious for giving you a bad time if you question her or say anything. Smiley said Wong, ... turns into a different person. She can come in in the morning and be real • friendly and bubbly and then without anyone doing anything or saying anything all of a sudden she can turn to ice ••.. After moving the crate, Bailey became aware of what had happened. He learned from Smiley that Wong was the one who put 39
the painting on the elevator and he confronted Wong, advising her that she had made a mistake. On August 19 Bailey recorded the incident in a memo to Hubbs. On September 2, 1981, Hubbs suspended Wong for her actions. The suspension memo was delivered shortly after a September 2 meeting held with Wong ' and her CSEA representative to investigate the matter. At the ~eeting Wong and her representative made several arguments in defense of the action. However, at no time prior to the hearing in this case did Wong or her representative acknowledge that Wong had made a mistake. According to Hubbs, it was this factor that played a major role in her decision to suspend Wong. In this regard, the letter of suspension states: From this incident it is apparent that you are incapable of working without continuous ongoing supervision and that you clearly lack the necessary sense of responsibility and good judgement required of a Senior Preparator. You have not given me any indication of your awareness of the seriou~ nature of your misconduct, nor any indication that in the future you will not repeat the error. In an attempt to make it perfectly clear to you that what you have done amounts to gross misconduct of such magnitute as towarrant immediate dismissal if repeated, I intend to suspend you for 12 hours of work, effective September 8-9, 1981, without pay. It was not until the hearing in this case that Wong finally admitted that she made a mistake. Several witnesses testified that they had never seen works of art left unattended on the elevator with the gate closed. The testimony showed only that works of art have been left 40
unattended on the elevator with the gate open, thus preventing the elevator from being called from another floor. On the other hand, other witnesses testified that in the past they had seen works of art left unattended in elevators with the gate closed. However, none of these workers ever notified any management official.of this. There was no evidence presented to show that any management person knew or should have known of these incidents.16 8. The Telephone Locks On July 30, 1981, Mary Louise Beecroft, a work-study employee, purchased phone locks at Hubbs' request. Beecroft testified that the phones in the preparation area were unlocked and there had been untraceable long-distance calls made after hours and on weekends from isolated areas in the Museum. Bel:croft purchased two locks that required two different keys. 16charging party presented evidence to show that in the past works of art have been damaged in the UAM, but there has never been corrective action taken until Wong's elevator incident. For example, union witnesses attributed cracks in a Neil Jenny painting to Bailey. A glass object was mistakenly packed as plastic, but no damage was done. A gust of wind bent a photo while it was being delivered. All of these incidents may be distinguished from the elevator incident. With respect to the Jenny painting, it was not clearly established that the cracks could be attributed to Bailey or any other employee. All other examples offered by the charging party involved damage caused by circumstances beyond the control of the employee responsible (i.e., a gust of wind), or situations where the particular approach to handling the art was a matter of judgment and therefore open to debate. There were no examples offered where an employee violated a clear policy as Wong did in the elevator incident. 41
When she returned, Hubbs said she wanted locks which could be opened with a master key. Rather than return the locks immediately, Hubbs decided to wait until a later date to do so. Hubbs, Egherman, Toby, Tesluk and Wong met in Egherman's office on August 12 to discuss, among other things, the July 31 letter of reprimand~ During the course of this meeting, the subject of Wong making telephone calls during work time to her CSEA representative was discussed. Hubbs was concerned that even a brief call might be disruptive because it might take an employee 10 minutes to get from the gallery to a phone and another 10 minutes to return to the gallery after the call. The call itself would take some time. If that person happened to be working with another person at the time, it could result in an employee standing around waiting for the caller to return. As a result of the meeting, Hubbs issued a memo on September 29, 1981, stating that, as a general rule telephone 1 calls should be restricted to break and lunch times. The memo said that if it was "necessary" to place a call during work hours, the employee should get permission from the on-site supervisor before leaving the work area. Shortly after this meeting, Wong was asked to exchange the locks previously purchased by Beecroft. Wong viewed this as a form of retaliation for participating in the meeting. However, she testified that, although she assumed her purchase of the phone locks after this meeting was directly related to the 42
earlier discussion of telephone calls during the meeting, she acknowledged that there may have been other reasons why Hubbs wanted locks on the phones. Lastly, there were pay phones in the Museum which Wong was free to use, so the locks did not interfere with her ability to call her representative. 9. The September 14, 1981 Representation Issue Wong arrived at work at 8:30 a.m. on Monday, September 14, 1981, the first day of work following her 12-hour suspension. At approximately 9:30 a.m. Hubbs and Bailey met Wong at the loading dock in the Museum. Hubbs had the understanding that Wong was to be on suspension for 4 hours in the morning and then work the afternoon of the previous Wednesday, so she asked Wong why she hadn't worked that afternoon. Wong said she didn't work in the afternoon because she was under suspension. Hubbs told Wong that it was her impression that she had been under suspension until noon and therefore had been ~xpected to show up for work in the afternoon. At that point, Wong said she wanted her representative. Hubbs said there would be no corrective action, and she further explained that she simply wanted to clear up the misunderstanding. It appears that both Wong and Hubbs were confused as to whether a previous agreement that Wong would work on Wednesday afternoon was superseded by the suspension.17 17wong's normal schedule was to work a full day on Monday and Tuesday, and a half-day on Wednesday. The confusion was 43
At that point, the conversation moved upstairs to the design office where Hubbs again told Wong that there would be no corrective action and she was obligated to discuss the matter. Wong asked to call Tesluk, her CSEA rep~esentative, and Hubbs agreed. Hubbs and Bailey were present when Wong discussed the issue with Tesluk on the phone. After Wong had been on the phone for awhile, she began to discuss other subjects with Tesluk. Hubbs told Wong she had been on the phone long enough, and since she had not asked for permission, she was asked to hang up. At that point Wong said to Tesluk over the phone that "Nina says I can't talk to you." Hubbs said, "that's not what I said. You tell her what I said." Wong then repeated to Tesluk what Hubbs had actually said and hung up. After she hung up the telephone, Wong told Hubbs that Tesluk advised her to go ahead with the discussion as long as it would not lead to,corrective action. Hubbs asked Wong if she was satisfied with Tesluk's advice. Wong said she wasn't and wanted to discuss it with Joe Toby, which she did. No disciplinary action was taken. Wong was paid for the four hours that she did not work on Wednesday afternoon. In a memo dated September 14, Hubbs asked Wong to make up the four due to the fact that Monday of the week in question was a holiday. 44
hours, but she never did. Wong contends she has no obligation to do so. 10. Sanding Frames In September 1981 Bailey assigned Wong the tasks of sanding and oiling frames in preparation for the Leonardo da Vinci Exhibit. These tasks had been performed in the past primarily by employees in the shop department, but were now performed by others since that department was eliminated as a result of the 1981 reorganization. Thus, it was not uncommon for all employees to perform such work assignments. It is true, as Wong and Bailey both testified, that while Wong was sanding and oiling frames, other employees were assigned the tasks of matting and framing works of art. Bailey testified that he had reservations about assigning these m9re delicate tasks to Wong because he didn't think she could handle them at the time. He said that, as a result of the elevator incident, sh~ was "fuming all the time" and therefore not in a condition to do the more delicate work. In response to the assertion that these assignments resulted in isolating her from other employees, Bailey testified that he did it for her own benefit. He said he moved her into an area where she could sand and oil near an exhaust fan. He also said that she should use a respirator when doing this work. Wong viewed this as harrassment because of the manner in which Bailey did it. 45
The pace at which Wong undertook those assignments also troubled Bailey. In demonstrating how to lightly sand a frame, Bailey completed a frame in about five minutes. Although she picked up the pace near the end of the assignment, Bailey estimated that Wong did approximately 11 frames per day. 11. Denial of Access to the Registration Area During the da Vinci Exhibit and the "Grand Master Key" Egherman described the need for maximum security around the da Vinci exhibit. It was the first time that da Vinci's work had been in the building or in the Bay Area for that matter, and it was of extraordinary value. He was concerned that some pieces, such as the Christ figure, might bring out the worst in some of the people that hang around Berkeley. As Egherman put it, they had had problems with "street people" in Berkeley with respect to damaging art and harrassing employees in the Museum. The daVinci's were electronically wired and connected to the police department in Berkeley. Special cases were built. There were 24-hour guards stationed in the gallery. On September 10, 1981, Jim Elliott issued a memo concerning security around the daVinci exhibit. Esssentially, the memo voiced a concern about security, and it limited access to the registration storage area without a specific authorization. Only a select group was permitted to go into the registration area. Even Egherman was excluded. The only people allowed in there were the individual curator working on the exhibit, the director, the registrar, who obviously had to handle the 46
paintings, and the photographer, who worked in there to take condition photographs. Bailey and Hubbs were also on the list. Hubbs testified that everyone wanted to see the pieces of art in the daVinci exhibit and everyone was interested in access to the registration room to view the work. She said that access even to ·the galleries was limited, and people had to have a special badge to get into the gallery. She said the exclusion of Wong from the registration area was by no means a reprisal and that the policy actually included practically everyone in the whole building, except for the five people named above. At about this time there was another security matter that arose at Jim Elliott's prompting. At a meeting Elliott brought up the fact that grand master keys should be limited to supervisory personnel, except at his discretion. Prior to that, Hubbs, Bailey, Wong and one other employee ha? grand master keys, and there was one additional grand master key on a key chain for on-call employees. On September 11, 1981, after the meeting with Elliott, Hubbs wrote a memo to Jesse Fisher, head of security, telling him that she had recently learned from Elliott that only supervisory personnel should have grand master keys. The memo told Fisher to retrieve all grand master keys from everyone except Bailey and Hubbs. She said the others should be issued sub-master keys. The sub-master key, in essence, gives the holder a more limited access to the 47
museum facilities. Wong's grand master key was taken away. 12. The September 29 Telephone Call As described above, a dispute existed as to whether Wong should be paid for the four hours she did not work on Wednesday, September 9, the last day of her suspension. In connection with this dispute, Hubbs asked Wong to turn in her timesheets ·by 10:00 a.m. the following day. On the morning of September 29, Wong left her work site without telling anybody and went to an outside pay telephone to call Tesluk about the timesheet issue. Bailey, who was looking for Wong, discovered her at the pay phone. A discussion took place. Bailey told Wong she was not to call her representative on work time. He testified that he told Wong she should, as a common courtesy, contact him before leaving the work area so that he is kept aware of her whereabouts when she is supposed to be working and, if necessary, he could get someone to cover fof her when she leaves. The matter was not pursued any further by either Wong or Bailey. Furthermore, Bailey's actions were consistent with a policy statement on telephone use issued by Hubbs. Wong testified that it would have been possible to call Tesluk on non-work time. However, she did not do so. Also, the call was made .at approximately 9:30 a.m.i Wong's break was at 10:00 a.m. There is no evidence to show that Wong received any corrective action as a result of the incident. 48
13. Assignment of Menial Tasks. In late September 1981 Bailey told Wong to pick up lumber and a sander from an outside shop. On several occasions during October and November, Bailey and/or Hubbs told Wong to take out the garbage. On October 8 Wong was told by Bailey to pick up the debris left by other employees, and on October 13 Wong was told to clean up a tool cart and matting tables which had been used by other employees. Wong claims these assignments were discriminatory.18 However, in direct contradiction to this claim of discriminatory treatment, Wong testified that she was asked to take out garbage more frequently after the reorganization, when the shop had been eliminated and there were fewer workers to perform such tasks. She also concedes that Bailey never asked her to do anything he didn't do. Moreover, Wong's co-workers testified that they,performed tasks such as taking out the trash, sanding frames, delivering and picking up items outside the Museum, etc. Even Kelly agreed that all preparators occasionally take out the trash. 18while testifying about work assignments, Bailey offeredanother earlier example of Wong's dissatisfaction about a work assignment during the Pornodoro Exhibit in March 1981. Therewere problems with unloading the exhibit, which was large and bulky. Wong was working on lighting and Bailey called her to help uncrate the exhibit and label it. Wong helped out forawhile and then returned to her lighting. Bailey went to herand asked for more help because they needed to unload it beforemoving on to other assignments. Bailey said that at that point Wong protested that he was assigning her "shit work." 49
Furthermore, supervisors Bailey and Hubbs performed these duties themselves. According to Hubbs, the only thing unusual about Wong taking out the trash was that she had to be told to do it. Other workers did it on a voluntary basis when they saw that a can was full, According to Wong, she was told to clean up after other preparators on occasion. But Bailey convincingly testified that, to the extent this occurred, it was due to the nature of the on-call system. For example, on-call workers may work for a temporary period and complete a matting assignment. Since the assignment is finished, they are not generally called back the next day, but the cleanup still needs to be done. Bailey testified that it made no sense to call the workers back just to clean up, so he gave the ·assignment to Wong, who was the only other career employee. 14. The Chinese Fan Incident On November 4, 1981, Bailey asked Wong to mount two Chinese fans. It took Wong a day and a half to mount the first fan. Bailey felt that this was too long and began to inject himself into the process, suggesting to Wong another way to do it. He said this irritated Wong, who told Bailey he needed help and should see a psychiatrist. Wong denied saying this to Bailey.19 19Another example of the Wong-Bailey relationshipoccurred at this point. Bailey apparently became frustrated 50
It was Bailey's opinion that, in the process of mounting the fan, Wong had improperly bent a corner of one of the fans and was picking at another corner with her fingernail. Bailey felt this was damaging to the fan. He told her to stop picking at it. She looked at him, smiled, and then defiantly continued to pick. Bailey Telated the entire incident to Hubbs. Wong then had a meeting with Hubbs, who told her that Bailey had seen her bend a corner of the fan while mounting it.· Wong told Hubbs that she did not bend the corner of the fan and if this incident was going to result in corrective action she would like to have her CSEA representative present. Later, possibly the next day, Hubbs called Wong to her office and told her that there were serious problems since Wong was not respondipg to Bailey's directives. Hubbs apologized because she was not personally able to supervise Wo9g directly all the time, but told her that this was simply not possible. Wong insisted on discussing the details of the fan incident, and explained how she had matted the fan. According to Hubbs, about the fans and told Wong to take out the tra~h instead of working on the fans. She looked at him but did not do it. Bailey called Hubbs, who appeared and asked Wong if Bailey told her to take out the trash. Wong said she didn't say she wouldn't do it. At that point Hubbs asked her to take out the trash and she did. Furthermore, there is no need to resolve the dispute about whether Wong told Bailey he should see a psychiatrist. This is mentioned here only to show the petty nature of the issues which characterized the Wong-Bailey relationship. 51
Wong at first claimed she did not bend ,the fan and accused Hubbs of knowing nothing about preparation work. Hubbs responded that she had done preparation work in the past and knew about matting. The two women talked further and, according to Hubbs, Wong eventually admitted she made a mistake and bent the fan when she could not properly insert the corner. Hubbs testified that she told Wong that that was understandable, and everyone makes mistakes. • Wong testified that she never admitted to Hubbs, or anyone else, that she bent the corner of the fan. She maintained at the hearing that in fact she did not bend the fan. This credibility dispute is resolved in favor of Hubbs. As Hubbs demonstrated with respect to the elevator incident, she was not reluctant to discipline Wong if she believed it proper I to do so. Wong was suspended for the elevator incident not so much because of her conduct, but rather because she_refused to admit that she made a mistake. Based on the information she had from Bailey, Hubbs would have been justified in disciplining Wong for the Chinese fan incident. However, she did not do so. The logical inference to be drawn from her failure to do so was that, unlike the elevator incident, Wong admitted her mistake with regard to the fans. Otherwise, there would have been no reason for Hubbs to not discipline her again. At some point, Wong's representative, Tesluk, contacted Toby in an attempt to set up a meeting to discuss the fan 52
incident along with a series of other incidents which had occurred prior to that date. In essence, Toby took the position that, since there had been no corrective action taken, there was no need for a meeting. Toby saw no point in having a discussion about how to mount a Chinese fan, nor did he see a need for a meeting to tell Hubbs how to run her department. However, Tdby also said that he would consider the request if presented with an agenda so that there was some structure to the meeting. Tesluk never contacted Toby with an agenda, and no meeting was held. Wong never received corrective action as a result of the fan incident. 15. The Desk Audit and Reclassification Denial Employees who seek reclassification have the right to ask for a desk audit to determine if their positions are properly classified. The employee usually fills out a job d~scription document with the percentages of time assigned to each task, and a supervisor signs the document to corroborate its contents if he or she is in agreement with the employee's description. Toby then does a desk audit to verify exactly what the employee does. Toby received Wong's request for a reclassification on June 30, 1981.20 Wong's supervisors, Bailey and Ross, had 20This was a continuation of the reclassification appeal that Wong had initiated in August 1980. 53
already refused to corroborate her description of her duties. They were of the opinion that Wong's description did not accurately reflect her actual duties, and therefore refused to concur in her request.21 Toby did not contact Wong to set up the desk audit until early October. He testified that, given his work backlog, it is not unusual for him to take three or four months to respond to such requests. Wong said she wanted to have Tesluk repr~sent her during the audit. At some point in early October, Toby heard from Tesluk, who asked to represent Wong. Toby refused the request. He then went on vacation for the latter part of October. Upon his return, the parties experienced some difficulty in arriving at a mutually agreeable date. Tesluk renewed her request to represent Wong on November 11. On about November 19, 1981, Toby again spoke with Wong about the desk audit. Wong again asked for representation and Toby refused. Apparently nothing happened over the holidays. On January 21, 1982, Toby wrote to Wong and told her that too much time had elapsed, and if he didn't hear from her by February 8 about a date, he would return the request to her and close the file. 21For example, Wong claimed that 75 percent of her duties involved lighting. Bailey's response, based on review of her timesheets, showed that she spent approximately 34 percent of her time doing lighting. He did not consider her to be a supervisor. And, in general, he was of the opinion that she distorted and grossly inflated her responsibilities. 54
The desk audit was finally conducted on February 24, 1982. Wong's request for representation was denied by Toby. He wrote the following with respect to the reclassification: After auditing your position on February 24, 1982 and giving it careful consideration, I find that your position is properly classified as a Senior Museum Preparator. To warrant ·reclassification to the Principal level you would either have to be supervising other Preparators or to be doing the most difficult preparative work. I find neither of these criteria to be true in your case. In the first place, you did not, and do not now truly supervise other employees. Supervision entails responsibility for hiring, evaluating and disciplining employees. Instead, you at times, exercised a lead role on particular projects with one or more of the employees that you listed. With one exception, all of them were casual employees who were occasionally called in, a few at a time, to help out with exhibits. Furthermore, even if lighting is considered a more difficult preparative task, the fact in your own time records show that in the time interval July 1980 to June 1981, your lighting assignments only equaled 50% or more of your working time on only two occasions-- January and February 1981. Since July 1, 1981 your assignments in this task have been diminished. Museum policy for some time now has been that assignments would cover a wide range of preparative tasks without any one person having specialized duties. This arrangement is not peculiar to UC Art Museum management. Museum technicians at the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art are all expected to do lighting in addition to other preparative tasks. Finally, to be comprehensive, I also considered the Scene Technician series. 55
However, it is quite clear that the series is intended for theatrical arts. These positions presume assignments in the dynamic lighting of performances (a really different set of parameters than is found in static lighting) and in the design, construction and painting of stage props and sets. It is quite clear that your position is not that of a Scene Technician. Even Wong conceded in her testimony that at the time of the desk audit ~he was n~t performing duties that would have entitled her to a reclassification. She contended, however, that she was entitled to a reclassification based on duties she performed at an earlier point in time, but, she claimed, those duties had been taken away from her as a reprisal for her protected activities. In addition, the lighting duties had formed the foundation for her r~classification proposal. She claimed her expertise in lighting was a major factor to be considered in the reclassification process. However, several other wjtnesses had a different opinion. Murphy, one of Wong's co-workers, testified that lighting was overr~ted. She said it amounted to little more than changing light bulbs. Hubbs agreed. Bailey was of .the opinion that lighting is not that complicated. He said it is not like nuclear physics; anyone with a sense of aesthetics who has been around the Museum for awhile would pick it up. Wong pointed to several of her other duties to support her reclassification request. However, all of these fall within 56
the preparator's current position description. Moreover, granting Wong's reclassification request would have been contrary to Egherman's philosophy about staffing at that time. The scene technician had performed a lot of lighting duties in the past. After the scene technician position was eliminated, Egherman decided not to fill the slot because it ·was too specialized and thus the specialist might claim higher compensation. Egherman wanted to move in the direction of filling positions with generalists. Ideally, these would be people who could do a little of everything. If an individual happened to be a little better in lighting, he or she could serve in a lead role in that capacity on particular projects, but the age of specialists was over. 16. Tool Cart Incident The standard Museum procedure for transporting a tool cart or an airlift down22 a ramp prior to April 1981 was. as follows. It was preferable for the employee to wear proper workshoes with flat heels and to precede the heavy equipment as it moved down the ramp. In other words, the employee backed down the ramp while restraining the cart by holding the handle. The tool cart and airlift can be easily stopped from this position. Employees, including Wong, usually kept an 22The airlift weighs approximately 400 pounds and the cart approximately 370 pounds. The tool cart is used to transport works of art. 57
extra pair of tennis shoes available for this purpose. During the course of her employment on March 2, 1982, Bailey told Wong to move a tool cart down a ramp. As she moved the cart, Wong was in a procession of other employees who were also in the process of moving tool carts and/or airlifts down the ramp. Murphy was moving the airlift and Smiley was moving a tool cart. Neither employee had assistance. Midway down the ramp, Wong lost control of the cart and, after banging off several walls, the cart rolled to a stop in the gallery below.23 Wong claimed she was injured in the process. The evidence showed that, while it may have been preferable for two people to move the cart, in the past women frequently moved this equipment alone, and several women actually performed this task on the day in question. Specifically, in contradiction to Wong's testimony, Shalk, Smiley, Murphy and Beecroft testified that they had observed other women, including Wong, perform this task alone many times prior to the incident in question. Smiley testified that earlier on the day of the incident -she saw Wong moving the airlift alone from gallery 2 down to the lobby. Wong was not wearing sneakers. 23As the cart rolled down the ramp several items, including Wong's little yellow notebook, fell out. Wong kept her notebook with her at work and made a practice of recording practically every event the very moment it happened. This included on the spot recording of her exchanges with Bailey and others in the department. After the cart rolled to a stop, Wong retrieved her notebook and began recording the incident. 58
Although Smiley offered Wong assistance, Wong.did not accept it. Smiley recalls that Wong was in a bad mood that day, a mood she had seen many times before. 17. The July 1, 1982 Layoff On May 21, 1982, Wong received a letter from Elliott informing her that, ·effective July 1, 1982, she would be placed on indefinite layoff status. The letter stated in relevant part: Using the exhibition schedule, we have found that there simply will not be enough work every week to provide you with a fixed 50% time schedule. There are 26 weeks with no preparation work scheduled. Even allowing for your three weeks of vacation, that leaves 23 weeks with no scheduled work for you to do. Since we still have a $200,000 deficit to retire and we still have to maintain our existing core budget despite inflation and cost of living increases, the funding for 23 weeks without definite work cannot be justified. I regret to inform you, then, that as of 1 July 1982 you will be on indefinite layoff status. This layoff is in no way a reflection on your performance; it relates. stric.tly to the Museum's financial situation. In fact, the plan is to no longer have any permanent career preparators on our core staff in any classification as of 1 July 1982. All preparation and shop work will be done by on-call casual employees. Although Elliott ultimately made the final decision to lay off Wong, Egherman participated to a great extent. He testified that, in addition to the cuts cited in Elliott's letter, the Museum reduced the security staff by half. The security staff 59
had escaped cuts during 1981. Also, one full-time 40 percent curatorial assistant position would not be filled. With respect to the exhibits for 1982-83, Egherman said the schedule was firm. As mentioned by Elliott in the layoff letter, the projected schedule showed that there were 26 weeks where the Museum would not need any shop or preparation work done. In other words, there would be 26 weeks during the year _when Won9, a half-time employee, would have little or nothing to do. Given this situation, according to Hubbs, the most efficient thing to do was lay off Wong and move to the use of a straight on-call worker system to perform the necessary work. Egherman testified that, due to the ongoing hearings in this case, he was concerned about implementing Wong's 1982 layoff. For this reason he told Hubbs to be absolutely certain that the layoff was justified and instituted solely for financial reasons. It was under this directive that Hubbs analyzed the situation and concluded that it was most efficient to go to a straight on-call system. Even after these cuts, a $190,000 deficit remained in the Museum. III. Daniel Kelly A. The Events of 1980 and Early 1981 By the end of May 1980 Kelly was due to return from Japan. Based on his experience working with Wong and Kelly in the past, Bailey was concerned that problems might arise if Kelly were to return to the Museum. To compound matters, when Wong 60
and Kelly had worked at the Museum in the past, Kelly was senior to Wong, but their roles were now reversed and Bailey felt this might present a problem. He told Wong that he did not intend to mediate disputes between the two of them. And if they couldn't work together smoothly, Kelly would not be called to work. Bailey testified that Wong reacted positively to this statement.· She was pleased that Bailey recognized that she was now senior to Kelly and would be treated as such. Bailey had a similar conversation with Kelly upon his return to the Museum. In early June 1980, shortly after his return to the Museum, Kelly had a meeting with Bailey during which he raised three chief concerns of employees in the UAM. First, Kelly testified that he told Bailey that on-call employees felt insecure about their positions because Bailey had control over how much and when they worked. According to Kelly, he told Bailey that on-call employees were reluctant to alienate Bailey_ for fear they would not be called to work. Second, Kelly spoke to Bailey about getting more advance notice of assignments for on~call workers. Third, Kelly testified that he told Bailey that employees were generally dissatisfied and concerned over the confusion surrounding what their job duties were.24 24one matter of dissatisfaction stemmed from the fact that there existed a discrepancy between hours and pay of career and on-call employees. Career employees worked a 7 1/2-hour day beginning at 8:30 a.m. and were paid for an 8-hour day. On-call employees were expected to work the same hours, but were paid for 7 1/2 hours. A meeting with Bailey 61
Kelly and Wong had similar meetings with Toby in July 1980. During at least one of these meetings, Kelly and Wong discussed the wage-lag problem with Toby. Although Kelly had been back only a short time, he said he learned of these problems by talking to Wong and other employees. During 1980 Kelly was supportive of Wong's efforts in the Museum. In August and October he met with Ross and discussed employment conditions in the preparation department. He thought that Wong was being harrassed and he was concerned for her wellbeing. He told Ross that he might file a discrimination suit if the harrassment didn't stop. In early November 1980, Andre Johnson had a conversation with Mary Lieuallen, a nonsupervisory employee, about certain financial matters that had to be completed before Johnson could hire on-call employees for an upcoming exhibit. During the discussion, Lieuallen said that perhaps he shouldn'~ hire Kelly because he was a "trouble maker." Johnson, who did not place much weight on her opinion, did not ask her what she meant by the comment. He assumed it was just a personal observation, and did not believe she was communicating this attitude on behalf of management. Johnson was not aware of any reason Lieuallen should call Kelly a "trouble maker," since Kelly had was requested by employees to discuss this situation. As a result of the meeting, Bailey granted the request and thereafter on-call employees were paid the same as career employees. 62
no conflicts with management up to that time. Lieuallen was a non-supervisory employee and there was no evidence presented to directly link her or her comment to any management representative. Shortly after his conversation with Lieuallen, Johnson testified that he was told by Egherman that when Kelly finished his current tasks he should not be rehired. He said he told Johnson that, unless pe was desperate, he would be better advised not to hire Kelly. Johnson responded that Kelly was a good worker and he wanted to continue to hire him. At this point, according to Johnson, Egherman called Kelly a "trouble maker." Johnson did not ask Egherman what he meant by "trouble maker," nor did Egherman volunteer a definition of that term. Johnson perceived Egherman's comment as a suggestion, not a direct command, since Egh~~man did not directly say "don't hire Daniel Kelly." Johnson testified that it was standard procedure for Egherman to approve people Johnson wanted to call for work. Egherman recalls this conversation with Johnson. He testified that he suggested to Johnson that he would prefer if Kelly was not rehired. This was not a directive, according to Egherman, because he did not want to exercise that kind of heavy control over Johnson's supervisory responsibility. The final decision was left to Johnson's judgment. Egherman further testified that he doubts he used the word "trouble 63
maker." He believes he may have used the word "difficult" to describe Kelly. Egherman's opinion of Kelly was based on hearsay and comments he picked up around the Museum. According to Johnson, he and Egherman had a similar conversation again in January 1981. Johnson paid no attention . . to Egherman's comments and continued to call Kelly to work. Time records show that Kelly received on-call work assignments from November 1980 through June 1981.25 I credit Johnson's testimony on this point and find that Egherman did, in fact, c~ll Kelly a "troublemaker." Johnson was clear in his recollection and thus convincing in his testimony that the specific word "troublemaker" was used. In contrast, while Egherman was generally a credible witness, he was unsure if he used that label to describe Kelly. Thereafter, on one occasion when Kelly was working in the Museum, Egherman walked in and said to Johnson "I s~e you hired Kelly after all." He then walked away. Egherman never took any adverse action against Johnson for hiring Kelly. Nor did Egherman ever threaten Johnson with reprisals for hiring Kelly. In addition, Shalk filled in for Bailey in December while he went on vacation. Wong testified that Shalk told her Bailey left instructions not to hire Kelly during this period. Shalk 25Kelly was called to work on a regular basis from January to the layoffs in July 1981. 64
testified that Bailey never made such a comment and, moreover, she never even discussed the subject with Wong. Bailey also denied ever telling Shalk to not call in Kelly for work. I found it highly unlikely that Shalk made this comment to Wong. By this point, the relationship between Wong and Shalk had deteriorated tremendously. Shalk testified that Wong was even secretive about lighting information. Further, Shalk was well aware of Wong's unpredictable nature and that she had a close relationship with Kelly~ Given these facts, it would have been inviting sheer aggravation to make such a comment to Wong. Thus, I find it very unlikely the statement was made. It is true, however, that Kelly was not called to work in December. When asked about this at the hearing, Shalk said that she simply preferred not to work with him and I credit her on this point. B. The Events of May-July 1981. Shortly after the meeting on May 13, 1981 when Elliott announced there would be cuts, Kelly undertook an effort to secure employment for himself and Wong. In separate meetings with Elliott, Ross and Hubbs, he proposed that he and Wong be permitted to share a job in the Museum after the layoffs. He outlined what he considered to be the advantages of such a job-sharing arrangement. While Elliott, Ross and Hubbs listened to Kelly, they correctly informed him that layoffs would have to be conducted under University regulations, and 65
factors such as seniority and employment status considered. Shortly before the layoffs, Kelly told Ross and Bailey that he was applying for a permanent position with the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art. He requested and received a letter of recommendation from Ross.26 Based on independent conversations they had with Kelly, both Hubbs ·and Bailey were under the impression that the job in San Francisco was his for the asking. And, since they did not hear from him, they assumed he got the job. During this time the relationship between Kelly and Bailey was hot and cold. There were occasions when the two men appeared to work well together, but there were occasions when they seemed unable to get along at all.27 26There is some dispute about whether Kelly mentioned the San Francisco job. At one point, he denied that he told Bailey he was being considered for the San Francisco job. _At another point he testified that he called Bailey during the last week in June to tell him he hadn't gotten the job. This inconsistency undermines Kelly's credibility on this point. If he hadn't told Bailey he was being considered for the job, why would he call him to say he hadn't gotten it? Moreover, I find it likely that Kelly did tell Bailey and Hubbs about the job on San Francisco because it was not a secret, since he had earlier requested and received a letter of recommendation from Ross. 27For example, Bailey recalls an incident in June 1981 when Kelly was, extremely angry with him. Kelly had not filled out his time sheet and they disagreed about his hours of work. Eventually, they came to an agreement. At some point, however, Kelly said Bailey could "stick it" or something on that order. Several days later, Kelly returned and apologized. Bailey then offered him work and Kelly began immediately. On another occasion, Bailey scheduled Kelly for two weeks. After Kelly had worked two days, he told Bailey that he had a more 66
c. July 27, 1981 Meeting. On July 27, 1981, Kelly and Tesluk met with Ross and Toby. The subject of on-call hours was discussed. Ross said that he had no intention to deny Kelly hours. According to Toby, Kelly was told that he was not laid off; he was still on the on-call list and would have the same opportunity for on-call hours as others on tile list. However, Toby said there was no guarantee of work, and it was emphasized that laid-off career people would have first crack at the available on-call hours. Kelly received no on-call hours after the meeting. Kelly claims that during this meeting Ross offered him on-call hours in the future. I find this to be unbelievable. First, it is unlikely that Ross was in the position to make any offers about future employment, given the fact that he had been laid off and would no longer be around. Secord, the practice at the Museum was to let the supervisor, Hubbs in this instance, have practically full authority over who worked and when they worked. It would have been an unlikely departure from past practice for Ross, a lame duck at this point, to now important issue to take care of than doing the job that he was assigned and scheduled to do. Bailey assumed Kelly needed to prepare his resume for the San Francisco job. Bailey told Kelly that the on-call system works both ways, suggesting that while Kelly may have no real obligation to the Museum, neither did the Museum have an obligation to call him for work. After Kelly left Bailey's office on that date, Bailey had no further contact with him. 67
guarantee Kelly hours. While Ross may have technically had the authority to make such a statement, given the practice of assigning hours, it is extremely doubtful that he would have done so without contacting Hubbs, and he had not done so at the time of the meeting. Toby's testimony supports this finding. He said essentially that Kelly was told that, as an on-call worker, he ~asn't laid off. But he was never guaranteed work. D. The Events After the July 27 Meeting. By this time Hubbs had taken over as supervisor. She testified that as per her earlier meeting with Kelly she was under the impression that he had gotten the job in San Francisco. It was not until after the July 27 meeting that she learned Kelly was still interested in on-call work at the Museum. ~n September it was time to renew the on-call list. Hubbs cut the list substantially because there was a great deal less work, some of the people were no longer interested, and some of those on the list were unknown to her. Also, Hubbs felt if she had a relatively small group of on-call workers she could call them in more frequently, Museum work would be more attractive to them, and thus the likelihood of their continuing to work at the Museum rather than seek employment elsewhere would be increased. Essentially, she wanted a small and reliable core of efficient on-call workers who would receive more hours under 68
this arrangement. During this process, Kelly was eliminated from the list. When Hubbs trimmed the list she was under the impression that she would be able to add to the list in the futur~ if necessary. However, shortly thereafter a hiring freeze was imposed and it became impossible to do so. There were two reasons Kelly was eliminated from the list. First, Hubbs testified that after July 1 there was~ whole new approach in the Museum. Cuts had been made and the whole operation trimmed back. They were not going to be doing things quite as thoroughly as in the past, going the full 100 percent to make assignments absolutely perfect. She described that the work would now be done in a manner which she called "quick and dirty," a theater term that means that things are built only to last for a few months. In the Museum things had been built, she said, to last for years. The program from now on was going to be quick and dirty, and she said that this went against Kelly's nature. His degree of "finesse" could no longer be used. In this regard, several witnesses testified about Kelly's work. There seems to be no dispute that Kelly was creative and capable of doing good work. However, there were other aspects of his work that were not always so useful in the Museum. Hubbs and Bailey testified that Kelly was overly thorough in his work; he was meticulous and a perfectionist. Hubbs said he 69
seemed compelled to develop an alternative approach to assignments. There were times when these qualities were useful, but Kelly needed to have a certain amount of restraint put on him to .minimize his propensity for detail. Other workers in the Museum echoed Hubbs' and Bailey's perception of Kellyis work. Shalk said he was overly meticulous ·and thus put a lot of pressure on other workers when they were ~orking to meet a deadline. Smiley said Kelly would undertake to develop a new time-saving device, but in the end it would take longer than if the exhibit had been installed without the device. Murphy described Kelly as a person who was strong-willed and who had no room for shortcuts. Beecroft said Kelly would take two days to determine how to save fifteen minutes. Things did not work smoothly when he was on the crew, according to Beecroft. The second reason Kelly was eliminated from the list involved the three-way relationship between Wong, Kelly and Bailey. Hubbs testified that Wong and Bailey were not getting along well. She said there was so much tension and friction between them that they couldn't even be in the same room together. She reasoned that Kelly would only make the situation worse. Instead of having two people who couldn't. work together, she would have three, and she was not interested in that. 70
From July 1 on, Hubbs' supervisor . was Jim Elliott. He never told her whether or not she should hire Kelly. Nor did Egherman ever try to influence her decision about hiring Kelly. It was solely up to Hubbs' discretion to decide whether or not she should hire Kelly. E. Kelly's Grievance. On Augu~t 19, 1981, Daniel Kelly filed a grievance. He was represented by CSEA. The subjects of the grievance were the so-called "banning" memo of July 20, 1981, and the fact that Kelly had not received on-call hours since the July 27 meeting. As more fully explained below, Toby rejected the grievance. IV. Sam Greyson On Friday, February 20, 1981, Egherman called an emergency meeting of all Museum supervisors, including Johnson, Bailey, Hubbs and Cecelia Franklin, the controller. There ~as a serious problem with the budget for on-call workers, since it was half-way through the year and the entire budget had been spent. The purpose of the meeting was to find ways to reduce the amount of on-call work that was required for the remaining six months of the year. During the meeting there was a discussion about cutting exhibitions, reducing the design requirements, and generally cutting the amount of work already planned. It was decided that the on-call workers already scheduled to work at the Museum would be cancelled. Bailey was 71
able to contact those on-call employees he had scheduled in the preparation department and advise them that their assignment was cancelled. Johnson tried to do the same in the shop department, but he was not entirely successful. Greyson and Ed Williams, another on-call worker, had been scheduled by Johnson to work in the shop department for a period of time beginning Monday, February 23, 1981. Johnson immediately made attempts to notify both Williams and Greyson of the cancellation of the project. Johnson was able to notify Williams on Friday afternoon, but was unable to contact Greyson. Throughout the weekend, Johnson made further attempts to contact Greyson but was unsuccessful. On Monday, February 23, 1981, when Greyson arrived at the Museum to begin work, Johnson advised hi_m that Egherman had cancelled the project. Johnson told him of the meeting held the previous Friday, and of his attempts to notify him. Greyson was extremely angry about the cancellation and the lack of advance notice. Greyson, who was paid for a half-day's work on February 23, held Egherman responsible. Upon learning of the cancellation, Greyson sat down at Johnson's desk and wrote a letter of protest to Egherman. The letter expressed Greyson's "personal outrage" at the situation and referred to Egherman's "managerial incompetence." It asserted that the Museum treats employees like "chattel(s) 1 and "non-persons." In a direct shot at Egherman, Greyson wrote 72
that the prevailing joke among on-call workers is that, ... the only apparent benefit to the Museum of your many hours of managerial training was to get you out of the Museum for a few days. Greyson did not consult with other on-call workers or request their authorization before he wrote the letter. He testified that he never asked anyone whether he should write it. It was his decision, and he alone signed it, although he claimed at the hearing he wrote it on behalf of other employees. However, the letter was seen by Wong and Johnson before it was delivered to Egherman, and both supported it. Copies of the letter were sent to Barney Bailey, David Ross, James Elliott and Mark Rosenthal, another management person. Many other Museum employees subsequently saw the letter. Greyson said he wrote the letter for three reasons. First, he anticipated that he would receive on-call work, had relied on this arrangement, and was upset when he learned that it had been cancelled. Second, according to Greyson, it had become a pattern for Museum management to make offers of on-call work, only to withdraw the work without giving advance notice. Also, the Museum had in the past called up on-call workers at the last minute to ask them to come in to work. On-eall workers had been accustomed to more notice. The third reason was Greyson's perception of the allegedly poor treatment that Kelly received. Kelly, however, was not mentioned in the letter. 73
Egherman was livid as a result of the letter. He felt it was personally insulting because of the tone and content, and because it was sent to his supervisor, his colleagues and his subordinates. He was particularly upset at the negative reference to his managerial incompetence. He said he could accept criticism, but not insults. Approximately 10 days after he delivered the letter, Greyson received the reply from Egherman in the mail. The reply began: You are justifiably angry for showing up for work yesterday according to schedule and being informed that your services would not be needed due to the withdrawal of funds that had been allocated for the project you were to work on. Egherman went on to explain that: ... the various Museum departments function autonomously and that unit supervisors have the authority and flexibility to determine how they will meet the goals established for their departments. In the case of the Shop on-call program, Andre manages it independently. I do not tell him who to hire or how to run it. Egherman described the meeting that had been held on Friday regarding the financial crisis and the discussion of the various ways they could reduce the total amount of extra labor to complete the year's exhibition schedule. Andre indicated his ability to do the required work without any on-call help. He did not mention that he had alreadyscheduled people for the next week. Had he done so, an accommodation would most 74
probably have been made to reduce the abruptness of the decision.28 Egherman described the on-call program as a two-way street. It is an opportunity for those involved to pick up work on a casual basis without having to make a full-time commitment to a job .. On-call staff can say yes when they are available to work and no when they are not. They are free to pursue other jobs and school interest. The final statement in the letter was, It's a shame that someone who has invested as much time and energy in the Museum as you have in the past has chosen to burn bridges in the way that you have. Copies of Egherman's letter were sent to Bailey, Elliott, Johnson, Rosenthal and Ross. Egherman and Johnson had a short conversation about Greyson shortly after these two letters were exchanged. Egherman told , Johnson that he wanted to meet with Greyson, and he wanted 28There was much conflicting testimony at the hearing about what was said at the February 20 meeting. Essentially the conflict centered on the question of whether Johnson said he had on-call workers already scheduled to work the following week and on the question of whether Johnson said he could perform the work in the shop in _the near future with a considerable cut in on-call help. It is unnecessary to resolve this dispute, since the theory of charging party's case is that Greyson's letter to Egherman was protected activity and the subsequent denial of on-call hours was unlawful retaliation. There is no contention that the cancellation of work on February 23 was aimed at Greyson, nor is there a contention that Greyson was even mentioned at the February 20, meeting. 75
Greyson to make some concessions. Johnson interpreted this comment to mean Egherman wanted an apology. Johnson responded by saying that Greyson is a good worker. Johnson described Greyson, a law student at the time, as a "country lawyer" who likes to spout off and get things of£ his chest, but things then return to normal. Egherman responded that he objected to Greyson's Yetter because it was both public and personal criticism. Egherman wanted Greyson to_admit that he went overboard. He encouraged Johnson to communicate to Greyson the need for a meeting to discuss the situation, but this apparently did not happen because Egherman had no further contact with Johnson or Greyson about the incident. Johnson testified that, at this point, he did not perceive that Egherman precluded the possibility of Greyson continuing as an on-call employee. During the first week of March, Greyson came ba9k into the shop and discussed the situation with Johnson. Johnson relayed his. perception of his earlier conversation with Egherman; that is, that the three of them would have to meet and that Greyson would have to make concessions. Greyson felt that it would be better if he waited a while so that Egherman could cool off. However, he never contacted Egherman. Later, on more than one occasion Greyson contacted Johnson in an attempt to get on-call hours, but there was no work available at the time. On other occasions when work was 76
available, Johnson attempted to call Greyson but, due to Greyson's schedule, either he could not make contact or Greyson was not available for work. On another occasion, Greyson went to the Museum and talked with Bailey, who told him that he was on the preparation department's list. In fact, Bailey offered Greyson some work. Greyson told Bailey he would have to clear it with Egherman. Bailey said he did not have to clear it with Egherman. He then assigned -Greyson a half-day on-call time. Greyson testified that in May he heard of the layoffs. He assumed that if Johnson was laid off he would not be able to get work. v. Andre Johnson. A. 1981 Layoffs and Denial of On-Call Work As a result of the l981 cuts, the shop department was abolished and Andre Johnson was laid off.29 From t~e date of 29Egherman was asked at the hearing why Johnson wasn'tgiven a temporary layoff as permitted by the University's regulations rather than an indefinite layoff. He cited two reasons for the indefinite layoff. First, Egherman said a temporary layoff suggests that there is some light at the end of the tunnel and holds out the possibility that the employee will be recalled. The opposite was true in the Museum. The future looked dim, and there was little chance that Johnsonwould be rehired. Thus, it would have been unfair to Johnsonand pointless to hold out this false hope. Also, given the circumstances, the temporary layoff would have been converted into and indefinite one one at some point in the near future. Second, Egherman said the Museum had just negotiated a seriesof permanent cuts with the Vice Chancellor's office, and temporary layoffs would have been contrary to the agreement. 77
the staff meeting in May 1981 announcing the layoffs, through the summer of 1981, Johnson freely discussed his plans with co-workers. Six witnesses testified at the hearing that Johnson told them that he intended to collect unemployment and was not interested in working at the Museum on an on-call basis. On several occasions prior to his layoff, Johnson indicated to a number of employees in the Museum that he was not interested in on-call work. These comments were made to co-workers in and around the Museum and it appears that it became well-known as a general fact that Johnson was not interested in on-call hours. He made it known that he was interested in pursuing other interests and expressed little concern about being unemployed.30 In addition, Egherman talked to Johnson about tempqrary work and told him that he would be called. But Johnson told Egherman that he didn't want to accept temporary work if it would jeopardize his rehire rights. Apparently, although 30These witnesses were Smiley, Murphy, Beecroft, Shalk, Bailey, Hubbs and Egherman. For example, he told Shalk that he wasn't worried about his future and wanted to spend some free time. He told Smiley that he was looking forward to being with his kids at home. He told Murphy he wasn't interested in prep work because it was too delicate, and he was pursuing the possibility of opening a grocery store at Shattuck and Alcatraz. He told Beecroft his wife, who had worked at the School for the Blind, which moved from Berkeley to Fremont, had a new job and he wanted to stay home and spend some time with his kids. He told Egherman, Hubbs and Bailey the same thing, and said that if he collected unemployment he would be all right until November. 78
Johnson was under the impression that accepting on-call hours would jeopardize his recall rights, Eghermen told Johnson that he didn't believe this was true and suggested that he verify it with Joe Toby. Egherman testified that it was very clear to him when they last spoke in June that Johnson did not want on-call time. In fact, Egherman saw Johnson several times during the ~ummer, and they talked, but Johnson never mentioned that he had changed his mind and wanted on-call tim~. The first notice Egherman received that Johnson wanted on-call work was when he received a letter from CSEA representative Michael Bogan. Hubbs' testimony on this point is consistent with that given by Egherman. During the last week in May, Hubbs and Johnson discussed Johnson's future. Hubbs asked everyone in the shop and preparation department if they would like t9 work on an on-call basis after July 1. Johnson told her he wasn't interested. According to Hubbs, he said he was going to collect unemployment for six months, and then get a full-time job in January; he said he needed to work around his house and he wanted to spend time with his kids. Significantly, Johnson also told Hubbs that he was confused about whether or not on-call work would affect preferential rehire. Johnson's version of these conversations is a little differ~nt. He acknowledged that he had a concern about preserving his rehire rights, but he did not intend to give the 79
impression that, as a result of this concern, he did not want on-call hours. Johnson testified that his parting words with Hubbs were that if there was no problem with rehire rights he would be available for work. Johnson made several inconsistent statements about when he first learned that his acceptance of on-call work would not affect his ~referential rehire status. First he said he learned this in late July; then he said it was early August; and then he said it was mid-July. In any event, after he learned this, it was not until late August that he informed the Museum that he would be interested in on-call work. In late August Egherman received a letter from Bogan requesting a meeting to discuss Johnson's situation. A meeting, attended by Egherman, Toby, Bogan and Johnson, was held on August.24. Egherman expressed surprise that Johnson had changed his mind and now wanted to work. He asked if Johnson would accept preparation work at the significantly lower wage or if he would accept only shop work. Bogan responded that Johnson wanted work, and refused to specify if he would accept preparation work. Johnson filed a grievance on September 2, 1981. He testified that after he filed the grievance Hubbs called him and said she had been under the impression that he did not want to work. According to Johnson, he told Hubbs that, 80
... was not the case, that the only problem I had was in preferential rehire rights, and that, in fact, I did want to work. According to Hubbs, Johnson complained that she had hired other people. Hubbs responded that she had done so because he had told her that he wasn't interested in working. Johnson said "well, I changed my mind." She asked him why he didn't let her know that he changed his mind, but he was evasive. He said that his mother had died and that he was sort of "spaced out" when he had seen her (Hubbs) earlier in the summer. At this point, Hubbs had already committed to hiring other people for the daVinci Exhibit, but told him that she would hire him as soon as there was another job, which she did. Since that time she has given him the first choice on all on-call shop work. B. Johnson's Treatment as an On-Call Worker Johnson was put on the on-call list as a building maintenance worker and received work for the daVinci Exhibit. By the time he began work, however, the on-call crew for that exhibit had already been hired, and Clausen, a former full-time employee of the shop, and Beecroft, a work-study student, had been chosen by Hubbs as the "lead" workers on the project. Prior to the reorganization, Johnson supervised these workers. Johnson testified that on his first day at work Beecroft explained to him and to Ed Williams their assigned duties, as well as the current chain of command. Beecroft explained that 81
the chain of command was, in order, Hubbs, Clausen, Beecroft and then Johnson and Williams. Although Johnson felt that he had to go along with this, it didn't sit well that he would be supervised by Clausen and Beecroft. On Johnson's first day back at work, he asked Beecroft to find someone, presumably with less experience, to remove some garbage, a ·task which he apparently felt was beneath his level of skill. Beecroft told him that if he wanted it removed he would have to do it himself. Subsequently, Williams and Johnson took out the garbage. Johnson conceded during his testimony that everyone on the job took out the trash. Several similar incidents regarding such assignments as taking out the trash and vacuuming occurred. In general, Johnson felt he received less skilled job assignments than other workers who had less experience. Johnson also testified about an incident involving skylights. Clausen told Johnson to perform the skylight work in a certain way. She felt this hadn't been done, but when she questioned him about why he hadn't done the job in the way she suggested, an unpleasant exchange occurred. She told Johnson that he was argumentative, that he was trying to start a fight, and that he should perform the job in the manner that she had instructed. This did not sit well with Johnson. According to Johnson, he and Williams felt physically isolated from other employees. Hubbs testified that she never 82
saw Johnson isolated. He worked in the galleries, -mainly with Ed Williams. She testified that it would have been pointless to hire him and then restrict him in that manner. Beecroft testified that Hubbs never asked her to isolate Williams or Johnson from the other employees. In the Museum employees usually work on teams, and Johnson and Williams were a team tha~ worked well with the rest of the people. Beecroft said that she never intentionally "isolated" Johnson or Williams. On occasion, they were isolated with her in performing certain duties. However, she said that on these occasions it was because they were involved in many different activities and the isolation was due to the nature of the work being performed. Johnson testified that in late September, while he was at work, Beecroft told him not to associate with Wong because she was involved in union activities. Beecroft denied ~hat she made such a statement. She said that she and Johnson once talked about the instant unfair practice charge. During the conversation she told him that there are two sides to every story and he should not be taken in by one side or the other. Given the tenuous relationship between Beecroft and Johnson at this point, it seems unlikely that Beecroft would take it upon herself to advise Johnson as to who he should associate with. Furthermore, the statement -consists of a comment from one non-supervisory employee to another. As such, even if it is 83
found that Beecroft made the statement, it would have no bearing on this case in the absence of any evidence that Hubbs or some other management official put Beecroft up to it. C. Johnson's Grievance. On September 2, 1981, Johnson filed his first grievance. He challenged the layoff itself and the denial of work. Johnson filed another grievance on October 21, 1981. This grievance pertained to adverse letters that had been placed in Johnson's personnel file during 1975 and 1976. The University's responses to these grievances are discussed below. VI. General Credibility Observations Adrienne Wong, the charging party's chief witness, was not a particularly credible one. On direct examination she was relaxed and gave lengthy detailed answers to questions asked by her representative. But on cross-examination her demeanor changed. She became guarded with her answers and djsplayed a selective memory. When the questioning got tough she even shed tears in a manner that did not strike me as particularly genuine. The tears seemed out of character for Wong, who had been through many tough battles with Bailey and others, seemingly without a hint of such emotion. In addition, Wong's testimony on many occasions was evasive, exaggerated, inconsistent, distorted or inherently unbelievable.31 When asked if she knew that Kelly was 3lr will set forth some examples to support these 84
pursuing a job at a museum in San Francisco, she replied that she didn't know. Given the relationship between Wong and Kelly and the circumstances at the time Kelly was seeking this job, I find it completely unbelievable that Wong was not aware of his efforts. On another occasion she testified that on the day of the elevator incident other employees placed works of art on the elevator and left them there unattended. If true, this statement would indicate that her conduct in this regard was not out of the ordinary. But when pressed on the matter she conceded that employees had placed works of art on the elevator unattended but, significantly, had not closed the door as she had. Thus, in the examples in her testimony no danger was presented. In a similar vein, she testified that when Bailey found her on the telephone he told her she was not permitted to call her representative, the implication being that Bailey attempted to block her from contacting the union representative. But when pressed on the point, she conceded that what Bailey actually said was that she should not call her representative on work time. This puts Bailey's comments in an entirely different light. observations. However, the examples are by no means all-inclusive. The record is replete with instances where Wong testified in this manner. In addition, it is noted that this section on credibility does not include resolution of all credibility matters in the case. Other credibility matters are resolved, as necessary, throughout the decision at appropriate places. 85
In her classification appeal she called herself a supervisor, a designation which she surely did not have. She also claimed that her lighting, at least in part, entitled her to the reclassification. In a disingenious ~ttempt to underscore her lighting work, she introduced her timesheets for December 1980, January 1981 and February 1981, which showed that she worked on lighting for over 50 percent of the time in those months. Based on these timesheets ?he testified that she worked over 50 percent of her time in lighting and was thus entitled to be reclassified. But when pressed on this figure, she conceded that she chose these three months because they were the highest. In fact, when .the complete picture is looked at, it becomes clear that Wong averaged only 34 percent of time performing lighting duties. She was obviously at all times aware of this fact. Wong's testimony becomes even more suspect when viewed in comparison with the testimony given by several of her co-workers. Although the testimony of co-workers was not without minor defects, Shalk, Beecroft, Smiley and Murphy were all generally credible witnesses. They were direct in their answers and appeared on the stand as employees who were genuinely interested in participating in the hearing, even though it was not the most pleasant experience for them. They were all disinterested in that they had no stake in the case. In fact, Shalk no longer worked in the Museum. 86
Contrary to Wong, each of these witnesses said that in the past they saw women move the tool cart and/or airlift down a ramp alone. Some of these workers even said they saw Wong do it. I find it significant that four credible witnesses (excluding Bailey, Hubbs and even Kelly) would contradict Wong on this point. The same can be said about performing the so-called menial tasks. Practically every witness who testified at the hearing said all workers performed these tasks. Wong alone claims that she was singled out to do this work in a discriminatory manner. It is hard to accept her claim in the face of such overwhelming opposition, and it also severely undermines her credibility. ~urther, Wong testified at great length about the problems stemming from the so-called lack of clarification of job duties. Shalk, the only other career preparator, t~stified that there was no such problem. Since Shalk was a much more believable witness, there is no choice but to discredit Wong. Shalk (and Bailey) also testified that Bailey did not tell her and Wong that the AFSCME dues were $100 a month, as Wong claims. Such a statement would have been preposterous, given the fact that the figure is exaggerated and Wong herself could have checked it out with a single phone call. Moreover, Wong implied that Bailey, by this statement, sought to discourage her from joining AFSCME. But this makes no sense, since it was 87
Bailey who had become .the point man in the wage-lag matter, and it was Bailey who suggested going to the union in the first place. Kelly's testimony, while slightly more convincing than Wong's, nevertheless suffered from similar flaws. For example, he testifi~d with certainty that Bailey was responsible for damage whicb occurred to the Jenny painting, yet he was not disciplined. If left to stand, this testimony would have assisted Wong's disparate treatment argument with respect to the suspension arising out of the Davis painting incident. However, when challenged on cross-examination, Kelly testified that he was not absolutely certain that it was Bailey who caused the cracks in the Jenny painting. Moreover, with respect to the discipline, he changed his testimony to say that to his knowledge Bailey was not disciplined. These significant qualifications cast serious doubt on Kelly as a witness because, in my view, he must have known when he testified on direct that, in fact, he was not sure Bailey did the damage to the Jenny painting, nor was he sure that Bailey was not disciplined. Furthermore, in my view, Kelly's manner of testifying in the end had the effect of making most of what he said unconvincing. Even when questions called for short direct answers, he consistently insisted on lengthy explanations which frequently contained irrelevant material and ultimately served 88
only to cloud the issues. Because of his propensity to do this rather than respond directly he left me with the overall impression that he was being evasive. This casts considerable doubt on the veracity of most of what he had to say. Lastly, Bailey and Hubbs were also credible witnesses. Both displayed a calm demeanor on the stand. They answered questions directly and with clarity, frequently emphatically making a point in a manner which impressed me as truthful. Also, I find little or no inherent inconsistencies or improbabilities in what they had to say about the central points litigated here. In sum, they were both good witnesses. ISSUES 1. Whether the UAM unlawfully interfered with, discriminated against or retaliated against Adrienne Wong by any of the following actions:32 32The allegation that the November 1980 evaluation, incorporating certain attached memos, constituted retaliation for Wong's protected activity was included in the original charge which was dismissed by a PERB hearing officer on September 23, 1981. Charging party did not appeal thatdismissal, nor did it include these allegations in the two lengthy amendments submitted prior to hearing. Although the charge was again amended at the outset of the hearing, that amendment included only the allegations that the 1981 layoff and the June 15, 1981 letter of reprimand were in retaliation for Wong's protected conduct in 1980. (Vol. I; pp. 8-10.) Also, the November 3 evaluation as well as the attachments thereto occurred more than six months before the filing of the original charge in September 1981. Thus, while the November 1980 evaluation, including the attachments, may be considered as background evidence, these actions cannot be considered as separate violations, and the arguments in charging party's brief to the contrary are rejected. 89
A. The July 1981 layoff; B. The June 12, 1981 letter about "specifications"; c. The June 16, 1981 performance evaluation; D. The July 16 and 20, 1981 letters regarding keys; E. The July 1981 memos regarding lighting files, use of the Xerox machine and other copying of files; F; The elevator incident suspension; G. The installation of telephone locks; H. The September 14, 1981 confrontation regarding representation; I. The assignment to sand frames in September 1981; J. The denial of access to the UAM during the daVinci exhibit; K. The withdrawal of Grand Master Key privileges; L. The September 29, 1981 confrontation regarding Wong's call to Tesluk; M. The assignment of menial tasks; N. The Chinese fan incident; o. The denial of representation at the desk audit; P. The reclassification .denial; Q. The tool cart incident; R. The 1982 layoff; s. The refusal to process grievances. 2. Whether the UAM unlawfully interfered with, discriminated against or retaliated against Daniel Kelly by 90
either of the following actions:33 A. The denial of on-call work after July 1, 1981; or B. The refusal to process grievances. 3. Whether the UAM unlawfully interfered with, discriminated against, or retaliated against Sam Greyson by denying him on-call work after February 23, 1981? 4. Whether the UAM unlawfully interfered with, discriminated against or retaliated against Andre Johnson by any of the following actions:34 33At the outset of the hearing the charging party moved to amend the charge to include the allegation that Kelly engaged in protected activities from January to August 1980, and in retaliation he was denied on-call hours on several· occasions leading up to July 1981. This allegation was part of the original charge that was dismissed by a PERB hearing officer. The dismissal was not appealed and, despite several subsequent comprehensive amendments, the allegations were never reinstated by the charging party. The motion to amend was denied on the record for two reasons. First, some of the acts of retaliation were time-barred. Second, because the charging party had ignored these allegations throughout the long procedural history leading up to the hearing, including the dismissal and two subsequent amendments, the respondent was not fairly on notice that it would have to defend against these allegations. Thus, permitting the amendment at such a late date would be unduly prejudicial. Charging party noted no objection to this ruling. (Vol. I, pp. 7-8.) To the extent evidence was taken about events before July 1981, it was taken for purpose of background information only and not for the purpose of litigating the issues in the proposed amendment which was denied. For these reasons, the lengthy arguments presented in charging party's brief about Kelly's actions and alleged reprisals prior to July 1981 are not considered as independent charges. · 34The original charge contained the allegation that the Museum in June 1981 subcontracted work involving the building of crates, rather than give it to Johnson. Although this 91
A. The 1981 layoff;
B. The denial of on-call work immediately after the
layoff;
C. The treatment as an on-call employee; or
D. The refusal to process grievances.
DISCUSSION
I. Introau·ction
Section 357l{a) of the Act prohibits discriminatory action
against an employee for engaging in conduct protected by the
HEERA. In Novato Unified School District (4/30/82) PERB
Decision No. 210, the Board set forth the standard by which
charges alleging discriminatory conduct under section 3571(a)
are to be decided. The Board summarized its test in a decision
under HEERA issued the same day as Novato:
•.. a party alleging a violation •.. has
the burden of making a showing sufficient to
support the inference that protected conduct
was a "motivating factor" in the employer's
decision to engage in the conduct of which
allegation was dismissed by a PERB hearing officer and never
formally reinstated by the charging party, a limited amount of
evidence concerning this issue was presented at the hearing.
Since the matter was not fully litigated, this issue will not
be addressed here. San Ramon Unified School District (8/9/82)
PERB Decision No. 230. However, it is worth noting that the
limited testimony offered on this point indicates that the UAM
did not act improperly. Johnson was asked to build the crates,
but he declined, saying that since he was to be laid off he
didn't want to undertake the project and then be forced to
leave it half-done. Also, the evidence showed that shop work
had on occasion been subcontracted in the past. It was under
these circumstances that the work was subcontracted.
92the employee complains. Once this is established, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that it would have taken the same action even in the absence of protected conduct. As noted in Novato, this shift in the burden of producing evidence must operate consistently with the charging party's obligation to establish an unfair practice by the preponderance of the evidence •. (California State University, Sacramento (4/30/82) PERB Decision No. 211-H at pp . 13-14 • ) The test adopted by the Board is consistent with precedent in California and under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) requiring the trier of fact to weigh both direct and circumstantial evidence in order to determine whether an action would not have been taken against an employee but for the exercise of protected rights. See, e.g., Martori Brothers Distributors v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 721, 729-730; Wright Line, Inc. (1980) 251 NLRB 150 [105 LRRM 1167] enf., in part, (1st Cir. 1981) 662 F.2d 899 [108 LRRM 2513] .35 Hence, assuming a prima facie case is presented, an employer carries the burden of producing evidence that the action "would have occurred in any event." Martori Brothers 35The construction of similar or identical provisions of the NLRA, as amended, 29 o.s.c. 151 et seq., may be used to guide interpretation of the EERA. See, e.g., San Die o Teachers Assn. v. Superior Court (1979) 12 Cal.3d 1,2-13; 1 Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608, 616. Compare section 357l(a) of the Act with section 8(a) (3) of the NLRA, also prohibiting discrimination for the exercise of protected rights. 93
Distributors v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., supra, 29 Cal.3d at 730. Once employer misconduct is demonstrated, the employer's action, ... should not be deemed an unfair labor practice unless the Board determines that the employee would have been retained "but for" his union membership or his performance of other protected activities. (Ibid.) It is under this test that the Museum's conduct will be analyzed. II. Adrienne Wong. A. Pre-CSEA Activities. The Charging Party's brief summarizes Wong 1 s pre-CSEA activities as follows. In the spring of 1980 she met with Bailey to discuss clarification of her responsibilities in the department. Her basic complaint was that her assignments'had been taken away at the last minute. Later, according to the Charging Party, she discussed with Bailey (and Toby) job description cards for employees in the department along with more general concerns, including the fact that on-call employees did not receive fringe benefits. On at least one occasion Kelly joined Wong when she met with Toby. The wage-lag problem was also discussed, and, as more fully described in the statement of facts, she actively worked to remedy the wage problem along with Shalk and Bailey. Section 3565 of HEERA states in relevant part: 94
Higher education employees shall have the right to form, join and participate in the activities of employee organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of representation on all matters of employer-employee relations and for the purpose of m~eting and conferring. To find any of Wong's actions protected under this section, it must be found that she actively participated in an employee organization, and that the organization existed for the purpose of representation r.egarding matters of employer-employee relations. See Monsoor v. State of California, Department of Developmental Services (7/28/82) PERB Decision No. 228-S (hereafter Monsoor). Under the Act an employee organization is defined in section 3562(g) as, •.. any organization of any kind in which higher education employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with higher education employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment of employees .•. , . Taking guidance from the private sector, the Board has interpreted similar language under the State Employer-Employee Relations Act to mean that a given aggregation of employees, to be considered an employee organization, need not be formally constituted, have formal membership requirements, hold regular meetings, have constitutions or by-laws, or in any other manner conform to the common definition of an "organization." Rather, the Board placed the central focus on whether the group has, as a key purpose, the representation of employees on 95
employment-related matters. Monsoor, supra, p. 7. Under this test, the Board observed that even two employees who act in concert to present grievances about cuts in overtime and loss of jobs may be viewed to have constituted themselves an employee organization because they had joined together to represent employees concerning working conditions. It follows that interfering with even two employees who engage in such activity has the effect of discouraging e~ployees in general from continuing to act in concert through an employee organization. Ohio Oil Company (1951) 92 NLRB 1597 [27 LRRM 1288] cited with approval in Monsoor, supra. Under this approach, we need not consider the full range of Wong's pre-CSEA conduct in order to determine that she engaged in the requisite protected activity to satisfy the first step under the Novato test. Wong's actions with respect to the wage-lag effort were protected. Wages is clearly a_working condition of concern to employees. Unlike most of her other actions, the efforts here were clearly in concert with at least two other nonsupervisory employees, Shalk and Kelly. In July 1980 Wong and Kelly met with Toby and discussed, among other things, the wage inequity problem. Also in July 1980, Wong and Shalk met with Bailey to discuss the same issue. These meetings were well known to other employees who stood to benefit if the wage-lag problem was successfully pursued. As a result of these meetings a substantial effort was undertaken. 96
Since the matter at issue involved the wages of all employees, and since many employees were aware of these efforts as a result of discussions with Wong, it can be said that Wong acted with at least the implied authority of these workers. Together with Bailey, Wong and Shalk collected information and prepared a proposal to be presented to the appropriate University body. Although Bailey made the representation, Wong and Shalk were present and their efforts leading up to the presentation were not insubstantial. Therefore, it is concluded that, although many of the issues Wong raised were personal in nature, she engaged in the activity required to bring her within the protections of the Act.36 However, there is no evidence that the Museum's pre-CSEA conduct about which the charging party complain~ was connected to this protected activity, or, for that matter, to any of Wong's other activities, ev~n assuming they are pro~ected. While it is abundantly clear that Wong and Bailey had a rocky 36Because of this finding, it is unnecessary to address the question of whether other activities connected to clarification of duties, job description cards, fringe benefits for on-call employees, etc. were protected. It is noted, however, that with respect to most of these activities Wong testified that she talked with other employees. ·However, the record established by the charging party is lacking as to whether Won~ acted with other employees or with the requisite express or implied authority of these other employees to make her conduct concerted. See Meyers Industries, Inc. (1984) 268 NLRB No. 73 [ LRRM ]. Thus, it is doubtful that these actions are protected-.-- 97
relationship, it is equally clear that their difficulties were not the result of Wong's protected activity or Bailey's unlawful motive. Bailey and Wong fell on hard times almost immediately after her return from Japan, and long before Wong did anything that can even remotely be considered protected activity. Upon her return, Wong became upset because Shalk had begun to play more of a role in the department. I believe Bailey's characterization of Wong as feeling "betrayed'' is an accurate one. She began to assert that her duties needed clarification, an assertion that Shalk and Murphy dispute. And she claimed she should be reclassified. Both of these complaints were unfounded in my view. Nevertheless, in conjunction with these claims, she protested to Toby that Bailey was treating her unfairly: he favored certain people, she said, and she was not one of them. Thus, it seems that Bailey and Wong djd not get along beginning from the time she returned from Japan. Simply put, Wong was not an easy perso~ to work with.37 This fact, not protected conduct, was the source of the tension. The record is replete with examples which demonstrate the difficulties Bailey had with Wong. For example, despite the 37The same thing may be said about Wong's relationshipwith her coworkers. Aside from the fact that they repeatedly contradicted her testimony at the hearing, they described her personality as moody and not very easy to work with. 98
fact that Bailey refused to grant her time off to draft her employee development plan, she wai_ted until the last minute to complete the draft and took time off anyway. The attachments to her November 3, 1980 evaluation, as well as Wong's rebuttal, show that on occasion Wong refused to attend staff meetings because she unilaterally determined her priorities were elsewhere at the time, or she disappeared from the worksite without apparent reason. When Bailey asked her to help uncrate the Pomodoro exhibit, she protested that it was "shit work." Other examples of the difficulties Bailey had in working with Wong are set forth in the statement of facts. It would serve no useful purpose to again describe them here; nor would it serve any useful purpose to assess blame for these incidents, as most of them boiled down to petty work-place disagreements. Suffice it to say that these problems were representative of the not uncommon situation where an employee and he~ supervisor simply are not able to work together smoothly for reasons related to what may be described as differences in style, approach to the work, personality, etc. In my view, the problems Bailey and Wong experienced do not suggest an unlawful motive. And there exists no concrete evidence in the record from which I am prepared to infer such a motive. Therefore, it is concluded that the charging party has not established a prima facie case under Novato with respect to the pre-CSEA allegations. 99
But even assuming that, regarding the Museum's pre-CSEA complained-of conduct, a prima facie case had been proved, the Charging Party's case does not stand up in the face of the Museum's reasons for its actions. The outstanding allegations of unlawful activity which occurred prior to the time Wong was first represented by CSEA on June 29, 1982 are (1) the June 12 letter, (2)' the June 16 evaluation, and (3) the July 1981 layoff. Each of these will be considered in order.38 1. The June 12, 1981 Letter: My best understanding of the Charging Party's argument concerning this letter is as follows. Prior to June 12, both Wong and Bailey knew the wage-lag proposal had been turned down. Consequently, Bailey somehow "knew" that Wong would reinstate her efforts to pursue the reclassification process, which she had temporarily given up. For some reason, even though Bailey favored the wage-lag proposal, he opposed Wong's pursuit of the reclassification issue and he issued the June 12 letter as a reprisal for initiating the reclassification proposal in the first place. Also, Charging Party urges a 38This charge was filed on September 18, 1981. Thus, Charging Party acknowledges that reprisal actions taken before March 18, 1981 are time-barred. However, it asserts that the July 15, 1980 memo, the September 16, 1980 memo, and the November 3, 1980 evaluation should be considered as independent violations because they were not placed in Wong's personnel until July 31, 1981. This argument is rejected, since I file have already found that Bailey never agreed to withdraw the November 3 evaluations and the attachments. Thus, these charges are time-barred. 100
finding that the letter was issued as a "warning" to Wong not to seek a reclassification in the future. Even if the facts as characterized by the Charging Party in making this argument are true, I find the argument to be unpersuasive. Bailey is the one who became the lead person in the wage-lag issue,· not only for his own benefit, but also because he.genuinely believed employees were underpaid. It was Bailey who encouraged Wong and Shalk to go to the union and seek its expertise on the matter. And it was Bailey, not Wong or Shalk, who actually went to AFSCME and sought assistance, dutifully reporting back to Wong with the information. It would strain credulity to now find that Bailey had completely changed his view about the pay inequity situation in the Museum and had turned to issuing letters such as this in reprisal for Wong's reclassification efforts. In addition, under Charging Party's argument, for the June 12 letter to be an unlawful reprisal under the Act, Wong's attempt at reclassification would have to be considered protected conduct. Indeed, Charging Party asserts that this conduct is protected. The best evidence of Wong's efforts to be reclassified is found in her written reclassification proposal which she eventually finally submitted to Toby on June 30, 1981. The proposal is a lengthy and detailed document which sets forth her individual duties and percentages of time she spent on 101
those duties. Despite Wong's self-serving testimony to the contrary, it is clearly an attempt to get herself classified to the principal preparator level. Given that the information therein is so unique to Wong's personal situation, it is not likely that other employees, such as Shalk, would benefit even if Wong was successful and ultimately reclassified. Indeed, in the proposal itself, Wong claimed that she supervised Shalk and 15 other on-call preparators. Based on the foregoing, I conclude that the reclassification effort was undertaken solely for her own benefit and thus was not protected conduct. Therefore, even if Bailey's June 12 memo was a reprisal for this conduct, it did not violate the Act. With respect to the specifics of the letter, Charging Party acknowledges that Wong knew what "specifications" meant. However, citing Wong's testimony, it argues that Bailey did not ask Wong for the "details," but rather asked her why they needed specifications, and she told them she didn't know. According to Charging Party's argument, it would have been absurd for Bailey to ask Wong about the details of the test since Wong had already told him that they needed specifications, thus indicating that details were not yet available. I agree, and it is precisely because such a statement would have been unlikely that I conclude Bailey did not ask for details of the test. Rather, it seems more logical to me that Bailey asked Wong what specifications were needed, 102
and she refu$ed to answer, thus prompting the letter. And, although the memo is inartfully drafted, it does clearly say that Bailey requested certain "information," as well as "details," from Wong. It is for these reasons that I credit Bailey's testimony to the effect that Wong defiantly refused to give him information she had, thus necessitating his call to facilities- In sum, I conclude that the June 12 letter was nothing more than another incident arising out of Wong's and Bailey's stormy relationship. There was no unlawful motive present, nor can it be said that this letter violated the Act in any way. 2. The June 16, 1981 Evaluation. As with the June 12 memo, Charging Party argues that the June 16 evaluation was a reprisal action taken because of Wong's efforts to "gain reclass for herself and others." For the reasons set forth in the preceding secti.on, it is concluded that the reclassification was unprotected. Thus, this argument is rejected. In an attempt to support its argument that the evaluation is somehow tainted, Charging Party points to the fact that no mention of Wong's lighting duties is found in the evaluation. It also points out that there are no comments in the evaluation which specifically support the ratings given Wong in the various categories~ instead, there are only general comments about not getting along with people. 103
It is true that the negative ratings are not supported by specific comments in the evaluation itself. To the extent that the evaluation does not include such comments, it may be said to be deficient. When asked about this point at the hearing, Bailey first testified that Wong wouldn't discuss the evaluation with him. Because there was no discussion he couldn't remember any specifics to support the ratings. However, when pr.essed on this point, Bailey cited several examples of incidents where Wong either refused to carry out an assignment, complained about an assignment, or wasted time during an assignment. According to Bailey, this conduct affected her performance in all the listed categories. In my view, Bailey's explanation on this matter is less than might be expected from a supervisor who gives an employee a negative evaluation. And it is certainly perferable to include such comments on the evaluation itself, even if the employee refuses to discuss it. The evaluation, therefore, is deficient in these respects. However, these deficiencies, standing alone, do not transform the evaluation into an illegal reprisal. As to Wong's lighting duties, Bailey correctly explained that they were covered under the rating he gave in the category "in-stallation." He further explained that as many as five people were involved in lighting during the evaluation period, and, therefore, the amount of time Wong spent doing lighting was not great. The Charging Party, in its brief, has not 104
challenged Bailey's explanations on these points. Based on the foregoing, I conclude that the June 16 evaluation has been sufficiently substantiated and thus cannot be viewed as an illegal reprisal under the Act. 3. The July 1981 Layoff. It is clear that a valid financial reason existed for reducing tpe staff in the shop and preparation departments and reorganizing those departments into the new installation department. Also, the Charging Party concedes that the layoff rules embodied in the SPP were followed to the extent that career employees were laid off in accordance with their seniority, and there were no vacant positions into which these career employees could have been transferred. Charging Party contends, nevertheless, that the layoff rules set forth in SPP 760.5, which give preference to career employees over casual employees, are applicable here and that they have not been followed. That section states in relevant part: Department Head. The department head shall determine when indefinite or temporary layoffs are necessary due to lack of work or lack of funds. The department head shall minimize indefinite layoffs from career positions by first reviewing the necessityfor existing casual and casual/restrictedpositions within the department .... ·After the layoff, Wong worked half-time. Other employees were called in to ~ork on an on-call basis. According to the Charging Party, since Wong was available for additional work 105
(beyond her .50 position) which was performed by these on-call employees after the layoff, section 760.5 was violated. Based on this violation, the Charging Party contends that an unlawful motivation should be inferred. This argument is unconvincing. Even if Charging Party is correct that SPP section 760.5 has not been followed, in the absence o~ any showing of disparate treatment or that the Museum's actions were pretextual, it cannot be concluded on this record that the Act has been violated. Charging Party has shown neither. As more fully explained below, it has shown only that there may have been an alternative approach to the assignment of work after the layoff. As to the merits of Charging Party's contention, a fair reading of SPP section 760.5 is that, in order to minimize the impact of layoff on career employees, the Museum was first obligated to consider whether on-call employees were needed. If on-call employees were not needed to perform the work, the Museum would presumably have the obligation to employ the career employees in some reduced capacity and/or otherwise offer them the equivalent of full-time work on an on-call basis. If, however, after considering the need for on-call employees, the Museum determined that they were·needed to perform the work, it would be free to continue to employ them, even though such a decision impacted negatively on the career employees involved. Thus, the Museum had to balance the need 106
for on-call employees against the protection of career employees. Under this reading of SPP section 760.5, I conclude that the obligation placed on the Museum by that section was fulfilled.39 The record evidence shows that, due to the nature of some of the ass ignrnents ,· it was not feasible to limit the staff to a few full-time career employees, and exclude on-call help.40 Due to the highly fluctuating work during the exhibition schedule, the Museum needed the flexibility to employ large numbers of employees on short notice for short periods of time. In addition, it was desirable to have some career 39This conclusion is based on the assumption that on-call employees in the Museum are covered by the SPP generally and by section 760.5 specifically, an assumption with which there is some disagreement. In essence, the Charging Party argues that on-call employees are included within the SPP definition of"casual" employee. As such, on-call employees are covered by the SPP in its entirety. The University, primarily through the testimony of Toby, cont.ends that on-call employees -are a unique group and not covered by the SPP. It is unnecessary to resolve this dispute. Even if it is determined that on-call employees are covered by the SPP, this determination will not alter the outcome of this decision. As more fully explained below, the dictates of section 760.5 were followed at least conceptually,and, as further noted below, the impact of the layoff on career employees was minimized to the extent possible under the circumstances. 40Examples were given at the hearing to ill~strate this point. If a huge concrete ball needed to be moved, it might require several employees (from the on-call list) to do it. Two or three career employees could not accomplish the.task. Also, it might take several employees to hang a particular work of art. Two career employees might not be able to do it. By using its allotment of position by employing career employees to the exclusion of on-call workers, the Museum would severely limit the flexibility it needed to perform such assignments. 107
employees on staff to perform necessary duties when there was a lull in the schedule, as well as when an exhibit was scheduled. Given these needs, Hubbs acted to balance the negative impact of the layoff on career employees against the Museum's need to employ on-call workers. She chose to staff the Museum with 1.5' career positions and use the remaining allotment to hire on-call workers as necessary. Under this post-layoff arrangement, it stands to reason that some on-call employees would be hired to do some of the work previously performed by career employees, including Wong. But this does not mean that the impact on career employees was not minimized or that SPP section 760.5 was violated. That the impact on career employees was minimized is evident when one compares the actual impact on the career employees involved with the potential impact. The average monthly on-call hours assigned for the second half of 1981 was 486. Of these, an average of 123 per month were assigned to laid-off career employees Clausen,.O'Neill and Johnson. This figure is significant when one considers that there are far fewer car.eer employees in the Museum than on-call employees.41 Thus, former career employees Clausen, O'Neil 41Ten employees, who were not former career employees,worked on an on-call basis during the last six months of 1981. By contrast, only three former career employees worked on an on-call basis during this period. 108
and Johnson received a large share of the post-layoff on-call work. Additionally, Wong retained a .50 career position, and Bailey retained a full-time slot, while Ross was laid off totally. The potential impact on career employees could have been much worse. Wong (and Bailey) could have been laid off completely and a straight on-call system implemented, or, for example, o.ther former career employees could have been given fewer on-call hours. The possibilities are endless and one need not consider each and every one to see that the impact on career employees was minimized. Under these circumstances, one cannot justifiably conclude that SPP section 760.5, assuming its applicability, was violated. Wong may not have been happy with the post-layoff distribution of work, but her displeasure and desire for more hours does not, under these circumstances, lead to the conclusion that the impact of the layoff on career employees was not minimized. In fact, a strong argument can be made that Wong, who retained .50 career status, fared much better than at least four of the career employees involved, thus rendering her claim of discrimination unconvincing. It is worth noting here that I have already found Hubbs did not guarantee Wong any hours beyond the .50 career position. To support its argument to the contrary, the Charging Party asserts in its brief that it is "clear" that Hubbs intended to give Wong full-time work, but circumstances caused her to change her mind. According to the Charging Party, "what must 109
have happened" is that Bailey became upset because he "knew" Wong intended to pursue the reclassification matter. He went to Hubbs and Egherman and the three of them worked out a situation whereby they would deny Wong work and "hopefully force her out of the Museum." In an attempt to explain why Wong was given the 0 .50 slot, the Charging Party's brief also asserts thi3,t "it is also quite possible" that Bailey somehow "knew" Wong had contacted CSEA (this was before any CSEA con tact emerged in the record) and the . 50 position was merely a means to "avoid a winning grievance by Wong." The record shows that Bailey played no role in the decisions regarding the layoff or the post-layoff distribution of hours. Because these arguments are based on sheer speculation and find absolutely no support in the record, they must be discarded. The Charging Party further argues that, given the number of on-call hours available after the layoff, Johnson, O'Neill and Clausen could each have been given 100 hours per month and that Wong could have been given 86 hours per month of on-call time. When coupled with her .50 career appointment, this would bring her up to full-time. This allocation would have left 100 hours available per month for distribution to other on-call workers.42 42This plan is known as Charging Party's "100 hour plan." It is based on the fact that the average number of on-call hours assigned monthly from July 1981 through December 1981 was 486 (CP Ex. No. 43). 110
It is the Charging Party's position that the Respondent has not proved that the "100 hour plan" would not have worked. This stance misconstrues the Novato test. W'nen boiled down to its basic terms, this ~rgument simply presents another alternative way to assign work in the Museum. It does not, by itself, detract from the decision to employ 1.5 career employees and use the remainder of the time for on-call workers. Under Novato, Respondent need not disprove the validity of an alternative employment-related decision. It need only show that it had a valid business justification for its dee is ion. In the absence of· a showing of disparate treatment or a finding by the trier of fact that the Respondent's decision is pretextual, its decision must stand. As stated above, I find no disparate treatment, nor do I find the Museum's decision to be pretextua1.43 Furthermore, the specifics of the Charging Party's "100 hour plan" are noteworthy. In essence, it seeks full-time work for Wong, but only 100 hours per month for the three other career employees who found themselves completely laid off 43rn support of its argument, the Charging Party asserts that the only way Respondent could have proved t:i-iat the "100 hour plan" would not have worked was to produce timesheets to show that the amount of work could not have been handled under the plan. Charging Party's brief states that Respondent never produced these timesheets pursuant to a valid subpoena duces tecum, thus suggesting a refusal to comply. It is noted here that, contrary to the Charging Party's assertion, the Respondent produced the information necessary to make this argument. Thus, the argument must fail. 111
without even the .50 career position to rely on. Why should the focus be on full-time work for Wong at the expense of former career employees who no longer have career status? Why not equalize all the hours? Why not assign the equivalent of full-time on-call work to Clausen, for example, and distribute the remainder of the hours equally? While there are endless alternatives one might propose as to the distribution of the work in the Museum after the layoff, there is no point in exploring these alternatives here. Suffice it to say that the resolution of the instant dispute does not turn on the possibility of the existence of some workable alternative distribution of work that would be more acceptable to Wong or to any other employee. What is more central to the resolution of the instant case is the consideration of whether Wong was treated differently from other employees or discriminatorily denied some right or benefit because of her union activity. This has not occurred. As stated, one could legitimately reach the conclusion that Wong emerged from these cuts in a favored position. For example, while it is true that Wong was not assigned on-call hours from January to December 1981, it is also true that the Museum could have gone to a pure on-call system. Instead, she was retained in a .50 career preparator position, thus affording her a certain amount of security and other benefits that other former career employees did not have. Ross, 112
Clausen, O'Neill, and Johnson, . for example, were career employees who were laid off completely. Further, a comparison of the on-call hours assigned to former career employees during this period further shows that Wong was not treated in a discriminatory manner. For example, while Clausen worked a substantial number of hours from September .through December, she worked no hours in July and August. O'Neill worked only in November. He did not work in July, August, September, October or December. Johnson worked less than half-time, and only in September, October and November. Wong had steady work throughout this period. Under these circumstances, it cannot be concluded that Wong was treated unfairly or differently from former career employees. As per her stated plan, Hubbs distributed the on-call work to a scal.ed-down group of approximately 13 employees. While it is true that some of these on-call workers occasionally worked more hours than Wong in a given month or during the last six months of 1981 as a whole, it is also true that there were months when they worked fewer hours than Wong or not at all.44 But this is explained by the nature of on-call work; 44rt is also noted that, with one exception, those on-call employees who worked more total hours than Wong during the last six months of 1981, also worked approximately an equivalent number of hours during the first six months of that year. Thus, at least for these employees, their hours were not increased to Wong's detriment. As for the remainder of employees, their hours were far below Wong's. 113
that is, during certain periods of time there is a great deal of work, and on-call workers may work a large number of hours, even more hours than a career employee.45 However, the opposite is also true. There are times when on-call employees work fewer hours than career employees or not at all. In sum, Wong has not been treated in a discriminatory manner. Based on all of the foregoing, it is concluded that the Charging Party has not shown that but for her protected activity Wong would not have received the June 12 memo, the July 16 evaluation, or the July 1 layoff. Nor has it been shown that but for her protected activity, Wong would have received on-call hours after July 1, 1981. The allegations as to Wong's pre-CSEA activity shall be dismissed. We now turn to Wong's post-CSEA activity. B. Post-CSEA Activities. In mid-June 1981, Wong joined CSEA and on approximately June 29 was represented by CSEA for the first time at a meeting to discuss, among other things, her June 16 evaluation. This is considered protected activity under the Act. See Redwoods Community College District (3/15/83) PERB Decision No. 293. Also, a few weeks later, Wong filed the first of many grievances challenging several Museum actions. ·she was 45For example, at least one major exhibit (daVinci) occurred during the last part of 1981. 114
represented by CSEA during these grievances. This, too, is protected conduct under HEERA. Rio Hondo Community College District (12/28/82) PERB Decision No. 272. Soon after the June 29 meeting where she was represented by CSEA, a series of incidents occurred which the Charging Party contends were motivated by the employer's unlawful motive and were therefore illegal un9er the Act. Coming on the heels of the above protected conduct, the timing of the beginning of this series of events, coupled with the large number of events, constitutes the requisite nexus between the protected activity and the complained of employer conduct. Thus, a prima facie case has been established~ and, under Novato, it is up to the University to come forward to explain its actions. 1. The July 16 and 20 letters regarding· keys. In the past, employees had either lost keys or forgotten to bring keys to work. Given this, Hubbs was legitimately concerned about the security of the art work in the building. Also, part-time employees were sometimes absent from the Museum for long periods of time during which their keys were required. For these reasons, Hubbs established a new policy which required employees to leave their keys at the control desk when leaving the Museum. As the supervisor, she had a right to set such a policy and she had valid reasons for doing so. The policy did not interfere with any employee's work, and it applied to everyone across the board. 115
Within a matter of hours Wong violated the policy, and she violated it again a few days later. Hubbs responded with letters of reprimand for each instance. Both letters reminded Wong of the newly-established procedure and informed her that if she continued to neglect these responsibilities her key privileges would be revoked. While it may have been advisable for Hubbs ±o discuss these incidents with Wong, rather than respond with memos, the fact that she did not do so is not fata1.46 There was a valid reason for the letters, Wong having twice within a matter of days violated a new policy implemented by a new supervisor. The Charging Party's argument that these letters came soon after Wong engaged in protected activity and were 11 trivial in nature 11 is rejected. Wong, like other employees, was bound to follow Hubbs' new policies. She did not. Based on the record it is my view that she would have received the letters even in the absence of her protected activity. 2. July 1981 Memos Dealing with Lighting Files, Use of Xerox Machine, and Other Copying of Files. 46rt is noteworthy that Hubbs, being aware of past difficulties in the preparation department, took a different approach to supervision than did Bailey. In my _view, where Bailey took an informal approach to the job, Hubbs was nore formal. She was quick to take control, establishing new procedures and generally demonstrating an assertiveness which had not previously been seen in the department. While she may not have handled every situation in the most skillful way, her shortcomings can be attributed more to the lack of experience than to any other factor. 116
These memos represent three more examples of Wong's defiant refusal to follow the directives of her supervisor. As a new supervisor, Hubbs attempted to consolidate the Museum's lighting files. Her intention to do so was announced at the July 15 meeting, along with her intention to rid the files of extraneous material. When she could not locate the files, she. asked Wong about their location. Wong responded that "usually they are kept in my desk," knowing that she had taken them home. Hubbs made further unsuccesful efforts to find the files. Later, she discovered that Wong had not been truthful about the location of the files and, in fact, had them in her possession all the while. This prompted the first of the three memos wherein Hubbs cited Wong's evasive answer, restated the new policy, and again requested the files be returned. I can find nothing improper about this memo. Hubbs was entitled to establish the new file policy and Wong was responsible _for following it, just as she was bound to follow the new key policy. It was her refusal to do so and her lack of truthfulness that prompted the July 20 memo, not her protected activity. Wong did not become free to ignore Museum policy because of her protected activities. Charging Party offers three lame arguments with respect to the files. First it asserts that Wong was never asked to prepare the files as part of her job, and actually prepared 117
some of them on her own time. Charging Party apparently feels that this gave Wong a personal claim to the files. This argument is not persuasive. While Wong may have not been asked to prepare the files, it is undeniable that she did so during the course of her employment. Thus, the University was entitled to monitor• their control and upkeep. Second 1 Charging Party argues that the files supported Wong's reclassification efforts and she didn't want any of the material to be discarded. But this does not excuse Wong's evasive answer to Hubbs and her ultimate refusal to comply with the policy. Wong would have been better advised to be honest with Hubbs about the whereabouts of the files and attempted to discuss her concern about the impact that cleansing the files would have on her reclassification appeal. Third, Charging Party asserts that since Wong had taken files home before this was nothing new. This ignores the fact that Hubbs had initiated a new effort to consolidate the files under a new policy. It was the refusal to respond to the new policy and Hubbs' inquiry that prompted the memo. Wong's practice of taking files home became irrelevant in the face of Hubbs' new policy. The July 21 memo was given to Wong because Hubbs immediately learned that Wong spent a considerable amount of time after work copying files. Hubbs had not asked Wong for copies, but rather wanted the originals to which she felt the 118
Museum had a right. Once again, Hubbs felt ,Wong was being deceptive. In addition, Hubbs learned that Wong had spent several hours at the Xerox machine copying these files and she felt this was an abuse of the Xeroxing privilege. These two factors prompted the memo, not Wong's protected activity. Furthermore, despite Charging Party's claim to the contrary, the July 21 memo appears on its face to be innocuous. It is a short memo which merely sets forth the fact that Wo?g copied files, asks her to seek permission before doing so in the future, and reminds her that use of the Xerox machine is a privilege which should not be abused. Also, unlike the July 20 and July 31 memos, it does not state Wong's appeal rights. This memo is probably not unlike hundreds of other memos that are issued at the University every day, and it stretches one's imagination to view it as retaliatory. The third memo about which the Charging Party complains was issued on July 31, 1981. On July 24 Hubbs and Wong had a discussion during which Hubbs once again made it clear that Wong needed to seek permission before copying Museum files. Wong was under the impression that this applied only to Xeroxing files, not to hand-copying. A few hours later, Wong entered Hubbs' office and, in Hubbs' presence, began hand-copying a file without permission. Hubbs obviously was not under the same impression as Wong and felt that hand-copying files without permission came within the 119
par~meters of her instructions to Wong. She viewed this as a deliberate attempt to ignore her instructions. Thus, the letter of reprimand issued. There appears to have been a misunderstanding between Wong and Hubbs about the issue of hand-copying versus machine-copying. Wong may have formed her opinion based on conversatipns with Hubbs and the July 21 memo, which discusses only Xeroxing files. From Hubbs' perspective, it would have made no sense to institute the policy only to permit employees to take possession of the files without permission if the purpose was to copy them by hand rather than machine. In any event, it was chiefly this misunderstanding which prompted Wong to attempt to hand-copy the files in question and which then triggered the July 31 let~er. In addition, this misunderstanding was probably complicated by Wong's and Hubbs' rapidly deteriorating relationship. It may even be that Hubbs' frustration with trying to get Wong to comply with her new policies on keys or files caused her to go overboard when Wong entered her office to copy the files. In any event, it is concluded that these factors, not Wong's protected conduct, prompted the July 31 letter. In sum, it has not been shown that but for Wong's protected activity these three documents would not have been issued. In my view, they were issued because Wong resisted complying with Hubbs' new policy on files or, regarding the July 31 memo, 120
because there was a misunderstanding about the applicability of the policy. Lastly, I can find nothing improper about denying Bailey, Kelly or Wong access to the Museum before 8:30 a.m. on July 20. In my view, this was nothing more than a legitimate attempt to see if any of these employees, apparently all suspects in Hubbs 1 -eyes, arrived early to return or copy the missing fiJes. In fact, her hunch turned out to be correct, as Wong showed up early for that very purpose. 3. The Telephone Locks. The Charging Party argues that asking Wong to return the telephone locks so shortly after the August 12 meeting, where calls to her CSEA representative were discussed, was a reprisal intended to make it difficult for her to call her representative. This argument ignores the evidence on this point. The decision to install telephone locks was made to stop untraceable long-distance calls which were being placed after hours and on weekends, not to prevent Wong from calling her representative. And the decision was made prior to the August 12 meeting. Thus, it cannot be seriously argued that the decision in some way constitutes retaliation for the meeting. More importantly, the evidence shows that throughout this long and arduous series of events Wong contacted her representative at will and, in fact, she did so frequently both prior to and subsequent to the August 12 meeting. At no time 121
was she interfered with in the exercise of this right. In my view, the request to return the locks had nothing to do with Wong's protected activity. It was simply a request to return the locks that Beecroft had purchased two weeks earlier for the purpose of stopping unauthorized long-distance calls. The fact that Wong was given this assignment after the August 12 meeting is pure coincidence. 4. The Davis Painting Incident and the September 2 'Suspension. Wong endangered a valuable work of art (Davis painting) by placing it unattended on a freight elevator and closing the door. This act was in clear violation of Museum policy which is that works of art should not be left unattended on elevators with the gate closed, thus creating the possibility of the elevator being called to another floor. It was this action, not her protected activity, that prompted her suspension. Even though Wong deliberately endangered a valuable work of art, it appears that she could have escaped disciplinary action by admitting her mistake. Hubbs testified that a major concern was that Wong refused to admit her mistake. Had Hubbs been given some assurance that Wong recognized her mistake and would attempt to avoid such error in the future, it a~pears that the suspension would not have occurred. But she refused to do so until the hearing in this case. The Charging Party asserts that the suspension letter makes 122
no mention of the refusal to admit a mistake as a reason for the suspension. This is simply not true. The letter clearly says that, .. you have not given me any indicationof your awareness of the serious nature of your misconduct, nor any indication that in the future you will not repeat the error. The Charging Party also argues that several CSEA witnesses testified that paintings had been left on elevators unattended in the past with no discipline imposed. However, none of these witnesses took steps to inform a Museum official of this occurrence and there was no independent evidence presented to indicate that management knew or should have known about these incidents. Thus, this aspect of Charging Party's disparate treatment argument must fai1.47 The next point raised by the Charging Party concerns the fact that the issuance of the suspension letter occurred before Wong and her CSEA representative met with management t9 discuss the matter. I find no merit in this argument. As far as I am aware, the employer has no obligation to meet with an employee and her representative before issuing a suspension. Thus, absent other evidence about the incident which would suggest an 47Evidence showing that in the past works of art were placed on elevators with the gate open has no bearing on thisissue, since the elevator could not be called to another floorwhile the gate was open. In short, no danger was presented to the art work under these circumstances. 123
unlawful motive, I decline to infer such motive based on the timing of the letter. Further, Charging Party attempts in vain to discredit the suspension by arguing that the letter did not include a reference to Smiley's testimony to the effect that Wong "giggled" as she shut the elevator gate. The logic of this argument escapes me. The letter included a clear and concise statement of the facts surrounding the incident, the concerns of Hubbs, the violations involved and appeal rights. What more is needed? Lastly, Charging Party again raises the disparate treatment argument, this time from another angle. In the past, according to this approach, works of art have been damaged or endangered by employees, but no discipline has been administered. As stated earlier in the statement of facts, each of these prior incidents is easily distinguished from the elevator incident. (See fn. 16, s·upra.) Thus, there has been no disparate treatment. 5. The September 14, 1981 Representation Issue. The Charging Party here argues that Wong was denied representation in violation of her Weingarten rights.48 The 48NLRB v. Weingarten (1975) 420 U.S. 25 [98 LRRM 2689] holds that an employee is entitled to a representative at an investigatory interview which the employee reasonably believes will lead to disciplinary action. PERB has adopted this doctrine. See Marin Community College District (11/19/80) PERB Decision No. 145. 124
Weingarten rule is not applicable to this situation because at the outset of the discussion Hubbs made it very clear that there was no disciplinary action contemplated. ~ne told Wong that she only wanted to clear up the misunderstanding about whether Wong was to work the previous Wednesday, and there was no objective evidence presented to show Wong had a reason to expect dis~ipline. As it turned out, Hubbs was truthful. There was no disciplinary action taken. Wong arguably had a -right under HEERA to be represented by CSEA on this employment-related matter, and CSEA arguably had a right to represent Wong, a member of the organization, even in the absence of disciplinary action. See Redwoods Community College District, supra, PERB Decision No. 293. However, the right to representation under Redwoods need not be addressed here, for even if this right existed, the evidence shows that Wong was not denied representation on September 14. Soon after Wong requested a representative, the conversation moved upstairs to the design office. It is true that Hubbs told Wong she was obligated to discuss the matter, but the discussion did not take place. Wong called Tesluk instead, and Tesluk advised Wong to go ahead and talk to Hubbs, provided there was no corrective action involve6. It appears that even then the discussion did not take place. Wong said she wasn't satisfied with Tesluk's advice and wanted to talk to Toby, which she did at some later point in time. And, to the 125
extent any discussion took place between Hubbs and Wong after the call to Tesluk, it was with Tesluk's approval. Hubbs may have felt Wong was not entitled to a representative, but she nevertheless did not press the point. She permitted Wong to call Tesluk and then apparently dropped the matter after Wong decided she wanted to tall< to Toby. There was ?O corre.ctive action taken, nor did Wong ever make up the four hours that triggered this incident in the first place. Under these facts, it cannot be concluded that Wong's right to representation was denied, nor can it be concluded that CSEA was denied the right to represent a member of the organization. 6. Sanding Frames and Other Menial Tasks. The Charging Party argues that Wong was assigned to sand frames in retaliation for her protected conduct. It is claimed that this assignment was made while other less skilled employees were doing matting and framing. It is further claimed that Wong was isolated from other employees while doing this work. These arguments are not convincing. This assignment was given to Wong shortly after the September 14 representation incident. Bailey felt that Wong was upset as a result of that incident and was in no condition to do the more delicate work on the daVinci exhibit. Standing alone, this explanation by Bailey might justifiably be 126
questioned. However, when placed in context, the assignment emerges as routine. It was not uncommon for all employees to perform such tasks, especially after the reorganization when the shop was no longer in existence and Wong and Bailey were the only remaining career employees. ·Despite her experience, Wong was not insulated from such assignments. The same is true with respect to the menial tasks Wong claims she was assigned as retaliatory measures by management. The evidence, including Wong 1 s • testimony, is overwhelming that everyone, at one time or another, performed such tasks. In the face of this evidence, one cannot conclude that Wong was singled out to do this work. The argument that the assignment was a form of harrassment and made to isolate Wong from other employees likewise is not convincing. In fact, the so-called isolation was for Wong's benefit as it permitted her to sand and oil the frames near the exhaust fan with a respirator. In my view, this cannot even remotely be considered harrassment. To the contrary, I would be more inclined to view this as harrassment if Bailey had assigned her this work in full view of other employees without the benefit of the exhaust fan or the respirator. 7. Denial of Access to the Registration Area During the daVinci Exhibit and the "Grand Master Key". On September 10, 1981, Elliott issued a memo calling for increased security for the daVinci exhibit. Egherman testified that the reason for increased security was two-fold. First, 127
since the art work was of extraordinary value and had not been shown in the Bay Area before, there was great interest in the exhibit. Second, based on past experience with so-called "street people" in Berkeley, there was concern that the works of art be adequately protected. To this end, access to the registration area where the art work was kept was limited, and other security measures taken. Wong was one of the people not permitted access. But this restriction was not directed at Wong as an individual. It applied to everyone except a few • employees on an "as needed" basis, i.e., curator, registrar, photographer, etc. Even Egherman was excluded. The absence of any evidence to cast doubt on Elliott's obvious security-related motive for issuing the directive, taken with the general application of the policy, makes it impossible to conclude that the policy or Wong's exclusion from the registration area was discriminatory. The same conclusion must be drawn with respect to the directive, again prompted by Elliott, that grand master keys be limited to supervisory personnel. While Hubbs and Bailey were permitted to retain their keys, at least three other keys, one of which was Wong's, were withdrawn. Once again, this can hardly be characterized as discriminatory. Sub-master keys, which afforded the holder more limited access to the Museum, were issued in place of the grand master keys. Since the directive applied to all non-supervisory personnel, not just to 128
Wong, and since there is no evidence that lack of a grand master key interfered with the ability of non-supervisory employees to perform their required duties, this action cannot be viewed as retaliation or discrimination. 8. The September 29, 1981 Telephone Call. At about 9:30 a.m. on September 29, Wong left her workplace during wor~ing hours without clearing it with her supervisor \ and went to an outside pay telephone to call Tesluk, her CSEA representative, about the September 9 pay dispute. The day before, Hubbs had asked Wong for a response on this dispute by 10:00 a.m. Bailey found Wong on the telephone and told her she was not to call her representative on work time, and as a courtesy she should let him know before leaving the work area dur,ing· worktime so he could get someone to cover for her if necessary. The matter was then totally dropped. There was no corrective action. I find nothing unlawful about Bailey's comments. In fact, he showed remarkable restraint, considering that an employee is usually expected to work during worktime. Bailey's restraint is even more remarkable when one considers that Wong was aware in advance of the 10:00 a.m. deadline and could have called Tesluk the night before. Further, despite the fact that Wong was due for a break at 10:00 a.m., she left work at 9:30 a.m. to make the call. In its brief, Charging Party asserts that these facts make 129
it "evident that Wong . was constantly being watched." I find this statement to be a complete exaggeration. 'l'Nhen boiled down to its simplest terms, this entire incident consists of Bailey telling Wong that she should not leave the work area to make telephone calls to her representative on worktime without letting her supervisor know where she was. There is nothing unlawful apout such a statement. 9. The Chinese Fan Incident. This incident represents nothing more than another confrontation in what had by this point become a long line of confrontations between Bailey and Wong. This time Bailey felt that Wong took too long to mount a Chinese fan, and he felt that she had improperly bent a corner of the fan in the mounting process. Wong naturally disagreed and, as might be expected, another unpleasant exchange occurred. But these exchanges, which had by now become commonplace, had nothing to do with protected activity. These two simply could not work together smoothly. It is my view that Bailey had become frustrated in trying to deal with Wong and had exhausted his patience. It seems that Wong, for her part, resented Bailey and felt he was constantly picking on her. In any event, the fact that these two had an unpleasant exchange over Chinese fans and generally were unable to work together does not automatically translate into unlawful harrassment under HEERA. After Bailey reported the incident to Hubbs, she met with 130
Wong and they discussed the Chinese fan incident, among other things. Unlike the elevator incident, Wong eventually admitted she bent the fan and Hubbs told her it was understandable because everyone makes mistakes. No corrective action took place and the entire matter was droppen. Tesluk, however, contacted Toby. She wanted a meeting to discuss, among other things, the fan incident. Toby understandably refused. Even Toby, who appeared to me on the witness stand to have the patience of Job, saw no point in the meeting, since there had been no corrective action and the matter had been dropped. Eventually, he agreed to a meeting if he was presented with an agenda so there could be some structure. But by now even Tesluk had given up on the matter because Toby never heard from her again. Nothing about this incident can remotely be construed as discriminatory or retaliatory. Wong and Bailey had a disagreement which Hubbs and Wong later discussed. This simply does not add up to harrassment. 10. The Desk Audit and Reclassification. The Charging Party here contends that by the time of the desk audit most of the preparator's duties had been taken away and Wong was doing primarily menial tasks. Thus, according to the Charging Party, any honest job audit would have resulted in her being reclassified downward. The Charging Party claims 131
this spells out a clear case of reprisal. This argument is unconvincing. It has already been concluded that Wong was not singled out to perform menial tasks. Everyone at one time or another did this work and the evidence does not show that Wong was assigned a disproportionate ·amount of these duties. Further, the record does not support the argument that Wong's duties had dramatically changed over the course of a year. The evidence on this point consists only of general assertions that Wong was increasingly being assigned menial tasks. While there are examples of this cited in the testimony, there is no accurate breakdown of precisely how much of Wong's time was being spent in this area, nor is there a meaningful comparison of Wong's time and duties with those of other preparators. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that Wong's duties changed measurably over the years, nor can it be concluded that she was doing primarily menial task as of the date of the desk audit.49 Turning to the merits of the reclassification appeal, it is obvious that Wong was not a supervisor, as she claimed. At most, she performed in a leadperson capacity with the employees she claimed she supervised. At one time or another, most employees served in a leadperson role. Nor did Toby find that 49 rn fact, Bailey disagreed with Wong's description of her duties as early as the summer of 1980, long before the Museum had the opportunity to transform her preparator duties into menial tasks. 132
she was performi~g the most difficult preparator work. His investigation indicated that, during the period July 1980 to June 1981, Wong's lighting assignments equaled 50 percent of her time on only two occasions. This would not entitle her to a reclassification. Moreover, one is left with the impression that, even if Wong·had done lighting in excess of 50 percent of her time, ~hat alone would not entitle her to reclassification, because several credible witnesses, including Wong's co-workers, testified that lighting was overrated and consisted of little more than changing light bulbs. There were no other significant duties upon which a reclassification could be based. Although at the hearing Wong described some of the duties upon which she would base a reclassification, they fell within the current position description of preparator. As such, they would not justify the reclassification. Lastly, consistent with Egherman's testimony, Toby informed Wong that the Museum was not interested in· creating specialized slots. Like other Bay Area museums, the UAM wanted employees who could perform a 11 wide range of preparative tasks 11 and had chosen not to allocate any of its existing positions to so-called specialists. The desk audit upon which the denial was largely based was conducted by Toby and Wong was denied a CSEA representative. Toby believed that Wong was not entitled to a representative because the desk audit was only a review of her work and not a 133
matter appropriate for union representation. The desk audit related to the reclassification appeal. As such, it was clearly an employment-related matter during which Wong had the right to a CSEA representative. In addition, CSEA had a right to represent Wong as one of its members. Denial of these rights violated section 357l(a) and (b) respectively. See Redwooqs Community College District, supra. 11. The Tool Cart Incident. While it may have been preferable to have two employees move these heavy pieces of equipment, it was not unusual for an individual employee to move the tool cart or the airlift down ramps in the Museum. Many employees, including Wong, had done this in the past, as well as on the day in question. Thus, it cannot be concluded that giving this assignment to Wong on March 2, 1982, was either discriminatory or retaliatory.SO 12. The July 1, 1982 Layoff. Ignoring evidence to the contrary, the Charging Party argues that the July 1982 layoff was the final act of retaliation. The Charging Party is, once again, off target. In fact, there was no work for Wong. As Elliott pointed out in his May 21, 1982 letter, the exhibition schedule showed that in 50since the Charging Party failed to address this issue in its brief, I can only assume that its complaint centers on the argument that this assignment was a form of discrimination or retaliation. 134
the upcoming year there would be 26 weeks with no preparation work scheduled. Allowing for vacation, Wong would be idle 23 weeks. Given the fact that the Museum still faced a huge deficit, carrying Wong under these circumstances could not be justified. Hubbs agreed wi-th Elliott and, after considerable thought about the impact Wong's layoff would have during the course of unfair practice hearings, concluded that the most efficient thing to do was to implement a straight on-call system. Thus, Wong was laid off along with other cuts that saw the security staff reduced by half and a curatorial position left unfilled. Based on this evidence, it is concluded that the Museum had a valid business reason for taking this action. There is no evidence which can be used to attribute an unlawful motive to Elliott, Egherman or Hubbs. The Charging Party simply has not come close to showing that but for the exercise of protected activity, Wong would not have been laid off. III. Daniel Kelly On July 27, 1981, Kelly was represented for the first time by CSEA at a meeting with Ross and Toby to discuss his post-layoff lack of on-call hours. Securing union representation about a matter of employment rela.tions falls within the protection afforded by section 3565. See Redwoods Community College District, supra. Thus, it is concluded that, as of July 27, Kelly had engaged in protected conduct. 135
The Charging Party, in its brief, also argues that Kelly engaged in protected conduct prior to that date by virtue of his other conduct and his support of Wong in her attempts to improve working conditions in the Museum. This activity may be summarized as follows. Kelly, in 1980, met with Ross, Toby and Bailey and voiced concerns on matters of interest to other workers in. the Museum. These included the number of hours worked and Bailey's control over these hours; advance notice for on-call workers; and clarification of job duties. During this process, he was openly supportive of Wong's activities and even joined her on occasion when she met with Toby to discuss employment-related concerns. To the extent that he joined with Wong to present employment-related concerns to management officials, his conduct is considered protected. See Ohio Oil Co., supra. Further, to the extent that Wong engaged in protected conduct by, for example, participating in the wage-lag process, Kelly's participation and support can be found to be protected~Sl Egherman's earlier references to Kelly as a troublemaker and the refusal to assign him on-call hours after July l 51 It is noted, however, that Kelly's pre-CSEA protectedconduct was extremely minimal and so remote in time as to have little bearing on the on-call hours issue. Further, since the central matter at issue with respect to Kelly is denial of on-call hours after July 1, and since Kelly had clearly engaged in protected conduct as of July 27, his pre-CSEA protected activity is relevant only to the alleged retaliation which took place between July 1 and July 27. 136
constitutes evidence from which an unlawful motive may be inferred. This inference is underscored by the fact that Kelly had received hours on a regular basis since his return from Japan. A prima facie case having been.established, we now turn to the Museum's explanation for refusing to assign Kelly work after July 1, 1981; Denial. of on-call hours during July 1981 will be considered first. Before doing so, however, it is important to note that most of Kelly's conduct which Charging Party views as protected occurred in the later part of 1980. Although Kelly and Bailey had several disputes during this period, which Charging Party attributes to Kelly's protected conduct, the record with respect to work assignments belies the fact that Bailey retaliated against Kelly. For the first six months of 1981, it was Bailey who assigned Kelly almost all of his wo_rk in the Museum. This marked a clear departure from 1980 when Kelly received most of his assignments from Johnson.52 Thus, it cannot be concluded that Kelly suffered discrimination during the first six months of 1981. After July 1, 1981, Hubbs was the person in charge of assigning hours. She credibly testified that at the time of 52ouring the first six months of 1981, Bailey assigned. Kelly 522.5 hours. Johnson, by contrast, assigned him 11.5 hours. During the last six months of 1980, Bailey assigned Kelly 565 hours. Johnson, by contrast, assigned him 548. 137
the layoff she had not heard from Kelly and was under the impression that he had taken the job in San Francisco. Thus, she did not assign him any hours in July.53 This is not to say, however, that, absent the possibility of the San Francisco job, Kelly would have been assigned work in July. Shortly after the July 27 meeting, Hubbs learned that Kelly did not ge~ the job in San Francisco and was interested in on-call hours. While in the process of trimming the on-call list, Hubbs had to decide whether she wanted Kelly on the list. She decided she didn't and she excluded him for two reasons. First, she felt Kelly was not able to work "quick and dirty." This would make him less valuable in the new approach she intended to use, as she felt Kelly would not fit into the newly-established core of reliable and efficient workers to do the work. Without minimizing Kelly's abilities as a preparator, it appears that he was simply not the kind of worker Hubbs wanted. It is noteworthy that Hubbs' view of Kelly's work finds considerable support in the record, especially from Kelly's co-workers. He was overly thorough, meticulous, and regularly sought time-consuming alternative approaches to assignments. 53rn fact, it ~as not unusual for most on-call employees, including Kelly, to receive little or no work in any given month. For example, Kelly received no work in July of 1980, and in December 1980 he worked only eight hours. 138
Hubbs justifiably felt that Kelly would not fit into the newly-organized department. In this connection, it is once again worth noting that Hubbs was a new supervisor in a recently reorganized department. It appears that, where Bailey had taken a more informal approach tD the job, Hubbs was more aggressive and decisive. She had a well-formed opinion as to how the on-call system would run under her supervision and she knew with certainty the type of employee she needed to get the job done. Because of the nature of his work, Kelly did not figure into the system. The second reason Kelly was eliminated from the list was his relationship with Wong and with Bailey .. without question, there was a tremendous amount of tension between Wong and Bailey. Hubbs' view, understandably, was that Kelly, given his close relationship with Wong and his sometimes volatile relationship with Bailey, would only heighten the tension. It is important to underscore here that, while this tension was disruptive, it did not have its roots in unlawful motive which stemmed from any opposition to protected conduct. As has been fully discussed above, Bailey dealt with Wong for approximately two years on many issues, and there was no convincing evidence to indicate that he harbored an unlawful motive. In my view, their problems were rooted in personality differences, not protected conduct. Simply put, they had an extremely hard time 139
working together. And the fact that Kelly and Wong were so close greatly exacerbated the problem. The same thing can be said about the relationship between Bailey and Kelly. Bailey had worked with Kelly beginning before Kelly went to Japan. Wnile not as volatile as the Bailey-Wong relationship, the Bailey-Kelly relationship left much to be. desired. They regularly had disagreements and it is not hard to see how a new supervisor would prefer not to have to deal with the chemistry of the$e three employees. Again, as with Wong, the evidence does not show that these differences were motivated by an anti-union animus. Bailey and Kelly simply were not very compatible as workers. It is also important to underscore the fact that Bailey's relationship with Kelly or Wong as not the only factor. Apart from Bailey, the concern about Wong and Kelly being unable to work together was not new by any means. As early as the summer of 1980, after their return from Japan and long before any protected activity took place, Bailey warned Kelly and Wong in separate conversations that he would not tolerate their relationship disrupting the workplace. These warnings were not without justification. They were based on Bailey's experience working with Wong and Kelly before they went to Japan. Hubbs undoubtedly knew of this history. Thus, her concerns were not unfounded, nor were they new. And the fact that, as a result of the events the past year, Bailey was now at odds with both 140
Kelly and Wong, made a bad situation worse. Hubbs decided not to contend with this situation. Since Kelly, an on-call employee, was most expendable, he was eliminated. After Hubbs trimmed the on-call list, a freeze was imposed and Kelly could not be placed on the list even if Hubbs had decided to do so. ·Thus, Kelly was never recalled to the Museum.54 Based on the foregoing, it is concluded that the Charging Party has not shown that but for his protected activity Kelly would have been assigned work after July 1, 1981. The real reasons Kelly was not assigned work after July 27 were the nature of his work and the potential disruption due to his volatile relationship with Bailey and/or Wong. IV. Sam Greyson The theory of the Charging Party's case here is that Greyson's February 23 letter to Egherman constituted protected activity, and the subsequent refusal to hire Greyson was in retaliation for that activity.55 It is conceded by the 541 draw no inference of unlawful motive from the fact that Toby and/or Ross may have told Kelly on July 27 that he was on the list and eligible to be called. This was apparently done without consulting Hubbs, who was the person in the position to make such a decision. As such, she ·was not bound by their comments. 55Greyson engaged in what may be generously described as arguably protected activity in 1980. However, even if found to be protected, that activity was so minimal and remote in time that it has no probative value with respect to the allegedly unlawful denial of work in 1981. Thus, no finding is made on this point. The charge with respect to Greyson centers on the February 23 letter. 141
Charging Party that Egherman 1 s response, which was received approximately 10 days after the Greyson letter was sent, is time-barred and cannot be considered as an independent violation.56 However, to the extent Greyson was denied on-call hours within the six-month statute of limitations period, the denial ~as due to the February 23 letter; and since the letter.was protected conduct, the Charging Party argues, the denial of hours was in violation of the Act. Upon learning of the work cancellation, Greyson immediately sat down and drafted the letter to Egherman without discussing it with other employees. Soon thereafter he showed the letter to Johnson and Wong.57 The evidence shows that Wong said she "supported" Greyson's letter before he sent it. While this may not constitute an express authorization for Greyson to act, it certainly supports a finding that, at minimum, Greyson acted with Wong's implicit authorization, thus bringing the conduct within the parameters of section 3565. See Ohio Oil Co., supra; Monsoor, supra. 56The unfair practice charge was filed on September 18, 1981. Egherman's letter was received no later than the first week in March. 57since Johnson was a supervisor at the time, he cannot be considered an employee with whom Greyson was lawfully acting in concert. As a supervisor, he had limited rights under the Act. See sections 3580-3581.7; See also and compare State of California, Department of Forestry (1980) PERB Decision No. 119-S. In any event, it is unnecessary to consider Greyson•s communication with Johnson, since Greyson had contacted at least one other employee. 142
The letter itself purported to . speak for other employees and addressed a variety of employment-related subjects as they impacted on on-call workers.58 While Greyson may have been better advised with respect to his choice of words to raise his complaints, he was understandably hot about the last-minute cancellation of work. And while Greyson may have gone overboard in his criticism of Egherman's competence, the degree to which he did so does not strip the letter of its protected status. Criticism of a supervisor on employment-related subjects is protected under the Act when its purpose is to advance the employees' interests in working conditions. State of California, Department of Transportation (11/16/82) PERB Decision No. 257-S. Based on the content of Greyson's letter, it can reasonably be read as an attempt to advance employee interest in working conditions. Egherman, for his part, was also justifiably upset by the manner in which his competence was criticized. However, since Greyson's letter was protected, Egherman was not free to retaliate against him because of the letter. While Egherman's response to Greyson was generally unobjectionable, the comment about Greyson having chosen to 58For example, the letter complained about such issues as advance notice, cancellation of work assignments, and the breakdown of communication between "management and labor" at the Museum. 143
"burn bridges" cannot be overlooked. It is the kind of statement which, on its face, delivers the message that Greyson would suffer some adverse consequences for having spoken out in a manner protected by the Act. As such, it is reasonable to infer an unlawful motive from this statement. However, notwithstanding the presence of protected conduct and evidence which suggests an unlawful motive, there has been no showing of harm. 59 As it turned out, Greyson suffered no adverse consequences as a result of his protected conduct. It appears that Egherman never intended to permanently deny Greyson work as a result of the letter. Even Johnson agreed that Egherman had not precluded the possibility of Greyson continuing at the Museum. Nor did Egherman take any actions to preclude hiring Greyson. He immediately told Johnson that he wanted to meet with Greyson. This was interpreted by Johnson to mean only that Egherman wanted Greyson to apologize or make some concessions.60 59It is noted here that Egherman's letter, in itself, may have constituted an independent violation under the Act. However, since the letter cannot be considered as such due to the six-month limitation on unfair practice charges, we are left with the sole issue of whether the subsequent denial of on-call hours within the six-month period was retaliation for protected conduct. As such, the "but for" test set forth in Novato must be applied to resolve the dispute. 6 0Johnson, as a supervisor and, ostensibly as agent of Egherman, told Greyson that Egherman wanted concessions and/or an apology. Under some circumstances, persisting in exacting 144
In any event, Johnson apparently did not take Egherman seriously, for as the Charging Party correctly points out in its brief, he attempted to hire Greyson almost immediately and on several occasions thereafter, but they were never able to make contact7 when they did make contact Greyson had other -commitments. There were occasions when Greyson approached Johnson, b~t each time there was no work available.61 Thus, despite Egherman's "burning bridges" memo (and the fact that he may have wanted an apology), Greyson never suffered any harm because of his February 23 letter. The real reason he was not awarded on-call hours was because he and Johnson couldn't make contact. When they did connect, there was either no work or Greyson was not available. Nor does th_e limited evidence support the cla.im that Bailey retaliated against Greyson while he (Bailey) was still a supervisor, by not awarding him on-call hours in the preparation department. On the one occasion when Greyson came into the Museum he and Bailey had a conversation during which an apology or concessions from an employee because he engaged in protected activity may constitute an independent violation. However, even this comment by Johnson to Greyson istime-barred, since it occurred in early March, o_utside thesix-month period. And, as more fully explained below, this was never pursued since Johnson immediately attempted to hire Greyson. 61The fact that Greyson never filed a grievance over thismatter (as did Wong, Kelly and Johnson) suggests that he may have had other commitments and was not seriously interested in on-call work at the time. 145
Bailey offered Greyson work. Greyson suggested Bailey clear it with Egherman, but Bailey responded that that wouldn 1 t be necessary. Bailey then hired Greyson for one-half day (5 hours). This indicates that Egherman had not put out the word to "blacklist" Greyson. It is true that from February 24 to July 1, the date Bailey gave up his supervisory duties, this was the on~y time he called Greyson to work, but this is not unusual. In the eight months prior to February 24, Bailey had called Greyson to work in the preparation department on only two occasions for a grand total of 15 hours.62 On July 1 Johnson was laid off and Bailey gave up his superv_isory duties. It was then up to Hubbs to decide whom to call in and when. There was no convincing evidence presented to show that Egherman blacklisted Greyson to Hubbs. Nor was there any evidence presented to show that Hubbs did not call Greyson to work because of protected conduct. What seems more likely is that Hubbs, in deciding to trim the on-call list, excluded Greyson because the number of hours he worked in the past year had not been great, and even these hours were almost exclusively in the shop. 62It is noted here that, except for these 15 hours, all of Greyson's work for the period July 1, 1980 to February 24, 1981, was in the shop department. Even there Greyson 1 s hours were not great. For the eight months immediately preceding February 24 he worked only 187 hours, or about 23 hours per month. 146
Based on the foregoing, it is concluded that the Charging Party has not shown that but for Greypon's protected conduct he would have received on-call hours after February 24, 1981. While Egherman' s "burning bridges" comment may show an unlawful motive and may well have been viewed as an independent violation if filed •timely, Johnson in effect ignored it with respect to.his efforts to hire Greyson. The real reasons Greyson was not hired have been described above. To summarize, Johnson tried to hire Greyson, but Greyson was not available, they could not make contact, or there was no work. Moreover, given his work record with respect to total hours, it was not out of the ordinary for Greyson not to be called in by Bailey or Hubbs. V. Andre Johnson The Charging Party here argues that Johnson, a supervisor, was laid off and then denied on-call hours because he refused to carry out Egherman's unlawful directives to retaliate and/or discriminate against Kelly and Greyson. The Charging Party points to State of California, Department of Health (1/10/79) PERB Decision No. 86-S and State of California, Department of Forestry, supra, PERB Decision No. 119-S, and correctly asserts that an employer's retaliatory conduct against a supervisor that has an adverse impact on the protected rights of non-supervisory employees may be challenged via the unfair practice route. The Charging Party would thus conclude that 147
Johnson's layoff was an illegal retaliation and employees viewed it as such. It has been found that Greyson and Kelly engaged in a limited amount of protected activity. It has also been found that Egherman at some point told Johnson that Kelly was a troublemaker and he suggested Johnson would be well advised not to hire Kelly. Egherman responded to Greyson's February 23 letter, which I have found to be protected, with the "burned bridges" response, and he told Johnson that he wanted to meet with Greyson before Johnson offered him any more work. After each of these episodes, Johnson ignored Egherman. He continued to hire Kelly, and he made attempts to hire Greyson, but he was unsuccessful. Thereafter, on July 1, 1981, Johnson was laid off, and for at least two months, not called in on an on-call basis. Since these circumstances present sufficient evidence from which an unlawful motive may be inferred, I conclude that a prima facie case has been presented. However, when one looks at the circumstances surrounding the layoff, the Charging Party's case completely evaporates. The Charging Party first argues that the layoffs were implemented in violation of the SPP and that there were no satisfactory business reasons for the layoff. As has been more fully explained above, there were ample reasons for the layoff. The Museum was facing a huge deficit and the budget needed to be cut drastically. That was the real reason for the 148
layoff, not an attempt to retaliate against Johnpon. In addition, it has been determined that the layoff decision was implemented in accordance with the requirements in SPP section 760. Two other career employees in the shop department were also laid off, and Ross, the chief curator, met with the same fate.· The shop department was eliminated as part of the reorganization. Cuts were made in administration, curatorial, and the Pacific Film Archives. As Egherman persuasively testified, the whole structure and character of the Museum had to be changed because of the dire financial conditions that existed. These were the real reasons for Andre Johnson's layoff. In my view, to suggest that, but for his so-called support or protection of Greyson or Kelly, Johnson would not have been laid off is nothing more than an exercise in self-delusion. Furthermore, the blame for Johnson not being called in for on-call work in July and August is appropriately placed on his own doorstep. Based on the record evidence, I conclude that at the time of the layoffs Hubbs and Egherman were justifiably under the impression that Johnson was not interested in receiving on-call work. This conclusion rests on two reasons. First, based on his own statements to the effect that he wanted to spend some free time, collect unemployment compensation and pursue other interests, practically every worker in the Museum who testified also had tne same impression (from Johnson 149
directly) as did Hubbs and Egherman. It is diffcult to ignore such overwhelming testimony.63 Second, Johnson himself testified that he wanted the work only if it did not jeopardize his rehire rights, and he told this to Hubbs at the time. He again cited this "problem" to Hubbs in September when she called him after the grievance was filed. Johnson did not find out that apcepting on-call hours would not jeopardize his rehire rights until mid to late July or early August. And it wasn't until late August that CSEA contacted Egherman and told him that Johnson was interested in working. The logical inference to draw from this is that Johnson, in fact, did not want to commit to accepting on-call hours until his rehire rights were finally determined. When this was done and he learned he could accept the hours without jeopardizing these rights, he contacted Egherman through CSEA and told him for the first time that he wanted to work. Moreover, Hubbs credibly testified that when she confronted Johnson about the fact that he had told her earlier that he did not want the hours, Johnson said he changed his mind and indicated that other personal problems had accounted for his earlier statement. Giving Johnson the benefit of the doubt, it is possible 63As fully set forth in fn. 30, supra, each of these witnesses testified about a different story they had heard from Johnson about his plans for the future. I find it extremely unlikely that seven witnesses would all manufacture such detailed facts about Johnson's future. 150
not that he never intended to leave the impressions that he did want to work on-call hours after the layoffs. Nevertheless, the evidence is overwhelming that his statements at the time were such that any reasonable person would justifiably have formed the impression that he did not want to work, and this is precisely what Hubbs and Egherman thought at the time. Therefore,. it is concluded that Johnson's own conduct and/or statements were the real reasons for his not being called to work after the layoff. A further observation adds to this finding. After observing all the witnesses and reviewing the record, it is my sense that Johnson was an employee who was well liked by Egherman, Hubbs and Bailey. While these three had their problems with Wong and Kelly, no such problems existed with Johnson. They were more than willing to work with him and, in fact, would have enjoyed having him on staff. Nor does Johnson's treatment as an on-call employee support the Charging Party's claim of retaliation. By the time he was finally hired as an on-call employee, the crew had already been picked for the daVinci exhibit and Clausen and Beecroft, Johnson's former subordinates, had already been picked as leadpersons for the crew. Thus, it was not unusual that Johnson found himself in the position of taking orders from employees he supervised in the past, and working fewer hours than these employees during this period. That Johnson was 151
upset and even hostile at this situation is perfectly understandable. He was placed in the embarrassing situation of taking direction from those whom he formerly supervised. However, nothing could be done about it at this point. In fact, it may have been disruptive of the work and would have definitely been unfair to Beecroft and Clausen for Hubbs, at such a late date during preparation for the major daVinci exhibit, to unilaterally . yank Beecroft and Clausen out of their lead roles and insert Johnson in their place. As I have found above, Johnson's own statements about his intentions after the layoff were the real reasons he was not offered on-call hours until September. It was this delay which put him in a role subordinate to Beecroft and Clausen during the daVinci exhibit, not an unlawful motive on Hubbs' part.64 Once he was hired, he naturally needed to be informed about the proper chain of command and, under the circumstances, was obligated to take direction from his former subordinates. Nor were the orders from Beecroft and/or Clausen in and of themselves discriminatory. Even Johnson admitted that everyone took out trash. No concrete evidence was introduced to show that, as a general rule, Johnson was given assignments 64Even if Hubbs had called Johnson to work on the exhibit at the same time as she called Clausen and Beecroft, the Charging Party has offered no argument that required Hubbs to place Johnson in a leadperson role. 152
requiring less skill, or that he was isolated from other employees. In fact, it is claimed by Charging Party that both Johnson and Williams were isolated in the Museum. If this is so, I fail to see how a discrimination theory can seriously be pursued, since Williams engaged in no protected conduct, and other employees, including Beecroft, worked along with Johnson. Jam more convinced by Hubbs' testimony that it would have been pointless to hire Johnson and Williams, and then spend time scheming about how to isolate them from other employees.65 To the extent that Johnson and Clausen or Beecroft had unpleasant exchanges during this period, as for example during the skylight incident, I conclude this was not surprising due to Johnson's hostility and probable embarrassment about the difficult position he was in, and not to any unlawful motive or attempt to harrass him because he refused to carry out illegal acts against Kelly or Greyson, or because of any other protected activity on his part. Lastly, as I have already found, given the tenuous relationship between Johnson and Beecroft, it is highly 65The work orders about which the Charging Partycomplains were given largely by Beecroft and Clausen, bothnon-supervisory employees. There has been no concrete evidenceproduced which would support the conclusion that Hubbs was directly connected to these orders or the manner in which theywere given. 153
unlikely that she would approach Johnson and tell him not to associate with Wong because of her union activities. Moreover, it is not unlikely, given the size and closeness of the Museum staff that Beecroft knew at the time that Johnson too had gone to the union, making her comment about Wong even more improbable. In my'view, it is more believable that Johnson and Beecroft h~d a conversation at some point and Beecroft told him, in essence, that there are two sides to every story. And even if Beecroft did suggest to Johnson to stay away from Wong because of her union activities, it is nothing more than a statement from one non-supervisory employee to another. As such, it has little or no bearing on this case in the absence of some evidence that Hubbs or some other management person was somehow connected to the statement. VI. Processing Grievances. The Charging Party here argues that the failure to properly process many grievances filed by the discriminatees constitutes a form of discrimination and/or evidence from which an unlawful motive can be inferred. Before approaching this issue, it is noted that, as a general rule, it is not unusual for the employer to take a more narrow reading of its regulations, grievance procedures, or other documents which purport to govern employment relations, seeking to preserve the most in the way of management options. By contrast, it is not unusual for the union to take the most expansive interpretation of such 154 .
documents, seeking to gain the maximum protections for its
members. Sometimes the employer prevails; sometimes the union
prevails. It would be unrealistic to attribute an unlawful
motive to the employer simply because it took a position in
which it opposed the union. In my view, the inference of an
unlawful motive should be reserved for situations during
grievance processing where the employer stakes out positions
which are not even arguable, or where a clear pattern of
obstructionist conduct emerges. The employer cannot be
criticized for taking arguably correct positions. It is from
this viewpoint that I will approach the grievances at issue
here.
1. Wong's Grievances.
Setting forth no argument, Charging Party summarily asserts
in its brief that,
. there is no need for argument her
[sic] since a careful reading of [the
grievances and their attachments] will show
a failure to properly process these
grievances.
I disagree.
The grievances at issue are those relating to: (1) the
June 12, 1981 "specifications" memo; (2) the July 16 and 20,
1981 memos regarding keys; (3) the July 14, 1981 layoff; (4)the
July 20, 1981 "banning" memo; and (5) the July 20 and 21, 1982
lighting files and Xerox memos. The Charging Party does not
contest the processing of grievances concerning: {l) the
155July 31, 1981 file-copying memo or (2) the September 2, 1981 suspension. The contested grievances will be considered in order. The University would not process the grievance challenging the June 12 "specifications" memo under SPP section 280 because, in its view, the memo did not constitute "corrective action with the meaning of the SPP. 11 66 Instead, the University agreed to review the matter under SPP section 290.67 665pp section 280 covers Employee Grievances. Section 280.2 states, in relevant part: An individual employee may request resolution under this policy of complaints pertaining to: a. the corrective actions of temporary or indefinite within-range salarydecrease, demotion, suspension withoutpay, and written warnings pertaining to such actions (note: complaints regarding other unspecified corrective actions and the written warnings pertaining to such actions are reviewed under Staff Personnel Policy 290); . The term corrective action is more broadly defined in. SPP section 270.5: Types of Corrective Action. Corrective actions include written warning; tempor~ry or indefinite within-range salary decrease; corrective demotion; suspension without pay; or other action deemed appropriate under the circumstances. 67The scope of SPP section 290 is set forth atsection 290.2: 156
A reading of the plain language in the SPP arguably supports the University's position that the June 12 letter was not corrective action as that term is defined by section 280.2. While section 270.5 contains a broader definition, section 280.2 appears to more narrowly define that term. Thus, for a·memo to be considered corrective action under sec~ion 280.2, it appears that it must pertain to one of the expressly enumerated items in that section. The June 12 letter does not pertain to any of the enumerated items and therefore arguably would not fall within the section 280 definition of corrective action. It might be argued that the June 12 letter pertained to the enumerated item "suspension without pay." However, since the evidence showed there was An individual employee may request resolution under this policy of any complaint regarding a specific management action which adversely affects the employee I s terms and ·conditions of employment. These complaints include but are not limited to those regarding: a. selection for transfer or promotion; b. position classification; c. merit salary increase or other salary action; d. the content of a performance evaluation;and, e. release prior to attaining regular status or prior to the first of the month following thirteen consecutivemonths on pay status. 157
never an intent to suspend Wong for this incident, this argument must fail. During the course of the grievance the Charging Party argued that the determination of grievability should be left to the hearing officer, and not to any University official. While section 280.20 arguably gives the hearing officer the authority to do so, μnder the University's argument, which I find to be far more convincing, that section is not directly applicable.68 More on point for our purposes here is SPP section 280.3, which expressly gives the personnel manager the initial right to determine the scope of the procedure and 68gpp Section 280.20 provides that the decision-maker has the authority to: Responsibility and Authority of the Hearing Committee or Officer. The Hearing Committee or Officer shall: a. Identify the grievance issues submitted in the original, written grievance for hearing; b. conduct a hearing to determine the facts and whether the management actiongrieved was in violation of Staff Personnel Policy or the Chancellor's implementing procedure or, if the grievance involves corrective action or dismissal, whether the management. action was reasonable under the circumstances; and c. submit a hearing report, in writing, tothe Chancellor. 158
provides an appeal route if the grievant objects.69 Since this route was taken on many occasions in the processing of Wong's grievances, and since the language in SPP section 280.3 is clear, it is difficult to see how the Charging Party can seriously argue that the University's actions were somehow improper. For the same reasons it is concluded that similar University responses to Wong's grievances challenging, as corrective actions, the July 16 and July 20 memos about keys, were at least arguably correct and therefore do not constitute reprisals for engaging in protected activity. Nor can an unlawful motive be inferred based on the evidence presentea.70 Toby again informed Wong that she could 69section 280.3 states: The Personnel Manager shall determine whether a complaint is within the scope of Staff Personnel Policy 280 or Staff Personnel Policy 290. An employee may appeal the Personnel Manager's decision to the Assistant Vice President-Staff and Management Personnel who shall have final responsibility for determining whether a complaint is within the scope of this policy. 70tgnoring Toby's statement that these memos are not corrective actions, the Charging Party during the grievance procedure essenti~lly argued that grounds for c6rrective action existed in the memos, and to the extent that the memos did not fall within the section 280.2 definition they were "defective." It appears that the Charging Party here actually invites corrective action, a serious step, in the face of University statements that the letters are not intended as 159
challenge these matters as corrective actions under the SPP section 290 review process. A reprisal allegation remained, and Toby informed Wong that she could grieve under SPP section 280 only the claim that the July 16 key memo was a reprisal for using the grievance procedure. However, Toby correctly stated that this issue cannot be grieved simultaneously under procedures of SPP sections 280 and 290.71 On July 14, 1981, Wong filed another grievance under SPP section 280. This one alleged that: (1) the department had not documented her layoff with lack of work or lack of funds as required by the SPP; and on-call employees were being called to do her work in violation of SPP section 760.5; and (2) the layoff constituted a further act in a series of punitive actions, including the June 12 "specification" memo and the negative June 18 performance evaluation. As a remedy, Wong requested that the June 12 memo and the evaluation be removed from her personnel file, and that the layoff be rescinded. such. Certainly the University's decision to take steps short of corrective action--when grounds to take corrective action exist--cannot be construed as retaliatory. 7lspp Section 290.3 states: An employee may elect to have a complaint which qualifies for review under Staff Personnel Policy 280 reviewed under this policy. However, the same complaint shall not be reviewed under both Staff Personnel Policies 280 and 290. 160
The University responded to the June 12 "specifications" issue in the same way it had when this subject was grieved earlier. With respect to the performance evaluation issue, the University correctly responded that performance evaluations are not grievable under SPP section 280.72 Regarding the layoff issues, the University responded that Wong received her layoff notice on May 26, 1981, and the grievance was filed on July 14, 1981. Since SPP section 280.9 imposes a 30-day statute of limitations on grievances, Toby determined that the grievance, to the extent it challenged the layoff, was untimely.73 After much communication and disagreement about the scope of the grievance and the remedy, the University eventually agreed to process the the grievance on the basis of alleged violations of SPP sections 760.1 and 760.S.74 In other words, the issue 72spp Section 280.2.d expressly excludes "evaluation of performance. 11 735pp section 280.9 states, in relevant part, that the grievance must be filed ••. within thirty calendar days after the date on which the employee could be expected to know of the event or action which gave rise to the grievance or within thirty calendar days after the date of the separation, whichever occurs first. (Emphasis added.) 74section 760.1 states: The policy of the University to minimize the effects of indefinite layoffs and reductions in time of employees in career positions 161
accepted into the grievance procedure was whether the Museum violated SPP section 760 by employing on-call workers to perform tasks Wong could have performed. Next, Wong filed a grievance, under both SPP sections 280 and 290, challenging the action which banned her from the Museum before 8:30 ·a.m. on July 20, 1981. As a remedy, she sought equ~l access to the Museum. Once again, exercising the SPP section 280.3 authority, Toby responded that this memo did not constitute corrective action under SPP section 280.2. Therefore, it was not grievable as such. Also, as Toby correctly pointed out, the grievance could not be processed under_ both the section 280 and the section 290 procedure.75 Eventually, the University when layoffs or reductions in time are necessitated by lack of funds or lack of work. To minimize the effects of layoff, the University shall give employees preferential opportunities for reassignment or transfer prior to layoff, the right to be recalled to the department from which laid off, and preference for reemployment in all departments of the campus or Laboratory. Section 760.5 is set forth at page 106, supra. 75spp section 280.2 states: An employee may elect to have a complaint which qualifies for review under this policy reviewed under Staff Personnel Policy 290. However, the same complaint shall not be reviewed under both Staff Personnel Policies 280 and 290. 162
agreed to process the grievance to consider the issue of whether the memo was a reprisal for the exercise of section 280 or 290 rights. The University maintained, however, that the arbitrator's remedial authority was limited to a determination that the banning memo be "reappraised without reprisal. 11 76 It was the University position that, under SPP section 280.27, since Wong.did not lose any "pay, benefits, or rights 11 as a result of the action, the arbitrator was powerless to make an award beyond the reappraisal remedy. It cannot be said that this interpretation of SPP section 280.27 is totally without merit. Moreover, since the banning memo applied to only one day which had long passed, one must strain to fashion an appropriate remedy regarding Wong's access in the future. In any event, presumably the Charging Party was free to argue for another remedy at the hearing and the arbitrator was free to consider the argument. Wong's grievance challenging the July 20, 1981 memo about 76The remedial authority of arbitrator is set forth at SPP section 280.27: Remedy. If the management action grieved is determined to be in violation of Staff Personnel Policy .or the Chancellor's . implementing procedure or if the corrective action or dismissal is determined not to be reasonable under the circumstances, the remedy shall not exceed restoring to the employee the pay, benefits, or rights lost as a result of the action, less any income earned from any other employment. 163
possession of lighting files was accepted by the University under the SPP section 280 grievance procedure. Aside from the substance of the memo, the reprisal aspect was also accepted as grievable. However, Toby again correctly refused to accept this grievance under SPP section 290 because of the section 280.2 prohibition against processing the same claim under both. procedures. Wong's related grievance challenging the July 21, 1981 memo about use of the Xerox machine was rejected as a SPP section 280 grievance because, once again, it was found that it did not constitute corrective action as that term is defined in section 280.2.a. Wong was advised that she could pursue this complaint under SPP section 290. Further, the July 21 memo was accepted under SPP section 280 for the sole purpose of determining whether it was issued as a reprisal for the exercise of section 280 and/or 290 rights. As with the banning memo grievance, the University asserted that the arbitrator did not have the authority to order the Xerox machine memo removed from Wong's personnel file. Although the validity of this position may be questioned, it was not totally unreasonable and, as stated, the Charging Party could always argue its position on remedy to the arbitrator. 2. Kelly's Grievances. Under SPP Sections 280 and 290, Kelly grieved the so-called "banning" memo of July 20, and the denial of on-call hours. As 164
a remedy, this grievance, as amended, sought a statement from management that Kelly had the same right of access as other employees. The remedy also sought the scheduling of future on-call hours, and back pay for hours unlawfully denied. The grievance was initially rejected by Toby because: (1) SPP section 290.3 prohibits a grievance from being heard under both. SPP section 280 and 290: ( 2) the "banning" memo was not 11 corrective action" under SPP section 280.2.a: (3) the right of access statement as a remedy was "tnappropriate," and, in any event, the hours Kelly was allegedly banned were non-work hours; and (4) under SPP section 280.27 the requested remedy (scheduling hours) is beyond the authority of the arbitrator, since under that section the arbitrator is limited to "restoring. the pay, benefits, or rights lost. 11 Apparently, it was the University's position that .the arbitrator had no authority to order the Museum to schedule hours for Kelly in the future. As with the arguments raised during Wong's grievances, the University's positions taken during the Kelly grievance are well-grounded in the SPP. To the extent that a legitimate dispute existed with respect to the remedy, Kelly was free to argue his position to the decision-maker. Toby's response was appealed to systemwide representatives, and a lengthy appeal process began. After much disagreement and months of written communications between the parties, the 165
grievance was accepted by the UniversitY,. The question thus arises as to whether an unlawful motive should be inferred from this long delay. While it is true that an unlawful motive may be inferred from the outright failure or refusal to process grievances, that is not what happened here. The University did not fail or refuse to process Kelly's grievance. It simply took positions different from those taken by Kelly. These differences req~ired Kelly to take the not unusual steps of appealing through established procedures to higher levels in the systemwide hierarchy. The grievance was eventually accepted. Another reason for the delay in getting the grievances accepted, in addition to the time-consuming appellate process, was the number and complexity of the grievances pending at the time. The delay was not, in my view, due to an unlawful motive or an attempt to retaliate against the grievants for protected conduct. 3. Johnson's Grievances. On September 2, 1981, Johnson filed a grievance alleging that: (1) he was laid off on July 1, 1981, in violation of SPP section 760; (2) after the layoff he was not called to work while less experienced employees were; and (3) these above-named actions were reprisals for supporting Kelly and Greyson in their conflicts with UAM management and for 166
participating in the grievance procedure.77 As a remedy, Johnson sought reinstatement to his former position. The Museum took the position, correctly, that Johnson received his layoff notice on May 26, 1981; since grievances must be filed within 30 days under SPP section 280.9, that part of the grievance that challenges the layoff decision was untimely .. Further, the grievance would have been untimely even if the 30-day period wa~ calculated beginning on July 1, 1981, the day the layoff became effective. The Museum informed Johnson that, to the extent his grievance argued for recall rights to casual employment, there existed no right under the SPP to be recalled to a casual position. And, to the extent his grievance argued for recall to a career position, Johnson was informed that, due to the layoff, there were no vacant career positions in the Museum for which he was qualified.78 77The August 25, 1981, meeting with management where Johnson was represented by CSEA is viewed as an informal stage of the grievance procedure. 78rn support of this position, the Museum cited SPP sections 760.1 and 760.14. Section 760.1 is set forth at footnote 74, supra. Section 760.14 states: Right to Recall to Layoff Department. A regular status employee who is separated or whose time is reduced because of indefinite layoff shall be recalled in order of seniority into any active and vacant career position for which the employee is qualified 167
Next, regarding denial of on-call hours, the University took the position that the denial did not violate SPP section 760.5. There seems to be an arguable position on the merits of the grievance, but I am unable to find any authority in the SPP for the University's assertion that the alleged violation is not grievable under section 280. Nor does this part of the grievance appear to be time-barred under SPP section 280.9, assuming, as the Charging Party . argued, Johnson didn't learn of the violation (i.e., that less experienced workers were being called in) until August 12, 1981. However, in view of the University's overall record with respect to processing the large number of grievances in this case, along with its underlying reason for not calling Johnson to work in July and August 1981, I decline to infer an unlawful motive from the fact that it may have taken unfounded positions on these isolated issues. Lastly, the University informed Johnson that it would accept that part of the grievance which alleged reprisals for participating in the informal steps of the grievance procedure. However, the Museum stated that the appropriate when the position is in the same class and department and at the.same or lesser percentage of time as the position held by the employee at the time of layoff. Right to recall is not extended to an employee who has not attained regular status. 168
remedy was not, as Johnson sought, reinstatement to his former position. Rather, the University asserted that the appropriate remedy, in the event he prevailed, was to make Johnson whole for those on-call jobs he lost since the August 25, 1981, meeting as a result of reprisals. Johnson filed a second grievance on October 2, 1981. He complained. that he had recently discovered a series of negative letters in his personnel file, and under the SPP, they should have been removed long ago.79 The Charging Party here asserts that the University re fused to process this grievance. The reason the grievance was not processed was that, after requesting and apparently securing more specificity with respect to the 11 letters, the University removed them from Johnson's file. Based on the foregoing, I am unable to infer an unlawful motive from th.e manner in which the University responded to the grievances filed by Wong, Kelly or Johnson. Although there were many issues raised by these hotly contested grievances, in almost all instances the University's responses were at least arguable. In many other instances, the University's positions were clearly correct. There were only a few examples, as noted 79According to the grievance, there were eleven letters in Johnson's personnel file. Their dates ranged from November 5, 1975 to September 23, 1976. Obviously, they had nothing to do with the instant case. 169
above, where the University took questionable positions. Given the totality of the University's responses, it would be patently unreasonable to infer an unlawful motive because on a few occasions its position may have been erroneous. While the grievants and CSEA may have preferred that the University take a more conciliatory approach to these grievances, the fact that it did not. simply does not translate to unlawful motive. This reasoning applies as well to that part of the Charging Party's case which claims the University's conduct during the grievances constituted a form of discrimination. The Charging Party produced no evidence about how the University processed grievances filed by employees who had not engaged in any form of protected activity. In the absence of such evidence, there is absolutely no basis upon which a discrimination finding can be made. CONCLUSION It has been found that the University denied Adrienne Wong the right to a CSEA representative during the desk audit conducted in conjunction with her reclassification appeal, a significant employment-related matter. This conduct interfered with Wong's right to be represented by an employee organization of her choice. It also violated CSEA's right to represent one of its members in an employment-related matter. All other aspects of this unfair practice charge are hereby dismissed. 170
REMEDY Section 3563.3 gives PERB the following remedial powers: The board shall have the power to issue a decision and order directing an offending party to cease and desist from the unfair practice and to take such affirmative action, including, but not limited to, the reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, ·as will effectuate the policies of this chapter. It has been found that UAM unlawfully denied Wong the right to be represented by an employee organization during a desk audit connected to a reclassification attempt, clearly an employment-related matter. This conduct also unlawfully interfered with the employee organization's right to represent its members. It is therefore appropriate to order the UAM to cease and desist from this conduct. It also is appropriate that the University be required to post a notice incorporating the terms of the order. The notice should be subscribed by an authorized agent of the'University indicating that it will comply with the terms thereof. The notice shall not be reduced in size. Posting such a notice will provide employees with notice that the University has acted in an unlawful manner and is being required to cease and desist from this activity. It effectuates the P,Urposes of the HEERA that employees be informed of the resolution of the controversy and will announce the University's readiness to comply with the ordered remedy. See Placerville Union School 171
District (9/18/78) PERB Decision No. 69; Pandol and Sons v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 580, 587; NLRB v. Express Publishing Co. (1941) 312 U.S. 426 [8 LRRM 415]. PROPOSED ORDER Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the entire record in the case, and pursuant to section 3563.3, it- is hereby ordered that the University and its representatives shall: 1. CEASE AND DESIST FROM: (a) Interfering with employee rights to be represented in employment-related matters by an employee organization; (b) Interfering with the right of an employee organization to represent its members on employment-related' matters. 2. TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE ACT: (a) Within five (5) workdays after this decision becomes final, prepare and post copies of the NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES attached as an appendix hereto, for at least thirty (30) workdays in conspicuous places at the locations where notices to UAM employees are customarily posted._ It must not be reduced in size and reasonable steps should be taken to see that it is not defaced, altered or covered by any material. 172
(b) Within twenty (20) workdays from service of the final decision herein, give written notification to the San Francisco Regional Director of the Public Employment Relations Board of the actions taken to comply with this order. Continue to report in writing to the regional director thereafter as directed. All reports to the regional director shall be cpncurrently served on the Charging Party herein. Pursuant to California Administrative Code, title 8, part III, section 32305, this Proposed Decision and Order shall become final on May 1, 1984, unless a party files a timely statement of except ions. In accordance with the rules, the statement of exceptions should identify by page citation or exhibit number the portions of the record relied upon for such exceptions. See California Administrative Code title 8, part III, section 32300. Such statement of exceptions and supporting brief must be actually received by the Public Employment Relations Board at its headquarters office in Sacramento before the close of business (5:00 p.m.) on May l, 1984, or sent by telegraph or certified United States mail, postmarked not later than the last day for filing in order to be timely filed. See California Administrative Code, title 8, part III, section 32135. Any statement of exceptions and supporting brief must be served concurrently with its filing upon each party to this proceeding. Proof of service shall be 173
filed with the Board itself. See California Administrative Code, title 8, part III, sections 32300 and 32305. Dated: April 11, 1984 174 FRED D'ORAZI Administrative Law Judge FRED D'ORAZI Administrative Law Judge
APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the State of California 0 After a hearing in Unfair Practice Case No. SF-CE-84-H, California State Employees Association v. Regents of the Un1vers1ty of Cal1forn1a, in which all parties had the right to part1c1pate, 1t has been found that the University violated Government Code sections 357l(a) and (b) . .As a result of this conduct we have been ordered to post this Notice, and will abide by the following. We will: 1. CEASE AND DESIST FROM: (a) Interfering with employee rights to be represented in employment-related matters by an employee organization; (b) Interfering with the right of an employee organization to represent its members on employment-related matters. Dated: REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA By Authorized Agent THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE. IT MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR AT LEAST THIRTY (30) WORKDAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE REDUCED IN SIZE, DEFACED, ALTERED OR COVERED BY ANY MATERIAL.
1 printed pages contain little extracted OCR body text; searchable legal-body completeness has not been established for those pages.
OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
, DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
CALIFORNIA STATE EMPLOYEES!
ASSOCTATION,
Charging Party, Case No. SF-CE-84-H
Ve. PERB Decision No. 449-8
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA,
December 4, 1984
Respondent.
See er ee ee et ee ee ee ee”
Appearances: Michael R. Bogen and Nadia Tesluk for the
California State Employees' Association; Milton H. Gordon,
Attorney for Regents of the University of California.
Before Jaeger, Morgenstern and Burt, Members.
DECISION AND ORDER
JAEGER, Member: The California State Employees'
Association (CSEA) excepts to the dismissal of certain portions
of its unfair practice charge against the Regents of the
University of California following a formal hearing conducted
by an administrative law judge for the Public Employment
Relations Board.
The Board has reviewed the entire record, including the
proposed decision attached hereto, and CSEA's exceptions and,
finding no prejudicial error in the administrative law judge's
findings of fact or conclusion of law, adopts the proposed
decision as its own and ORDERS that said portions of the charge
are DISMISSED.
Members Morgenstern and Burt joined in this decision.
STATE
OF
CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC
EMPLOY.MENT
RELATIONS
BOARD
aaa
CALIFORNIA
STATE
EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION,
Charging
Party,
v.
REGENTS
OF THE
UNIVERSITY
OF
CALIFORNIA;
Respondent.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
__________________
)
Unfair
Practice
Case
No.
SF-CE-84-H
PROPOSED
DECISION
(
4/11/84)
Appearances: Michael
Bogan and
Nadia
Tesluk,
representatives
for
California State
Employees
Association;
Milton
Gordon,
attorney,
for
Regents
of the University of California.
Before:
Fred
D'Orazio, Administrative
Law
Judge.
PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
The
California State
Employees
Association (hereafter
CSEA
or
Charging
Party)
filed this
unfair practice
charge
against
the
Regents of the
University of California (hereafter
University or
Respondent)
on
September
18,
1981.
The
charge
alleged that
the
University Art
Museum
(hereafter
Museum
or
UAM)
systematically discriminated
and
retaliated against four
employees because of
their protected
activities
-in
violation
of
section
357l(a) of the
Higher Education
Employer-Employee
Relations
Act
(hereafter
HEERA
or
Act).l
lThe
HEERA
is codified at
Government Code
section 3560,
During
a
long
procedural
history,
the
charge
was
dismissed
once
and amended
several
times.
The
charge
was
also
amended
at
the
outset
of
the
formal
hearing
as
well
as
during
the hearing
itself.
An
informal conference
was
held
on November 5
and
6,
1981,
but the case
was
not
settled.
The
University
filed
its
answer
on
November
25,
1981.
The
answer
generally
denied the charges
and
asserted affirmative
defenses
which
will
be
dealt
with
below.
A
pre-hearing
conference
was
conducted
by
the undersigned
on
March
15,
1982,
and
the
formal
hearing
commenced on
March
22, 1982. Fourteen
days
of hearing
were
conducted
between
March
22
and
June
1,
1982. After several extension,
the briefing
schedule
was
completed
on
February
1,
1983 and
the
case
was
submitted.
PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
FACTS
I.
Background.
Prior to
July
1,
1981,
the University Art
Museum was
divided into
two
departments
where
the events in question here
took place.
The shop department performed
duties
such as
constructing
and
tearing
down
walls for
exhibits, building
et
seq. All statutory references hereafter are to theGovernment Code
unless otherwise noted.
2
crates
to
hold
art
work,
etc.
It
was
supervised
by
Andre
Johnson,
who
reported
directly
to
Ron
Egherman,
assistant
director
for
administration.
Egherman
reported
to
Jim
Elliott,
director
of
the
Museum.
Two
full-time
career
employees
worked
under Johnson.
They were
John
O'Neil
and
Laurie Clausen.
The
preparation
department performed
duties associated
with
installing· art
exhibits.
These
included assignments such as
lighting,
matting, video,
etc.
Barney
Bailey
was
the
chief
preparator
and
supervisor
of
the
preparation
department.
He
reported
directly
to
David Ross,
the
assistant director
and
chief curator.
Ross
reported to
Elliott.
There
were two
full-time
career preparators in
the department.
They
were
Adrienne
Wong
and
Bobbie
Shalk.
In general,
employees
in
the
shop department
were
paid
a
little
more
than
employees
in
the
preparation
department.
Nina
Hubbs, a
designer, also
worked
in
the
Mus~um. She was
a
liaison
between
the
curatorial
staff
and
the
shop
and
preparation
departments.
Both
departments
relied
heavily
on what
are
referred to
as
"on,-call" workers.
As
the
name
suggests, these are people
who
are called to
work on
short notice.
They may work
for as
little
as
a
half
day
or as long as several
days
at
a
stretch,
depending on
the needs of the
Museum. While they are paid the
same
as
full-time
employees,
on-call
workers do
not receive
other benefits.
3
The
need
for
on-call
workers
is
determined
by
the
peak-and-valley nature of
the
work
in
the
Museum.
For example,
several
employees
may
be
necessary to prepare
and
install
a
large exhibit,
but
they
may
not
be
needed
while
the
exhibit
is
shown. They
may
again
be
needed
when
it
is
time
to
take
down
the
exhibit,
but
they
may
not
be
needed
during the
lull
that
occurs
between
exhibits.
Thus,
the
need
for
on-call
workers
is
determined
largely
by
the
exhibit
schedule.
Use
of
on-call
workers
is
a
relatively
new
concept
at
the
UAM,
although
it
is
a common
practice at
museums
in general.
Egherman
instituted
the
practice
in
approximately
1978.
As a
result
of
layoffs
and
other
cutbacks
on
July
1,
1981,
there
was a
reorganization in the
UAM.
The
shop
department
was
eliminated
and
Johnson, Clausen
and
O'Neil
were
laid off.
The
chief
preparator position
was
eliminated
and a new
posit~on,
head of
installation
and
design,
created.
Hubbs
filled
that
position,
and
Bailey
was demoted
to
a
full-time preparator
position.
He
no
longer
was
considered
a
supervisor.
He
served
as
a
lead person
instead.
Shalk
was
offered
a
half-time
preparator position in place of her
full-time career
slot,
but
chose
to resign for personal reasons.
Wong was
cut
back
to
a
half-time preparator.
The Museum
continued to
use
on-call
workers.
Egherman,
the assistant director
of administration,
and
Elliott,
the director of the
UAM,
retained their positions.
4
The
assistant
director
and
chief curator position
was
eliminated
as
a
result
of the
reorganization
and
Ross
was
laid
off.
II.
Adrienne
Wong.
Adrienne
Wong
began working
in
the
Museum
as
a
work-study
student in
1975.
A~ter she
graduated
in
March
of
1976,
she
worked
as
a
senior
museum
preparator
on an
on-call
basis
until
January
1979,
when
she
became a
full-time preparator.
From
April
1979
to
November
1979,
Wong
was
granted
a
leave
of
absence
to
go
to
Japan
where
Daniel Kelly, previously
an
on-call
preparator in
the
UAM,
was an
artist-in-residence.
Kelly
and
Wong
had a
personal
relationship.
Wong
actually
wanted
to quit
the
UAM
to
go
to Japan to
be
with
him,
but
Bailey,
her
immediate
supervisor,
persuaded her
to
take
a
leave
of
absence
instead. Bailey
felt
at that
time
that
Wong, who
possessed
more
experience than Shalk,
had
certain
abilities
which
made
her
valuable to
the
UAM
and he was
prepared
to
hold
her
position
open.
When Wong
left
for Japan,
she
and
Shalk
had
a good working
relationship.
A.
Wong's
Return
from
Japan
and
the Events of 1980.
While
Wong was
in Japan, Bailey
worked
extensively with
Bobbie Shalk,
at that
time the only other full-time preparator
on
the
staff.
At some
point after
her
return,
Wong
formed
the
opinion that there
had developed
a
redistribution
of
responsibilities in the preparation department.
It
appears
5
that Wong was displeased that, in her absence, Bailey had come
to rely on Shalk to perform key duties in the department. In a
sense, Wong felt Shalk had replaced her as the lead
preparator. Shalk testified that Wong became moody and
unpredictable after her return from Japan. And Bailey
testified that he i'ncreasingly found himself in the position of
trying to mediate a rivalry that was rapidly developing between
Wong and Shalk. In essence, it was his view that Wong felt
betrayed.
On May 29, 1980, Wong asked Bailey for a clarification of
her role within the department and an accurate description of
her job duties. Wong's contention was that the job description
cards were about 10 years old and no longer accurately
reflected the duties of employees in that position.
Wong testified that she talked to other preparators, in
both full-time and casual on-call status, about he~ concerns in
this area. However, Wong's chief concern was personal in
nature. Of primary concern was the fact that certain lighting
duties had been taken away from her, sometimes at the last
minute, and given to Shalk. This was particularly upsetting to
Wong, who considered herself to be an expert in lighting.
Additionally, at about this time, Wong spoke to Bailey and
voiced her opinion that, based on the work she was performing,
she should be reclassified to a higher position. This request
was based in large part on the lighting duties, which she
6
considered to be higher level work. As will be more fully
explained below, Bailey ultimately rejected Wong's request for
reclassification.
On May 30 Bailey gave Wong a good evaluation and
recorrnnended her for a 7 1/2 percent merit increase. He said
that, while there were some problems with Wong's work, she was
basically doing a good job. Also, compared to other museums in
the Bay Area, preparators at UAM were underpaid and B~iley
thought it unfair to give an underpaid employee, who was
basically doing a good job, a bad evaluation with little or no
raise. Bailey's evaluation was further affected in part by the
fact that Wong had just returned from Japan .and was undergoing
some personal difficulty, stemming from, among other things, a
death in the family. On the other hand, Bailey testified that
there were some problems with Wong, but he felt they were not
typical of her work.
On June 26 and 27, 1980, Wong spoke with Joe Toby, an
analyst in the University's personnel department, about two
issues which were of primary concern to employees in the
department. First, she raised with Toby the so-called wage-lag
problem, which essentially means that preparators in the UAM
were paid less than employees in comparable positions in other
Bay Area museums. Second, she raised with Toby the fact that
on-call preparators did not receive fringe benefits. Wong said
she discussed the meeting with other employees in the UAM and
7
with Bailey, who also stood to gain if the wage-lag issue was
pursued successfully. According to Wong, Toby and Bailey, as
well as the employees, were receptive to her inquiries,
especially the pay inequity situation, as pay for preparators
was lagging about 15 percent behind the pay for comparable
positions in other Bay Area museums.
During· the summer and fall of 1980, and into 1981, she
continued to meet with Toby and with representatives of the
UAM.2 During these meetings the issues relating to
clarification of responsibilities, job description cards, wage
inequities, and layoffs were discussed. Wong testified that
employees in the department were aware that these discussions
were ongoing. However, except for the wage-lag matter, it
seems that i.f other employees knew of these discussions, their
awareness was in the vaguest sense, and, at least for issues
other than the wage-lag, the record does not estabiish that
Wong acted as an appointed representative of other workers.
For example, at the hearing Wong testified at great length that
2For example, on July 16, 1980, Wong met with Toby and
David Ross to discuss a proposed job description card that she
prepared. On July 11, 1980, Wong, Shalk and Bailey met and
discussed wage inequities. On July 25, 1980, Wong and Kelly
met with Toby and discussed job descriptions and wage
inequities. In addition, in July 1980, Wong submitted, among
other things, her version of a correct job description card to
Egherman. The card was submitted in conjunction with her
contention that she should be reclassified.
8
a
burning
issue in
the
department
concerned
the lack of
clarification
of
duties
and
responsibilities
of workers.
In
contrast,
Shalk,
Wong's
co-worker
and
only
other career
preparator,
testified
convincingly
that,
aside
from
isolated
incidents,
she
was
not
aware
that
a
problem
existed
with
clarification
of
duties. Shalk's
testimony
was
corroborated
by
Mary
Kate
Murphy, an
on-call preparator.
More9ver,
Toby's
version of these
meetings
is
a
little
different.
Although
he
concedes
that
the
wage
lag
problem
was
discussed,
he
said
the
focus
of
the meetings during
this
period
was on Wong,
as
an
individual.
She wanted
to
be
reclassified
to
the scene
technician position;
she
wanted
to
do some
personal
training at
the
Oakland
Art
Museum; and
she complained
about
her
November
evaluation,
to
be
described
below. With
respect
to
Bq~ley,
Wong
complained
to
Toby
that
he· was
erratic
and
didn't
give people
enough
information to
do
th~ir jobs.
She
said Bailey
favored
certain
people
and
she
was
not
one
of
them.
By
this
time, Bailey
had
already talked to
Toby
about the
problems
he was
having with
Wong,
so
Toby was
well
aware
of
both sides of the
story.
These
discussions continued
into
1981
and
it
appears
that
Toby
tried to
mediate the
situation.
He
was
unsuccessful
and
at
some
point
he began
to advise Bailey
as
to
what
his options
were as a
supervisor with respect to
dealing with
Wong.
9
In September of 1980 Wong formally proposed to Bailey that
she be granted a six-month employee development program which
included two projects: (l} a lighting internship at the Oakland
Museum, and (2) a video course to assist in performing video
work. The lighting internship program involved working at the
Oakland Art Museum revamping the lighting system and
researching low voltage. Bailey rejected the proposal because
the UAM had just researched low voltage and purchased $3,000
worth of low voltage fixtures. Thus, he saw no benefit to the
UAM from this part of the proposal. Also, he said Wong wanted
to take a private tutorial in video. Bailey thought it was a
better idea for both Wong and Shalk to take a class rather than
a private tutorial.3 Wong then presented the proposal to
Ross and Egherman. It was similarly rejected.
By October 1980 the relationship between Wong and Bailey
was rapidly deteriorating. According to Wong's te~timony, she
had been given the lead role in lighting for the Marioni
3An example of the problems Bailey had working with Wong
at this time is evidenced by the situation surrounding drafting
the employee development proposal. Bailey asked Wong to submit
a written proposal. Three weeks went by but no proposal was
forthcoming. On a Friday Wong asked Bailey if she could have
Monday off to draft the proposal. Bailey refused because they
were in the midst of preparing for an exhibit and Wong was
needed at work. Also, Bailey felt three weeks was long
enough. On Monday morning Wong called the Museum to say she
would not be reporting to work. She said she was tired from
staying up all night to draft her proposal.
10
Exhibit and Shalk had been given the lead role in video. Wong
said Bailey, without apparent justification, claimed her work
was unacceptable and suggested terminating her if she didn't
improve. For several weeks therafter, according to Wong, he
assigned her menial cleanup chores. This prompted Wong to have
a meeting with Ross, where she said she was not being treated
equally and she would file a discrimination suit if it didn't
stop.
In November 1980 Bailey, who stood to benefit from any
readjustment which came out of pursuing the wage-lag issue,
became dissatisfied at the slow pace with which ~he matter was
moving. He decided to get involved.4 He met with Ross,
Egherman and Elliott, and took the lead role in putting
together a package to argue for increased wages for
preparators. He was assisted by Wong and Shalk, and together
they eventually developed a proposal. This effort.took a
considerable period of time because the issue had systemwide
ramifications and the material needed to be gathered from other
campuses. Eventually Bailey unsuccessfully presented the
4In April of 1980 Bailey had encouraged Wong and Shalk to
seek union assistance with the wage-lag problem.· He apparently
felt union representation would be more effective due to any
expertise the Union might bring to the issue. He took steps to
contact a union, he met with AFSCME representatives, and he
reported back to_Wong and Shalk. Despite these efforts by
Bailey, Wong claims that Bailey, in an attempt to discourage
union participation, told her and Shalk that AFSCME's dues were
$100 per month.
. 11
proposal for increased wages to a systemwide board established
to consider such matters. Wong and Shalk accompanied him and
assisted him in the presentation.5
A few days later, on November 3, 1980, Wong received what
she described as an unfair performance evaluation. She
complained to Ross that she objected to the evaluation and
intended to file a grievance.
The evaluation rated Wong as "unsatisfactory" in two areas:
(1) Installation and (2) Collection Study/Storage. She was
rated as "improvement needed" in four categories: (1) Packing/
Shipping/Receiving, (2) Collection/Delivery of works in the
Local Area, (3) Related Services, and (4) Other. In the
"Comments" section of the evaluation, Bailey wrote that Wong
refused to carry out his requests and accept responsibility
when an assignment was delegated to her. He said that her lack
of ability to communicate with others, especially quring a task
which involved two or more employees, had had a negative impact
on her work. In addition, Bailey wrote that her,
. bad temper has had deteriorating
consequences to the morale of the
preparation staff.
He further accused her of causing "unnecessary stress" in the
unit because of her "defiance."
5The so-called wage-lag board is made up of appointees
who hear proposals and arguments as to wage inequities. It is
constituted on a systemwide basis and meets periodically.
12
In support of his comments, Bailey attached to the
evaluation a September 16 memo from Bailey to Ross regarding
Wong's refusal to participate in a meeting during the Hartley
Exhibit, and a July 15 memo from Bailey to Wong about her
refusing to attend another meeting during another exhibit.
Also attached to the evaluation was a November 3 memo about
Wong taking too long to perform an assignment. This latter
memo incorporates by reference an October 22 memo wherein
Bailey questioned Wong about disappearing from the work
location.
In the July 15 memo, Bailey wrote that Wong's "direct
defiance" in refusing to attend a meeting resulted in her being
unprepared for circumstances that followed. He informed Wong
that, as the supervisor, he would determine job
responsibilities. In her rebut~al statement, submitted after a
one-month stress-related absence, Wong conceded th 9t Bailey
requested the meeting, but she,
•.. felt the priority of [her] time was
needed for the MFA Lighting Installation.
Wong wrote that she requested a meeting with Ross to determine
priorities. At the hearing, Wong testified that she had other
duties to attend to that day, and Ross once told her not to
spend her efforts on time-wasting projects. Shalk's testimony
confirmed Bailey's to the extent that Wong did not attend the
meeting.
13
In the
September
16
memo
to
Ross,
issued during
the Hartley
Exhibit,
Bailey
again
complained
that
Wong
refused
to attend
a
staff
meeting,
despite
the
fact that
he
explained the
meeting
was
important
and
it
had
been
delayed
several
times
for
her
sake.
He
further
wrote
that,
...
as
a
supervisor
I
refuse to
accept
this
form
of
protest.
He
told
Ross
that
he
intended
to,
...
press the issue to the
fullest
the
next time
[he
is]
put
in
this
position.
In
rebuttal,
Wong
asserted
that
she
did not
refuse to
participate
in
the meeting.
She
explained
that
she
was
consistently
pressed for
answers
to
lighting
problems which
she
did
not have.
In
an
attempt to
avoid
dealing
with
Bailey
on
the matter,
she claimed
it
needed
to
be
resolved
by
the
chief
curator.
Bailey's
November 3
memo
to
Wong
referenced
th~
October
22
memo
which
stated that
she
disappeared
from work
without
telling
him.
He
apparently
had asked her
to
let
him know
before leaving in the future
so
he
could avoid
questioning
her
judgment.
He
docked
her 2.5 hours for
her absence.
The
November 3
memo
cites
another
incident
where her
disappearance
at
the
last
minute "taxed the
exhibition."
In her
rebuttal
Wong
claims she did not
walk
out of one
of
the exhibits
(Joan
Jonas).
With
respect to the other
(Avedon),
she asserted that
she walked
out because she was
"emotionally
14
upset" after an argument with Bailey. Both Bailey and Shalk
confirmed that Wong walked out of the Avedon Exhibit. And
Bailey convincingly testified she told him "fuck you" before
leaving.
After Bailey returned from his vacation in January 1981,
they discussed the fact that there were problems in the
department~ and they agreed to attempt to work them out more
amicably in the future. Wong said she asked Bailey if he
wanted to discuss the evaluation, and he refused, saying he
intended to withdraw it.6
Bailey denied telling Wong he would withdraw the
evaluation. He said that, because of the problems in the
department, especially his relationship with Wong, he put a
tremendous amount of time and energy into the evaluation and
had deep concerns about the impact it would have on Wong.
Specifically, he was concerned about the deteriorating
relationships in the department and felt a negative evaluation
would make things worse. Meetings to mediate the situation had
been unsuccessful. Further, he was concerned because he
thought the evaluation might affect Wong's heart condition.
After returning from an absence due to stress, Wong wore a
heart monitor. And, according to Bailey, he received a letter
6As will more fully be discussed below, the evaluation
appeared in Wong's personnel file in June 1981.
15
from
Wong's
psychologist
saying
that
Wong
should
not
be
working
in
the
Museum
until
she
felt
better.
This
too
gave
him
reason
for
concern,
as
he
felt
the
evaluation
would
cause her
more
stress.
Bailey discussed
all
of
this
with
Toby
before
proceeding to
issue
the
evaluation. In
sum,
Bailey
testified
that,
given
all
that
he
went
through
in drafting
the
evaluation~
it
would have been
absurd
for
him
to
simply
agree
to
then
withdraw
it
and
insert
nothing
in
its
place.
I
credit
Bailey
on
this
point
and
find
that
he
never
agreed
to
withdraw
the
evaluation.
As more
fully
explained
below
in
the
credibility
section,
Wong
was
not
a
particularly
believable
witness,
while
Bailey
was more
impressive
on
the
stand.
Furthermore,
it
makes no
sense
that
Bailey
would
draft
the
detailed
evaluation,
knowing
fully that
Wong
would
certainly
disagree
with
it,
only to
withdraw
it
at
the
slightest
protest.
This
is
especially true
given the unplea
9
ant
atmosphere
in
the department
at
the
time;
that
is,
the
relationship
between
Wong
and
Bailey
had
deteriorated greatly
and
there
was
little
hope
that
Wong would
quietly
accept the
evaluation
or
that things
would
get
better.
Bailey,
who was
concerned about the
situation,
was
well
aware
of
this
and,
further,
had
to
be aware
of the
fact that
the. hard
feelings
would not evaporate simply because
he
agreed to
withdraw
the
evaluation.
I
·agree that
it
would have been absurd for
him
to
draft
such an
evaluation
and
then almost immediately withdraw
16
it
at
the
slightest protest,
inserting
nothing
in
its
place.
Indeed,
I
find
that
he
did not
do
so.
Meanwhile,
by
the
end
of
1980
the
relationship
between
Wong
and
Shalk
had
worsened.
Shalk
testified
that
Wong
became
secretive
about
lighting
information.
This
presented
a
problem, because
Wong
was
supposed
to
be
serving
as the
lead
person
on
lighting
and,
in
a
loose sense,
training
Shalk.
By
March
1981,
Shalk wrote
a
letter
about
Wong
to
Bailey in
which
she
said
she
had
to
let
off
some
steam.
In the
letter,
she
told
Bailey
she
was
tired
of
trying
to
compromise
with
Wong
with
no
response,
and
she complained
of
Wong's
"sullen
and
defiant"
moods.
In
short,
she wrote
that
she
was
"pissed
off."7
B. The
Events of
1981
1.
The
Layoffs
In January of
1981
Museum management
found
its~lf
in the
midst of
a
severe
financial
crisis.
The Museum had
overspent
its
budget and,
for
the
first
time
in
over 40
years, the
Berkeley
campus
faced
a.
deficit
of about
$2
million. This
meant
that there
would be
less
money from
student fees
and
70thers
who
worked
with
Wong
described her in the
same
way. For example,
Mary Kate Murphy, a
preparator in the
Museum,
described
Wong
as
moody, downcast and glum.
Also, she
corroborated Shalk's testimony
that
Shalk
and Wong
did not get
along well.
17
tuition channeled to the Museum. Also, fund raising efforts
had not gotten off to a quick start and a cash-flow problem
existed.
Organizationally, the Vice Chancellor's office has
budgetary control over the UAM. A meeting of management
officials from the Museum and the Vice Chancellor's office was
held in January to discuss the crisis. As of that date, the
expected deficit was approximately $197,000. In general terms,
what emerged from the meeting was a request that the Museum cut
its budget by approximately $300,000 to $400,000 for 1981-82.
Approximately 70 to 80 percent of this would be accomplished by
permanent staff reductions.
On March 18, 1981, Elliott responded to the Vice
Chancellor's office in a lengthy memo. In essence, the memo
suggested that a $300,000 cut was too severe, and any cuts that
were made needed to be done in stages. Neverthele 9 s, Elliott
sought to comply. He set forth a proposal which broke the
budget into two components, the "core" component and the
"program" component. The core component was that part which
would rely on general funding. Even if no additional funds
were raised by other means, the Museum would still be able to
function on the core component. The program component was that
part which would fluctuate depending on the amount of income
available from outside sources. Naturally, if the Museum
received more program money it would be richer, but at worst it
18
could function on the core component. Further, in his memo,
Elliott stressed his concern for staff members who might have
to be laid off and with the morale of those who remained.
Communications continued between representatives from the
Museum, Elliott and Egherman, and representatives of the Vice
Chancellor's office. There were several meetings and lengthy
memoranda exchanged on the subject. Several options emerged
and were considered. It appears that these exchanges
eventually took on the flavor of negotiations, with both sides
setting forth their positions and various options. Museum
representatives argued for the highest possible budget. In
addition, part of this process included consideration of the
impact fund raisers would have on the budget.
This process continued for the first six months of 1981,
and a great deal of uncertainty existed during this period.8
Egherman said that paring down costs was a difficult job. To
make up $300,000, he said he couldn't just cut a few dollars
here and a few dollars there, but rather the whole structure
and character of the Museum had to be changed. Thus, cuts were
made in administration, curatorial, and in the Pacific Film
8Various options were discussed during this ~eriod. For
example, one plan called for 1.5 full-time positions in the
Museum. Another called for two positions, and yet another
called for three positions. However, it appears that during
this process no one really knew with certainty how much money
there would be or how many positions would finally be allotted
to the staff.
19
Archives.
A
new
concept
in
the
allocation
of
space
was
developed.
For example,
gallery
B,
which
was
highly
labor-intensive
because
it
was
designed
for
exhibitions,
would
no
longer
be
used.
Instead,
the
permanent
collection
was
put
in gallery
B, and
changing
exhibitions in
other
galleries
which
had lower
ceilings
·and
were
easier
to
light
and
to
install.
Also,
admission
would be
charged
and
the
number
of
exhibits
reduced.
The
final
budget
emerged on
June 3.
It
was
$1.15
million.
As
stated, this
figure
was
arrived
at
after
much
negotiation
between the
Museum
representatives,
Egherman and
Elliott,
and
representatives
of the Chancellor's
office.
Employees were
kept
informed
at
various steps
along the
way. They knew
the
$1.15 million
had
been
agreed
to,
but they
didn't
know how
the
money would be
allotted.
Egherman
testified
that
he
committed
to
the Viqe
Chancellor's office
during the
negotiations that
as
much money
as
possible
would be
put
into
programs because
that is
what
the
fund
raisers
wanted.
One
issue
which
kept
surfacing during the
budget process
was
the concerns of
fund
raisers,
donors,
and
those
who gave endowments
to the
Museum. They wanted
assurances that
the University
was committed
to
funding the
Museum
so
that their contributions
would go towards a
quality
operation.
The
final
budget, including the layoffs,
was announced on
20
June 24, 1981. The equivalent of 9.38 full-time positions were
eliminated. However, this affected 14 or 15 employees because
some were part-time. The Museum was reorganized. The shop
department was eliminated and all of its career employees--
Johnson, O'Neill and Clausen--were laid off. A new department
was set up to do the work the shop and preparation departments
did in the·past. Hubbs was named head of that department. Her
position in design was not filled.
Additionally, the budget provided for the equivalent of two
other full-time positions. Bailey retained one full-time
position, but he was demoted from chief preparator to a
non-supervisory lead person slot. Hubbs testified that she
offered Bailey the full-time position because of his experience
and the fact that she felt a little uneasy about taking over
the supervision of the combined preparation and shop
departments. Wong was reduced from full-time prep~rator to a
.50 preparator. Shalk had been offered the .50 position based
on her seniority over Wong, but she declined and resigned.
The remaining .50 position was allotted to on-call
workers. Hubbs reasoned that this would give her the
flexibility needed to employ on-call workers to handle the
peaks and valleys of the exhibition season. Also available for
this purpose was some on-call money from the program budget.
David Ross, the chief curator was laid off. Every
department except security was hit by the layoff.
21
Although
it
was
the
chancellor's office that
eventually
imposed
the
final
budget,
Hubbs
had
the primary
authority to
decide
how
to
allocate
the
two
full-time positions.
For
example,
rather
than
have
l.~
career
positions,
she could
have
decided to
use
all
the
money
for the
two
positions
for only
on-call
employees,
or she could
have
devised
some
other
arrangement.· After consulting
with
Toby, Ross and
Egherman,
she
settled
on
1.50
caree~
positions
and
.50
on-call.
Bailey
played
no
role
in
this
decision
or
in
the
layoffs.
In
fact,
he
didn't
even
know
they
were coming.
The
layoffs
were
effective
July 1,
1981.
Meanwhile,
in
May
1981
Jim
Elliott,
director
of the
UAM,
called
a
meeting
of
all
staff
to
announce
that
there
would
be
layoffs.
Elliott
explained
that
the
layoffs
were
necessary
due
to cutbacks in
funding
from
the Berkeley
campus.
Wong
testified
that
she
had
no
reason to question
the
vali9ity of
Elliott's
explanation.
Immediately
after
Elliott's
May
13
announcement,
but before
the
cuts
were implemented,
Wong
and
Kelly undertook
a
campaign
to secure
employment
for themselves in the face of
this
muse~rn-wide
layoff.
Wong
set
up a
meeting with
Elliott
and
told
him
of the role
she had
filled
in the department
and
the
functions
she had
performed.
She
raised
with
him
the idea
that
she and Kelly continue to receive
work.
Wong
first
proposed,
in essence, that
she receive
a
.50
preparator's slot
and .50
22
on-call
time.
Alternatively,
she proposed
that
Kelly
be
given
the .50
on-call
time
if
she
couldn't
have
it.
In
making
this
proposal,
Wong
was
aware
of
the
fact that
if
she
and
Kelly
received
this
work,
it
would be
to
the
exclusion of
all
other
employees
who
were
also
facing
a
layoff.
Elliott
directed
Wong
to
Ross
who,
in
turn, directed
her
to
Nina Hubbs,
the
new
head
of
installation
and
design.9
Wong,
in
fact,
had
several discussions
with
Hubbs
about
future
employment.
It
had been announced
that
there
was a
likelihood
that
1.5
positions
would be
available,
and
once
again the
thrust
of
Wong's comments
to
Hubbs was
to secure as
much
of
this
work
as
possible
for
herself
and
for Daniel Kelly.
She
claims
that
Hubbs, on
June 3,
and
again
on
June 5,
offered
her
a
.50
position
and
told
her
that
Shalk,
who
actually
had more
seniority
than
Wong, would be
offered
the
other
.SO
position.
On
June 8, according to
Wong, Hubbs
offered
her
a
.SO
position
and a
.50
casual on-call position,
Shalk having decided
to
leave the
UAM
by
this
time.
Wong
further
testified that
Hubbs
said
Kelly could
have
the
.50
casual on-call position
if
Wong
didn't
want
it.
Hubbs'
version of these conversations
is
somewhat
different.
Hubbs
denied
making
the
offers.
She
said
she
told
Wong
9wong
also
went
to
Toby and
pursued the
possibility
of
securing
a
position for herself
and
for Kelly.
23
that
Shalk
had more
seniority
and
thus
was
entitled
to the
remaining
.50
slot.
But
if
Shalk
declined,
Wong
was
next
in
line
and
could
have
it.
According
to
Hubbs,
Wong
said
she
was
interested,
and
she
also raised the
fact that
Kelly
was
interested
in
a
.50
job or
other
work.
Hubbs
denied
that
she
offered
Wong
the
.50
position,
plus
.50
worth
of other
on-call
work.
This
would add
up
to
a
full-time
job
and
Hubbs
said
she
was
not in
a
position
to
offer that.
In the
end,
Wong
said
she
was
interested
in the
.50
position.10
I
credit
Hubbs'
testimony
on
this
point.
Hubbs
knew
Bailey
would
get
one
full-time
job.
There
was
only
one
other
.50
slot
available.
Hubbs
could not
have
offered
Wong a
.50
position
until
after
Shalk
declined the
same
position since
the
layoff
of
career
employees
is
based
on
seniority
and
Shalk
was
senior
to
Wong. More
importantly,
it
is
not
believable
that
Hubbs
would
offer either
Wong
or Kelly
a
.50
on-call
positi_on,
since
such an
offer
would
limit
the
number
of
employees
Hubbs
could
call
to
work
at
any one
time
and
thus reduce the
flexibility
needed
to handle the
fluctuating
workload
in the
Museum.
It
does not
seem
even remotely
possible that
Hubbs,
who
struck
me
as
a
conscientious
and
thoughtful
manager,
would have
tied
her
own
hands
in
this
regard. This
is especially true since
it
was
lOApparently, Bailey did not figure into these
discussions, although
Hubbs and
Bailey talked about
Bailey's
situation at other times.
24
Hubbs'
stated
philosophy
at
the
time
to preserve
this
flexibility
by
using the
remaining
.50
position
for
on-call
employees.
Committing
this
amount
of
on-call
work
to
any one
employee
would
have
completely
undermined
her
ability
to
cover
the
work
during
exhibitions.
2.
The
June
12
Letter
On
June
12,
1981,
Bailey
gave
Wong
the following
memo:
My
request for information
from
you,
details
on a
light test
was
denied. After
which you
suggested
I do
it
myself.
You
then denied
a
request
for the
name
of
the person
I
needed
to contact to obtain the information
I
needed
to
complete
the
project
myself.
When
I
asked
you
why
you were
so
defiant
youranswer
was you
didn't
like
the
way I
"handled" the attempt to
correct
our
wage
lag.
This
abstract
defiance
and
your
leaving for the
day
(returning
after
speaking
to
David Ross)
because
you
don't
"feel
well"
and
that
"you
don't
have
to takeanything
from me"
is
inexcusable.
This
is
by
far
not the
first
incident of
its
kind
or the
first
caution to
you
that
it
is
inexcusable.
Shortly
after
she
received
this
memo, on
approximately June 16,
Wong made
her
first
contact
with
CSEA, and a
meeting
was
held
on
June
29
to discuss the
memo, among
other things.11
llThe
original
memo
used
the
word
"warning" in the
last
sentence in place of the
word
"caution."
At some
point,probably before the meeting with
CSEA
representatives, the
word
"warning"
was changed
to "caution."
The change was made by
Bailey at
Toby's suggestion.
The
effect of the change was
to
make
it
clear that the
letter
did not
constitute corrective
action
and
thus could not be used to support
a
subsequent
disciplinary action.
25
There had been a situation in the Museum where light bulbs
were burning out too fast. These bulbs were sent to facilities
management to be checked. Since Bailey had not heard anything
from facilities management for about a month, he told Wong to
call and check it out. Wong got off the telephone and said
that she had to tak~ some "stuff" down to facilities
management.· Bailey said, "what stuff?" She said,
"specifications." Bailey repeatedly asked what specifications,
but she would not say anything except "specifications," even
though she knew precisely what specifications were requested.
Wong then said, "if you want to do it, do it yourself." Bailey
said, "okay, I will. What's the number."
Wong had called facilities management and had been
transferred to the appropriate individual. When Bailey asked
for the number, instead of giving him the number or name of the
person she had been talking to, she gave him the original
number, which meant that when Bailey called he had to get
transferred himself. Bailey called the number, eventually got
transferred, and a man at the other end of the line explaihed
he needed certain specifications. Bailey told him the
specifications had been sent in a month ago. At this point,
the person in facilities looked in his file, confirmed that
what Bailey said was true, and said, "okay, we'll get back to
you." That was the end of it. Significantly, Wong was present
and in fact was the one who gave these specifications to the
26
facilities management people approximately a month ago when
they visited the museum to check out the problem. Thus, she
was at all times aware of the specifications Bailey wanted.
Bailey summed up the incident as follows. He said that
Wong frequently would make a response to him which was
sufficiently vague to be confusing or incomplete, but not so
incomplete -as to be completely nonresponsive. He described
this as passive defiance.
Wong eventually filed a grievance under SPP section 280.
As more fully explained below, the University rejected the
grievance because the memo did not constitute "corrective
action" within the meaning of the SPP and therefore was not
grievable under section 280.12
3. The June 16 Performance Evaluation
On June 16, 1981, Wong received her performance evaluation
covering the period July 1, 1980 to July 1, 1981. Bailey rated
her as "unsatisfactory" in three categories, and "improvement
needed" in four categories.13 He also attached comments.
12The facts surrounding the University's res~onses to the
grievances filed by all the discriminatees in this case, and
the charging party's arguments in relation to each grievance,
are 0
set forth in Section VI, infra.
13 11 Unsatisfactory" ratin~s were in Response to Supervisor
(and co-workers); Packing/Shipping/Receiving; and
Installation. "Improvement Needed" ratings were in
Collection/Storage; Collection/Delivery; Related Services (such
as handling art work for loan on campus); and Others (such as
safe handling of art).
27
which were generally critical of Wong's ability to get along
with co-workers, and of her general attitude about her job.
Bailey did not include written specific incidents to support
his comments.
The evaluation further states that Wong made improvements
since her last evaluation. However, the evaluation contains
more negative checks in the various categories than in the
prior evaluation. Bailey explained this inconsistency. He
said that essentially Wong was erratic in her work. While she
improved temporarily, she ultimately regressed in the overall
ratings.
He further explained that Wong would not sit down with him
to discuss the evaluation, so the specifics in support of these
ratings were never discussed. At first Bailey testified that,
since there had been no discussion, he has no recollection of
what these specifics were. However, when pressed, he recalled
several specifics to support his "Comments" in the evaluation.
Specifically, he said that he once told Shalk to tell Wong, who
was going out to pick up some lamps, to stop by a certain
manufacturer's place of business and pick up a ladder. Shalk
did so, but Wong said she didn't have time and she didn't want
to talk to Shalk about it. Then she left. As a result, the
equipment was not picked up, and someone else had to make a
separate trip to get the ladder. Also, Bailey cited the
example of the Pomodoro Exhibition when Wong kept telling him
28
that
he was
assigning
her
"shit
work."
Further,
he
said there
were
at least
three
or four times
when
Wong
gave
Shalk
an
extremely
hard time
which
consequently
affected
everybody's
performance.
He
also cited
the
incident
when he
asked
Wong
for
specifications
about the
light
bulbs
and
she
wouldn't give
them
to
him.
Bailey
said
that
on
another occasion
he
asked
her to
clear off
a
matting
table.
She
gave
him a
long
memo
wherein
she asked
him
where he
wanted
her
to put
certain
items.
She
listed
these
items
in
a
long
list,
but
they
were
basically
just
little
odds
and
ends
that
were on
the
table
and
didn't
have
any
specific
place to
go; she should
have
known
where
to
put
them.
The
odds
and
ends
were
such
things
as
little
pieces of paper,
etc.
He
termed
her
memo
"ridiculous."
A
day
later
she
came
back with another
memo
specifying
a
list
of
similar
items
and
asked Bailey
where
to put
them.
On
the
third
day
she gave
him
yet
another
memo
in
which
she
said that
she
had
decided
to put
all
these
little
odds
and
ends under
the
table
until
it
was
decided exactly
where
they should go.
Bailey
said
that's
exactly
what he wanted
her to
do
in the
first
place, but
it
took
three
memos and
three
days
to
do a
job
that
should have
been
done
in half
an
hour.
He
said that this affected the
installation
and
all
aspects of her
work
because
it
wasted time.
Another
point of contention
stemming from
the evaluation
involved the fact that
her
lighting responsibilities
were
not
specifically reflected
on
the evaluation,
even though she had
29
done
lighting
during the
evaluation period.
Bailey
said
that
her
lighting
responsibilities
were
covered
under
the
area of
installation.
He
also said
that
at least
three
people,
including
Shalk
and
himself,
and
as
many
as
five
people
when
the
on-call
workers
were
considered,
also
did
lighting
at
the
time.
Thus,
Wong's.percentage
of
time
in
lighting
was
not
great.
Bailey's
comments
also
incorporated
by
reference the
October
1980
evaluation.
I
have
already
found
that
Bailey
never agreed
to
withdraw
the
October
1980
evaluation.
When
he
was
the
chief preparator,
it
was
Bailey's practice
to
keep
evaluations in
his
desk
along with
other personnel
information. After the
reorganization,
he
transferred his
files
and
responsibilities
over
to
Nina
Hubbs and showed
her
where he
kept the personnel
files.
He'was informed
that
the
personnel
files
should
be
kept
upstairs
in another
office.
Hubbs
then
transferred
all
the personnel
files,
incfuding
Wong's,
into
the business
office
files.
It
was
apparent
at
this
point that
Wong
learned
that
the
October
1980
evaluation
had
not
been withdrawn.
The
evaluation
was
discussed
at
the June
29
meeting
in
Toby's
office.
Present
were Toby,
Bailey
and
Wong, who
was
represented
by
Nadia Tesluk of
CSEA.
Also
discussed
was
the
June
12
letter
regarding
"specifications."
This
was
the
first
time
Wong was
represented
by CSEA.
30
4. The July 14 Grievance.
On July 14, 1981, Wong filed a grievance about her layoff.
The grievance charged that the University's layoff regulations
(SPP section 760) had been violated because,
.•. the department does not document the
layoff with either a lack of funds or a lack
of work. ·
Additionally, Wong complained in the grievance that casual
~mployees were "being retained to do the same work." Lastly,
the grievance asserted that the layoff was part of a continuing
"series of punitive actions" including the June 12 "letter of
warning" and the June 28 evaluation.
5. The July 16 and 20 Letters Regarding Keys
Nina Hubbs returned from vacation on July 13 as the new
supervisor of the installation and design department. As
mentioned earlier, Hubbs became the supervisor of Barney Bailey
and Adrienne Wong, and Bailey no longer had supervisory
responsibility for Wong. He did, however, serve as a lead
person and had a great deal of contact with Wong in this
capacity.
As part of this transition, Hubbs established new
procedures for the use of building keys. Keys would no longer
be taken home, but would be left at "control," the security
desk, prior to leaving for the day.
On July 15, she met with Bailey, Wong, and Gary Garvin,
another employee, and directed them to follow this new
31
procedure. Reasons for the new procedure were based largely on
her concern for the security of the art work. In the past,
problems had been created when keys were left at home or lost.
In addition, those people who worked part-time were absent from
the Museum for long periods of time during which their keys
might be required. Hubbs' policy on keys applied to the entire
staff.
Two hours after Hu.bbs announced this directive, Wong left
the Museum without leaving her keys at control. At the end of
the day, when turning in her keys, Hubbs discovered that Wong
was the only employee who had not done so. Hubbs chose not to
discuss the matter with Wong. Instead, on July 16, 1981, she
wrote Wong a letter of reprimand citing the incident.
On the next day that Wong was scheduled to work, Monday,
July 20, she again forgot her keys. Rather than tell Hubbs
that she left her keys at home, Wong went directly to control
and attempted to get a second set. This prompted Hubbs to
write Wong a second letter of reprimand on the subject of
keys. Both letters simply reminded Wong of the
newly-established procedure and said that if she continued to
neglect this responsibility her key privileges would be
rescinded. In addition, the July 20 letter asserted that the
keys were University property and their removal from the Museum
constituted misappropriation of University property, which is
32
subject to corrective action. Both of these letters were given
to Wong on Monday, July 20.
In the past, others had lost their keys, but were not
reprimanded. For example, Bailey once lost his keys prior to
June 1981, before this procedure was established. There was no
evidence that this had occurred under the new procedure.
Wong filed grievances about both of the memos related to
the key issue. On September 2, 1981, Elliott responded by.
letter assuring her that the security reasons prompted the
memos and they were not a reprisal for use of the grievance
procedure.
6. The July 1981 Memos Dealing with Lighting Files, Use
of Xerox Machine, and Other Copying of Files.
On July 14 Hubbs tried to locate the lighting files that
were normally kept in a filing cabinet in Wong's desk. The
information in these files was needed to prepare a new budget
for the department. When she could not locate the iiles Hubbs
asked Wong if she knew where they were. Wong replied "usually
they are kept in my desk." In fact, Wong had taken the files
home.
The next day, July 15, Hubbs had a meeting with Bailey,
Wong and Garvin and they discussed the issue of the keys and
consolidation of files. Hubbs anounced that she intended to
consolidate the working files from the old shop, preparation
and design departments in her office, including the lighting
33
files.
Also,
Hubbs
said
that,
in order
to
clean
up
the
files
before
consolidation,
any
extraneous
material
would be
thrown
out.
Wong
became
extremely
concerned
that
some
of the
information
that
she
had
in these
files
might
be
discarded,
and
this
would
hurt
her
attempts
at
a
reclassification.
Wong
apparently
felt
that
her
work
in
lighting
could
be
documented
by
reviewing her
research in
this
area,
which
was
included in
these
files.
Two.
days
later,
on
July
17,
Hubbs
again looked
for
the
lighting
files
in
Wong's
desk.
Again
she
could
not
locate
the
specific
files
she needed.
Hubbs became
increasingly
concerned about the whereabouts
of the
files.
On
Friday evening,
July
17,
at
6:30
p.m.,
Hubbs
called
control
and
requested
that
Adrienne
Wong,
Barney
Bailey,
and
Daniel Kelly
be
denied access to the
Museum
offices
from
that
time through 8:30
a.m.,
Monday,
July
20.
The
hours
included only the time during
which
those
individuals did
not
normally
work. Normal work
hours for these
employees were
to
begin again
on
Monday
at
8:30 a.m.
She
did ~his in order to
determine
who was
responsible for the
removal
of
lighting
files.
Hubbs'
intention
was
to see
if
anyone would
attempt to
return
the
files
over
the
weekend.
On
Monday,
July
20,
Wong
arrived at
work
early
to
copy
the
files,
knowing
that
Hubbs wanted them.14
A
security
guard·
told
her to leave the building
and
not to return until
8:30 a.m.
When Wong
arrived at
work
later that
morning she
34
brought several files with her and Hubbs asked her where the
remainder of the files were. Wong responded,
Oh, I thought that I told you that I had
them at home.
And Hubbs said,
No, you didn't tell me that you had them at
home. • · [Y] ou told me that usually they
were kept in your desk and they're not in
your desk.
Hubbs then requested that Wong prepare a list of all the files
that she kept at home, and Wong did so.
On July 20, 1981, Hubbs gave Wong a letter of warning. The
letter states in relevant part:
On July 14, i981 I asked you if you knew
where the lighting files were. You replied,
"Usually they are kept in my desk." Since
they were at that time in your personal
possession, this was an intentionally
evasive and deceptive answer. You did not
at any time inform me that you had any files
at home. On July 15 I specifically
requested that all catalogues, pamphlets,
files, etc. were to be kept in my office and
were to be removed only with my permission.
At that time you should have informed me
that you had materials in your possession.
14wong says that she had concern that if the files were
consolidated, what she considered her personal information
would be thrown out, because Hubbs wanted to get rid of the
extraneous material. This explanation is questionable. Hubbs
asked her only to consolidate certain files. If there were
extraneous material in these files that were Wong's personal
materials, she could simply have removed this material and
submitted the files to Hubbs for consolidation as requested.
Since she ·didn't·do this, the logical inference is that she
was, in fact, copying University files for her own use.
35
The files you brought in this morning you
removed from the office once again without
my permission. All lighting files are to be
kept in the grey file cabinet in my office
unless I specifically request or give
permission for them to be removed. I want
all of the files you have listed (and any
others that may have escaped your memory) on
the attached memo returned tomorrow morning
before 9 a~. These files are the property
of the University. Removal of them without
supervisorial permission constitutes a
mtsappropriation of University property and
is grounds for immediate dismissal under
Staff Personnel Policy 740.11.
The next day, on July 21, Hubbs learned that Wong had been
copying the files on Monday evening during non-work hours.
This concerned Hubbs because she had not requested copies of
the files. She wanted the originals. Hubbs was informed that
Wong had copied a large amount of files with the Museum Xerox
machine over a period of three to four hours. Hubbs felt that
this was costly and inappropriate. Eventually what Hubbs
received were copies, not the originals.15 Again, Hubbs felt
that Wong was being deceptive and not behaving in an honest
manner. She then wrote the following memo to Wong on July 21:
It has been brought to my attention that on
July 20 at 7:30 pm and July 21 at 7:30 am
you were using the xerox machine in this
building to copy files. As I have not
requested copies of any files from you, I
15wong claims the originals were her own work product and
developed on her own time. She said Hubbs had no right to
them; however, she consented to make copies available anyway.
It is my understanding that the charging party now considers
these files in the nature of "gifts" to the Museum.
36
assume
that
you were
copying
files
for
your
own
personal
use.
In the
future,
please
request
permission
from
me
before
copying
any
files
that
are
University property.
Also, while
the
use
of
the
xerox
machine
for
personal business
is
a
privilege
we
all
make
occasional
use
of,
it
is
a
privilege that
due
to
abuse
by
one
or
two
individuals
may
be
rescinded
at
any
time.
On
Friday,
July
24, 1981,
Wong
came
into
Hubbs'
office at
approximately
11:00
a.m.
and
questioned
Hubbs
about her
policy
on
copying
files.
Hubbs
explained
that
she should ask
permission before
copying
any
material
from a
file
so
that
in
the event
that
the
file
was
lost
she
could
identify
who
had
it
last.
Hubbs
reiterated
the
content of
her
July
21
memo
where
she
stated that
in
the
future
Wong
should
secure permission
before
copying
UAM
files.
A few
hours
later
Wong
returned to
Hubbs'
office,
removed a
file
from a
cabinet
and,
without
permission,
began
copying
it.
This time,
however,
Wong
copied
the
file
by hand
as
Hubbs
looked on.
Wong's
actions
prompted
Hubbs
to issue yet
another
letter
of
reprimand
on
July
31, 1981.
In the
letter
Hubbs
related
the
events leading
up
to July
24 and
the hand-copying
incident
which
occurred
on
that
day.
Hubbs
wrote
that
Wong
"deliberately
chose
to ignore [her]
instructions."
The memo
also stated that
Hubbs
looked on
the incident
as
an example
of
"surreptitious behavior,"
which
is
a form
of "dishonesty"
~nd
"insubordination."
Wong
claims
that
Hubbs'
instructions about
37
securing permission applied only to Xeroxing files, not
hand-copying files.
With the assistance of CSEA, Wong filed grievances
challenging the three memos. In each instance Elliott _upheld
the action taken by Hubbs, informing Wong that the files
contained confidential information and that it was the
supervisor'~ responsibility to monitor their use. In response
to the July 31 letter of reprimand, Elliott again upneld the
action. He informed Wong that the memos represented the
culmination of her "complete and dogged" disregard for her
supervisor's regulations concerning use of the files.
7. The Davis Painting Incident
Works of art are frequently transported by the elevator at
the UAM. The elevator has a gate which must be closed before
it will move from floor to floor. As with most elevators, it
is possible to call the elevator to a particular fl?or by
pressing a button. However, the elevator at the UAM cannot be
called in this way unless the gate is closed.
There is no dispute that it is unsafe for a work of art to
travel unattended on the elevator from floor to floor.
Therefore, it is a well-established policy at UAM, that works
of art not be left unattended on the elevator with the gate
closed, thus permitting them to be called from another level.
A major concern is that workers who carry tools use the
elevator, and if they don't notice the work of art there is a
38
risk that the tools may accidentally come in contact with the
art and damage it.
On August 17, 1981, Wong placed a valuable Davis painting
unattended on the freight elevator and closed the doors.
According to Hubbs, the painting was such that a person not
familiar with minimalist art may not recognize it as a work ot
art. This would create more danger to the art. The painting
was called to another floor where a worker from the physical
plant got on and rode with the painting to another gallery.
Mary Smiley witnessed Wong's actions. She testified that
on August 17 she was working with Wong. They were to leave the
elevator area to help Bailey move a large crate. Prior to
doing so, Wong opened the elevator door, moved the cart
carrying the painting onto the elevator, and deliberately
closed the door. Smiley told Wong she hoped it was still there
when they got back, and Wong laughed. She testified that she
did not attempt to stop Wong because,
Adrienne is fairly notorious for giving you
a bad time if you question her or say
anything.
Smiley said Wong,
... turns into a different person. She
can come in in the morning and be real •
friendly and bubbly and then without anyone
doing anything or saying anything all of a
sudden she can turn to ice ••..
After moving the crate, Bailey became aware of what had
happened. He learned from Smiley that Wong was the one who put
39
the
painting
on
the
elevator
and
he
confronted
Wong,
advising
her
that
she
had made a
mistake.
On
August
19
Bailey recorded
the incident
in
a
memo
to
Hubbs.
On
September
2,
1981,
Hubbs
suspended
Wong
for her
actions.
The
suspension
memo
was
delivered shortly
after
a
September
2
meeting
held with
Wong
'
and
her
CSEA
representative
to
investigate
the
matter.
At
the
~eeting
Wong
and
her
representative
made
several
arguments
in
defense
of
the
action.
However,
at
no
time
prior
to the hearing
in
this
case did
Wong
or her
representative
acknowledge
that
Wong
had
made a
mistake.
According
to
Hubbs,
it
was
this
factor that
played
a
major
role
in
her
decision to
suspend
Wong.
In
this
regard, the
letter
of
suspension
states:
From
this
incident
it
is
apparent
that
you
are incapable of
working
without continuous
ongoing
supervision
and
that
you
clearly
lack the necessary sense
of
responsibility
and good
judgement
required of
a
Senior
Preparator.
You
have
not given
me
any
indication of
your awareness
of the seriou~
nature of
your
misconduct,
nor any
indication
that
in the
future
you
will
not
repeat the
error.
In
an
attempt to
make
it
perfectly
clear
to
you
that
what you have done amounts
to gross
misconduct
of
such
magnitute as towarrant
immediate
dismissal
if
repeated,
I
intend to
suspend
you
for
12
hours of
work,
effective
September
8-9,
1981,
without pay.
It
was
not
until
the hearing in
this
case
that
Wong
finally
admitted
that
she
made a
mistake.
Several witnesses
testified that
they had never seen works
of
art left
unattended
on
the elevator with the gate closed.
The
testimony
showed
only that
works
of
art
have been
left
40
unattended on the elevator with the gate open, thus preventing
the elevator from being called from another floor. On the
other hand, other witnesses testified that in the past they had
seen works of art left unattended in elevators with the gate
closed. However, none of these workers ever notified any
management official.of this. There was no evidence presented
to show that any management person knew or should have known of
these incidents.16
8. The Telephone Locks
On July 30, 1981, Mary Louise Beecroft, a work-study
employee, purchased phone locks at Hubbs' request. Beecroft
testified that the phones in the preparation area were unlocked
and there had been untraceable long-distance calls made after
hours and on weekends from isolated areas in the Museum.
Bel:croft purchased two locks that required two different keys.
16charging party presented evidence to show that in the
past works of art have been damaged in the UAM, but there has
never been corrective action taken until Wong's elevator
incident. For example, union witnesses attributed cracks in a
Neil Jenny painting to Bailey. A glass object was mistakenly
packed as plastic, but no damage was done. A gust of wind bent
a photo while it was being delivered. All of these incidents
may be distinguished from the elevator incident. With respect
to the Jenny painting, it was not clearly established that the
cracks could be attributed to Bailey or any other employee.
All other examples offered by the charging party involved
damage caused by circumstances beyond the control of the
employee responsible (i.e., a gust of wind), or situations
where the particular approach to handling the art was a matter
of judgment and therefore open to debate. There were no
examples offered where an employee violated a clear policy as
Wong did in the elevator incident.
41
When she returned, Hubbs said she wanted locks which could be
opened with a master key. Rather than return the locks
immediately, Hubbs decided to wait until a later date to do so.
Hubbs, Egherman, Toby, Tesluk and Wong met in Egherman's
office on August 12 to discuss, among other things, the July 31
letter of reprimand~ During the course of this meeting, the
subject of Wong making telephone calls during work time to her
CSEA representative was discussed. Hubbs was concerned that
even a brief call might be disruptive because it might take an
employee 10 minutes to get from the gallery to a phone and
another 10 minutes to return to the gallery after the call.
The call itself would take some time. If that person happened
to be working with another person at the time, it could result
in an employee standing around waiting for the caller to
return. As a result of the meeting, Hubbs issued a memo on
September 29, 1981, stating that, as a general rule telephone 1
calls should be restricted to break and lunch times. The memo
said that if it was "necessary" to place a call during work
hours, the employee should get permission from the on-site
supervisor before leaving the work area.
Shortly after this meeting, Wong was asked to exchange the
locks previously purchased by Beecroft. Wong viewed this as a
form of retaliation for participating in the meeting. However,
she testified that, although she assumed her purchase of the
phone locks after this meeting was directly related to the
42
earlier
discussion of
telephone
calls
during the meeting,
she
acknowledged
that
there
may
have been
other
reasons
why
Hubbs
wanted
locks
on
the
phones.
Lastly, there
were
pay
phones
in
the
Museum
which
Wong
was
free
to use,
so
the locks did
not
interfere
with
her
ability
to
call
her
representative.
9.
The
September
14,
1981
Representation Issue
Wong
arrived
at
work
at
8:30
a.m.
on Monday,
September
14,
1981,
the
first
day
of
work
following her 12-hour
suspension.
At
approximately
9:30 a.m.
Hubbs and
Bailey
met
Wong
at
the
loading
dock
in
the
Museum. Hubbs had
the understanding
that
Wong was
to
be
on
suspension for
4
hours in the
morning and
then
work
the afternoon
of
the previous
Wednesday,
so
she
asked
Wong why
she
hadn't
worked
that
afternoon.
Wong
said
she
didn't
work
in the afternoon
because she
was
under
suspension.
Hubbs
told
Wong
that
it
was
her impression
that
she
had
been
under suspension
until
noon and
therefore
had
been
~xpected
to
show up
for
work
in the afternoon.
At
that point,
Wong
said
she
wanted
her
representative.
Hubbs
said there
would
be no
corrective action,
and
she
further explained
that
she simply
wanted
to
clear
up
the misunderstanding.
It
appears
that
both
Wong and Hubbs were
confused as to
whether
a
previous agreement
that
Wong
would work on Wednesday
afternoon
was
superseded
by
the suspension.17
17wong's normal schedule
was
to
work a
full
day on Monday
and Tuesday, and a
half-day
on Wednesday. The
confusion
was
43
At
that point,
the
conversation
moved
upstairs
to
the
design
office
where Hubbs
again
told
Wong
that
there
would be
no
corrective
action
and
she
was
obligated to discuss the
matter.
Wong
asked
to
call
Tesluk,
her
CSEA
rep~esentative,
and
Hubbs
agreed.
Hubbs and
Bailey
were
present
when
Wong
discussed the issue
with Tesluk
on
the
phone.
After
Wong
had
been
on
the
phone
for
awhile,
she
began
to discuss other subjects
with
Tesluk.
Hubbs
told
Wong
she
had
been
on
the
phone
long
enough,
and
since
she
had
not
asked
for
permission,
she
was
asked
to
hang
up. At
that
point
Wong
said to
Tesluk over
the
phone
that
"Nina
says
I
can't
talk
to you."
Hubbs
said,
"that's
not
what
I
said.
You
tell
her
what
I
said."
Wong
then repeated to
Tesluk
what
Hubbs
had
actually said
and hung
up.
After
she
hung up
the
telephone,
Wong
told
Hubbs
that
Tesluk advised her
to
go
ahead
with the discussion as
long
as
it
would
not lead
to,corrective
action.
Hubbs
asked
Wong
if
she
was
satisfied
with
Tesluk's
advice.
Wong
said
she
wasn't
and wanted
to discuss
it
with
Joe
Toby, which
she
did.
No
disciplinary action
was
taken.
Wong
was
paid for the
four hours
that
she
did not
work on Wednesday
afternoon. In
a
memo
dated September 14,
Hubbs
asked
Wong
to
make up
the four
due to the fact that
Monday
of the
week
in question
was a
holiday.
44
hours, but she never did. Wong contends she has no obligation
to do so.
10. Sanding Frames
In September 1981 Bailey assigned Wong the tasks of sanding
and oiling frames in preparation for the Leonardo da Vinci
Exhibit. These tasks had been performed in the past primarily
by employees in the shop department, but were now performed by
others since that department was eliminated as a result of the
1981 reorganization. Thus, it was not uncommon for all
employees to perform such work assignments. It is true, as
Wong and Bailey both testified, that while Wong was sanding and
oiling frames, other employees were assigned the tasks of
matting and framing works of art. Bailey testified that he had
reservations about assigning these m9re delicate tasks to Wong
because he didn't think she could handle them at the time. He
said that, as a result of the elevator incident, sh~ was
"fuming all the time" and therefore not in a condition to do
the more delicate work.
In response to the assertion that these assignments
resulted in isolating her from other employees, Bailey
testified that he did it for her own benefit. He said he moved
her into an area where she could sand and oil near an exhaust
fan. He also said that she should use a respirator when doing
this work. Wong viewed this as harrassment because of the
manner in which Bailey did it.
45
The
pace
at
which
Wong
undertook
those assignments
also
troubled Bailey.
In demonstrating
how
to
lightly
sand
a
frame,
Bailey
completed
a
frame
in
about
five
minutes.
Although she
picked
up
the
pace
near the
end
of
the assignment,
Bailey
estimated
that
Wong
did approximately
11
frames
per
day.
11.
Denial
of
Access
to the
Registration
Area During
the
da
Vinci
Exhibit
and
the
"Grand
Master
Key"
Egherman
described
the
need
for
maximum
security
around
the
da
Vinci
exhibit.
It
was
the
first
time
that
da
Vinci's
work
had been
in the building
or
in
the
Bay
Area
for
that
matter,
and
it
was
of extraordinary value.
He
was
concerned
that
some
pieces,
such
as the
Christ figure,
might
bring out the worst in
some
of
the people
that
hang
around
Berkeley.
As
Egherman
put
it,
they
had had
problems
with
"street
people"
in Berkeley with
respect
to
damaging
art
and
harrassing
employees
in the
Museum.
The
daVinci's
were
electronically
wired
and
connected
to
the police
department
in Berkeley. Special cases
were
built.
There
were
24-hour guards
stationed
in the
gallery.
On
September
10, 1981, Jim
Elliott
issued
a
memo
concerning
security
around
the daVinci
exhibit. Esssentially,
the
memo
voiced
a
concern about
security,
and
it
limited access
to
the
registration
storage area without
a
specific authorization.
Only a
select
group
was
permitted to
go
into the
registration
area.
Even Egherman was
excluded.
The
only people allowed in
there
were
the individual curator
working on
the exhibit, the
director, the
registrar,
who
obviously had to handle the
46
paintings,
and
the photographer,
who
worked
in
there to take
condition
photographs.
Bailey
and Hubbs were
also
on
the
list.
Hubbs
testified
that
everyone
wanted
to
see
the
pieces of
art
in
the
daVinci
exhibit
and
everyone
was
interested
in
access to
the
registration
room
to
view
the
work.
She
said
that
access
even
to ·the
galleries
was
limited,
and
people
had
to
have
a
special
badge
to get into
the
gallery.
She
said
the
exclusion of
Wong
from
the
registration
area
was by no means a
reprisal
and
that
the
policy
actually
included
practically
everyone
in the
whole
building,
except for the
five
people
named
above.
At
about
this
time
there
was
another
security
matter
that
arose
at
Jim
Elliott's
prompting.
At a
meeting
Elliott
brought
up
the
fact that
grand master
keys should
be
limited
to
supervisory personnel, except
at
his discretion.
Prior to
that,
Hubbs,
Bailey,
Wong
and one
other
employee ha? grand
master keys,
and
there
was one
additional
grand master
key
on a
key
chain for
on-call
employees.
On
September 11, 1981,
after
the
meeting with
Elliott,
Hubbs
wrote
a
memo
to Jesse Fisher,
head
of security, telling
him
that
she
had
recently learned
from
Elliott
that
only supervisory personnel should have
grand
master keys.
The
memo
told Fisher to
retrieve
all
grand master
keys
from everyone except Bailey
and Hubbs. She
said the
others
should be
issued sub-master keys.
The
sub-master key,
in essence, gives the holder
a more
limited access to the
47
museum facilities. Wong's grand master key was taken away.
12. The September 29 Telephone Call
As described above, a dispute existed as to whether Wong
should be paid for the four hours she did not work on
Wednesday, September 9, the last day of her suspension. In
connection with this dispute, Hubbs asked Wong to turn in her
timesheets ·by 10:00 a.m. the following day. On the morning of
September 29, Wong left her work site without telling anybody
and went to an outside pay telephone to call Tesluk about the
timesheet issue. Bailey, who was looking for Wong, discovered
her at the pay phone. A discussion took place. Bailey told
Wong she was not to call her representative on work time. He
testified that he told Wong she should, as a common courtesy,
contact him before leaving the work area so that he is kept
aware of her whereabouts when she is supposed to be working
and, if necessary, he could get someone to cover fof her when
she leaves. The matter was not pursued any further by either
Wong or Bailey. Furthermore, Bailey's actions were consistent
with a policy statement on telephone use issued by Hubbs.
Wong testified that it would have been possible to call
Tesluk on non-work time. However, she did not do so. Also,
the call was made .at approximately 9:30 a.m.i Wong's break was
at 10:00 a.m. There is no evidence to show that Wong received
any corrective action as a result of the incident.
48
13.
Assignment
of
Menial
Tasks.
In
late
September
1981
Bailey
told
Wong
to pick
up
lumber
and
a
sander
from an
outside
shop.
On
several
occasions during
October
and November,
Bailey and/or
Hubbs
told
Wong
to take out
the
garbage.
On
October
8
Wong
was
told
by
Bailey to pick
up
the debris
left
by
other
employees,
and on
October
13
Wong
was
told
to clean
up a
tool
cart
and
matting
tables
which had
been
used
by
other
employees.
Wong
claims these
assignments
were
discriminatory.18
However,
in
direct
contradiction
to
this
claim of
discriminatory treatment,
Wong
testified
that
she
was
asked
to
take out
garbage
more
frequently
after
the
reorganization,
when
the
shop
had
been
eliminated
and
there
were fewer
workers
to
perform
such
tasks.
She
also
concedes
that
Bailey
never asked
her to
do
anything
he
didn't
do.
Moreover,
Wong's
co-workers
testified
that
they,performed
tasks
such
as taking out the
trash,
sanding frames,
delivering
and
picking
up
items
outside the
Museum,
etc.
Even
Kelly
agreed
that
all
preparators occasionally take out the
trash.
18while
testifying
about
work
assignments, Bailey offeredanother
earlier
example
of
Wong's
dissatisfaction
about
a work
assignment during the
Pornodoro
Exhibit in
March 1981. Therewere problems with unloading the
exhibit,
which was
large
and
bulky.
Wong was working on
lighting
and
Bailey called her to
help uncrate the exhibit
and
label
it.
Wong
helped out forawhile
and
then returned to her
lighting. Bailey
went
to herand asked for
more
help because they needed
to unload
it
beforemoving on
to other assignments. Bailey said that at that point
Wong
protested that
he was
assigning her
"shit
work."
49
Furthermore,
supervisors
Bailey
and Hubbs
performed
these
duties
themselves.
According
to
Hubbs,
the
only
thing unusual
about
Wong
taking out the
trash
was
that
she
had
to
be
told
to
do
it.
Other workers
did
it
on a
voluntary
basis
when
they
saw
that
a
can
was
full,
According
to
Wong,
she
was
told
to clean
up
after
other
preparators
on
occasion.
But
Bailey convincingly
testified
that,
to
the
extent
this
occurred,
it
was
due
to the
nature of
the
on-call
system.
For
example,
on-call
workers
may
work
for
a
temporary
period
and
complete
a
matting assignment. Since
the
assignment
is finished,
they
are
not
generally called
back
the
next day, but the cleanup
still
needs
to
be done.
Bailey
testified
that
it
made no
sense
to
call
the
workers
back
just
to clean
up, so
he gave
the
·assignment
to
Wong, who was
the
only other career
employee.
14.
The
Chinese
Fan
Incident
On
November
4, 1981,
Bailey
asked
Wong
to
mount two
Chinese
fans.
It
took
Wong
a day and a
half
to
mount
the
first
fan.
Bailey
felt
that this
was
too long
and
began
to
inject
himself
into
the process, suggesting to
Wong
another
way
to
do
it.
He
said this irritated
Wong, who
told Bailey
he needed
help
and
should see
a
psychiatrist.
Wong
denied saying
this
to
Bailey.19
19Another example
of the Wong-Bailey
relationshipoccurred at this point. Bailey apparently
became
frustrated
50
It was Bailey's opinion that, in the process of mounting
the fan, Wong had improperly bent a corner of one of the fans
and was picking at another corner with her fingernail. Bailey
felt this was damaging to the fan. He told her to stop picking
at it. She looked at him, smiled, and then defiantly continued
to pick.
Bailey Telated the entire incident to Hubbs. Wong then had
a meeting with Hubbs, who told her that Bailey had seen her
bend a corner of the fan while mounting it.· Wong told Hubbs
that she did not bend the corner of the fan and if this
incident was going to result in corrective action she would
like to have her CSEA representative present.
Later, possibly the next day, Hubbs called Wong to her
office and told her that there were serious problems since Wong
was not respondipg to Bailey's directives. Hubbs apologized
because she was not personally able to supervise Wo9g directly
all the time, but told her that this was simply not possible.
Wong insisted on discussing the details of the fan incident,
and explained how she had matted the fan. According to Hubbs,
about the fans and told Wong to take out the tra~h instead of
working on the fans. She looked at him but did not do it.
Bailey called Hubbs, who appeared and asked Wong if Bailey told
her to take out the trash. Wong said she didn't say she
wouldn't do it. At that point Hubbs asked her to take out the
trash and she did. Furthermore, there is no need to resolve
the dispute about whether Wong told Bailey he should see a
psychiatrist. This is mentioned here only to show the petty
nature of the issues which characterized the Wong-Bailey
relationship.
51
Wong
at
first
claimed she
did not
bend
,the
fan
and
accused
Hubbs
of
knowing
nothing about
preparation
work.
Hubbs
responded
that
she
had done
preparation
work
in the
past
and
knew
about
matting.
The two
women
talked
further
and,
according
to
Hubbs,
Wong
eventually
admitted
she
made a
mistake
and
bent the
fan
when
she could
not
properly
insert
the
corner.
Hubbs
testified
that
she
told
Wong
that that
was
understandable,
and
everyone
makes
mistakes.
•
Wong
testified
that
she never
admitted
to
Hubbs,
or
anyone
else,
that
she
bent the corner
of
the fan.
She
maintained
at
the hearing
that
in
fact
she
did
not
bend
the fan.
This
credibility
dispute
is
resolved in
favor
of
Hubbs.
As
Hubbs
demonstrated with
respect to
the
elevator incident,
she
was
not
reluctant
to
discipline
Wong
if
she
believed
it
proper
I
to
do
so.
Wong
was
suspended
for the
elevator incident not
so
much
because
of
her conduct, but
rather
because
she_refused to
admit
that
she
made a
mistake.
Based on
the information she
had
from
Bailey,
Hubbs would
have been
justified
in
disciplining
Wong
for the
Chinese fan
incident.
However,
she
did not
do
so.
The
logical inference to
be drawn from
her
failure
to
do
so
was
that, unlike the elevator incident,
Wong
admitted her mistake with regard to the fans. Otherwise, there
would have been no
reason for
Hubbs
to not
discipline
her again.
At some
point,
Wong's
representative, Tesluk, contacted
Toby
in
an attempt to set
up a meeting to discuss the fan
52
incident along with a series of other incidents which had
occurred prior to that date. In essence, Toby took the
position that, since there had been no corrective action taken,
there was no need for a meeting. Toby saw no point in having a
discussion about how to mount a Chinese fan, nor did he see a
need for a meeting to tell Hubbs how to run her department.
However, Tdby also said that he would consider the request if
presented with an agenda so that there was some structure to
the meeting.
Tesluk never contacted Toby with an agenda, and no meeting
was held. Wong never received corrective action as a result of
the fan incident.
15. The Desk Audit and Reclassification Denial
Employees who seek reclassification have the right to ask
for a desk audit to determine if their positions are properly
classified. The employee usually fills out a job d~scription
document with the percentages of time assigned to each task,
and a supervisor signs the document to corroborate its contents
if he or she is in agreement with the employee's description.
Toby then does a desk audit to verify exactly what the employee
does.
Toby received Wong's request for a reclassification on
June 30, 1981.20 Wong's supervisors, Bailey and Ross, had
20This was a continuation of the reclassification appeal
that Wong had initiated in August 1980.
53
already refused to corroborate her description of her duties.
They were of the opinion that Wong's description did not
accurately reflect her actual duties, and therefore refused to
concur in her request.21 Toby did not contact Wong to set up
the desk audit until early October. He testified that, given
his work backlog, it is not unusual for him to take three or
four months to respond to such requests.
Wong said she wanted to have Tesluk repr~sent her during
the audit. At some point in early October, Toby heard from
Tesluk, who asked to represent Wong. Toby refused the
request. He then went on vacation for the latter part of
October. Upon his return, the parties experienced some
difficulty in arriving at a mutually agreeable date. Tesluk
renewed her request to represent Wong on November 11. On about
November 19, 1981, Toby again spoke with Wong about the desk
audit. Wong again asked for representation and Toby refused.
Apparently nothing happened over the holidays. On January 21,
1982, Toby wrote to Wong and told her that too much time had
elapsed, and if he didn't hear from her by February 8 about a
date, he would return the request to her and close the file.
21For example, Wong claimed that 75 percent of her duties
involved lighting. Bailey's response, based on review of her
timesheets, showed that she spent approximately 34 percent of
her time doing lighting. He did not consider her to be a
supervisor. And, in general, he was of the opinion that she
distorted and grossly inflated her responsibilities.
54
The desk audit was finally conducted on February 24, 1982.
Wong's request for representation was denied by Toby. He wrote
the following with respect to the reclassification:
After auditing your position on February 24,
1982 and giving it careful consideration, I
find that your position is properly
classified as a Senior Museum Preparator.
To warrant ·reclassification to the Principal
level you would either have to be
supervising other Preparators or to be doing
the most difficult preparative work. I find
neither of these criteria to be true in your
case.
In the first place, you did not, and do not
now truly supervise other employees.
Supervision entails responsibility for
hiring, evaluating and disciplining
employees. Instead, you at times, exercised
a lead role on particular projects with one
or more of the employees that you listed.
With one exception, all of them were casual
employees who were occasionally called in, a
few at a time, to help out with exhibits.
Furthermore, even if lighting is considered
a more difficult preparative task, the fact
in your own time records show that in the
time interval July 1980 to June 1981, your
lighting assignments only equaled 50% or
more of your working time on only two
occasions-- January and February 1981.
Since July 1, 1981 your assignments in this
task have been diminished. Museum policy
for some time now has been that assignments
would cover a wide range of preparative
tasks without any one person having
specialized duties. This arrangement is not
peculiar to UC Art Museum management.
Museum technicians at the San Francisco
Museum of Modern Art are all expected to do
lighting in addition to other preparative
tasks.
Finally, to be comprehensive, I also
considered the Scene Technician series.
55
However, it is quite clear that the series
is intended for theatrical arts. These
positions presume assignments in the dynamic
lighting of performances (a really different
set of parameters than is found in static
lighting) and in the design, construction
and painting of stage props and sets. It is
quite clear that your position is not that
of a Scene Technician.
Even Wong conceded in her testimony that at the time of the
desk audit ~he was n~t performing duties that would have
entitled her to a reclassification. She contended, however,
that she was entitled to a reclassification based on duties she
performed at an earlier point in time, but, she claimed, those
duties had been taken away from her as a reprisal for her
protected activities.
In addition, the lighting duties had formed the foundation
for her r~classification proposal. She claimed her expertise
in lighting was a major factor to be considered in the
reclassification process. However, several other wjtnesses had
a different opinion. Murphy, one of Wong's co-workers,
testified that lighting was overr~ted. She said it amounted to
little more than changing light bulbs. Hubbs agreed. Bailey
was of .the opinion that lighting is not that complicated. He
said it is not like nuclear physics; anyone with a sense of
aesthetics who has been around the Museum for awhile would pick
it up.
Wong pointed to several of her other duties to support her
reclassification request. However, all of these fall within
56
the preparator's current position description.
Moreover, granting Wong's reclassification request would
have been contrary to Egherman's philosophy about staffing at
that time. The scene technician had performed a lot of
lighting duties in the past. After the scene technician
position was eliminated, Egherman decided not to fill the slot
because it ·was too specialized and thus the specialist might
claim higher compensation. Egherman wanted to move in the
direction of filling positions with generalists. Ideally,
these would be people who could do a little of everything. If
an individual happened to be a little better in lighting, he or
she could serve in a lead role in that capacity on particular
projects, but the age of specialists was over.
16. Tool Cart Incident
The standard Museum procedure for transporting a tool cart
or an airlift down22 a ramp prior to April 1981 was. as
follows. It was preferable for the employee to wear proper
workshoes with flat heels and to precede the heavy equipment as
it moved down the ramp. In other words, the employee backed
down the ramp while restraining the cart by holding the
handle. The tool cart and airlift can be easily stopped from
this position. Employees, including Wong, usually kept an
22The airlift weighs approximately 400 pounds and the
cart approximately 370 pounds. The tool cart is used to
transport works of art.
57
extra pair of tennis shoes available for this purpose.
During the course of her employment on March 2, 1982,
Bailey told Wong to move a tool cart down a ramp. As she moved
the cart, Wong was in a procession of other employees who were
also in the process of moving tool carts and/or airlifts down
the ramp. Murphy was moving the airlift and Smiley was moving
a tool cart. Neither employee had assistance. Midway down the
ramp, Wong lost control of the cart and, after banging off
several walls, the cart rolled to a stop in the gallery
below.23 Wong claimed she was injured in the process.
The evidence showed that, while it may have been preferable
for two people to move the cart, in the past women frequently
moved this equipment alone, and several women actually
performed this task on the day in question. Specifically, in
contradiction to Wong's testimony, Shalk, Smiley, Murphy and
Beecroft testified that they had observed other women,
including Wong, perform this task alone many times prior to the
incident in question. Smiley testified that earlier on the day
of the incident -she saw Wong moving the airlift alone from
gallery 2 down to the lobby. Wong was not wearing sneakers.
23As the cart rolled down the ramp several items,
including Wong's little yellow notebook, fell out. Wong kept
her notebook with her at work and made a practice of recording
practically every event the very moment it happened. This
included on the spot recording of her exchanges with Bailey and
others in the department. After the cart rolled to a stop,
Wong retrieved her notebook and began recording the incident.
58
Although Smiley offered Wong assistance, Wong.did not accept
it. Smiley recalls that Wong was in a bad mood that day, a
mood she had seen many times before.
17. The July 1, 1982 Layoff
On May 21, 1982, Wong received a letter from Elliott
informing her that, ·effective July 1, 1982, she would be placed
on indefinite layoff status. The letter stated in relevant
part:
Using the exhibition schedule, we have found
that there simply will not be enough work
every week to provide you with a fixed 50%
time schedule. There are 26 weeks with no
preparation work scheduled. Even allowing
for your three weeks of vacation, that
leaves 23 weeks with no scheduled work for
you to do. Since we still have a $200,000
deficit to retire and we still have to
maintain our existing core budget despite
inflation and cost of living increases, the
funding for 23 weeks without definite work
cannot be justified.
I regret to inform you, then, that as of
1 July 1982 you will be on indefinite layoff
status. This layoff is in no way a
reflection on your performance; it relates.
stric.tly to the Museum's financial
situation. In fact, the plan is to no
longer have any permanent career preparators
on our core staff in any classification as
of 1 July 1982. All preparation and shop
work will be done by on-call casual
employees.
Although Elliott ultimately made the final decision to lay off
Wong, Egherman participated to a great extent. He testified
that, in addition to the cuts cited in Elliott's letter, the
Museum reduced the security staff by half. The security staff
59
had escaped cuts during 1981. Also, one full-time 40 percent
curatorial assistant position would not be filled.
With respect to the exhibits for 1982-83, Egherman said the
schedule was firm. As mentioned by Elliott in the layoff
letter, the projected schedule showed that there were 26 weeks
where the Museum would not need any shop or preparation work
done. In other words, there would be 26 weeks during the year
_when Won9, a half-time employee, would have little or nothing
to do. Given this situation, according to Hubbs, the most
efficient thing to do was lay off Wong and move to the use of a
straight on-call worker system to perform the necessary work.
Egherman testified that, due to the ongoing hearings in
this case, he was concerned about implementing Wong's 1982
layoff. For this reason he told Hubbs to be absolutely certain
that the layoff was justified and instituted solely for
financial reasons. It was under this directive that Hubbs
analyzed the situation and concluded that it was most efficient
to go to a straight on-call system. Even after these cuts, a
$190,000 deficit remained in the Museum.
III. Daniel Kelly
A. The Events of 1980 and Early 1981
By the end of May 1980 Kelly was due to return from Japan.
Based on his experience working with Wong and Kelly in the
past, Bailey was concerned that problems might arise if Kelly
were to return to the Museum. To compound matters, when Wong
60
and
Kelly
had worked
at
the
Museum
in
the
past,
Kelly
was
senior
to
Wong,
but
their
roles
were
now
reversed
and
Bailey
felt
this
might
present
a
problem.
He
told
Wong
that
he
did
not
intend to
mediate
disputes
between
the
two
of
them.
And
if
they
couldn't
work
together
smoothly, Kelly
would
not
be
called
to
work.
Bailey
testified
that
Wong
reacted
positively
to
this
statement.·
She was
pleased
that
Bailey
recognized
that
she
was
now
senior
to
Kelly
and would
be
treated
as such.
Bailey
had
a
similar
conversation
with Kelly
upon
his
return
to the
Museum.
In
early
June 1980,
shortly
after
his return
to the
Museum,
Kelly
had a
meeting with
Bailey during
which he
raised three
chief
concerns
of
employees
in
the
UAM.
First,
Kelly
testified
that
he
told
Bailey
that on-call
employees
felt
insecure
about
their
positions
because
Bailey
had
control
over
how much and
when
they
worked. According
to Kelly,
he
told Bailey
that
on-call
employees were
reluctant
to
alienate
Bailey_
for
fear
they
would
not
be
called to
work. Second, Kelly spoke
to
Bailey
about
getting
more
advance
notice of
assignments for
on~call
workers. Third, Kelly
testified that
he
told Bailey
that
employees were
generally
dissatisfied
and
concerned over
the confusion surrounding
what
their
job
duties
were.24
24one
matter of
dissatisfaction
stemmed from
the fact
that there existed
a
discrepancy between hours
and pay
of
career
and
on-call
employees. Career employees worked a
7
1/2-hour
day beginning
at
8:30 a.m. and were
paid for an
8-hour day. On-call employees were expected to
work
the
same
hours, but
were
paid for
7
1/2 hours.
A meeting with Bailey
61
Kelly and Wong had similar meetings with Toby in July 1980.
During at least one of these meetings, Kelly and Wong discussed
the wage-lag problem with Toby. Although Kelly had been back
only a short time, he said he learned of these problems by
talking to Wong and other employees.
During 1980 Kelly was supportive of Wong's efforts in the
Museum. In August and October he met with Ross and discussed
employment conditions in the preparation department. He
thought that Wong was being harrassed and he was concerned for
her wellbeing. He told Ross that he might file a
discrimination suit if the harrassment didn't stop.
In early November 1980, Andre Johnson had a conversation
with Mary Lieuallen, a nonsupervisory employee, about certain
financial matters that had to be completed before Johnson could
hire on-call employees for an upcoming exhibit. During the
discussion, Lieuallen said that perhaps he shouldn'~ hire Kelly
because he was a "trouble maker." Johnson, who did not place
much weight on her opinion, did not ask her what she meant by
the comment. He assumed it was just a personal observation,
and did not believe she was communicating this attitude on
behalf of management. Johnson was not aware of any reason
Lieuallen should call Kelly a "trouble maker," since Kelly had
was requested by employees to discuss this situation. As a
result of the meeting, Bailey granted the request and
thereafter on-call employees were paid the same as career
employees.
62
no
conflicts
with
management up
to
that
time.
Lieuallen
was a
non-supervisory
employee
and
there
was no
evidence
presented to
directly
link
her or her
comment
to
any management
representative.
Shortly
after
his
conversation
with
Lieuallen,
Johnson
testified
that
he
was
told
by Egherman
that
when
Kelly
finished
his current
tasks
he
should not
be
rehired.
He
said
he
told
Johnson
that,
unless
pe was
desperate,
he would
be
better
advised not to
hire
Kelly.
Johnson responded
that
Kelly
was a
good worker
and he wanted
to
continue
to
hire
him. At
this
point,
according to
Johnson,
Egherman
called
Kelly
a
"trouble
maker."
Johnson
did not ask
Egherman
what he
meant
by
"trouble
maker,"
nor
did
Egherman
volunteer
a
definition
of
that
term.
Johnson perceived
Egherman's
comment
as
a
suggestion, not
a
direct
command,
since
Egh~~man
did not
directly
say
"don't hire
Daniel Kelly."
Johnson
testified
that
it
was
standard
procedure for
Egherman
to
approve
people
Johnson wanted
to
call
for
work.
Egherman
recalls this
conversation with Johnson.
He
testified
that
he
suggested to
Johnson
that
he would
prefer
if
Kelly
was
not rehired.
This
was
not
a
directive,
according to
Egherman, because
he
did not
want
to exercise that
kind
of
heavy
control
over Johnson's supervisory responsibility.
The
final
decision
was
left
to Johnson's judgment. Egherman
further testified that
he doubts he used the
word
"trouble
63
maker."
He
believes
he
may
have used
the
word
"difficult"
to
describe
Kelly.
Egherman's
opinion of
Kelly
was
based
on
hearsay
and comments he
picked
up
around
the
Museum.
According
to Johnson,
he and Egherman had a
similar
conversation
again
in
January
1981. Johnson
paid
no
attention
. .
to
Egherman's
comments and
continued to
call
Kelly
to
work.
Time
records
show
that
Kelly
received
on-call
work
assignments
from
November 1980
through June 1981.25
I
credit
Johnson's
testimony
on
this
point
and
find
that
Egherman
did, in
fact, c~ll
Kelly
a
"troublemaker."
Johnson
was
clear
in
his recollection
and
thus convincing
in
his
testimony
that
the
specific
word
"troublemaker"
was
used. In
contrast,
while
Egherman was
generally
a
credible witness,
he
was
unsure
if
he
used
that label
to describe
Kelly.
Thereafter,
on one
occasion
when
Kelly
was
working
in
the
Museum, Egherman walked
in
and
said to
Johnson
"I
s~e
you
hired
Kelly
after
all."
He
then
walked
away. Egherman
never took
any
adverse
action against
Johnson
for
hiring
Kelly.
Nor
did
Egherman
ever
threaten
Johnson with
reprisals
for
hiring
Kelly.
In
addition,
Shalk
filled
in for Bailey in
December
while
he went on
vacation.
Wong
testified that
Shalk
told
her Bailey
left
instructions
not to hire
Kelly during
this period.
Shalk
25Kelly was
called to
work on a
regular basis
from
January to the layoffs in July
1981.
64
testified
that
Bailey
never
made
such
a comment
and, moreover,
she never
even
discussed the
subject
with
Wong.
Bailey
also
denied
ever
telling
Shalk
to
not
call
in
Kelly for
work.
I
found
it
highly
unlikely
that
Shalk
made
this
comment
to
Wong.
By
this
point,
the
relationship
between
Wong
and
Shalk
had
deteriorated
tremendously. Shalk
testified
that
Wong
was
even
secretive
about
lighting
information.
Further,
Shalk
was
well
aware
of
Wong's
unpredictable nature
and
that
she
had
a
close relationship
with
Kelly~ Given
these
facts,
it
would
have
been
inviting
sheer aggravation
to
make
such
a comment
to
Wong.
Thus,
I
find
it
very
unlikely the statement
was made.
It
is
true,
however,
that
Kelly
was
not
called
to
work
in
December.
When
asked
about
this at
the
hearing,
Shalk
said
that
she simply
preferred
not to
work
with
him and I
credit
her
on
this
point.
B. The
Events
of
May-July 1981.
Shortly
after
the
meeting
on
May
13,
1981 when
Elliott
announced
there
would be
cuts,
Kelly undertook
an
effort
to
secure
employment
for himself
and Wong.
In
separate meetings
with
Elliott,
Ross and Hubbs, he proposed
that
he and
Wong
be
permitted to share
a
job in the
Museum
after
the
layoffs.
He
outlined
what he
considered to
be
the advantages of
such a
job-sharing arrangement.
While
Elliott,
Ross and Hubbs
listened
to Kelly, they correctly
informed him
that layoffs
would have to
be conducted under University regulations,
and
65
factors such as seniority and employment status considered.
Shortly before the layoffs, Kelly told Ross and Bailey that
he was applying for a permanent position with the San Francisco
Museum of Modern Art. He requested and received a letter of
recommendation from Ross.26
Based on independent conversations they had with Kelly,
both Hubbs ·and Bailey were under the impression that the job in
San Francisco was his for the asking. And, since they did not
hear from him, they assumed he got the job.
During this time the relationship between Kelly and Bailey
was hot and cold. There were occasions when the two men
appeared to work well together, but there were occasions when
they seemed unable to get along at all.27
26There is some dispute about whether Kelly mentioned the
San Francisco job. At one point, he denied that he told Bailey
he was being considered for the San Francisco job. _At another
point he testified that he called Bailey during the last week
in June to tell him he hadn't gotten the job. This
inconsistency undermines Kelly's credibility on this point. If
he hadn't told Bailey he was being considered for the job, why
would he call him to say he hadn't gotten it? Moreover, I find
it likely that Kelly did tell Bailey and Hubbs about the job on
San Francisco because it was not a secret, since he had earlier
requested and received a letter of recommendation from Ross.
27For example, Bailey recalls an incident in June 1981
when Kelly was, extremely angry with him. Kelly had not filled
out his time sheet and they disagreed about his hours of work.
Eventually, they came to an agreement. At some point, however,
Kelly said Bailey could "stick it" or something on that order.
Several days later, Kelly returned and apologized. Bailey then
offered him work and Kelly began immediately. On another
occasion, Bailey scheduled Kelly for two weeks. After Kelly
had worked two days, he told Bailey that he had a more
66
c.
July
27,
1981
Meeting.
On
July
27, 1981,
Kelly
and
Tesluk
met
with
Ross and
Toby.
The
subject
of
on-call
hours
was
discussed.
Ross
said
that
he
had
no
intention
to
deny
Kelly
hours.
According
to
Toby,
Kelly
was
told that
he
was
not
laid
off;
he
was
still
on
the
on-call
list
and would
have
the
same
opportunity
for
on-call
hours as
others
on
tile
list.
However, Toby
said there
was no
guarantee
of
work,
and
it
was
emphasized
that laid-off
career
people
would have
first
crack
at
the
available on-call
hours. Kelly
received
no
on-call
hours
after
the meeting.
Kelly claims
that
during
this
meeting
Ross
offered
him
on-call
hours
in the
future.
I
find
this
to
be
unbelievable.
First,
it
is
unlikely
that
Ross was
in the
position
to
make any
offers
about
future
employment,
given the
fact that
he had been
laid
off
and would no
longer
be around. Secord, the
practice
at
the
Museum was
to
let
the supervisor,
Hubbs
in
this
instance,
have
practically full
authority
over
who
worked and
when
they
worked.
It
would
have been an
unlikely departure
from
past practice
for
Ross,
a lame duck
at this point, to
now
important issue to take care of than doing the job
that
he
was
assigned
and
scheduled to
do.
Bailey
assumed
Kelly needed
to
prepare his
resume
for the
San
Francisco job. Bailey told
Kelly that
the on-call
system works both ways,
suggesting
that
while Kelly
may
have no
real obligation to the
Museum,
neither
did the
Museum have an
obligation to
call
him
for
work.
After
Kelly
left
Bailey's office
on
that date, Bailey
had no
further
contact with him.
67
guarantee Kelly hours. While Ross may have technically had the
authority to make such a statement, given the practice of
assigning hours, it is extremely doubtful that he would have
done so without contacting Hubbs, and he had not done so at the
time of the meeting. Toby's testimony supports this finding.
He said essentially that Kelly was told that, as an on-call
worker, he ~asn't laid off. But he was never guaranteed work.
D. The Events After the July 27 Meeting.
By this time Hubbs had taken over as supervisor. She
testified that as per her earlier meeting with Kelly she was
under the impression that he had gotten the job in
San Francisco. It was not until after the July 27 meeting that
she learned Kelly was still interested in on-call work at the
Museum.
~n September it was time to renew the on-call list. Hubbs
cut the list substantially because there was a great deal less
work, some of the people were no longer interested, and some of
those on the list were unknown to her. Also, Hubbs felt if she
had a relatively small group of on-call workers she could call
them in more frequently, Museum work would be more attractive
to them, and thus the likelihood of their continuing to work at
the Museum rather than seek employment elsewhere would be
increased. Essentially, she wanted a small and reliable core
of efficient on-call workers who would receive more hours under
68
this
arrangement.
During
this
process,
Kelly
was
eliminated
from
the
list.
When
Hubbs
trimmed
the
list
she
was
under
the impression
that
she
would
be
able to
add
to
the
list
in
the futur~
if
necessary.
However,
shortly thereafter
a
hiring
freeze
was
imposed
and
it
became
impossible
to
do
so.
There
were two
reasons Kelly
was
eliminated
from
the
list.
First,
Hubbs
testified
that
after
July
1
there was~
whole
new
approach
in the
Museum.
Cuts
had been
made and
the
whole
operation
trimmed
back.
They were
not going
to
be doing
things
quite
as thoroughly as
in
the
past,
going
the
full
100
percent
to
make
assignments
absolutely
perfect.
She
described
that
the
work would
now
be done
in
a manner which
she
called
"quick
and
dirty,"
a
theater
term
that
means
that
things are
built
only to
last
for
a few
months.
In the
Museum
things
had
been
built,
she
said,
to
last
for years.
The
program
from
now on was
going
to
be quick
and
dirty,
and
she
said
that this
went
against
Kelly's nature.
His
degree
of "finesse"
could
no
longer
be
used.
In
this
regard, several witnesses
testified
about
Kelly's
work. There
seems
to
be no
dispute that
Kelly
was
creative
and
capable of
doing
good work. However,
there
were
other aspects
of his
work
that
were
not always so
useful in the
Museum.
Hubbs and
Bailey
testified that
Kelly
was
overly thorough in
his
work; he was
meticulous
and a
perfectionist.
Hubbs
said
he
69
seemed compelled to develop an alternative approach to
assignments. There were times when these qualities were
useful, but Kelly needed to have a certain amount of restraint
put on him to .minimize his propensity for detail.
Other workers in the Museum echoed Hubbs' and Bailey's
perception of Kellyis work. Shalk said he was overly
meticulous ·and thus put a lot of pressure on other workers when
they were ~orking to meet a deadline. Smiley said Kelly would
undertake to develop a new time-saving device, but in the end
it would take longer than if the exhibit had been installed
without the device. Murphy described Kelly as a person who was
strong-willed and who had no room for shortcuts. Beecroft said
Kelly would take two days to determine how to save fifteen
minutes. Things did not work smoothly when he was on the crew,
according to Beecroft.
The second reason Kelly was eliminated from the list
involved the three-way relationship between Wong, Kelly and
Bailey. Hubbs testified that Wong and Bailey were not getting
along well. She said there was so much tension and friction
between them that they couldn't even be in the same room
together. She reasoned that Kelly would only make the
situation worse. Instead of having two people who couldn't.
work together, she would have three, and she was not interested
in that.
70
From July 1 on, Hubbs' supervisor
. was Jim Elliott. He
never told her whether or not she should hire Kelly. Nor did
Egherman ever try to influence her decision about hiring
Kelly. It was solely up to Hubbs' discretion to decide whether
or not she should hire Kelly.
E. Kelly's Grievance.
On Augu~t 19, 1981, Daniel Kelly filed a grievance. He was
represented by CSEA. The subjects of the grievance were the
so-called "banning" memo of July 20, 1981, and the fact that
Kelly had not received on-call hours since the July 27
meeting. As more fully explained below, Toby rejected the
grievance.
IV. Sam Greyson
On Friday, February 20, 1981, Egherman called an emergency
meeting of all Museum supervisors, including Johnson, Bailey,
Hubbs and Cecelia Franklin, the controller. There ~as a
serious problem with the budget for on-call workers, since it
was half-way through the year and the entire budget had been
spent. The purpose of the meeting was to find ways to reduce
the amount of on-call work that was required for the remaining
six months of the year. During the meeting there was a
discussion about cutting exhibitions, reducing the design
requirements, and generally cutting the amount of work already
planned. It was decided that the on-call workers already
scheduled to work at the Museum would be cancelled. Bailey was
71
able
to
contact
those
on-call
employees
he
had
scheduled
in
the
preparation
department
and
advise
them
that their
assignment
was
cancelled.
Johnson
tried
to
do
the
same
in
the
shop
department, but
he
was
not
entirely
successful.
Greyson
and
Ed
Williams, another
on-call
worker,
had
been
scheduled
by
Johnson
to
work
in the
shop
department for
a
period of
time
beginning
Monday,
February
23, 1981.
Johnson
immediately
made
attempts to
notify
both Williams
and
Greyson
of the
cancellation
of the
project.
Johnson
was
able
to notify
Williams
on
Friday afternoon, but
was
unable
to contact
Greyson. Throughout
the
weekend,
Johnson
made
further attempts
to
contact
Greyson
but
was
unsuccessful.
On
Monday,
February
23, 1981,
when
Greyson
arrived
at
the
Museum
to
begin
work,
Johnson
advised
hi_m
that
Egherman
had
cancelled
the
project.
Johnson
told
him
of the
meeting
held
the previous Friday,
and
of his attempts to notify
him.
Greyson
was
extremely
angry about the
cancellation
and
the lack
of
advance
notice.
Greyson,
who was
paid for
a
half-day's
work
on
February 23,
held
Egherman
responsible.
Upon
learning of the
cancellation,
Greyson
sat
down
at
Johnson's
desk
and
wrote
a
letter
of protest
to
Egherman. The
letter
expressed Greyson's "personal outrage"
at
the
situation
and
referred to
Egherman's "managerial incompetence."
It
asserted that the
Museum
treats
employees
like "chattel(s)
1 and
"non-persons." In
a
direct shot at
Egherman, Greyson wrote
72
that the prevailing joke among on-call workers is that,
... the only apparent benefit to the
Museum of your many hours of managerial
training was to get you out of the Museum
for a few days.
Greyson did not consult with other on-call workers or
request their authorization before he wrote the letter. He
testified that he never asked anyone whether he should write
it. It was his decision, and he alone signed it, although he
claimed at the hearing he wrote it on behalf of other
employees. However, the letter was seen by Wong and Johnson
before it was delivered to Egherman, and both supported it.
Copies of the letter were sent to Barney Bailey, David Ross,
James Elliott and Mark Rosenthal, another management person.
Many other Museum employees subsequently saw the letter.
Greyson said he wrote the letter for three reasons. First,
he anticipated that he would receive on-call work, had relied
on this arrangement, and was upset when he learned that it had
been cancelled. Second, according to Greyson, it had become a
pattern for Museum management to make offers of on-call work,
only to withdraw the work without giving advance notice. Also,
the Museum had in the past called up on-call workers at the
last minute to ask them to come in to work. On-eall workers
had been accustomed to more notice. The third reason was
Greyson's perception of the allegedly poor treatment that Kelly
received. Kelly, however, was not mentioned in the letter.
73
Egherman was
livid
as
a
result
of the
letter.
He
felt
it
was
personally
insulting
because
of the
tone
and
content,
and
because
it
was
sent to
his
supervisor,
his
colleagues
and
his
subordinates.
He
was
particularly
upset
at
the negative
reference to
his
managerial
incompetence.
He
said
he
could
accept
criticism,
but not
insults.
Approximately
10
days
after
he
delivered
the
letter,
Greyson
received the reply
from Egherman
in the mail.
The
reply
began:
You
are
justifiably
angry
for
showing
up
for
work
yesterday
according
to schedule
and
being informed
that
your
services
would
not
be needed
due
to
the withdrawal
of
funds
that
had been
allocated
for
the
project
you
were
to
work
on.
Egherman went
on
to explain
that:
...
the various
Museum
departments function
autonomously
and
that unit supervisors
have
the
authority
and
flexibility
to
determine
how
they
will
meet
the goals
established
for
their
departments. In the case of the
Shop
on-call
program,
Andre manages
it
independently.
I do
not
tell
him
who
to
hire
or
how
to
run
it.
Egherman
described the
meeting
that
had been
held
on
Friday
regarding the
financial
crisis
and
the discussion of the
various
ways
they could reduce the
total
amount
of extra labor
to
complete the
year's exhibition schedule.
Andre
indicated his ability
to
do
the
required
work
without
any
on-call help.
He
did not mention
that
he had
alreadyscheduled people for the next
week. Had he
done
so,
an accommodation would most
74
probably have been made to reduce the
abruptness of the decision.28
Egherman described the on-call program as a two-way
street. It is an opportunity for those involved to pick up
work on a casual basis without having to make a full-time
commitment to a job ..
On-call staff can say yes when they are
available to work and no when they are not.
They are free to pursue other jobs and
school interest.
The final statement in the letter was,
It's a shame that someone who has invested
as much time and energy in the Museum as you
have in the past has chosen to burn bridges
in the way that you have.
Copies of Egherman's letter were sent to Bailey, Elliott,
Johnson, Rosenthal and Ross.
Egherman and Johnson had a short conversation about Greyson
shortly after these two letters were exchanged. Egherman told
,
Johnson that he wanted to meet with Greyson, and he wanted
28There was much conflicting testimony at the hearing
about what was said at the February 20 meeting. Essentially
the conflict centered on the question of whether Johnson said
he had on-call workers already scheduled to work the following
week and on the question of whether Johnson said he could
perform the work in the shop in _the near future with a
considerable cut in on-call help. It is unnecessary to resolve
this dispute, since the theory of charging party's case is that
Greyson's letter to Egherman was protected activity and the
subsequent denial of on-call hours was unlawful retaliation.
There is no contention that the cancellation of work on
February 23 was aimed at Greyson, nor is there a contention
that Greyson was even mentioned at the February 20, meeting.
75
Greyson to make some concessions. Johnson interpreted this
comment to mean Egherman wanted an apology. Johnson responded
by saying that Greyson is a good worker. Johnson described
Greyson, a law student at the time, as a "country lawyer" who
likes to spout off and get things of£ his chest, but things
then return to normal. Egherman responded that he objected to
Greyson's Yetter because it was both public and personal
criticism. Egherman wanted Greyson to_admit that he went
overboard. He encouraged Johnson to communicate to Greyson the
need for a meeting to discuss the situation, but this
apparently did not happen because Egherman had no further
contact with Johnson or Greyson about the incident. Johnson
testified that, at this point, he did not perceive that
Egherman precluded the possibility of Greyson continuing as an
on-call employee.
During the first week of March, Greyson came ba9k into the
shop and discussed the situation with Johnson. Johnson relayed
his. perception of his earlier conversation with Egherman; that
is, that the three of them would have to meet and that Greyson
would have to make concessions. Greyson felt that it would be
better if he waited a while so that Egherman could cool off.
However, he never contacted Egherman.
Later, on more than one occasion Greyson contacted Johnson
in an attempt to get on-call hours, but there was no work
available at the time. On other occasions when work was
76
available,
Johnson
attempted
to
call
Greyson
but,
due
to
Greyson's schedule,
either
he
could not
make
contact
or
Greyson
was
not
available
for
work.
On
another
occasion,
Greyson went
to
the
Museum and
talked
with
Bailey,
who
told
him
that
he
was on
the
preparation
department's
list.
In
fact,
Bailey offered
Greyson
some
work.
Greyson
told
Bailey
he
would
have
to clear
it
with
Egherman.
Bailey said
he
did not
have
to
clear
it
with
Egherman.
He
then
assigned
-Greyson a
half-day
on-call
time.
Greyson
testified
that
in
May
he
heard
of the
layoffs.
He
assumed
that
if
Johnson
was
laid off
he would
not
be
able
to
get
work.
v. Andre
Johnson.
A. 1981
Layoffs
and
Denial
of
On-Call
Work
As a
result
of the l981
cuts,
the
shop
department
was
abolished
and Andre
Johnson
was
laid off.29
From
t~e
date of
29Egherman was
asked
at
the hearing
why
Johnson
wasn'tgiven
a
temporary
layoff as permitted
by
the
University's
regulations rather
than
an
indefinite layoff.
He
cited
two
reasons for the
indefinite layoff.
First,
Egherman
said
a
temporary
layoff suggests
that there is
some
light at
the
end
of the tunnel
and
holds out the
possibility that
the
employee
will
be
recalled.
The
opposite
was
true in the
Museum. The
future
looked dim, and
there
was
little
chance
that
Johnsonwould be
rehired.
Thus,
it
would have been
unfair to Johnsonand
pointless to hold out
this false
hope. Also, given the
circumstances, the temporary
layoff
would have been
converted
into
and
indefinite
one one
at
some
point in the near
future.
Second, Egherman
said the
Museum had
just negotiated
a
seriesof
permanent
cuts with the Vice
Chancellor's office,
and
temporary layoffs
would have been
contrary to the agreement.
77
the staff meeting in May 1981 announcing the layoffs, through
the summer of 1981, Johnson freely discussed his plans with
co-workers. Six witnesses testified at the hearing that
Johnson told them that he intended to collect unemployment and
was not interested in working at the Museum on an on-call
basis. On several occasions prior to his layoff, Johnson
indicated to a number of employees in the Museum that he was
not interested in on-call work. These comments were made to
co-workers in and around the Museum and it appears that it
became well-known as a general fact that Johnson was not
interested in on-call hours. He made it known that he was
interested in pursuing other interests and expressed little
concern about being unemployed.30
In addition, Egherman talked to Johnson about tempqrary
work and told him that he would be called. But Johnson told
Egherman that he didn't want to accept temporary work if it
would jeopardize his rehire rights. Apparently, although
30These witnesses were Smiley, Murphy, Beecroft, Shalk,
Bailey, Hubbs and Egherman. For example, he told Shalk that he
wasn't worried about his future and wanted to spend some free
time. He told Smiley that he was looking forward to being with
his kids at home. He told Murphy he wasn't interested in prep
work because it was too delicate, and he was pursuing the
possibility of opening a grocery store at Shattuck and
Alcatraz. He told Beecroft his wife, who had worked at the
School for the Blind, which moved from Berkeley to Fremont, had
a new job and he wanted to stay home and spend some time with
his kids. He told Egherman, Hubbs and Bailey the same thing,
and said that if he collected unemployment he would be all
right until November.
78
Johnson was under the impression that accepting on-call hours
would jeopardize his recall rights, Eghermen told Johnson that
he didn't believe this was true and suggested that he verify it
with Joe Toby. Egherman testified that it was very clear to
him when they last spoke in June that Johnson did not want
on-call time. In fact, Egherman saw Johnson several times
during the ~ummer, and they talked, but Johnson never mentioned
that he had changed his mind and wanted on-call tim~. The
first notice Egherman received that Johnson wanted on-call work
was when he received a letter from CSEA representative
Michael Bogan.
Hubbs' testimony on this point is consistent with that
given by Egherman. During the last week in May, Hubbs and
Johnson discussed Johnson's future. Hubbs asked everyone in
the shop and preparation department if they would like t9 work
on an on-call basis after July 1. Johnson told her he wasn't
interested. According to Hubbs, he said he was going to
collect unemployment for six months, and then get a full-time
job in January; he said he needed to work around his house and
he wanted to spend time with his kids. Significantly, Johnson
also told Hubbs that he was confused about whether or not
on-call work would affect preferential rehire.
Johnson's version of these conversations is a little
differ~nt. He acknowledged that he had a concern about
preserving his rehire rights, but he did not intend to give the
79
impression that, as a result of this concern, he did not want
on-call hours. Johnson testified that his parting words with
Hubbs were that if there was no problem with rehire rights he
would be available for work.
Johnson made several inconsistent statements about when he
first learned that his acceptance of on-call work would not
affect his ~referential rehire status. First he said he
learned this in late July; then he said it was early August;
and then he said it was mid-July. In any event, after he
learned this, it was not until late August that he informed the
Museum that he would be interested in on-call work.
In late August Egherman received a letter from Bogan
requesting a meeting to discuss Johnson's situation. A
meeting, attended by Egherman, Toby, Bogan and Johnson, was
held on August.24. Egherman expressed surprise that Johnson
had changed his mind and now wanted to work. He asked if
Johnson would accept preparation work at the significantly
lower wage or if he would accept only shop work. Bogan
responded that Johnson wanted work, and refused to specify if
he would accept preparation work.
Johnson filed a grievance on September 2, 1981. He
testified that after he filed the grievance Hubbs called him
and said she had been under the impression that he did not want
to work. According to Johnson, he told Hubbs that,
80
... was not the case, that the only
problem I had was in preferential rehire
rights, and that, in fact, I did want to
work.
According to Hubbs, Johnson complained that she had hired
other people. Hubbs responded that she had done so because he
had told her that he wasn't interested in working. Johnson
said "well, I changed my mind." She asked him why he didn't
let her know that he changed his mind, but he was evasive. He
said that his mother had died and that he was sort of "spaced
out" when he had seen her (Hubbs) earlier in the summer.
At this point, Hubbs had already committed to hiring other
people for the daVinci Exhibit, but told him that she would
hire him as soon as there was another job, which she did.
Since that time she has given him the first choice on all
on-call shop work.
B. Johnson's Treatment as an On-Call Worker
Johnson was put on the on-call list as a building
maintenance worker and received work for the daVinci Exhibit.
By the time he began work, however, the on-call crew for that
exhibit had already been hired, and Clausen, a former full-time
employee of the shop, and Beecroft, a work-study student, had
been chosen by Hubbs as the "lead" workers on the project.
Prior to the reorganization, Johnson supervised these workers.
Johnson testified that on his first day at work Beecroft
explained to him and to Ed Williams their assigned duties, as
well as the current chain of command. Beecroft explained that
81
the chain of command was, in order, Hubbs, Clausen, Beecroft
and then Johnson and Williams. Although Johnson felt that he
had to go along with this, it didn't sit well that he would be
supervised by Clausen and Beecroft.
On Johnson's first day back at work, he asked Beecroft to
find someone, presumably with less experience, to remove some
garbage, a ·task which he apparently felt was beneath his level
of skill. Beecroft told him that if he wanted it removed he
would have to do it himself. Subsequently, Williams and
Johnson took out the garbage. Johnson conceded during his
testimony that everyone on the job took out the trash. Several
similar incidents regarding such assignments as taking out the
trash and vacuuming occurred. In general, Johnson felt he
received less skilled job assignments than other workers who
had less experience.
Johnson also testified about an incident involving
skylights. Clausen told Johnson to perform the skylight work
in a certain way. She felt this hadn't been done, but when she
questioned him about why he hadn't done the job in the way she
suggested, an unpleasant exchange occurred. She told Johnson
that he was argumentative, that he was trying to start a fight,
and that he should perform the job in the manner that she had
instructed. This did not sit well with Johnson.
According to Johnson, he and Williams felt physically
isolated from other employees. Hubbs testified that she never
82
saw Johnson isolated. He worked in the galleries, -mainly with
Ed Williams. She testified that it would have been pointless
to hire him and then restrict him in that manner.
Beecroft testified that Hubbs never asked her to isolate
Williams or Johnson from the other employees. In the Museum
employees usually work on teams, and Johnson and Williams were
a team tha~ worked well with the rest of the people. Beecroft
said that she never intentionally "isolated" Johnson or
Williams. On occasion, they were isolated with her in
performing certain duties. However, she said that on these
occasions it was because they were involved in many different
activities and the isolation was due to the nature of the work
being performed.
Johnson testified that in late September, while he was at
work, Beecroft told him not to associate with Wong because she
was involved in union activities. Beecroft denied ~hat she
made such a statement. She said that she and Johnson once
talked about the instant unfair practice charge. During the
conversation she told him that there are two sides to every
story and he should not be taken in by one side or the other.
Given the tenuous relationship between Beecroft and Johnson at
this point, it seems unlikely that Beecroft would take it upon
herself to advise Johnson as to who he should associate with.
Furthermore, the statement -consists of a comment from one
non-supervisory employee to another. As such, even if it is
83
found
that
Beecroft
made
the statement,
it
would
have
no
bearing
on
this
case in
the
absence
of
any
evidence
that
Hubbs
or
some
other
management
official
put Beecroft
up
to
it.
C.
Johnson's
Grievance.
On
September 2, 1981, Johnson
filed
his
first
grievance.
He
challenged
the
layoff
itself
and
the
denial of
work.
Johnson
filed
another grievance
on
October
21, 1981.
This
grievance pertained to
adverse
letters
that
had
been
placed in
Johnson's personnel
file
during
1975
and
1976.
The
University's
responses to these grievances are discussed
below.
VI. General
Credibility
Observations
Adrienne
Wong,
the charging
party's
chief witness,
was
not
a
particularly
credible
one.
On
direct
examination she
was
relaxed
and
gave
lengthy
detailed
answers
to questions
asked
by
her
representative.
But
on
cross-examination her
demeanor
changed.
She became
guarded with her
answers
and
djsplayed
a
selective
memory. When
the questioning got
tough she even shed
tears
in
a manner
that
did not
strike
me
as
particularly
genuine.
The
tears
seemed
out of character
for
Wong, who had
been through
many
tough
battles
with Bailey
and
others,
seemingly without
a
hint
of
such emotion.
In addition,
Wong's
testimony
on many
occasions
was
evasive, exaggerated, inconsistent, distorted
or
inherently
unbelievable.31
When
asked
if
she knew
that
Kelly
was
3lr will set forth
some examples to support these
84
pursuing a job at a museum in San Francisco, she replied that
she didn't know. Given the relationship between Wong and Kelly
and the circumstances at the time Kelly was seeking this job, I
find it completely unbelievable that Wong was not aware of his
efforts. On another occasion she testified that on the day of
the elevator incident other employees placed works of art on
the elevator and left them there unattended. If true, this
statement would indicate that her conduct in this regard was
not out of the ordinary. But when pressed on the matter she
conceded that employees had placed works of art on the elevator
unattended but, significantly, had not closed the door as she
had. Thus, in the examples in her testimony no danger was
presented. In a similar vein, she testified that when Bailey
found her on the telephone he told her she was not permitted to
call her representative, the implication being that Bailey
attempted to block her from contacting the union
representative. But when pressed on the point, she conceded
that what Bailey actually said was that she should not call her
representative on work time. This puts Bailey's comments in an
entirely different light.
observations. However, the examples are by no means
all-inclusive. The record is replete with instances where Wong
testified in this manner. In addition, it is noted that this
section on credibility does not include resolution of all
credibility matters in the case. Other credibility matters are
resolved, as necessary, throughout the decision at appropriate
places.
85
In her classification appeal she called herself a
supervisor, a designation which she surely did not have. She
also claimed that her lighting, at least in part, entitled her
to the reclassification. In a disingenious ~ttempt to
underscore her lighting work, she introduced her timesheets for
December 1980, January 1981 and February 1981, which showed
that she worked on lighting for over 50 percent of the time in
those months. Based on these timesheets ?he testified that she
worked over 50 percent of her time in lighting and was thus
entitled to be reclassified. But when pressed on this figure,
she conceded that she chose these three months because they
were the highest. In fact, when .the complete picture is looked
at, it becomes clear that Wong averaged only 34 percent of time
performing lighting duties. She was obviously at all times
aware of this fact.
Wong's testimony becomes even more suspect when viewed in
comparison with the testimony given by several of her
co-workers. Although the testimony of co-workers was not
without minor defects, Shalk, Beecroft, Smiley and Murphy were
all generally credible witnesses. They were direct in their
answers and appeared on the stand as employees who were
genuinely interested in participating in the hearing, even
though it was not the most pleasant experience for them. They
were all disinterested in that they had no stake in the case.
In fact, Shalk no longer worked in the Museum.
86
Contrary
to
Wong,
each
of these witnesses
said
that
in
the
past
they
saw
women
move
the
tool
cart
and/or
airlift
down a
ramp
alone.
Some
of these
workers
even
said
they
saw
Wong
do
it.
I
find
it
significant that
four
credible
witnesses
(excluding
Bailey,
Hubbs and
even
Kelly)
would
contradict
Wong
on
this
point.
The same
can be
said
about performing
the
so-called
menial
tasks. Practically
every
witness
who
testified at
the hearing
said
all
workers performed
these
tasks.
Wong
alone claims
that
she
was
singled
out
to
do
this
work
in
a
discriminatory
manner.
It
is
hard
to accept her claim in the face of
such
overwhelming
opposition,
and
it
also severely
undermines
her
credibility.
~urther,
Wong
testified at
great
length
about the
problems
stemming from
the
so-called
lack
of
clarification
of job
duties.
Shalk, the only
other career preparator,
t~stified
that
there
was no
such problem. Since Shalk
was a much more
believable witness, there is
no
choice but to
discredit
Wong.
Shalk
(and
Bailey)
also
testified that
Bailey did not
tell
her
and
Wong
that
the
AFSCME
dues were $100 a month,
as
Wong
claims.
Such a
statement
would have been
preposterous, given
the fact that
the figure is
exaggerated
and
Wong
herself
could
have checked
it
out with
a
single
phone
call.
Moreover,
Wong
implied that Bailey,
by
this statement, sought to discourage
her
from
joining
AFSCME.
But
this
makes no
sense, since
it
was
87
Bailey who had become .the point man in the wage-lag matter, and
it was Bailey who suggested going to the union in the first
place.
Kelly's testimony, while slightly more convincing than
Wong's, nevertheless suffered from similar flaws. For example,
he testifi~d with certainty that Bailey was responsible for
damage whicb occurred to the Jenny painting, yet he was not
disciplined. If left to stand, this testimony would have
assisted Wong's disparate treatment argument with respect to
the suspension arising out of the Davis painting incident.
However, when challenged on cross-examination, Kelly testified
that he was not absolutely certain that it was Bailey who
caused the cracks in the Jenny painting. Moreover, with
respect to the discipline, he changed his testimony to say that
to his knowledge Bailey was not disciplined. These significant
qualifications cast serious doubt on Kelly as a witness
because, in my view, he must have known when he testified on
direct that, in fact, he was not sure Bailey did the damage to
the Jenny painting, nor was he sure that Bailey was not
disciplined.
Furthermore, in my view, Kelly's manner of testifying in
the end had the effect of making most of what he said
unconvincing. Even when questions called for short direct
answers, he consistently insisted on lengthy explanations which
frequently contained irrelevant material and ultimately served
88
only to
cloud the
issues.
Because
of
his
propensity to
do
this
rather
than
respond
directly
he
left
me
with
the
overall
impression
that
he
was
being
evasive.
This
casts
considerable
doubt
on
the
veracity
of
most
of
what he had
to
say.
Lastly,
Bailey
and Hubbs
were
also credible
witnesses.
Both
displayed
a
calm
demeanor on
the
stand.
They
answered
questions
directly
and
with
clarity,
frequently emphatically
making
a
point in
a manner which
impressed
me
as
truthful.
Also,
I
find
little
or
no
inherent
inconsistencies
or
improbabilities
in
what
they
had
to
say
about the
central
points
litigated
here.
In
sum,
they
were
both
good
witnesses.
ISSUES
1.
Whether
the
UAM
unlawfully
interfered
with,
discriminated against
or
retaliated
against
Adrienne
Wong
by
any
of
the following
actions:32
32The
allegation that
the
November 1980
evaluation,
incorporating
certain
attached
memos,
constituted
retaliation
for
Wong's
protected
activity
was
included in the
original
charge
which was
dismissed
by a
PERB
hearing
officer
on
September 23, 1981. Charging
party did not appeal
thatdismissal,
nor
did
it
include these
allegations
in the
two
lengthy
amendments
submitted
prior to hearing.
Although
the
charge
was
again
amended
at
the
outset of the hearing,
that
amendment
included only the
allegations that
the
1981
layoff
and
the June 15,
1981
letter
of
reprimand were
in
retaliation
for
Wong's
protected conduct in
1980. (Vol.
I;
pp. 8-10.)
Also, the
November 3
evaluation as well as the attachments
thereto
occurred
more
than six
months
before the
filing of the
original
charge in
September 1981. Thus, while the
November 1980
evaluation, including the attachments,
may be
considered as background evidence, these actions cannot be
considered as separate violations,
and
the arguments in
charging party's brief to the contrary are rejected.
89
A. The
July
1981
layoff;
B.
The
June 12,
1981
letter
about
"specifications";
c. The
June 16,
1981
performance
evaluation;
D.
The
July
16 and
20,
1981
letters
regarding
keys;
E.
The
July
1981 memos
regarding
lighting
files,
use
of
the
Xerox
machine
and
other
copying
of
files;
F;
The
elevator incident
suspension;
G.
The
installation
of
telephone locks;
H. The
September
14,
1981
confrontation regarding
representation;
I.
The
assignment
to
sand frames
in
September 1981;
J.
The
denial of access to the
UAM
during the
daVinci
exhibit;
K.
The
withdrawal
of
Grand
Master
Key
privileges;
L. The
September 29,
1981
confrontation regarding
Wong's
call
to Tesluk;
M.
The
assignment
of
menial
tasks;
N. The
Chinese fan
incident;
o. The
denial of representation at
the
desk
audit;
P.
The
reclassification
.denial;
Q. The
tool cart
incident;
R. The
1982
layoff;
s.
The
refusal to process grievances.
2. Whether
the
UAM
unlawfully interfered with,
discriminated against or
retaliated against Daniel Kelly by
90
either of the following actions:33
A. The denial of on-call work after July 1, 1981; or
B. The refusal to process grievances.
3. Whether the UAM unlawfully interfered with,
discriminated against, or retaliated against Sam Greyson by
denying him on-call work after February 23, 1981?
4. Whether the UAM unlawfully interfered with,
discriminated against or retaliated against Andre Johnson by
any of the following actions:34
33At the outset of the hearing the charging party moved
to amend the charge to include the allegation that Kelly engaged
in protected activities from January to August 1980, and in
retaliation he was denied on-call hours on several· occasions
leading up to July 1981. This allegation was part of the
original charge that was dismissed by a PERB hearing officer.
The dismissal was not appealed and, despite several subsequent
comprehensive amendments, the allegations were never reinstated
by the charging party. The motion to amend was denied on the
record for two reasons. First, some of the acts of retaliation
were time-barred. Second, because the charging party had
ignored these allegations throughout the long procedural
history leading up to the hearing, including the dismissal and
two subsequent amendments, the respondent was not fairly on
notice that it would have to defend against these allegations.
Thus, permitting the amendment at such a late date would be
unduly prejudicial. Charging party noted no objection to this
ruling. (Vol. I, pp. 7-8.) To the extent evidence was taken
about events before July 1981, it was taken for purpose of
background information only and not for the purpose of
litigating the issues in the proposed amendment which was
denied. For these reasons, the lengthy arguments presented in
charging party's brief about Kelly's actions and alleged
reprisals prior to July 1981 are not considered as independent
charges. ·
34The original charge contained the allegation that the
Museum in June 1981 subcontracted work involving the building
of crates, rather than give it to Johnson. Although this
91
A. The 1981 layoff;
B. The denial of on-call work immediately after the
layoff;
C. The treatment as an on-call employee; or
D. The refusal to process grievances.
DISCUSSION
I. Introau·ction
Section 357l{a) of the Act prohibits discriminatory action
against an employee for engaging in conduct protected by the
HEERA. In Novato Unified School District (4/30/82) PERB
Decision No. 210, the Board set forth the standard by which
charges alleging discriminatory conduct under section 3571(a)
are to be decided. The Board summarized its test in a decision
under HEERA issued the same day as Novato:
•.. a party alleging a violation •.. has
the burden of making a showing sufficient to
support the inference that protected conduct
was a "motivating factor" in the employer's
decision to engage in the conduct of which
allegation was dismissed by a PERB hearing officer and never
formally reinstated by the charging party, a limited amount of
evidence concerning this issue was presented at the hearing.
Since the matter was not fully litigated, this issue will not
be addressed here. San Ramon Unified School District (8/9/82)
PERB Decision No. 230. However, it is worth noting that the
limited testimony offered on this point indicates that the UAM
did not act improperly. Johnson was asked to build the crates,
but he declined, saying that since he was to be laid off he
didn't want to undertake the project and then be forced to
leave it half-done. Also, the evidence showed that shop work
had on occasion been subcontracted in the past. It was under
these circumstances that the work was subcontracted.
92
the employee complains. Once this is
established, the burden shifts to the
employer to demonstrate that it would have
taken the same action even in the absence of
protected conduct. As noted in Novato, this
shift in the burden of producing evidence
must operate consistently with the charging
party's obligation to establish an unfair
practice by the preponderance of the
evidence •. (California State University,
Sacramento (4/30/82) PERB Decision No. 211-H
at pp . 13-14 • )
The test adopted by the Board is consistent with precedent
in California and under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
requiring the trier of fact to weigh both direct and
circumstantial evidence in order to determine whether an action
would not have been taken against an employee but for the
exercise of protected rights. See, e.g., Martori Brothers
Distributors v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981)
29 Cal.3d 721, 729-730; Wright Line, Inc. (1980) 251 NLRB 150
[105 LRRM 1167] enf., in part, (1st Cir. 1981) 662 F.2d 899
[108 LRRM 2513] .35
Hence, assuming a prima facie case is presented, an
employer carries the burden of producing evidence that the
action "would have occurred in any event." Martori Brothers
35The construction of similar or identical provisions of
the NLRA, as amended, 29 o.s.c. 151 et seq., may be used to
guide interpretation of the EERA. See, e.g., San Die o
Teachers Assn. v. Superior Court (1979) 12 Cal.3d 1,2-13; 1
Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608,
616. Compare section 357l(a) of the Act with section 8(a) (3)
of the NLRA, also prohibiting discrimination for the exercise
of protected rights.
93
Distributors
v.
Agricultural
Labor
Relations
Bd.,
supra,
29
Cal.3d
at
730.
Once
employer
misconduct
is
demonstrated,
the employer's
action,
...
should
not
be
deemed an
unfair
labor
practice
unless the
Board
determines
that
the
employee
would
have been
retained
"but
for"
his
union
membership
or
his
performance
of other protected
activities.
(Ibid.)
It
is
under
this
test
that
the
Museum's
conduct
will
be
analyzed.
II.
Adrienne
Wong.
A. Pre-CSEA
Activities.
The
Charging
Party's brief
summarizes
Wong
1 s pre-CSEA
activities
as
follows. In the spring of
1980
she
met
with
Bailey
to
discuss
clarification
of her
responsibilities
in the
department.
Her
basic
complaint
was
that
her assignments'had
been taken
away
at
the
last
minute.
Later,
according to the
Charging
Party,
she
discussed
with
Bailey
(and Toby)
job
description
cards for
employees
in the department along with
more
general concerns, including the
fact that on-call
employees
did not receive fringe benefits.
On
at least
one
occasion Kelly joined
Wong when
she met
with
Toby. The
wage-lag problem
was
also discussed,
and, as
more
fully
described in the statement of
facts,
she
actively
worked
to
remedy
the
wage
problem along with Shalk
and
Bailey.
Section
3565
of
HEERA
states
in relevant part:
94
Higher education employees shall have the
right to form, join and participate in the
activities of employee organizations of
their own choosing for the purpose of
representation on all matters of
employer-employee relations and for the
purpose of m~eting and conferring.
To find any of Wong's actions protected under this section,
it must be found that she actively participated in an employee
organization, and that the organization existed for the purpose
of representation r.egarding matters of employer-employee
relations. See Monsoor v. State of California, Department of
Developmental Services (7/28/82) PERB Decision No. 228-S
(hereafter Monsoor). Under the Act an employee organization is
defined in section 3562(g) as,
•.. any organization of any kind in which
higher education employees participate and
which exists for the purpose, in whole or in
part, of dealing with higher education
employers concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, hours and other terms and
conditions of employment of employees .•. , .
Taking guidance from the private sector, the Board has
interpreted similar language under the State Employer-Employee
Relations Act to mean that a given aggregation of employees, to
be considered an employee organization, need not be formally
constituted, have formal membership requirements, hold regular
meetings, have constitutions or by-laws, or in any other manner
conform to the common definition of an "organization." Rather,
the Board placed the central focus on whether the group has, as
a key purpose, the representation of employees on
95
employment-related matters. Monsoor, supra, p. 7. Under this
test, the Board observed that even two employees who act in
concert to present grievances about cuts in overtime and loss
of jobs may be viewed to have constituted themselves an
employee organization because they had joined together to
represent employees concerning working conditions. It follows
that interfering with even two employees who engage in such
activity has the effect of discouraging e~ployees in general
from continuing to act in concert through an employee
organization. Ohio Oil Company (1951) 92 NLRB 1597
[27 LRRM 1288] cited with approval in Monsoor, supra.
Under this approach, we need not consider the full range of
Wong's pre-CSEA conduct in order to determine that she engaged
in the requisite protected activity to satisfy the first step
under the Novato test. Wong's actions with respect to the
wage-lag effort were protected. Wages is clearly a_working
condition of concern to employees. Unlike most of her other
actions, the efforts here were clearly in concert with at least
two other nonsupervisory employees, Shalk and Kelly. In
July 1980 Wong and Kelly met with Toby and discussed, among
other things, the wage inequity problem. Also in July 1980,
Wong and Shalk met with Bailey to discuss the same issue.
These meetings were well known to other employees who stood to
benefit if the wage-lag problem was successfully pursued. As a
result of these meetings a substantial effort was undertaken.
96
Since the matter at issue involved the wages of all employees,
and since many employees were aware of these efforts as a
result of discussions with Wong, it can be said that Wong acted
with at least the implied authority of these workers. Together
with Bailey, Wong and Shalk collected information and prepared
a proposal to be presented to the appropriate University body.
Although Bailey made the representation, Wong and Shalk were
present and their efforts leading up to the presentation were
not insubstantial. Therefore, it is concluded that, although
many of the issues Wong raised were personal in nature, she
engaged in the activity required to bring her within the
protections of the Act.36
However, there is no evidence that the Museum's pre-CSEA
conduct about which the charging party complain~ was connected
to this protected activity, or, for that matter, to any of
Wong's other activities, ev~n assuming they are pro~ected.
While it is abundantly clear that Wong and Bailey had a rocky
36Because of this finding, it is unnecessary to address
the question of whether other activities connected to
clarification of duties, job description cards, fringe benefits
for on-call employees, etc. were protected. It is noted,
however, that with respect to most of these activities Wong
testified that she talked with other employees. ·However, the
record established by the charging party is lacking as to
whether Won~ acted with other employees or with the requisite
express or implied authority of these other employees to make
her conduct concerted. See Meyers Industries, Inc. (1984)
268 NLRB No. 73 [ LRRM ]. Thus, it is doubtful that
these actions are protected-.--
97
relationship,
it
is
equally
clear
that their
difficulties
were
not the
result
of
Wong's
protected
activity
or
Bailey's
unlawful
motive.
Bailey
and
Wong
fell
on
hard times almost
immediately
after
her
return
from
Japan,
and
long
before
Wong
did
anything
that
can
even
remotely
be
considered
protected
activity.
Upon
her
return,
Wong
became
upset
because Shalk
had
begun
to
play
more
of
a
role
in
the department.
I
believe
Bailey's
characterization
of
Wong
as
feeling
"betrayed''
is
an
accurate
one.
She
began
to
assert that
her
duties
needed
clarification,
an
assertion that
Shalk
and Murphy
dispute.
And
she
claimed
she should
be
reclassified.
Both
of these
complaints
were
unfounded
in
my
view.
Nevertheless, in conjunction
with
these
claims,
she
protested
to
Toby
that
Bailey
was
treating
her
unfairly:
he
favored
certain
people,
she
said,
and
she
was
not
one
of
them. Thus,
it
seems
that
Bailey
and
Wong
djd not get
along beginning
from
the
time she
returned
from
Japan.
Simply
put,
Wong
was
not
an
easy perso~ to
work
with.37 This
fact,
not protected
conduct,
was
the source of the tension.
The
record
is replete
with examples which
demonstrate the
difficulties
Bailey
had
with
Wong. For example,
despite the
37The same
thing
may be
said about
Wong's
relationshipwith her coworkers. Aside from
the fact that
they repeatedly
contradicted her testimony
at
the hearing, they described her
personality
as moody and not very easy to
work
with.
98
fact
that
Bailey refused
to grant
her
time
off
to
draft
her
employee development
plan,
she
wai_ted
until
the
last
minute
to
complete
the
draft
and
took time
off
anyway. The
attachments
to
her
November
3,
1980
evaluation,
as
well as
Wong's
rebuttal,
show
that
on
occasion
Wong
refused to attend
staff
meetings
because
she
unilaterally
determined
her
priorities
were
elsewhere
at
the time, or
she
disappeared
from
the
worksite
without apparent reason.
When
Bailey
asked
her to help
uncrate
the
Pomodoro
exhibit,
she
protested
that
it
was
"shit
work."
Other
examples
of the
difficulties
Bailey
had
in
working
with
Wong
are
set
forth
in the statement of
facts.
It
would
serve
no
useful
purpose
to again
describe
them
here;
nor
would
it
serve
any
useful
purpose
to assess
blame
for these
incidents,
as
most
of
them
boiled
down
to
petty
work-place
disagreements.
Suffice
it
to
say
that
these
problems
were
representative of
the
not
uncommon
situation
where an employee and he~
supervisor
simply are not able to
work
together
smoothly
for reasons
related
to
what
may
be
described as
differences in
style,
approach
to the
work,
personality, etc.
In
my
view,
the
problems Bailey
and
Wong
experienced
do
not suggest
an
unlawful
motive.
And
there
exists
no
concrete evidence in the record
from which I
am
prepared to infer
such a
motive. Therefore,
it
is
concluded
that the charging party
has not established
a
prima facie case under Novato with respect to the
pre-CSEA
allegations.
99
But
even assuming
that,
regarding the
Museum's pre-CSEA
complained-of conduct,
a
prima
facie
case
had
been
proved, the
Charging
Party's
case
does
not
stand
up
in
the face
of the
Museum's
reasons for
its
actions.
The
outstanding
allegations
of
unlawful
activity
which
occurred
prior
to
the
time
Wong
was
first
represented
by
CSEA
on
June 29,
1982
are
(1)
the
June
12
letter,
(2)'
the
June
16
evaluation,
and (3)
the
July
1981
layoff.
Each
of these
will
be
considered in order.38
1.
The
June 12,
1981
Letter:
My
best
understanding of the
Charging
Party's
argument
concerning
this
letter
is
as
follows.
Prior
to
June 12, both
Wong
and
Bailey
knew
the
wage-lag
proposal
had
been
turned
down.
Consequently, Bailey
somehow "knew"
that
Wong
would
reinstate
her
efforts
to pursue the
reclassification
process,
which
she
had
temporarily given up. For
some
reason,
even
though
Bailey favored the
wage-lag
proposal,
he opposed Wong's
pursuit
of the
reclassification
issue
and he
issued the June
12
letter
as
a
reprisal
for
initiating
the
reclassification
proposal in the
first
place.
Also, Charging
Party urges
a
38This charge
was
filed
on September 18, 1981. Thus,
Charging Party
acknowledges
that reprisal actions
taken before
March
18,
1981
are time-barred.
However,
it
asserts that
the
July
15,
1980 memo,
the September 16,
1980 memo, and
the
November
3,
1980
evaluation should be
considered as independent
violations
because they
were
not placed in
Wong's
personnel
until July
31, 1981. This argument
is rejected, since
I
file
have already
found
that Bailey never agreed to withdraw the
November 3
evaluations
and
the attachments. Thus, these
charges are time-barred.
100
finding
that
the
letter
was
issued as
a
"warning"
to
Wong
not
to
seek
a
reclassification
in the
future.
Even
if
the
facts
as
characterized
by
the
Charging
Party
in
making
this
argument
are
true,
I
find
the
argument
to
be
unpersuasive. Bailey
is
the
one
who
became
the lead person in
the
wage-lag
issue,· not only for
his
own
benefit,
but
also
because he.genuinely believed
employees
were
underpaid.
It
was
Bailey
who
encouraged
Wong
and
Shalk
to
go
to
the union
and
seek
its
expertise
on
the
matter.
And
it
was
Bailey, not
Wong
or
Shalk,
who
actually
went
to
AFSCME
and
sought
assistance,
dutifully
reporting
back
to
Wong
with
the information.
It
would
strain
credulity
to
now
find
that
Bailey
had
completely
changed
his
view
about the
pay
inequity
situation
in the
Museum
and had
turned
to issuing
letters
such
as
this
in
reprisal
for
Wong's
reclassification efforts.
In
addition,
under Charging
Party's
argument,
for the
June
12
letter
to
be
an
unlawful
reprisal
under
the
Act,
Wong's
attempt
at reclassification
would
have
to
be
considered
protected
conduct. Indeed, Charging
Party
asserts that this
conduct
is protected.
The
best
evidence
of
Wong's
efforts
to
be
reclassified is
found
in her written reclassification
proposal
which she
eventually finally
submitted to
Toby on June 30, 1981. The
proposal is
a
lengthy
and
detailed
document which
sets forth
her individual duties
and
percentages of time she spent on
101
those
duties.
Despite
Wong's
self-serving
testimony
to
the
contrary,
it
is clearly
an
attempt
to
get
herself
classified
to
the
principal
preparator
level.
Given
that
the information
therein is
so
unique
to
Wong's
personal
situation,
it
is
not
likely
that other
employees, such
as Shalk,
would
benefit
even
if
Wong
was
successful
and
ultimately
reclassified.
Indeed,
in
the proposal
itself,
Wong
claimed
that
she
supervised
Shalk
and
15
other
on-call preparators.
Based
on
the
foregoing,
I
conclude
that
the
reclassification effort
was
undertaken
solely
for
her
own
benefit
and
thus
was
not
protected
conduct.
Therefore,
even
if
Bailey's
June
12
memo was a
reprisal
for
this
conduct,
it
did not
violate
the Act.
With
respect to
the
specifics
of the
letter,
Charging
Party
acknowledges
that
Wong
knew
what
"specifications"
meant.
However,
citing
Wong's
testimony,
it
argues
that
Bailey did
not
ask
Wong
for the
"details,"
but rather
asked
her
why
they
needed
specifications,
and she
told
them
she
didn't
know.
According
to
Charging
Party's
argument,
it
would
have been
absurd for Bailey
to
ask
Wong
about the
details
of the
test
since
Wong
had
already told
him
that
they needed
specifications,
thus
indicating that details
were
not
yet
available.
I
agree,
and
it
is precisely
because such
a
statement
would have been
unlikely that
I
conclude Bailey did
not ask for
details
of the
test.
Rather,
it
seems more
logical
to
me
that Bailey asked
Wong
what
specifications
were needed,
102
and
she
refu$ed
to
answer,
thus
prompting
the
letter.
And,
although the
memo
is inartfully
drafted,
it
does
clearly
say
that
Bailey requested
certain
"information,"
as well as
"details,"
from
Wong.
It
is
for
these
reasons
that
I
credit
Bailey's
testimony
to
the
effect
that
Wong
defiantly
refused to
give
him
information
she
had,
thus
necessitating
his
call
to
facilities-
In
sum,
I
conclude
that
the
June
12
letter
was
nothing
more
than another
incident
arising
out
of
Wong's and
Bailey's
stormy
relationship.
There
was
no
unlawful motive
present,
nor can
it
be
said
that
this
letter
violated
the
Act
in
any
way.
2.
The
June 16,
1981
Evaluation.
As
with the
June
12
memo,
Charging
Party argues
that
the
June
16
evaluation
was
a
reprisal
action
taken because
of
Wong's
efforts to
"gain
reclass
for
herself
and
others."
For
the
reasons
set
forth
in the preceding secti.on,
it
is
concluded
that
the
reclassification
was
unprotected.
Thus,
this
argument
is
rejected.
In an
attempt
to
support
its
argument
that
the evaluation
is
somehow
tainted,
Charging
Party points to the
fact that
no
mention
of
Wong's
lighting duties is
found
in the evaluation.
It
also points
out
that there are
no comments
in the evaluation
which
specifically
support the ratings
given
Wong
in the
various categories~ instead, there are only general
comments
about not getting
along with people.
103
It is true that the negative ratings are not supported by
specific comments in the evaluation itself. To the extent that
the evaluation does not include such comments, it may be said
to be deficient. When asked about this point at the hearing,
Bailey first testified that Wong wouldn't discuss the
evaluation with him. Because there was no discussion he
couldn't remember any specifics to support the ratings.
However, when pr.essed on this point, Bailey cited several
examples of incidents where Wong either refused to carry out an
assignment, complained about an assignment, or wasted time
during an assignment. According to Bailey, this conduct
affected her performance in all the listed categories. In my
view, Bailey's explanation on this matter is less than might be
expected from a supervisor who gives an employee a negative
evaluation. And it is certainly perferable to include such
comments on the evaluation itself, even if the employee refuses
to discuss it. The evaluation, therefore, is deficient in
these respects. However, these deficiencies, standing alone,
do not transform the evaluation into an illegal reprisal.
As to Wong's lighting duties, Bailey correctly explained
that they were covered under the rating he gave in the category
"in-stallation." He further explained that as many as five
people were involved in lighting during the evaluation period,
and, therefore, the amount of time Wong spent doing lighting
was not great. The Charging Party, in its brief, has not
104
challenged
Bailey's
explanations
on
these
points.
Based
on
the
foregoing,
I
conclude
that
the
June
16
evaluation
has
been
sufficiently
substantiated
and
thus cannot
be
viewed
as
an
illegal
reprisal
under
the
Act.
3.
The
July
1981
Layoff.
It
is
clear that
a
valid financial
reason
existed
for
reducing tpe
staff
in
the
shop
and
preparation
departments
and
reorganizing
those departments
into
the
new
installation
department.
Also,
the
Charging
Party
concedes
that
the
layoff
rules
embodied
in the
SPP
were
followed
to
the
extent
that
career
employees were
laid off
in
accordance with
their
seniority,
and
there
were
no
vacant
positions into
which
these
career
employees
could
have been
transferred.
Charging
Party
contends, nevertheless, that
the
layoff rules set
forth in
SPP
760.5,
which
give preference
to career
employees
over
casual
employees,
are applicable here
and
that
they
have
not
been followed.
That
section
states
in relevant
part:
Department
Head.
The
department head
shall
determine
when
indefinite
or
temporary
layoffs are necessary
due
to lack of
work
or
lack of funds.
The
department head
shall
minimize
indefinite layoffs
from
career
positions
by
first
reviewing the
necessityfor existing casual
and
casual/restrictedpositions within the department
....
·After the layoff,
Wong
worked
half-time.
Other employees
were
called in
to
~ork on
an
on-call basis.
According
to the
Charging Party, since
Wong was
available for additional
work
105
(beyond
her
.50
position)
which
was
performed
by
these
on-call
employees
after
the
layoff, section
760.5
was
violated.
Based
on
this
violation,
the
Charging
Party
contends
that
an
unlawful
motivation
should
be
inferred.
This
argument
is
unconvincing.
Even
if
Charging
Party
is
correct that
SPP
section
760.5
has
not
been followed,
in
the
absence o~
any
showing
of
disparate
treatment or
that
the
Museum's
actions
were
pretextual,
it
cannot be concluded
on
this
record
that
the
Act
has
been
violated.
Charging
Party
has
shown
neither.
As
more
fully
explained
below,
it
has
shown
only
that
there
may
have been
an
alternative
approach
to
the
assignment of
work
after
the
layoff.
As
to
the merits of
Charging
Party's
contention,
a
fair
reading of
SPP
section
760.5
is that,
in order
to
minimize
the
impact
of
layoff
on
career
employees,
the
Museum
was
first
obligated to consider
whether
on-call
employees were
needed.
If
on-call
employees
were
not
needed
to
perform
the
work,
the
Museum
would
presumably have
the
obligation to
employ
the
career
employees
in
some
reduced
capacity and/or otherwise
offer
them
the equivalent of full-time
work on an
on-call
basis. If,
however,
after
considering the
need
for
on-call
employees, the
Museum
determined
that
they were·needed
to
perform the
work,
it
would be
free to continue to
employ them,
even though such
a
decision
impacted
negatively
on
the career
employees involved. Thus, the
Museum
had to balance the need
106
for
on-call
employees
against
the
protection
of career
employees.
Under
this
reading
of
SPP
section
760.5,
I
conclude
that
the
obligation
placed
on
the
Museum
by
that
section
was
fulfilled.39
The
record evidence
shows
that,
due
to the nature
of
some
of
the ass
ignrnents
,·
it
was
not
feasible
to
limit
the
staff
to
a
few
full-time
career
employees,
and
exclude
on-call
help.40
Due
to
the
highly
fluctuating
work
during the
exhibition
schedule, the
Museum
needed
the
flexibility
to
employ
large
numbers
of
employees
on
short notice
for
short
periods
of
time.
In
addition,
it
was
desirable to
have
some
career
39This
conclusion
is
based
on
the
assumption
that on-call
employees
in the
Museum
are
covered
by
the
SPP
generally
and
by
section
760.5
specifically,
an
assumption with
which
there
is
some
disagreement.
In
essence, the
Charging
Party argues
that
on-call
employees
are included within the
SPP
definition of"casual"
employee.
As
such,
on-call
employees
are
covered by
the
SPP
in
its
entirety.
The
University, primarily
through the
testimony of
Toby,
cont.ends
that on-call
employees
-are
a
unique
group
and
not covered
by
the
SPP.
It
is
unnecessary
to resolve
this
dispute.
Even
if
it
is
determined
that on-call
employees
are
covered by
the
SPP,
this
determination
will
not
alter
the
outcome
of
this decision.
As
more
fully
explained
below,
the
dictates
of section
760.5 were
followed
at least
conceptually,and, as
further
noted below, the impact
of the
layoff
on
career
employees
was
minimized
to the extent possible
under
the
circumstances.
40Examples were
given
at
the hearing to
ill~strate this
point. If
a
huge
concrete
ball
needed
to
be
moved,
it
might
require several
employees (from the
on-call
list)
to
do
it.
Two
or three career
employees
could not accomplish
the.task.
Also,
it
might take several
employees
to
hang
a
particular
work
of
art.
Two
career
employees might not be able to
do
it.
By
using
its
allotment of position
by employing
career
employees
to the exclusion of on-call workers, the
Museum
would
severely
limit the
flexibility it
needed to perform such assignments.
107
employees
on
staff
to
perform
necessary
duties
when
there
was
a
lull
in the schedule, as well as
when
an
exhibit
was
scheduled.
Given
these
needs,
Hubbs
acted
to
balance the
negative
impact
of the
layoff
on
career
employees
against
the
Museum's
need
to
employ
on-call
workers.
She
chose
to
staff
the
Museum
with
1.5'
career
positions
and
use the remaining
allotment to
hire
on-call
workers
as
necessary.
Under
this
post-layoff
arrangement,
it
stands
to
reason
that
some
on-call
employees
would
be
hired
to
do
some
of
the
work
previously
performed
by
career
employees,
including
Wong.
But
this
does
not
mean
that
the
impact
on
career
employees
was
not
minimized
or
that
SPP
section
760.5
was
violated.
That
the
impact
on
career
employees
was
minimized
is
evident
when
one compares
the
actual
impact
on
the
career
employees
involved with the
potential
impact.
The
average
monthly
on-call
hours assigned for the
second
half
of
1981
was
486.
Of
these,
an
average
of
123
per
month were
assigned to
laid-off
career
employees
Clausen,.O'Neill
and
Johnson. This
figure is significant
when
one
considers
that there are far
fewer car.eer employees
in the
Museum
than
on-call
employees.41 Thus, former
career
employees Clausen, O'Neil
41Ten
employees,
who
were not former
career
employees,worked on an
on-call basis during the
last six
months
of
1981.
By
contrast,
only three
former
career
employees worked on an
on-call basis during
this period.
108
and
Johnson
received
a
large
share of the
post-layoff
on-call
work.
Additionally,
Wong
retained
a
.50
career
position,
and
Bailey retained
a
full-time
slot,
while
Ross
was
laid
off
totally.
The
potential
impact
on
career
employees
could have
been
much
worse.
Wong
(and
Bailey)
could
have been
laid off
completely
and
a
straight
on-call
system implemented,
or,
for
example, o.ther former
career
employees
could
have been
given
fewer
on-call
hours.
The
possibilities
are endless
and one
need not
consider
each
and
every
one
to
see
that
the
impact
on
career
employees
was
minimized.
Under
these circumstances,
one
cannot
justifiably
conclude
that
SPP
section
760.5, assuming
its
applicability,
was
violated.
Wong may
not
have been happy
with the
post-layoff distribution
of
work,
but her displeasure
and
desire
for
more
hours
does
not,
under
these circumstances,
lead to
the conclusion
that
the
impact
of
the
layoff
on
career
employees
was
not
minimized. In
fact,
a
strong
argument can be
made
that
Wong, who
retained
.50
career
status,
fared
much
better
than
at least
four
of the
career
employees
involved,
thus rendering her claim of discrimination
unconvincing.
It is
worth
noting here
that
I
have
already
found Hubbs
did
not guarantee
Wong
any
hours
beyond
the
.50
career position.
To
support
its
argument
to the contrary, the Charging
Party
asserts
in
its brief that
it
is "clear" that
Hubbs
intended to
give
Wong
full-time
work,
but circumstances caused her to
change her
mind. According
to the Charging Party,
"what must
109
have
happened"
is
that
Bailey
became
upset
because
he
"knew"
Wong
intended
to
pursue the
reclassification
matter.
He
went
to
Hubbs
and
Egherman and
the
three
of
them worked
out
a
situation
whereby
they
would
deny
Wong
work
and
"hopefully
force
her
out
of the
Museum."
In an
attempt
to
explain
why
Wong
was
given the
0
.50
slot,
the
Charging
Party's
brief
also
asserts
thi3,t
"it
is
also quite possible"
that
Bailey
somehow
"knew"
Wong
had
contacted
CSEA
(this
was
before
any
CSEA
con
tact
emerged
in the record)
and
the
.
50
position
was
merely
a
means
to
"avoid
a
winning
grievance
by
Wong." The
record
shows
that
Bailey played
no
role
in the
decisions regarding the
layoff
or the
post-layoff distribution
of hours.
Because
these
arguments
are
based
on
sheer speculation
and
find
absolutely
no
support in the record, they
must
be
discarded.
The
Charging
Party further
argues
that,
given the
number
of
on-call
hours
available
after
the
layoff,
Johnson,
O'Neill
and
Clausen could each have been given
100
hours per
month
and
that
Wong
could have been given
86
hours per
month
of
on-call
time.
When
coupled with
her
.50
career
appointment,
this
would
bring
her
up
to full-time.
This
allocation
would have
left
100
hours
available per
month
for
distribution to other on-call
workers.42
42This
plan is
known
as Charging
Party's
"100
hour
plan." It is
based
on
the fact that the average
number
of
on-call hours assigned monthly from
July
1981
through
December 1981 was 486 (CP
Ex.
No.
43).
110
It is the Charging Party's position that the Respondent has
not proved that the "100 hour plan" would not have worked.
This stance misconstrues the Novato test. W'nen boiled down to
its basic terms, this ~rgument simply presents another
alternative way to assign work in the Museum. It does not, by
itself, detract from the decision to employ 1.5 career
employees and use the remainder of the time for on-call
workers. Under Novato, Respondent need not disprove the
validity of an alternative employment-related decision. It
need only show that it had a valid business justification for
its dee is ion. In the absence of· a showing of disparate
treatment or a finding by the trier of fact that the
Respondent's decision is pretextual, its decision must stand.
As stated above, I find no disparate treatment, nor do I find
the Museum's decision to be pretextua1.43
Furthermore, the specifics of the Charging Party's "100
hour plan" are noteworthy. In essence, it seeks full-time work
for Wong, but only 100 hours per month for the three other
career employees who found themselves completely laid off
43rn support of its argument, the Charging Party asserts
that the only way Respondent could have proved t:i-iat the "100
hour plan" would not have worked was to produce timesheets to
show that the amount of work could not have been handled under
the plan. Charging Party's brief states that Respondent never
produced these timesheets pursuant to a valid subpoena duces
tecum, thus suggesting a refusal to comply. It is noted here
that, contrary to the Charging Party's assertion, the
Respondent produced the information necessary to make this
argument. Thus, the argument must fail.
111
without
even
the
.50
career
position
to
rely
on.
Why
should
the
focus be
on
full-time
work
for
Wong
at
the
expense
of
former
career
employees
who
no
longer
have
career
status?
Why
not equalize
all
the
hours?
Why
not
assign
the
equivalent of
full-time on-call
work
to
Clausen,
for
example,
and
distribute
the
remainder
of the hours equally?
While
there are endless
alternatives
one
might
propose as
to
the
distribution
of
the
work
in the
Museum
after
the
layoff, there
is
no
point
in
exploring these
alternatives
here. Suffice
it
to
say
that
the
resolution
of the
instant
dispute
does
not
turn
on
the
possibility
of the
existence
of
some
workable
alternative
distribution
of
work
that
would
be
more
acceptable
to
Wong
or
to
any
other
employee.
What
is
more
central to
the
resolution
of
the
instant
case
is
the consideration of
whether
Wong
was
treated differently
from
other
employees
or
discriminatorily
denied
some
right
or
benefit
because
of her
union
activity.
This has not occurred.
As
stated,
one
could
legitimately
reach the conclusion
that
Wong
emerged
from
these cuts in
a
favored
position.
For
example, while
it
is
true that
Wong
was
not assigned
on-call
hours
from
January
to
December
1981,
it
is also true that
the
Museum
could have gone
to
a
pure
on-call
system.
Instead,
she
was
retained in
a
.50
career preparator position, thus
affording her
a
certain
amount
of security
and
other benefits
that other
former
career
employees
did not have. Ross,
112
Clausen,
O'Neill,
and
Johnson,
.
for
example,
were
career
employees
who
were
laid off
completely.
Further,
a
comparison
of the
on-call
hours
assigned
to
former
career
employees
during
this
period
further
shows
that
Wong was
not
treated
in
a
discriminatory
manner. For example,
while
Clausen
worked
a
substantial
number
of
hours
from
September .through
December,
she
worked no
hours
in July
and
August.
O'Neill
worked
only
in
November.
He
did
not
work
in
July,
August, September, October
or
December.
Johnson
worked
less
than
half-time,
and
only in
September, October
and
November.
Wong
had
steady
work
throughout
this
period.
Under
these
circumstances,
it
cannot be concluded
that
Wong
was
treated unfairly
or
differently
from
former
career
employees.
As
per her
stated
plan,
Hubbs
distributed
the
on-call
work
to
a
scal.ed-down
group
of
approximately
13
employees. While
it
is
true that
some
of these
on-call
workers
occasionally
worked
more
hours than
Wong
in
a
given
month
or during the
last six
months
of
1981
as
a
whole,
it
is also true that there
were
months
when
they
worked fewer
hours than
Wong
or not
at
all.44
But
this is
explained
by
the nature of on-call
work;
44rt is also
noted
that,
with one
exception, those
on-call
employees
who
worked more
total
hours than
Wong
during
the last
six
months
of
1981,
also
worked
approximately an
equivalent
number
of hours during the
first
six
months
of that
year.
Thus,
at least
for these employees,
their
hours were not
increased to
Wong's
detriment.
As
for the remainder of
employees,
their hours
were
far
below Wong's.
113
that is, during certain periods of time there is a great deal
of work, and on-call workers may work a large number of hours,
even more hours than a career employee.45 However, the
opposite is also true. There are times when on-call employees
work fewer hours than career employees or not at all. In sum,
Wong has not been treated in a discriminatory manner.
Based on all of the foregoing, it is concluded that the
Charging Party has not shown that but for her protected
activity Wong would not have received the June 12 memo, the
July 16 evaluation, or the July 1 layoff. Nor has it been
shown that but for her protected activity, Wong would have
received on-call hours after July 1, 1981. The allegations as
to Wong's pre-CSEA activity shall be dismissed. We now turn to
Wong's post-CSEA activity.
B. Post-CSEA Activities.
In mid-June 1981, Wong joined CSEA and on approximately
June 29 was represented by CSEA for the first time at a meeting
to discuss, among other things, her June 16 evaluation. This
is considered protected activity under the Act. See Redwoods
Community College District (3/15/83) PERB Decision No. 293.
Also, a few weeks later, Wong filed the first of many
grievances challenging several Museum actions. ·she was
45For example, at least one major exhibit (daVinci)
occurred during the last part of 1981.
114
represented by CSEA during these grievances. This, too, is
protected conduct under HEERA. Rio Hondo Community College
District (12/28/82) PERB Decision No. 272. Soon after the
June 29 meeting where she was represented by CSEA, a series of
incidents occurred which the Charging Party contends were
motivated by the employer's unlawful motive and were therefore
illegal un9er the Act. Coming on the heels of the above
protected conduct, the timing of the beginning of this series
of events, coupled with the large number of events, constitutes
the requisite nexus between the protected activity and the
complained of employer conduct. Thus, a prima facie case has
been established~ and, under Novato, it is up to the University
to come forward to explain its actions.
1. The July 16 and 20 letters regarding· keys.
In the past, employees had either lost keys or forgotten to
bring keys to work. Given this, Hubbs was legitimately
concerned about the security of the art work in the building.
Also, part-time employees were sometimes absent from the Museum
for long periods of time during which their keys were
required. For these reasons, Hubbs established a new policy
which required employees to leave their keys at the control
desk when leaving the Museum. As the supervisor, she had a
right to set such a policy and she had valid reasons for doing
so. The policy did not interfere with any employee's work, and
it applied to everyone across the board.
115
Within a matter of hours Wong violated the policy, and she
violated it again a few days later. Hubbs responded with
letters of reprimand for each instance. Both letters reminded
Wong of the newly-established procedure and informed her that
if she continued to neglect these responsibilities her key
privileges would be revoked. While it may have been advisable
for Hubbs ±o discuss these incidents with Wong, rather than
respond with memos, the fact that she did not do so is not
fata1.46 There was a valid reason for the letters, Wong
having twice within a matter of days violated a new policy
implemented by a new supervisor.
The Charging Party's argument that these letters came soon
after Wong engaged in protected activity and were 11 trivial in
nature 11 is rejected. Wong, like other employees, was bound to
follow Hubbs' new policies. She did not. Based on the record
it is my view that she would have received the letters even in
the absence of her protected activity.
2. July 1981 Memos Dealing with Lighting Files, Use of
Xerox Machine, and Other Copying of Files.
46rt is noteworthy that Hubbs, being aware of past
difficulties in the preparation department, took a different
approach to supervision than did Bailey. In my _view, where
Bailey took an informal approach to the job, Hubbs was nore
formal. She was quick to take control, establishing new
procedures and generally demonstrating an assertiveness which
had not previously been seen in the department. While she may
not have handled every situation in the most skillful way, her
shortcomings can be attributed more to the lack of experience
than to any other factor.
116
These memos represent three more examples of Wong's defiant
refusal to follow the directives of her supervisor.
As a new supervisor, Hubbs attempted to consolidate the
Museum's lighting files. Her intention to do so was announced
at the July 15 meeting, along with her intention to rid the
files of extraneous material. When she could not locate the
files, she. asked Wong about their location. Wong responded
that "usually they are kept in my desk," knowing that she had
taken them home. Hubbs made further unsuccesful efforts to
find the files. Later, she discovered that Wong had not been
truthful about the location of the files and, in fact, had them
in her possession all the while. This prompted the first of
the three memos wherein Hubbs cited Wong's evasive answer,
restated the new policy, and again requested the files be
returned.
I can find nothing improper about this memo. Hubbs was
entitled to establish the new file policy and Wong was
responsible _for following it, just as she was bound to follow
the new key policy. It was her refusal to do so and her lack
of truthfulness that prompted the July 20 memo, not her
protected activity. Wong did not become free to ignore Museum
policy because of her protected activities.
Charging Party offers three lame arguments with respect to
the files. First it asserts that Wong was never asked to
prepare the files as part of her job, and actually prepared
117
some of them on her own time. Charging Party apparently feels
that this gave Wong a personal claim to the files. This
argument is not persuasive. While Wong may have not been asked
to prepare the files, it is undeniable that she did so during
the course of her employment. Thus, the University was
entitled to monitor• their control and upkeep.
Second 1 Charging Party argues that the files supported
Wong's reclassification efforts and she didn't want any of the
material to be discarded. But this does not excuse Wong's
evasive answer to Hubbs and her ultimate refusal to comply with
the policy. Wong would have been better advised to be honest
with Hubbs about the whereabouts of the files and attempted to
discuss her concern about the impact that cleansing the files
would have on her reclassification appeal.
Third, Charging Party asserts that since Wong had taken
files home before this was nothing new. This ignores the fact
that Hubbs had initiated a new effort to consolidate the files
under a new policy. It was the refusal to respond to the new
policy and Hubbs' inquiry that prompted the memo. Wong's
practice of taking files home became irrelevant in the face of
Hubbs' new policy.
The July 21 memo was given to Wong because Hubbs
immediately learned that Wong spent a considerable amount of
time after work copying files. Hubbs had not asked Wong for
copies, but rather wanted the originals to which she felt the
118
Museum had a right. Once again, Hubbs felt ,Wong was being
deceptive. In addition, Hubbs learned that Wong had spent
several hours at the Xerox machine copying these files and she
felt this was an abuse of the Xeroxing privilege. These two
factors prompted the memo, not Wong's protected activity.
Furthermore, despite Charging Party's claim to the
contrary, the July 21 memo appears on its face to be
innocuous. It is a short memo which merely sets forth the fact
that Wo?g copied files, asks her to seek permission before
doing so in the future, and reminds her that use of the Xerox
machine is a privilege which should not be abused. Also,
unlike the July 20 and July 31 memos, it does not state Wong's
appeal rights. This memo is probably not unlike hundreds of
other memos that are issued at the University every day, and it
stretches one's imagination to view it as retaliatory.
The third memo about which the Charging Party complains was
issued on July 31, 1981. On July 24 Hubbs and Wong had a
discussion during which Hubbs once again made it clear that
Wong needed to seek permission before copying Museum files.
Wong was under the impression that this applied only to
Xeroxing files, not to hand-copying. A few hours later, Wong
entered Hubbs' office and, in Hubbs' presence, began
hand-copying a file without permission. Hubbs obviously was
not under the same impression as Wong and felt that
hand-copying files without permission came within the
119
par~meters of her instructions to Wong. She viewed this as a
deliberate attempt to ignore her instructions. Thus, the
letter of reprimand issued.
There appears to have been a misunderstanding between Wong
and Hubbs about the issue of hand-copying versus
machine-copying. Wong may have formed her opinion based on
conversatipns with Hubbs and the July 21 memo, which discusses
only Xeroxing files. From Hubbs' perspective, it would have
made no sense to institute the policy only to permit employees
to take possession of the files without permission if the
purpose was to copy them by hand rather than machine. In any
event, it was chiefly this misunderstanding which prompted Wong
to attempt to hand-copy the files in question and which then
triggered the July 31 let~er. In addition, this
misunderstanding was probably complicated by Wong's and Hubbs'
rapidly deteriorating relationship. It may even be that Hubbs'
frustration with trying to get Wong to comply with her new
policies on keys or files caused her to go overboard when Wong
entered her office to copy the files. In any event, it is
concluded that these factors, not Wong's protected conduct,
prompted the July 31 letter.
In sum, it has not been shown that but for Wong's protected
activity these three documents would not have been issued. In
my view, they were issued because Wong resisted complying with
Hubbs' new policy on files or, regarding the July 31 memo,
120
because
there
was
a
misunderstanding
about
the
applicability
of
the policy. Lastly,
I
can
find
nothing
improper
about
denying
Bailey,
Kelly
or
Wong
access
to
the
Museum
before
8:30
a.m.
on
July
20.
In
my
view,
this
was
nothing
more
than
a
legitimate
attempt
to
see
if
any
of these
employees,
apparently
all
suspects in
Hubbs
1
-eyes,
arrived early
to
return
or
copy
the
missing
fiJes.
In
fact,
her
hunch
turned out
to
be
correct,
as
Wong
showed up
early
for
that
very purpose.
3.
The
Telephone Locks.
The
Charging
Party
argues
that
asking
Wong
to
return
the
telephone locks
so
shortly
after
the
August
12
meeting,
where
calls
to
her
CSEA
representative
were
discussed,
was
a
reprisal
intended
to
make
it
difficult
for her
to
call
her
representative.
This
argument
ignores the
evidence
on
this
point.
The
decision to
install
telephone locks
was made
to
stop untraceable long-distance
calls
which were
being
placed
after
hours
and on weekends,
not
to prevent
Wong
from
calling
her representative.
And
the decision
was
made
prior to the
August
12
meeting.
Thus,
it
cannot be
seriously
argued
that
the decision in
some way
constitutes retaliation
for the
meeting.
More
importantly, the evidence
shows
that
throughout
this
long
and arduous
series of events
Wong
contacted her
representative at will
and, in fact,
she did so
frequently both
prior to
and subsequent to the August 12
meeting.
At no time
121
was
she
interfered
with
in
the
exercise
of
this
right.
In
my
view,
the request to
return
the
locks
had
nothing
to
do
with
Wong's
protected
activity. It
was
simply
a
request
to return
the
locks
that
Beecroft
had
purchased
two weeks
earlier
for the
purpose of stopping unauthorized
long-distance
calls.
The
fact
that
Wong
was
given
this
assignment
after
the
August
12
meeting
is
pure coincidence.
4.
The
Davis
Painting Incident
and
the
September
2
'Suspension.
Wong
endangered
a
valuable
work
of
art
(Davis
painting)
by
placing
it
unattended
on
a
freight elevator
and
closing the
door.
This
act
was
in
clear violation
of
Museum
policy
which
is
that
works
of
art
should not
be
left
unattended
on
elevators
with the gate closed, thus
creating
the
possibility
of the
elevator
being
called to
another
floor.
It
was
this action,
not her
protected
activity, that
prompted
her suspension.
Even
though
Wong
deliberately
endangered
a
valuable
work
of
art,
it
appears
that
she could have escaped
disciplinary action
by
admitting her mistake.
Hubbs
testified
that
a
major
concern
was
that
Wong
refused to
admit
her mistake.
Had
Hubbs
been
given
some
assurance
that
Wong
recognized her mistake
and would
attempt to
avoid such
error in the future,
it
a~pears
that
the
suspension
would
not have occurred.
But she
refused to
do so
until
the hearing in
this case.
The
Charging
Party asserts that the suspension
letter
makes
122
no
mention
of
the
refusal
to
admit
a
mistake
as
a
reason
for
the
suspension.
This
is
simply
not
true.
The
letter
clearly
says
that,
..
you
have
not given
me
any
indicationof
your awareness
of the
serious nature
of
your misconduct, nor
any
indication
that
in
the
future
you
will
not
repeat
the
error.
The
Charging
Party
also
argues
that
several
CSEA
witnesses
testified
that paintings
had been
left
on
elevators
unattended
in
the
past
with
no
discipline
imposed.
However, none
of these
witnesses
took
steps to
inform
a Museum
official
of
this
occurrence
and
there
was
no
independent evidence
presented
to
indicate that
management
knew
or
should
have
known
about
these
incidents.
Thus,
this
aspect of
Charging
Party's disparate
treatment
argument must
fai1.47
The
next point raised
by
the
Charging
Party
concerns
the
fact that
the issuance of the suspension
letter
occurred before
Wong
and
her
CSEA
representative
met
with
management
t9
discuss
the matter.
I
find
no
merit in
this
argument.
As
far as
I am
aware, the
employer
has
no
obligation to
meet
with
an employee
and
her representative before issuing
a
suspension.
Thus,
absent other
evidence about the incident
which would
suggest
an
47Evidence showing
that
in the past
works
of
art
were
placed
on
elevators
with the gate
open has
no
bearing
on
thisissue, since the elevator could not be
called to another floorwhile the gate
was
open. In
short,
no
danger
was
presented to
the art
work
under these circumstances.
123
unlawful motive, I decline to infer such motive based on the
timing of the letter.
Further, Charging Party attempts in vain to discredit the
suspension by arguing that the letter did not include a
reference to Smiley's testimony to the effect that Wong
"giggled" as she shut the elevator gate. The logic of this
argument escapes me. The letter included a clear and concise
statement of the facts surrounding the incident, the concerns
of Hubbs, the violations involved and appeal rights. What more
is needed?
Lastly, Charging Party again raises the disparate treatment
argument, this time from another angle. In the past, according
to this approach, works of art have been damaged or endangered
by employees, but no discipline has been administered. As
stated earlier in the statement of facts, each of these prior
incidents is easily distinguished from the elevator incident.
(See fn. 16, s·upra.) Thus, there has been no disparate
treatment.
5. The September 14, 1981 Representation Issue.
The Charging Party here argues that Wong was denied
representation in violation of her Weingarten rights.48 The
48NLRB v. Weingarten (1975) 420 U.S. 25 [98 LRRM 2689]
holds that an employee is entitled to a representative at an
investigatory interview which the employee reasonably believes
will lead to disciplinary action. PERB has adopted this
doctrine. See Marin Community College District (11/19/80) PERB
Decision No. 145.
124
Weingarten
rule
is
not
applicable
to
this situation
because
at
the
outset
of the
discussion
Hubbs
made
it
very
clear
that
there
was
no
disciplinary
action
contemplated.
~ne
told
Wong
that
she only
wanted
to
clear
up
the
misunderstanding
about
whether
Wong
was
to
work
the
previous
Wednesday,
and
there
was
no
objective
evidence
presented
to
show
Wong
had
a
reason
to
expect
dis~ipline.
As
it
turned
out,
Hubbs
was
truthful.
There
was
no
disciplinary
action
taken.
Wong
arguably
had
a
-right
under
HEERA
to
be
represented
by
CSEA
on
this
employment-related
matter,
and
CSEA
arguably
had
a
right to
represent
Wong, a member
of the
organization,
even
in
the
absence
of
disciplinary action.
See
Redwoods
Community
College
District,
supra,
PERB
Decision
No.
293.
However,
the
right
to representation
under
Redwoods
need
not be
addressed
here,
for
even
if
this right existed,
the evidence
shows
that
Wong
was
not denied
representation
on September
14.
Soon
after
Wong
requested
a
representative,
the
conversation
moved
upstairs
to the design
office.
It is
true
that
Hubbs
told
Wong
she
was
obligated to discuss
the
matter,
but the discussion did not take place.
Wong
called
Tesluk
instead,
and Tesluk advised
Wong
to
go
ahead and
talk to
Hubbs,
provided there
was
no
corrective action involve6.
It
appears
that
even then the discussion did not take place.
Wong
said
she wasn't
satisfied
with Tesluk's advice
and wanted
to talk to
Toby, which she
did
at
some
later point in time.
And,
to the
125
extent any discussion took place between Hubbs and Wong after
the call to Tesluk, it was with Tesluk's approval.
Hubbs may have felt Wong was not entitled to a
representative, but she nevertheless did not press the point.
She permitted Wong to call Tesluk and then apparently dropped
the matter after Wong decided she wanted to tall< to Toby.
There was ?O corre.ctive action taken, nor did Wong ever make up
the four hours that triggered this incident in the first
place. Under these facts, it cannot be concluded that Wong's
right to representation was denied, nor can it be concluded
that CSEA was denied the right to represent a member of the
organization.
6. Sanding Frames and Other Menial Tasks.
The Charging Party argues that Wong was assigned to sand
frames in retaliation for her protected conduct. It is claimed
that this assignment was made while other less skilled
employees were doing matting and framing. It is further
claimed that Wong was isolated from other employees while doing
this work. These arguments are not convincing.
This assignment was given to Wong shortly after the
September 14 representation incident. Bailey felt that Wong
was upset as a result of that incident and was in no condition
to do the more delicate work on the daVinci exhibit. Standing
alone, this explanation by Bailey might justifiably be
126
questioned.
However,
when
placed in
context,
the assignment
emerges
as
routine.
It
was
not
uncommon
for
all
employees
to
perform such
tasks, especially
after
the
reorganization
when
the
shop
was
no
longer in existence
and
Wong
and
Bailey
were
the
only remaining
career
employees. ·Despite
her experience,
Wong
was
not
insulated
from
such
assignments.
The
same
is
true
with
respect
to
the
menial
tasks
Wong
claims
she
was
assigned
as
retaliatory
measures
by
management.
The
evidence, including
Wong 1 s
•
testimony,
is
overwhelming
that
everyone,
at
one
time
or
another,
performed such
tasks.
In
the
face
of
this
evidence,
one
cannot conclude
that
Wong
was
singled
out
to
do
this
work.
The
argument
that
the
assignment
was
a
form
of harrassment
and
made
to
isolate
Wong
from
other
employees
likewise
is
not
convincing. In
fact,
the
so-called isolation
was
for
Wong's
benefit
as
it
permitted her
to
sand and
oil
the
frames
near the
exhaust fan with
a
respirator.
In
my
view,
this
cannot
even
remotely
be
considered harrassment.
To
the
contrary,
I
would
be
more
inclined to
view
this
as harrassment
if
Bailey had
assigned her
this
work
in
full
view
of other
employees
without
the benefit of the exhaust fan or the
respirator.
7. Denial of
Access
to the Registration
Area During
the
daVinci Exhibit
and
the
"Grand Master Key".
On
September 10, 1981,
Elliott
issued
a memo
calling for
increased security for the daVinci
exhibit.
Egherman
testified
that the reason for increased security
was
two-fold.
First,
127
since the art work was of extraordinary value and had not been
shown in the Bay Area before, there was great interest in the
exhibit. Second, based on past experience with so-called
"street people" in Berkeley, there was concern that the works
of art be adequately protected. To this end, access to the
registration area where the art work was kept was limited, and
other security measures taken. Wong was one of the people not
permitted access. But this restriction was not directed at
Wong as an individual. It applied to everyone except a few
•
employees on an "as needed" basis, i.e., curator, registrar,
photographer, etc. Even Egherman was excluded. The absence of
any evidence to cast doubt on Elliott's obvious
security-related motive for issuing the directive, taken with
the general application of the policy, makes it impossible to
conclude that the policy or Wong's exclusion from the
registration area was discriminatory.
The same conclusion must be drawn with respect to the
directive, again prompted by Elliott, that grand master keys be
limited to supervisory personnel. While Hubbs and Bailey were
permitted to retain their keys, at least three other keys, one
of which was Wong's, were withdrawn. Once again, this can
hardly be characterized as discriminatory. Sub-master keys,
which afforded the holder more limited access to the Museum,
were issued in place of the grand master keys. Since the
directive applied to all non-supervisory personnel, not just to
128
Wong, and since there is no evidence that lack of a grand
master key interfered with the ability of non-supervisory
employees to perform their required duties, this action cannot
be viewed as retaliation or discrimination.
8. The September 29, 1981 Telephone Call.
At about 9:30 a.m. on September 29, Wong left her workplace
during wor~ing hours without clearing it with her supervisor
\
and went to an outside pay telephone to call Tesluk, her CSEA
representative, about the September 9 pay dispute. The day
before, Hubbs had asked Wong for a response on this dispute by
10:00 a.m. Bailey found Wong on the telephone and told her she
was not to call her representative on work time, and as a
courtesy she should let him know before leaving the work area
dur,ing· worktime so he could get someone to cover for her if
necessary. The matter was then totally dropped. There was no
corrective action.
I find nothing unlawful about Bailey's comments. In fact,
he showed remarkable restraint, considering that an employee is
usually expected to work during worktime. Bailey's restraint
is even more remarkable when one considers that Wong was aware
in advance of the 10:00 a.m. deadline and could have called
Tesluk the night before. Further, despite the fact that Wong
was due for a break at 10:00 a.m., she left work at 9:30 a.m.
to make the call.
In its brief, Charging Party asserts that these facts make
129
it
"evident
that
Wong
. was
constantly
being
watched."
I
find
this
statement
to
be
a
complete
exaggeration.
'l'Nhen
boiled
down
to
its
simplest
terms,
this entire
incident
consists
of Bailey
telling
Wong
that
she should
not leave the
work
area
to
make
telephone
calls
to
her representative
on
worktime
without
letting
her supervisor
know
where
she
was.
There
is
nothing
unlawful
apout
such
a
statement.
9.
The
Chinese
Fan
Incident.
This
incident represents
nothing
more
than
another
confrontation in
what
had by
this
point
become
a
long
line
of
confrontations
between
Bailey
and
Wong.
This time
Bailey
felt
that
Wong
took
too
long
to
mount
a
Chinese
fan,
and
he
felt
that
she had
improperly bent
a
corner of the
fan
in the
mounting
process.
Wong
naturally
disagreed
and,
as
might be
expected, another unpleasant
exchange
occurred.
But
these
exchanges,
which
had by
now
become commonplace,
had
nothing
to
do
with
protected
activity.
These
two
simply could not
work
together
smoothly.
It
is
my
view
that
Bailey had
become
frustrated in trying to deal with
Wong
and had
exhausted
his
patience.
It
seems
that
Wong,
for her
part, resented Bailey
and
felt
he
was
constantly picking
on
her.
In any
event, the
fact that
these
two
had an
unpleasant
exchange over Chinese
fans
and
generally
were
unable
to
work
together
does
not
automatically translate into unlawful harrassment under
HEERA.
After Bailey reported the incident to
Hubbs, she met
with
130
Wong and they discussed the Chinese fan incident, among other
things. Unlike the elevator incident, Wong eventually admitted
she bent the fan and Hubbs told her it was understandable
because everyone makes mistakes. No corrective action took
place and the entire matter was droppen.
Tesluk, however, contacted Toby. She wanted a meeting to
discuss, among other things, the fan incident. Toby
understandably refused. Even Toby, who appeared to me on the
witness stand to have the patience of Job, saw no point in the
meeting, since there had been no corrective action and the
matter had been dropped. Eventually, he agreed to a meeting if
he was presented with an agenda so there could be some
structure. But by now even Tesluk had given up on the matter
because Toby never heard from her again.
Nothing about this incident can remotely be construed as
discriminatory or retaliatory. Wong and Bailey had a
disagreement which Hubbs and Wong later discussed. This simply
does not add up to harrassment.
10. The Desk Audit and Reclassification.
The Charging Party here contends that by the time of the
desk audit most of the preparator's duties had been taken away
and Wong was doing primarily menial tasks. Thus, according to
the Charging Party, any honest job audit would have resulted in
her being reclassified downward. The Charging Party claims
131
this
spells
out
a
clear
case
of
reprisal.
This argument
is
unconvincing.
It
has
already
been concluded
that
Wong
was
not
singled
out
to
perform
menial
tasks.
Everyone
at
one
time
or another did
this
work
and
the evidence
does
not
show
that
Wong
was
assigned
a
disproportionate
·amount
of these
duties.
Further, the record
does not support the
argument
that
Wong's
duties
had
dramatically
changed
over
the course of
a
year.
The
evidence
on
this
point
consists
only
of general
assertions that
Wong
was
increasingly
being assigned
menial
tasks.
While
there
are
examples
of
this cited
in
the testimony,
there
is
no
accurate
breakdown
of
precisely
how much
of
Wong's
time
was
being spent
in
this
area,
nor
is
there
a
meaningful comparison
of
Wong's
time
and
duties
with those of
other preparators.
Therefore,
it
cannot
be concluded
that
Wong's
duties
changed
measurably over
the years,
nor
can
it
be concluded
that
she
was
doing
primarily
menial
task
as of the date of the
desk
audit.49
Turning
to
the merits of the
reclassification
appeal,
it
is
obvious
that
Wong
was
not
a
supervisor, as she claimed.
At
most, she performed in
a
leadperson capacity with the
employees
she claimed she
supervised.
At one
time
or another,
most
employees served in
a
leadperson
role.
Nor
did
Toby
find that
49
rn
fact, Bailey disagreed with
Wong's
description of
her duties as early as the
summer
of
1980, long before the
Museum
had the opportunity to transform her preparator duties
into
menial tasks.
132
she was performi~g the most difficult preparator work. His
investigation indicated that, during the period July 1980 to
June 1981, Wong's lighting assignments equaled 50 percent of
her time on only two occasions. This would not entitle her to
a reclassification. Moreover, one is left with the impression
that, even if Wong·had done lighting in excess of 50 percent of
her time, ~hat alone would not entitle her to reclassification,
because several credible witnesses, including Wong's
co-workers, testified that lighting was overrated and consisted
of little more than changing light bulbs. There were no other
significant duties upon which a reclassification could be
based. Although at the hearing Wong described some of the
duties upon which she would base a reclassification, they fell
within the current position description of preparator. As
such, they would not justify the reclassification.
Lastly, consistent with Egherman's testimony, Toby informed
Wong that the Museum was not interested in· creating specialized
slots. Like other Bay Area museums, the UAM wanted employees
who could perform a 11
wide range of preparative tasks 11
and had
chosen not to allocate any of its existing positions to
so-called specialists.
The desk audit upon which the denial was largely based was
conducted by Toby and Wong was denied a CSEA representative.
Toby believed that Wong was not entitled to a representative
because the desk audit was only a review of her work and not a
133
matter appropriate
for
union
representation.
The
desk
audit related
to
the
reclassification
appeal.
As
such,
it
was
clearly
an
employment-related
matter during
which
Wong
had
the
right
to
a
CSEA
representative.
In
addition,
CSEA
had
a
right
to represent
Wong
as
one
of
its
members.
Denial of
these
rights
violated section
357l(a)
and (b)
respectively.
See
Redwooqs Community
College
District,
supra.
11.
The
Tool
Cart
Incident.
While
it
may
have been
preferable to
have
two
employees
move
these
heavy
pieces of
equipment,
it
was
not unusual
for
an
individual
employee
to
move
the
tool
cart
or the
airlift
down
ramps
in the
Museum. Many
employees,
including
Wong,
had
done
this
in the
past,
as well as
on
the
day
in
question.
Thus,
it
cannot
be concluded
that
giving
this
assignment
to
Wong
on
March 2, 1982,
was
either
discriminatory or
retaliatory.SO
12.
The
July
1,
1982
Layoff.
Ignoring evidence
to the
contrary,
the
Charging
Party
argues
that
the July
1982
layoff
was
the
final act of
retaliation.
The
Charging
Party
is,
once
again,
off target.
In
fact, there
was
no work
for
Wong. As
Elliott
pointed out in
his
May
21, 1982
letter,
the exhibition
schedule
showed
that
in
50since the Charging
Party failed to address
this issue
in
its brief,
I
can only
assume
that its
complaint
centers
on
the
argument
that this
assignment
was a form
of discrimination
or retaliation.
134
the
upcoming
year
there
would
be
26
weeks
with
no
preparation
work
scheduled.
Allowing
for
vacation,
Wong
would
be
idle
23
weeks.
Given
the
fact that
the
Museum
still
faced
a
huge
deficit,
carrying
Wong
under
these
circumstances could
not
be
justified.
Hubbs
agreed
wi-th
Elliott
and,
after
considerable thought
about the
impact
Wong's
layoff
would
have
during the course of
unfair practice
hearings,
concluded
that
the
most
efficient
thing to
do
was
to
implement
a
straight
on-call
system.
Thus,
Wong
was
laid off
along with
other cuts
that
saw
the
security
staff
reduced
by
half
and
a
curatorial
position
left
unfilled.
Based
on
this
evidence,
it
is
concluded
that
the
Museum
had
a
valid
business
reason for taking
this action.
There
is
no
evidence
which
can be used
to
attribute
an
unlawful motive
to
Elliott,
Egherman
or
Hubbs.
The
Charging
Party
simply has not
come
close to
showing
that
but for the
exercise of
protected
activity,
Wong
would
not
have been
laid off.
III.
Daniel Kelly
On
July
27, 1981,
Kelly
was
represented for the
first
time
by
CSEA
at
a
meeting with
Ross
and
Toby
to discuss
his
post-layoff
lack of on-call hours. Securing union
representation
about
a
matter of
employment
rela.tions
falls
within the protection afforded
by
section
3565. See
Redwoods
Community
College
District,
supra.
Thus,
it
is
concluded
that,
as of July
27, Kelly had engaged in protected conduct.
135
The
Charging
Party, in
its
brief,
also
argues
that
Kelly
engaged
in
protected
conduct
prior
to
that
date
by
virtue
of
his
other
conduct
and
his
support of
Wong
in her attempts to
improve working
conditions in the
Museum.
This
activity
may
be
summarized
as follows. Kelly,
in
1980,
met
with
Ross,
Toby
and
Bailey
and
voiced concerns
on
matters of
interest
to other
workers
in.
the
Museum.
These
included the
number
of
hours
worked
and
Bailey's control
over
these hours;
advance
notice
for
on-call
workers;
and
clarification
of
job
duties.
During
this
process,
he
was
openly
supportive of
Wong's
activities
and
even
joined her
on
occasion
when
she
met
with
Toby
to discuss
employment-related concerns.
To
the extent
that
he
joined
with
Wong
to present
employment-related concerns
to
management
officials,
his
conduct
is
considered
protected.
See Ohio
Oil
Co.,
supra. Further, to
the
extent that
Wong
engaged
in
protected
conduct by, for
example,
participating
in the
wage-lag
process, Kelly's participation
and
support can be
found
to
be
protected~Sl
Egherman's
earlier
references to
Kelly as
a
troublemaker
and
the
refusal to assign
him
on-call
hours
after
July
l
51
It is
noted,
however,
that Kelly's
pre-CSEA
protectedconduct
was
extremely minimal and so remote
in
time
as to
have
little
bearing
on
the on-call
hours
issue. Further, since the
central
matter
at
issue with respect to
Kelly
is denial of
on-call
hours
after July 1,
and
since Kelly had
clearly
engaged
in protected
conduct as of July
27,
his
pre-CSEA
protected
activity is relevant only to the alleged retaliation
which took
place
between July
1
and
July
27.
136
constitutes evidence from which an unlawful motive may be
inferred. This inference is underscored by the fact that Kelly
had received hours on a regular basis since his return from
Japan. A prima facie case having been.established, we now turn
to the Museum's explanation for refusing to assign Kelly work
after July 1, 1981;
Denial. of on-call hours during July 1981 will be considered
first. Before doing so, however, it is important to note that
most of Kelly's conduct which Charging Party views as protected
occurred in the later part of 1980. Although Kelly and Bailey
had several disputes during this period, which Charging Party
attributes to Kelly's protected conduct, the record with
respect to work assignments belies the fact that Bailey
retaliated against Kelly. For the first six months of 1981, it
was Bailey who assigned Kelly almost all of his wo_rk in the
Museum. This marked a clear departure from 1980 when Kelly
received most of his assignments from Johnson.52 Thus, it
cannot be concluded that Kelly suffered discrimination during
the first six months of 1981.
After July 1, 1981, Hubbs was the person in charge of
assigning hours. She credibly testified that at the time of
52ouring the first six months of 1981, Bailey assigned.
Kelly 522.5 hours. Johnson, by contrast, assigned him
11.5 hours. During the last six months of 1980, Bailey
assigned Kelly 565 hours. Johnson, by contrast, assigned him
548.
137
the layoff
she had
not heard
from
Kelly
and
was
under
the
impression
that
he had
taken the job
in
San
Francisco.
Thus,
she
did
not
assign
him
any
hours
in July.53
This
is
not
to
say,
however,
that,
absent the
possibility
of the
San
Francisco
job,
Kelly
would
have been
assigned
work
in
July.
Shortly
after
the
July
27
meeting,
Hubbs
learned
that
Kelly
did
not
ge~
the
job
in
San
Francisco
and
was
interested
in
on-call
hours.
While
in
the process of
trimming
the
on-call
list,
Hubbs
had
to
decide
whether she
wanted
Kelly
on
the
list.
She
decided
she
didn't
and
she excluded
him
for
two
reasons.
First,
she
felt
Kelly
was
not
able
to
work
"quick
and
dirty."
This
would
make
him
less
valuable in the
new
approach
she intended
to
use, as she
felt
Kelly
would
not
fit
into
the
newly-established core of
reliable
and
efficient
workers
to
do
the
work.
Without minimizing
Kelly's
abilities
as
a
preparator,
it
appears
that
he
was
simply not the kind
of
worker
Hubbs
wanted.
It
is
noteworthy
that
Hubbs' view
of Kelly's
work
finds
considerable support in the record,
especially
from
Kelly's
co-workers.
He
was
overly thorough, meticulous,
and
regularly
sought time-consuming
alternative
approaches
to assignments.
53rn
fact,
it
~as not unusual for
most
on-call
employees,
including Kelly, to receive
little
or
no work
in
any
given
month. For example, Kelly received
no work
in July of 1980,
and in
December 1980 he worked
only eight hours.
138
Hubbs justifiably felt that Kelly would not fit into the
newly-organized department.
In this connection, it is once again worth noting that
Hubbs was a new supervisor in a recently reorganized
department. It appears that, where Bailey had taken a more
informal approach tD the job, Hubbs was more aggressive and
decisive. She had a well-formed opinion as to how the on-call
system would run under her supervision and she knew with
certainty the type of employee she needed to get the job done.
Because of the nature of his work, Kelly did not figure into
the system.
The second reason Kelly was eliminated from the list was
his relationship with Wong and with Bailey .. without question,
there was a tremendous amount of tension between Wong and
Bailey. Hubbs' view, understandably, was that Kelly, given his
close relationship with Wong and his sometimes volatile
relationship with Bailey, would only heighten the tension. It
is important to underscore here that, while this tension was
disruptive, it did not have its roots in unlawful motive which
stemmed from any opposition to protected conduct. As has been
fully discussed above, Bailey dealt with Wong for approximately
two years on many issues, and there was no convincing evidence
to indicate that he harbored an unlawful motive. In my view,
their problems were rooted in personality differences, not
protected conduct. Simply put, they had an extremely hard time
139
working
together.
And
the
fact that
Kelly
and
Wong
were
so
close greatly
exacerbated the
problem.
The same
thing
can be
said
about
the
relationship
between
Bailey
and
Kelly. Bailey
had
worked
with Kelly beginning
before
Kelly
went
to
Japan.
Wnile
not as
volatile
as
the
Bailey-Wong
relationship,
the Bailey-Kelly
relationship
left
much
to
be.
desired.
They
regularly
had
disagreements
and
it
is
not
hard
to
see
how a new
supervisor
would
prefer
not
to
have
to
deal
with the chemistry
of
the$e
three
employees. Again,
as
with
Wong,
the evidence
does
not
show
that
these
differences
were
motivated
by an
anti-union
animus.
Bailey
and
Kelly
simply
were
not very compatible as workers.
It is
also
important
to
underscore the
fact that Bailey's
relationship
with Kelly or
Wong
as not the
only
factor.
Apart
from
Bailey, the concern about
Wong
and
Kelly being unable
to
work
together
was
not
new
by any means.
As
early
as the
summer
of
1980,
after their return
from
Japan
and
long
before
any
protected activity
took
place, Bailey
warned
Kelly
and
Wong
in
separate conversations that
he
would
not
tolerate their
relationship disrupting
the workplace. These warnings were not
without
justification.
They were
based
on
Bailey's experience
working with
Wong
and
Kelly before they
went
to Japan.
Hubbs
undoubtedly
knew
of
this history.
Thus,
her concerns were not
unfounded, nor were
they
new. And
the fact that,
as
a
result
of the events the past year, Bailey
was now
at
odds with both
140
Kelly
and
Wong, made
a
bad
situation
worse.
Hubbs
decided not
to
contend with
this situation.
Since Kelly,
an
on-call
employee,
was
most
expendable, he
was
eliminated.
After
Hubbs
trimmed
the
on-call
list,
a
freeze
was
imposed
and
Kelly could not
be
placed
on
the
list
even
if
Hubbs
had
decided
to
do
so.
·Thus,
Kelly
was
never
recalled to the
Museum.54
Based
on
the
foregoing,
it
is
concluded
that
the
Charging
Party
has not
shown
that
but
for
his
protected
activity
Kelly
would have been
assigned
work
after
July
1,
1981.
The
real
reasons
Kelly
was
not
assigned
work
after
July
27
were
the
nature of
his
work
and
the
potential disruption
due
to
his
volatile
relationship
with Bailey and/or
Wong.
IV.
Sam
Greyson
The
theory of the
Charging
Party's
case
here
is that
Greyson's February
23
letter
to
Egherman
constituted protected
activity,
and
the subsequent
refusal to hire
Greyson
was
in
retaliation
for
that activity.55
It
is
conceded by
the
541
draw
no
inference of unlawful motive
from
the
fact
that
Toby
and/or
Ross
may
have
told
Kelly
on
July
27
that
he
was on
the
list
and
eligible to
be
called.
This
was
apparently
done without consulting
Hubbs,
who was
the person in the
position to
make
such
a
decision.
As
such, she
·was
not
bound
by
their
comments.
55Greyson engaged
in
what
may
be generously described as
arguably protected activity in
1980.
However, even
if
found
to
be protected, that activity
was
so minimal and remote
in
time
that
it
has
no
probative value with respect to the allegedly
unlawful denial of
work
in 1981. Thus, no
finding is
made on
this point.
The
charge with respect to
Greyson
centers
on the
February
23
letter.
141
Charging Party that Egherman 1 s response, which was received
approximately 10 days after the Greyson letter was sent, is
time-barred and cannot be considered as an independent
violation.56 However, to the extent Greyson was denied
on-call hours within the six-month statute of limitations
period, the denial ~as due to the February 23 letter; and since
the letter.was protected conduct, the Charging Party argues,
the denial of hours was in violation of the Act.
Upon learning of the work cancellation, Greyson immediately
sat down and drafted the letter to Egherman without discussing
it with other employees. Soon thereafter he showed the letter
to Johnson and Wong.57 The evidence shows that Wong said she
"supported" Greyson's letter before he sent it. While this may
not constitute an express authorization for Greyson to act, it
certainly supports a finding that, at minimum, Greyson acted
with Wong's implicit authorization, thus bringing the conduct
within the parameters of section 3565. See Ohio Oil Co.,
supra; Monsoor, supra.
56The unfair practice charge was filed on September 18,
1981. Egherman's letter was received no later than the first
week in March.
57since Johnson was a supervisor at the time, he cannot
be considered an employee with whom Greyson was lawfully acting
in concert. As a supervisor, he had limited rights under the
Act. See sections 3580-3581.7; See also and compare State of
California, Department of Forestry (1980) PERB Decision
No. 119-S. In any event, it is unnecessary to consider
Greyson•s communication with Johnson, since Greyson had
contacted at least one other employee.
142
The letter itself purported to
. speak for other employees
and addressed a variety of employment-related subjects as they
impacted on on-call workers.58 While Greyson may have been
better advised with respect to his choice of words to raise his
complaints, he was understandably hot about the last-minute
cancellation of work. And while Greyson may have gone
overboard in his criticism of Egherman's competence, the degree
to which he did so does not strip the letter of its protected
status. Criticism of a supervisor on employment-related
subjects is protected under the Act when its purpose is to
advance the employees' interests in working conditions. State
of California, Department of Transportation (11/16/82) PERB
Decision No. 257-S. Based on the content of Greyson's letter,
it can reasonably be read as an attempt to advance employee
interest in working conditions.
Egherman, for his part, was also justifiably upset by the
manner in which his competence was criticized. However, since
Greyson's letter was protected, Egherman was not free to
retaliate against him because of the letter.
While Egherman's response to Greyson was generally
unobjectionable, the comment about Greyson having chosen to
58For example, the letter complained about such issues as
advance notice, cancellation of work assignments, and the
breakdown of communication between "management and labor" at
the Museum.
143
"burn
bridges"
cannot
be
overlooked.
It
is
the kind
of
statement
which,
on
its
face,
delivers
the
message
that
Greyson
would
suffer
some
adverse
consequences
for
having spoken
out in
a
manner
protected
by
the Act.
As
such,
it
is
reasonable
to
infer
an
unlawful
motive
from
this
statement.
However,
notwithstanding the
presence
of
protected
conduct
and
evidence
which
suggests
an
unlawful motive,
there
has
been
no
showing
of
harm.
59
As
it
turned
out,
Greyson
suffered
no
adverse consequences
as
a
result
of
his
protected
conduct.
It
appears
that
Egherman
never intended
to
permanently
deny Greyson
work
as
a
result
of
the
letter.
Even
Johnson
agreed
that
Egherman
had
not
precluded the
possibility
of
Greyson
continuing
at
the
Museum.
Nor
did
Egherman
take
any
actions
to
preclude
hiring
Greyson.
He
immediately
told
Johnson
that
he
wanted
to
meet
with
Greyson. This
was
interpreted
by Johnson
to
mean
only
that
Egherman wanted Greyson
to
apologize or
make some
concessions.60
59It
is
noted here
that
Egherman's
letter,
in
itself,
may
have
constituted
an independent
violation
under
the Act.
However,
since the
letter
cannot be considered as
such due
to
the six-month
limitation
on
unfair practice
charges,
we
are
left
with the sole issue of whether the subsequent
denial of
on-call
hours within the six-month period
was
retaliation
for
protected
conduct.
As
such, the "but for"
test set forth in
Novato must be applied to resolve the dispute.
6
0Johnson, as
a
supervisor and,
ostensibly as agent of
Egherman,
told
Greyson
that
Egherman wanted concessions and/or
an apology.
Under some
circumstances, persisting in exacting
144
In any
event,
Johnson
apparently
did not take
Egherman
seriously,
for as the
Charging
Party
correctly
points
out in
its
brief,
he
attempted
to
hire
Greyson
almost immediately
and
on
several
occasions
thereafter,
but
they
were
never
able to
make
contact7
when
they
did
make
contact
Greyson had
other
-commitments.
There
were
occasions
when
Greyson
approached
Johnson, b~t
each time
there
was
no work
available.61
Thus,
despite
Egherman's
"burning
bridges"
memo
(and
the
fact that
he
may
have wanted an
apology),
Greyson
never
suffered
any
harm
because
of
his
February
23
letter.
The
real
reason
he
was
not
awarded
on-call
hours
was
because he and
Johnson
couldn't
make
contact.
When
they did connect,
there
was
either
no work
or
Greyson
was
not
available.
Nor
does
th_e
limited
evidence support the
cla.im
that
Bailey
retaliated
against
Greyson
while
he
(Bailey)
was
still
a
supervisor,
by not awarding
him
on-call
hours in the
preparation
department.
On
the
one
occasion
when
Greyson
came
into
the
Museum
he and
Bailey
had
a
conversation during
which
an apology
or concessions
from
an employee
because he engaged
in protected
activity
may
constitute
an independent
violation.
However, even
this
comment
by Johnson
to
Greyson
istime-barred, since
it
occurred in early
March, o_utside
thesix-month period.
And,
as
more
fully explained
below,
this
was
never pursued since
Johnson immediately attempted to
hire
Greyson.
61The
fact that
Greyson never
filed
a
grievance over
thismatter (as did
Wong,
Kelly and Johnson) suggests that
he
may
have had
other
commitments and was
not seriously interested
in
on-call
work
at
the time.
145
Bailey offered Greyson work. Greyson suggested Bailey clear it
with Egherman, but Bailey responded that that wouldn 1 t be
necessary. Bailey then hired Greyson for one-half day (5
hours). This indicates that Egherman had not put out the word
to "blacklist" Greyson. It is true that from February 24 to
July 1, the date Bailey gave up his supervisory duties, this
was the on~y time he called Greyson to work, but this is not
unusual. In the eight months prior to February 24, Bailey had
called Greyson to work in the preparation department on only
two occasions for a grand total of 15 hours.62
On July 1 Johnson was laid off and Bailey gave up his
superv_isory duties. It was then up to Hubbs to decide whom to
call in and when. There was no convincing evidence presented
to show that Egherman blacklisted Greyson to Hubbs. Nor was
there any evidence presented to show that Hubbs did not call
Greyson to work because of protected conduct. What seems more
likely is that Hubbs, in deciding to trim the on-call list,
excluded Greyson because the number of hours he worked in the
past year had not been great, and even these hours were almost
exclusively in the shop.
62It is noted here that, except for these 15 hours, all
of Greyson's work for the period July 1, 1980 to February 24,
1981, was in the shop department. Even there Greyson 1 s hours
were not great. For the eight months immediately preceding
February 24 he worked only 187 hours, or about 23 hours per
month.
146
Based on
the foregoing,
it
is
concluded
that
the
Charging
Party
has not
shown
that
but
for Greypon's
protected
conduct
he
would
have
received
on-call
hours
after
February 24,
1981.
While
Egherman'
s
"burning
bridges"
comment
may
show
an
unlawful
motive
and
may
well
have been viewed
as
an
independent
violation
if
filed
•timely, Johnson
in
effect
ignored
it
with
respect
to.his efforts
to
hire
Greyson.
The
real
reasons
Greyson
was
not
hired
have been
described
above.
To
summarize,
Johnson
tried
to
hire
Greyson,
but
Greyson
was
not
available,
they
could not
make
contact, or there
was
no
work.
Moreover,
given
his
work
record
with
respect to
total
hours,
it
was
not
out
of
the ordinary for
Greyson
not
to
be
called
in
by
Bailey
or
Hubbs.
V.
Andre
Johnson
The
Charging
Party here
argues
that
Johnson,
a
supervisor,
was
laid off
and
then denied
on-call
hours
because he
refused
to
carry
out
Egherman's unlawful
directives
to
retaliate
and/or
discriminate against
Kelly and Greyson.
The
Charging
Party
points to State
of
California,
Department
of Health (1/10/79)
PERB
Decision
No.
86-S and
State of
California,
Department
of
Forestry, supra,
PERB
Decision
No.
119-S,
and
correctly asserts
that
an employer's
retaliatory
conduct
against
a
supervisor
that
has an adverse impact on
the protected rights of
non-supervisory
employees
may
be challenged via the
unfair
practice route.
The
Charging Party
would
thus conclude
that
147
Johnson's layoff was an illegal retaliation and employees
viewed it as such.
It has been found that Greyson and Kelly engaged in a
limited amount of protected activity. It has also been found
that Egherman at some point told Johnson that Kelly was a
troublemaker and he suggested Johnson would be well advised not
to hire Kelly. Egherman responded to Greyson's February 23
letter, which I have found to be protected, with the "burned
bridges" response, and he told Johnson that he wanted to meet
with Greyson before Johnson offered him any more work. After
each of these episodes, Johnson ignored Egherman. He continued
to hire Kelly, and he made attempts to hire Greyson, but he was
unsuccessful. Thereafter, on July 1, 1981, Johnson was laid
off, and for at least two months, not called in on an on-call
basis. Since these circumstances present sufficient evidence
from which an unlawful motive may be inferred, I conclude that
a prima facie case has been presented.
However, when one looks at the circumstances surrounding
the layoff, the Charging Party's case completely evaporates.
The Charging Party first argues that the layoffs were
implemented in violation of the SPP and that there were no
satisfactory business reasons for the layoff. As has been more
fully explained above, there were ample reasons for the
layoff. The Museum was facing a huge deficit and the budget
needed to be cut drastically. That was the real reason for the
148
layoff,
not
an
attempt
to
retaliate
against
Johnpon.
In
addition,
it
has
been
determined
that
the
layoff
decision
was
implemented
in
accordance with the requirements in
SPP
section
760.
Two
other career
employees
in the
shop
department
were
also laid off,
and Ross,
the
chief curator,
met
with the
same
fate.·
The
shop
department
was
eliminated as
part
of
the
reorganization.
Cuts
were
made
in administration,
curatorial,
and
the
Pacific
Film
Archives.
As
Egherman
persuasively
testified,
the
whole
structure
and
character
of
the
Museum
had
to
be changed
because
of the
dire financial
conditions that existed.
These were
the
real
reasons
for
Andre
Johnson's
layoff.
In
my
view,
to
suggest
that,
but for
his
so-called
support
or protection of
Greyson
or Kelly,
Johnson
would
not
have been
laid off is
nothing
more
than
an
exercise
in
self-delusion.
Furthermore, the
blame
for
Johnson not being
called in for
on-call
work
in
July
and August
is appropriately
placed
on
his
own
doorstep.
Based
on
the record evidence,
I
conclude
that at
the
time
of the
layoffs
Hubbs
and
Egherman were
justifiably
under the impression
that
Johnson
was
not
interested
in
receiving on-call
work. This conclusion
rests
on two
reasons.
First,
based
on
his
own
statements to the
effect that
he wanted
to
spend
some
free time,
collect
unemployment
compensation
and
pursue other interests, practically
every worker in the
Museum
who
testified also
had tne
same
impression (from Johnson
149
directly)
as did
Hubbs
and
Egherman.
It is diffcult
to
ignore
such
overwhelming
testimony.63
Second, Johnson
himself
testified
that
he
wanted
the
work
only
if
it
did
not
jeopardize
his
rehire rights,
and
he
told
this
to
Hubbs
at
the time.
He
again
cited this
"problem"
to
Hubbs
in
September
when
she
called
him
after
the grievance
was
filed.
Johnson
did
not find
out
that
apcepting
on-call
hours
would
not jeopardize
his
rehire rights
until
mid
to
late
July
or
early
August.
And
it
wasn't
until late
August
that
CSEA
contacted
Egherman
and
told
him
that
Johnson
was
interested
in
working.
The
logical
inference to
draw
from
this is that
Johnson,
in
fact, did
not
want
to
commit
to
accepting
on-call
hours
until
his rehire
rights
were
finally
determined.
When
this
was
done and
he
learned
he could
accept the
hours without jeopardizing these
rights,
he
contacted
Egherman
through
CSEA
and
told
him
for the
first
time
that
he wanted
to
work. Moreover,
Hubbs
credibly
testified
that
when
she
confronted
Johnson about the
fact that
he
had
told her
earlier
that
he
did not
want
the hours, Johnson
said
he
changed
his
mind
and
indicated that other personal
problems had accounted for
his
earlier
statement.
Giving Johnson
the
benefit
of the doubt,
it
is possible
63As
fully set forth in fn.
30,
supra, each of these
witnesses
testified
about
a
different story
they had
heard
from
Johnson about
his plans for the future.
I
find
it
extremely
unlikely that
seven witnesses
would
all
manufacture such
detailed facts about Johnson's future.
150
not
that
he
never
intended
to
leave the impressions
that
he
did
want
to
work
on-call
hours
after
the
layoffs.
Nevertheless,
the
evidence
is
overwhelming
that his
statements
at
the
time
were such
that
any
reasonable person
would
justifiably
have
formed
the
impression
that
he
did not
want
to
work,
and
this
is
precisely
what
Hubbs
and
Egherman
thought
at
the time.
Therefore,.
it
is
concluded
that
Johnson's
own
conduct
and/or
statements
were
the
real
reasons for
his
not being
called to
work
after
the
layoff.
A
further
observation
adds
to
this
finding. After
observing
all
the witnesses
and
reviewing the
record,
it
is
my
sense
that
Johnson
was
an
employee
who
was
well
liked
by
Egherman,
Hubbs
and
Bailey.
While
these three
had
their
problems with
Wong
and
Kelly,
no
such problems
existed
with
Johnson.
They were
more
than
willing to
work
with
him
and, in
fact,
would
have enjoyed having
him on
staff.
Nor
does
Johnson's treatment as
an
on-call
employee
support
the
Charging
Party's
claim of
retaliation.
By
the
time he
was
finally
hired
as an
on-call
employee,
the
crew had
already
been
picked for the
daVinci
exhibit
and Clausen
and
Beecroft,
Johnson's
former
subordinates,
had
already
been picked as
leadpersons for the
crew. Thus,
it
was
not unusual
that
Johnson found
himself in the
position of taking orders
from
employees he supervised in the past,
and working fewer
hours
than these employees during this period.
That Johnson was
151
upset and even hostile at this situation is perfectly
understandable. He was placed in the embarrassing situation of
taking direction from those whom he formerly supervised.
However, nothing could be done about it at this point. In
fact, it may have been disruptive of the work and would have
definitely been unfair to Beecroft and Clausen for Hubbs, at
such a late date during preparation for the major daVinci
exhibit, to unilaterally
. yank Beecroft and Clausen out of their
lead roles and insert Johnson in their place. As I have found
above, Johnson's own statements about his intentions after the
layoff were the real reasons he was not offered on-call hours
until September. It was this delay which put him in a role
subordinate to Beecroft and Clausen during the daVinci exhibit,
not an unlawful motive on Hubbs' part.64
Once he was hired, he naturally needed to be informed about
the proper chain of command and, under the circumstances, was
obligated to take direction from his former subordinates. Nor
were the orders from Beecroft and/or Clausen in and of
themselves discriminatory. Even Johnson admitted that everyone
took out trash. No concrete evidence was introduced to show
that, as a general rule, Johnson was given assignments
64Even if Hubbs had called Johnson to work on the exhibit
at the same time as she called Clausen and Beecroft, the
Charging Party has offered no argument that required Hubbs to
place Johnson in a leadperson role.
152
requiring less
skill,
or
that
he
was
isolated
from
other
employees. In
fact,
it
is
claimed
by
Charging
Party
that
both
Johnson
and
Williams
were
isolated
in the
Museum.
If this
is
so,
I
fail
to
see
how a
discrimination
theory
can
seriously
be
pursued, since
Williams
engaged
in
no
protected
conduct,
and
other
employees,
including Beecroft,
worked
along with
Johnson.
Jam
more
convinced by
Hubbs'
testimony
that
it
would
have
been
pointless to
hire
Johnson
and
Williams,
and
then
spend time
scheming
about
how
to
isolate
them from
other
employees.65
To
the
extent
that
Johnson
and
Clausen
or Beecroft
had
unpleasant
exchanges
during
this
period, as for
example
during
the skylight incident,
I
conclude
this
was
not
surprising
due
to
Johnson's
hostility
and
probable
embarrassment about
the
difficult
position
he
was
in,
and
not
to
any
unlawful motive or
attempt to harrass
him
because he
refused to carry
out
illegal
acts
against
Kelly or
Greyson,
or because
of
any
other
protected
activity
on
his part.
Lastly,
as
I
have
already
found,
given the tenuous
relationship
between Johnson and
Beecroft,
it
is
highly
65The work
orders
about which
the
Charging
Partycomplains
were
given largely
by Beecroft
and
Clausen,
bothnon-supervisory employees. There has been
no
concrete evidenceproduced which would
support the conclusion that
Hubbs was
directly
connected to these orders or the
manner
in
which theywere
given.
153
unlikely that
she
would
approach Johnson
and
tell
him
not
to
associate
with
Wong
because
of
her
union
activities.
Moreover,
it
is
not
unlikely,
given the
size
and
closeness of the
Museum
staff
that
Beecroft
knew
at
the
time
that
Johnson
too
had
gone
to
the union,
making
her
comment
about
Wong
even
more
improbable. In
my'view,
it
is
more
believable
that
Johnson
and
Beecroft
h~d
a
conversation
at
some
point
and
Beecroft
told
him,
in essence,
that
there are
two
sides to
every
story.
And
even
if
Beecroft did suggest
to
Johnson
to stay
away
from
Wong
because
of her
union
activities,
it
is
nothing
more
than
a
statement
from
one
non-supervisory
employee
to another.
As
such,
it
has
little
or
no
bearing
on
this
case in the
absence
of
some
evidence
that
Hubbs
or
some
other
management
person
was
somehow
connected
to
the statement.
VI. Processing Grievances.
The
Charging
Party here argues
that
the
failure to properly
process
many
grievances
filed
by
the discriminatees
constitutes
a
form
of discrimination and/or evidence
from which an
unlawful
motive can be
inferred.
Before approaching
this issue,
it
is
noted
that,
as
a
general rule,
it
is
not unusual for the
employer
to take
a more
narrow
reading of
its
regulations,
grievance procedures, or other
documents which
purport to
govern
employment
relations,
seeking
to preserve the
most
in
the
way
of
management
options.
By
contrast,
it
is
not unusual
for the union to take the most
expansive
interpretation of such
154 .
documents, seeking to gain the maximum protections for its
members. Sometimes the employer prevails; sometimes the union
prevails. It would be unrealistic to attribute an unlawful
motive to the employer simply because it took a position in
which it opposed the union. In my view, the inference of an
unlawful motive should be reserved for situations during
grievance processing where the employer stakes out positions
which are not even arguable, or where a clear pattern of
obstructionist conduct emerges. The employer cannot be
criticized for taking arguably correct positions. It is from
this viewpoint that I will approach the grievances at issue
here.
1. Wong's Grievances.
Setting forth no argument, Charging Party summarily asserts
in its brief that,
. there is no need for argument her
[sic] since a careful reading of [the
grievances and their attachments] will show
a failure to properly process these
grievances.
I disagree.
The grievances at issue are those relating to: (1) the
June 12, 1981 "specifications" memo; (2) the July 16 and 20,
1981 memos regarding keys; (3) the July 14, 1981 layoff; (4)the
July 20, 1981 "banning" memo; and (5) the July 20 and 21, 1982
lighting files and Xerox memos. The Charging Party does not
contest the processing of grievances concerning: {l) the
155
July
31,
1981
file-copying
memo
or
(2)
the
September 2,
1981
suspension.
The
contested
grievances
will
be
considered in
order.
The
University
would
not process the grievance
challenging
the
June
12
"specifications"
memo
under
SPP
section
280
because,
in
its
view,
the
memo
did not
constitute "corrective
action
with
the
meaning
of
the
SPP.
11
66
Instead, the
University
agreed
to
review
the matter
under
SPP
section
290.67
665pp
section
280
covers
Employee
Grievances.
Section
280.2
states,
in relevant
part:
An
individual
employee
may
request
resolution
under
this
policy
of complaints
pertaining
to:
a.
the
corrective actions of
temporary
or
indefinite
within-range
salarydecrease,
demotion,
suspension withoutpay,
and
written
warnings
pertaining to
such
actions (note: complaints
regarding other unspecified corrective
actions
and
the written
warnings
pertaining to
such
actions are
reviewed
under
Staff
Personnel Policy
290);
.
The
term
corrective action
is
more
broadly defined
in.
SPP
section
270.5:
Types
of Corrective Action. Corrective
actions include written
warning; tempor~ry
or
indefinite
within-range salary decrease;
corrective
demotion; suspension without pay;
or other action
deemed
appropriate
under
the
circumstances.
67The
scope of
SPP
section
290
is set forth atsection
290.2:
156
A
reading of the
plain
language
in
the
SPP
arguably
supports
the
University's position that
the
June
12
letter
was
not
corrective action
as
that
term
is
defined
by
section
280.2.
While
section
270.5
contains
a
broader
definition,
section
280.2
appears
to
more
narrowly
define
that
term.
Thus,
for
a·memo
to
be
considered
corrective action
under sec~ion
280.2,
it
appears
that
it
must
pertain
to
one
of
the
expressly
enumerated items
in
that section.
The
June
12
letter
does
not
pertain to
any
of
the
enumerated items and
therefore
arguably
would
not
fall
within the
section
280
definition
of corrective action.
It
might be
argued
that
the
June
12
letter
pertained to
the
enumerated item
"suspension
without pay."
However,
since
the evidence
showed
there
was
An
individual
employee
may
request
resolution
under
this
policy of
any
complaint regarding
a
specific
management
action
which
adversely
affects
the
employee
I s
terms and
·conditions of
employment. These
complaints include but
are
not
limited to
those regarding:
a. selection
for
transfer
or promotion;
b. position classification;
c.
merit salary increase or other salary
action;
d. the content of
a
performance
evaluation;and,
e. release prior to attaining regular
status or prior to the
first
of the
month
following thirteen consecutivemonths on pay
status.
157
never
an
intent to
suspend
Wong
for
this
incident,
this
argument
must
fail.
During
the course
of the grievance the
Charging
Party
argued
that
the
determination of
grievability
should
be
left
to
the
hearing
officer,
and
not
to
any
University
official.
While
section
280.20
arguably gives the hearing
officer
the
authority
to
do
so,
μnder
the
University's
argument,
which
I
find
to
be
far
more
convincing,
that section
is
not
directly
applicable.68
More
on
point
for our purposes
here
is
SPP
section
280.3,
which
expressly gives the personnel
manager
the
initial
right
to
determine the
scope
of the
procedure
and
68gpp
Section
280.20
provides
that
the decision-maker has
the
authority to:
Responsibility
and
Authority of the
Hearing
Committee
or Officer.
The
Hearing
Committee
or Officer
shall:
a. Identify
the grievance
issues
submitted
in the
original, written
grievance for
hearing;
b.
conduct
a
hearing to
determine the
facts
and
whether
the
management
actiongrieved
was
in violation
of
Staff
Personnel Policy or the Chancellor's
implementing procedure
or,
if
the
grievance involves
corrective action or
dismissal,
whether the
management.
action
was
reasonable under the
circumstances;
and
c.
submit
a
hearing report, in writing, tothe Chancellor.
158
provides
an
appeal
route
if
the
grievant objects.69
Since
this
route
was
taken
on
many
occasions
in
the
processing of
Wong's
grievances,
and
since
the
language
in
SPP
section
280.3
is
clear,
it
is
difficult
to
see
how
the
Charging
Party
can
seriously
argue
that
the
University's actions
were
somehow
improper.
For
the
same
reasons
it
is
concluded
that similar
University
responses
to
Wong's
grievances challenging, as
corrective actions,
the July
16 and
July
20
memos
about
keys,
were
at
least
arguably
correct
and
therefore
do
not
constitute
reprisals
for
engaging
in
protected
activity.
Nor
can an
unlawful
motive be
inferred
based
on
the evidence
presentea.70
Toby
again
informed
Wong
that
she
could
69section
280.3
states:
The
Personnel
Manager
shall
determine
whether
a
complaint
is
within the
scope
of
Staff
Personnel Policy
280
or Staff
Personnel Policy
290.
An
employee
may
appeal the Personnel Manager's
decision
to
the Assistant
Vice
President-Staff
and
Management
Personnel
who
shall
have
final
responsibility
for determining whether
a
complaint
is
within the
scope
of
this policy.
70tgnoring Toby's statement
that
these
memos
are not
corrective actions, the Charging
Party during the grievance
procedure
essenti~lly
argued
that
grounds for c6rrective action
existed in the
memos,
and
to the extent that
the
memos
did not
fall
within the section
280.2
definition
they
were
"defective."
It
appears
that the Charging Party here actually
invites corrective action,
a
serious step, in the face of
University statements that the
letters
are not intended as
159
challenge these matters as corrective actions under the SPP
section 290 review process. A reprisal allegation remained,
and Toby informed Wong that she could grieve under SPP
section 280 only the claim that the July 16 key memo was a
reprisal for using the grievance procedure. However, Toby
correctly stated that this issue cannot be grieved
simultaneously under procedures of SPP sections 280 and 290.71
On July 14, 1981, Wong filed another grievance under SPP
section 280. This one alleged that: (1) the department had not
documented her layoff with lack of work or lack of funds as
required by the SPP; and on-call employees were being called to
do her work in violation of SPP section 760.5; and (2) the
layoff constituted a further act in a series of punitive
actions, including the June 12 "specification" memo and the
negative June 18 performance evaluation. As a remedy, Wong
requested that the June 12 memo and the evaluation be removed
from her personnel file, and that the layoff be rescinded.
such. Certainly the University's decision to take steps short
of corrective action--when grounds to take corrective action
exist--cannot be construed as retaliatory.
7lspp Section 290.3 states:
An employee may elect to have a complaint
which qualifies for review under Staff
Personnel Policy 280 reviewed under this
policy. However, the same complaint shall
not be reviewed under both Staff Personnel
Policies 280 and 290.
160
The University responded to the June 12 "specifications"
issue in the same way it had when this subject was grieved
earlier. With respect to the performance evaluation issue, the
University correctly responded that performance evaluations are
not grievable under SPP section 280.72 Regarding the layoff
issues, the University responded that Wong received her layoff
notice on May 26, 1981, and the grievance was filed on July 14,
1981. Since SPP section 280.9 imposes a 30-day statute of
limitations on grievances, Toby determined that the grievance,
to the extent it challenged the layoff, was untimely.73
After much communication and disagreement about the scope of
the grievance and the remedy, the University eventually agreed
to process the the grievance on the basis of alleged violations
of SPP sections 760.1 and 760.S.74 In other words, the issue
72spp Section 280.2.d expressly excludes "evaluation of
performance. 11
735pp section 280.9 states, in relevant part, that the
grievance must be filed
••. within thirty calendar days after the
date on which the employee could be expected
to know of the event or action which gave
rise to the grievance or within thirty
calendar days after the date of the
separation, whichever occurs first.
(Emphasis added.)
74section 760.1 states:
The policy of the University to minimize the
effects of indefinite layoffs and reductions
in time of employees in career positions
161
accepted into the grievance procedure was whether the Museum
violated SPP section 760 by employing on-call workers to
perform tasks Wong could have performed.
Next, Wong filed a grievance, under both SPP sections 280
and 290, challenging the action which banned her from the
Museum before 8:30 ·a.m. on July 20, 1981. As a remedy, she
sought equ~l access to the Museum.
Once again, exercising the SPP section 280.3 authority,
Toby responded that this memo did not constitute corrective
action under SPP section 280.2. Therefore, it was not
grievable as such. Also, as Toby correctly pointed out, the
grievance could not be processed under_ both the section 280 and
the section 290 procedure.75 Eventually, the University
when layoffs or reductions in time are
necessitated by lack of funds or lack of
work. To minimize the effects of layoff,
the University shall give employees
preferential opportunities for reassignment
or transfer prior to layoff, the right to be
recalled to the department from which laid
off, and preference for reemployment in all
departments of the campus or Laboratory.
Section 760.5 is set forth at page 106, supra.
75spp section 280.2 states:
An employee may elect to have a complaint
which qualifies for review under this policy
reviewed under Staff Personnel Policy 290.
However, the same complaint shall not be
reviewed under both Staff Personnel Policies
280 and 290.
162
agreed to process the grievance to consider the issue of
whether the memo was a reprisal for the exercise of section 280
or 290 rights. The University maintained, however, that the
arbitrator's remedial authority was limited to a determination
that the banning memo be "reappraised without reprisal. 11 76
It was the University position that, under SPP section 280.27,
since Wong.did not lose any "pay, benefits, or rights 11 as a
result of the action, the arbitrator was powerless to make an
award beyond the reappraisal remedy. It cannot be said that
this interpretation of SPP section 280.27 is totally without
merit. Moreover, since the banning memo applied to only one
day which had long passed, one must strain to fashion an
appropriate remedy regarding Wong's access in the future. In
any event, presumably the Charging Party was free to argue for
another remedy at the hearing and the arbitrator was free to
consider the argument.
Wong's grievance challenging the July 20, 1981 memo about
76The remedial authority of arbitrator is set forth at
SPP section 280.27:
Remedy. If the management action grieved is
determined to be in violation of Staff
Personnel Policy .or the Chancellor's .
implementing procedure or if the corrective
action or dismissal is determined not to be
reasonable under the circumstances, the
remedy shall not exceed restoring to the
employee the pay, benefits, or rights lost
as a result of the action, less any income
earned from any other employment.
163
possession
of
lighting
files
was
accepted
by
the
University
under
the
SPP
section
280
grievance procedure.
Aside
from
the
substance of the
memo,
the
reprisal
aspect
was
also
accepted as
grievable.
However, Toby
again
correctly
refused
to accept
this
grievance
under
SPP
section
290
because
of the
section
280.2
prohibition against
processing the
same
claim
under
both.
procedures.
Wong's
related
grievance challenging
the
July
21,
1981
memo
about
use
of the
Xerox
machine
was
rejected
as
a SPP
section
280
grievance because,
once
again,
it
was
found
that
it
did
not
constitute corrective action
as
that
term
is
defined
in
section
280.2.a.
Wong
was
advised
that
she
could
pursue
this
complaint
under
SPP
section
290.
Further, the
July
21 memo
was
accepted
under
SPP
section
280
for the sole
purpose
of
determining
whether
it
was
issued as
a
reprisal
for the
exercise
of
section
280
and/or
290
rights.
As
with
the
banning
memo
grievance, the University asserted that
the
arbitrator
did
not
have the
authority to order the
Xerox machine
memo
removed
from Wong's
personnel
file.
Although
the
validity
of
this
position
may
be questioned,
it
was
not
totally
unreasonable
and, as
stated,
the Charging
Party could always argue
its
position
on remedy
to the
arbitrator.
2.
Kelly's Grievances.
Under
SPP
Sections
280 and 290,
Kelly grieved the so-called
"banning"
memo
of July
20, and
the denial of on-call hours.
As
164
a
remedy,
this
grievance, as
amended,
sought
a
statement
from
management
that
Kelly
had
the
same
right
of access as
other
employees.
The
remedy
also
sought
the scheduling
of future
on-call
hours,
and
back
pay
for
hours unlawfully denied.
The
grievance
was
initially
rejected
by
Toby
because:
(1)
SPP
section
290.3
prohibits
a
grievance
from
being heard
under
both.
SPP
section
280
and
290:
(
2)
the
"banning"
memo
was
not
11
corrective
action"
under
SPP
section
280.2.a:
(3)
the
right
of access statement as
a
remedy
was
"tnappropriate,"
and,
in
any
event, the
hours Kelly
was
allegedly
banned
were
non-work
hours;
and (4)
under
SPP
section
280.27
the
requested
remedy
(scheduling hours)
is
beyond
the
authority
of the
arbitrator,
since
under
that section
the
arbitrator is
limited
to "restoring.
the
pay,
benefits, or
rights
lost.
11
Apparently,
it
was
the
University's position that
.the
arbitrator
had
no
authority to order the
Museum
to
schedule
hours for Kelly in the
future.
As
with
the
arguments
raised
during
Wong's
grievances, the
University's positions
taken during the Kelly grievance
are
well-grounded in the
SPP.
To
the extent that
a
legitimate
dispute existed
with
respect to
the
remedy,
Kelly
was
free to
argue
his position to the decision-maker.
Toby's response
was
appealed
to
systemwide
representatives,
and
a
lengthy appeal process began. After
much
disagreement
and months
of written
communications between the parties, the
165
grievance
was
accepted
by
the
UniversitY,.
The
question thus
arises
as
to
whether
an
unlawful
motive should
be
inferred
from
this
long
delay.
While
it
is true
that
an
unlawful
motive
may
be
inferred
from
the
outright failure
or
refusal
to
process grievances,
that
is
not
what
happened
here.
The
University
did not
fail
or
refuse to
process
Kelly's
grievance.
It
simply took
positions
different
from
those taken
by
Kelly.
These
differences
req~ired
Kelly
to
take the not unusual
steps of
appealing
through
established
procedures
to higher
levels
in the
systemwide
hierarchy.
The
grievance
was
eventually accepted.
Another reason for the delay in
getting
the grievances
accepted, in addition to
the
time-consuming
appellate process,
was
the
number
and
complexity
of the grievances
pending
at
the
time.
The
delay
was
not, in
my
view,
due
to
an
unlawful motive
or
an
attempt to
retaliate
against
the
grievants for
protected
conduct.
3.
Johnson's Grievances.
On
September
2,
1981, Johnson
filed
a
grievance
alleging
that:
(1) he
was
laid off
on
July
1, 1981,
in violation of
SPP
section
760; (2)
after
the layoff
he
was
not
called to
work
while
less
experienced
employees were; and (3)
these
above-named
actions
were
reprisals
for supporting Kelly and
Greyson in their conflicts
with
UAM
management and
for
166
participating
in the grievance procedure.77
As a
remedy,
Johnson sought
reinstatement
to
his
former
position.
The
Museum
took
the
position, correctly, that
Johnson
received
his
layoff notice
on
May
26,
1981;
since grievances
must
be
filed
within
30
days under
SPP
section
280.9,
that
part
of
the grievance
that
challenges the
layoff decision
was
untimely
..
Further,
the grievance
would
have been
untimely
even
if
the
30-day
period
wa~
calculated
beginning
on
July
1,
1981,
the
day
the
layoff
became
effective.
The
Museum
informed Johnson
that, to
the
extent
his
grievance
argued
for
recall rights
to
casual
employment,
there
existed
no
right
under
the
SPP
to
be
recalled to
a
casual
position.
And,
to
the
extent
his
grievance
argued for
recall
to
a
career
position,
Johnson
was
informed
that,
due
to the
layoff,
there
were no
vacant
career positions in
the
Museum
for
which he
was
qualified.78
77The
August 25, 1981, meeting with
management where
Johnson
was
represented
by
CSEA
is
viewed
as
an
informal stage
of
the grievance procedure.
78rn
support of
this position, the
Museum
cited
SPP
sections
760.1 and
760.14. Section
760.1
is set forth
at
footnote
74,
supra. Section
760.14
states:
Right
to
Recall
to
Layoff Department.
A
regular status
employee
who
is
separated or
whose
time
is
reduced because of indefinite
layoff shall
be
recalled in order of
seniority into
any
active
and vacant career
position for
which
the
employee
is qualified
167
Next,
regarding
denial of
on-call
hours, the
University
took the
position
that
the
denial
did not
violate
SPP
section
760.5.
There
seems
to
be
an
arguable
position
on
the
merits
of the grievance, but
I am
unable
to
find
any
authority
in
the
SPP
for the
University's assertion that
the
alleged
violation is
not
grievable
under
section
280.
Nor
does
this
part
of the grievance
appear
to
be
time-barred
under
SPP
section
280.9,
assuming,
as the
Charging
Party
.
argued,
Johnson
didn't
learn of
the
violation
(i.e.,
that less
experienced
workers
were
being
called
in)
until
August
12,
1981.
However,
in
view
of the
University's overall
record with
respect
to
processing the
large
number
of grievances in
this
case,
along
with
its
underlying reason for
not
calling
Johnson
to
work
in
July
and August 1981,
I
decline to
infer
an
unlawful motive
from
the
fact that
it
may
have
taken
unfounded
positions
on
these isolated issues.
Lastly, the University
informed Johnson
that
it
would
accept
that part of the grievance
which
alleged
reprisals
for
participating
in the informal steps of the grievance
procedure.
However,
the
Museum
stated that
the
appropriate
when
the position is
in the
same
class
and
department
and
at
the.same or
lesser
percentage of time
as the position held
by
the
employee
at
the time of layoff.
Right
to recall is
not extended to
an employee
who
has not
attained regular status.
168
remedy
was
not, as
Johnson
sought,
reinstatement
to
his
former
position.
Rather,
the University
asserted that
the
appropriate
remedy,
in
the event
he
prevailed,
was
to
make
Johnson
whole
for
those
on-call
jobs
he
lost
since
the
August 25,
1981,
meeting
as
a
result
of
reprisals.
Johnson
filed
a
second
grievance
on
October
2, 1981.
He
complained.
that
he
had
recently
discovered
a
series
of negative
letters
in
his
personnel
file,
and
under
the
SPP,
they should
have
been
removed
long
ago.79
The
Charging
Party here
asserts
that
the
University re
fused
to
process
this
grievance.
The
reason
the grievance
was
not processed
was
that,
after
requesting
and
apparently securing
more
specificity
with
respect to the
11
letters,
the University
removed them from
Johnson's
file.
Based
on
the foregoing,
I am
unable
to infer
an
unlawful
motive
from
th.e
manner
in
which
the University
responded
to
the
grievances
filed
by
Wong,
Kelly or Johnson. Although
there
were
many
issues raised
by
these
hotly contested grievances,
in
almost
all
instances the
University's
responses
were
at least
arguable.
In
many
other instances, the
University's positions
were
clearly correct.
There
were
only
a few
examples,
as noted
79According
to the grievance, there
were
eleven
letters
in Johnson's personnel
file.
Their dates
ranged
from
November 5, 1975
to
September 23, 1976. Obviously, they had
nothing to
do
with the instant case.
169
above, where the University took questionable positions. Given
the totality of the University's responses, it would be
patently unreasonable to infer an unlawful motive because on a
few occasions its position may have been erroneous. While the
grievants and CSEA may have preferred that the University take
a more conciliatory approach to these grievances, the fact that
it did not. simply does not translate to unlawful motive.
This reasoning applies as well to that part of the Charging
Party's case which claims the University's conduct during the
grievances constituted a form of discrimination. The Charging
Party produced no evidence about how the University processed
grievances filed by employees who had not engaged in any form
of protected activity. In the absence of such evidence, there
is absolutely no basis upon which a discrimination finding can
be made.
CONCLUSION
It has been found that the University denied Adrienne Wong
the right to a CSEA representative during the desk audit
conducted in conjunction with her reclassification appeal, a
significant employment-related matter. This conduct interfered
with Wong's right to be represented by an employee organization
of her choice. It also violated CSEA's right to represent one
of its members in an employment-related matter.
All other aspects of this unfair practice charge are hereby
dismissed.
170
REMEDY
Section
3563.3
gives
PERB
the
following remedial powers:
The
board
shall
have
the
power
to issue
a
decision
and
order
directing
an
offending
party to
cease
and
desist
from
the
unfair
practice
and
to take
such
affirmative
action,
including, but
not
limited
to,
the
reinstatement
of
employees
with
or without
back
pay,
·as
will effectuate
the
policies
of
this
chapter.
It
has been
found
that
UAM
unlawfully
denied
Wong
the
right
to
be
represented
by an employee
organization
during
a
desk
audit
connected
to
a
reclassification
attempt,
clearly
an
employment-related
matter.
This conduct
also
unlawfully
interfered
with
the
employee
organization's right
to represent
its
members.
It is
therefore appropriate to order the
UAM
to
cease
and
desist
from
this
conduct.
It
also
is
appropriate that
the University
be
required
to
post
a
notice incorporating the
terms
of the order.
The
notice
should
be
subscribed
by an
authorized
agent of
the'University
indicating that
it
will
comply
with
the
terms
thereof.
The
notice shall
not
be reduced
in
size.
Posting
such
a
notice
will
provide
employees with
notice that
the University has
acted in
an
unlawful
manner and
is
being required to cease
and
desist
from
this activity. It
effectuates
the
P,Urposes
of the
HEERA
that
employees be informed of the resolution of the
controversy
and
will
announce
the University's readiness to
comply with the ordered remedy. See
Placerville
Union School
171
District (9/18/78) PERB Decision No. 69; Pandol and Sons v.
Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 580, 587;
NLRB v. Express Publishing Co. (1941) 312 U.S. 426 [8 LRRM 415].
PROPOSED ORDER
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law,
and the entire record in the case, and pursuant to section
3563.3, it- is hereby ordered that the University and its
representatives shall:
1. CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
(a) Interfering with employee rights to be
represented in employment-related matters by an employee
organization;
(b) Interfering with the right of an employee
organization to represent its members on employment-related'
matters.
2. TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE ACT:
(a) Within five (5) workdays after this decision
becomes final, prepare and post copies of the NOTICE TO
EMPLOYEES attached as an appendix hereto, for at least thirty
(30) workdays in conspicuous places at the locations where
notices to UAM employees are customarily posted._ It must not
be reduced in size and reasonable steps should be taken to see
that it is not defaced, altered or covered by any material.
172
(b) Within twenty (20) workdays from service of the
final decision herein, give written notification to the
San Francisco Regional Director of the Public Employment
Relations Board of the actions taken to comply with this
order. Continue to report in writing to the regional director
thereafter as directed. All reports to the regional director
shall be cpncurrently served on the Charging Party herein.
Pursuant to California Administrative Code, title 8,
part III, section 32305, this Proposed Decision and Order shall
become final on May 1, 1984, unless a party files a timely
statement of except ions. In accordance with the rules, the
statement of exceptions should identify by page citation or
exhibit number the portions of the record relied upon for such
exceptions. See California Administrative Code title 8,
part III, section 32300. Such statement of exceptions and
supporting brief must be actually received by the Public
Employment Relations Board at its headquarters office in
Sacramento before the close of business (5:00 p.m.) on May l,
1984, or sent by telegraph or certified United States mail,
postmarked not later than the last day for filing in order to
be timely filed. See California Administrative Code, title 8,
part III, section 32135. Any statement of exceptions and
supporting brief must be served concurrently with its filing
upon each party to this proceeding. Proof of service shall be
173
filed
with
the
Board
itself.
See
California
Administrative
Code,
title
8,
part
III,
sections
32300
and 32305.
Dated:
April
11,
1984
174
FRED
D'ORAZI
Administrative
Law
Judge
FRED
D'ORAZI
Administrative
Law
Judge
APPENDIX
NOTICE
TO
EMPLOYEES
POSTED
BY
ORDER
OF
THE
PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONS
BOARD
An
Agency
of the
State
of
California
0
After
a
hearing in Unfair
Practice
Case
No.
SF-CE-84-H,
California
State
Employees
Association
v.
Regents
of the
Un1vers1ty of Cal1forn1a, in
which
all
parties
had
the
right
to
part1c1pate,
1t
has
been
found
that
the University
violated
Government
Code
sections
357l(a)
and (b)
.
.As a
result
of
this
conduct
we
have been
ordered
to post
this
Notice,
and
will
abide
by
the following.
We
will:
1.
CEASE
AND
DESIST
FROM:
(a)
Interfering
with
employee
rights
to
be
represented in
employment-related
matters
by an employee
organization;
(b)
Interfering
with
the
right
of
an employee
organization to
represent
its
members
on
employment-related
matters.
Dated:
REGENTS OF
THE
UNIVERSITY
OF
CALIFORNIA
By
Authorized
Agent
THIS IS
AN
OFFICIAL NOTICE.
IT
MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR AT LEAST
THIRTY
(30)
WORKDAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING
AND MUST NOT BE
REDUCED IN SIZE, DEFACED, ALTERED OR COVERED BY ANY
MATERIAL.Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.