Davis Joint Unified School District * * * Overruled in part by County of Santa Clara (2022) PERB Decision No. 2820-M, p. 7 and Cerritos Community College District (2022) PERB Decision No. 2819, p. 31 * * * (PERB 0393E)

STATE 	OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION 	OF 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
DAVIS 	TEACHERS ASSOCIATION,
Charging 	Party,
v.
DAVIS 	JOINT 	UNIFIED 	SCHOOL 	DISTRICT,
Respondent.
Case Nos. 	S-CE-103
S-CE-104
PERB Decision No. 	393
August 2, 	1984
Appearances: 	George A. 	Cassell 	for 	Davis Teachers Association;
Gary G. 	Mathiason, 	Wendy A. 	Cheit 	and Harlan E. 	Van Wye,
Attorneys 	(Littler, 	Mendelson, 	Fastiff & Tichy) 	for Davis Joint
Unified 	School 	District.
Before Hesse, 	Chairperson; 	Tovar, 	Jaeger, Morgenstern and Burt,
Members.
DECISION
TOVAR, 	Member: 	This case 	is before 	the Public Employment
Relations Board 	(PERB 	or Board) 	on exceptions 	filed 	by 	the
Davis Joint Unified School District 	(District) 	to 	the proposed
decision 	of an 	administrative 	law 	judge 	(ALJ). 	The 	District
excepts 	to 	the ALJ's 	conclusion 	that 	it 	violated 	subsection
3543.5(c) 	of 	the Educational Employment Relations Act 	(EERA or
Act)1 by 	refusing 	to 	negotiate 	certain 	proposals 	put 	forth
for 	negotiation by 	the Davis Teachers Association 	(Association).
1The 	EERA 	is 	codified 	at 	Government 	Code 	section 	3540
et 	seq. 	All 	statutory 	references 	herein 	are 	to 	the 	Government
Code 	unless 	otherwise 	indicated.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
______________ )
* * * Overruled in part by County of Santa Clara (2022) PERB Decision No.
2820-M, p. 7 and Cerritos Community College District (2022) PERB Decision
No. 2819, p. 31 * * *

FACTS
In 	the 	fall of 	1976, 	following 	recognition of 	the
Association 	as 	the 	exclusive 	representative 	of 	the 	District's
certificated employees, 	the parties began negotiations 	for
their 	first 	collective 	bargaining 	agreement. 	By February 	1978,
they had 	reached 	agreement on most 	issues. 	However, 	two
articles 	included 	in 	the Association's 	original negotiating
proposal 	had 	never 	been 	negotiated. 	The 	first of 	these 	was
Article 	XXV, 	entitled 	"Teacher 	Responsibility For 	Supervision
of Non-teachers." 	This 	article 	consisted of 	18 	paragraphs,
among 	which 	were 	the 	following:
l(c) 	Instructional 	aides or 	volunteer 	aides
shall 	not 	perform 	bargaining 	unit 	work
unless 	the 	performance 	of 	such work 	is 	under
the 	direct 	supervision 	of 	a 	teacher 	and
there 	is no 	teacher 	in 	the District,
including 	teachers 	with 	preferential 	recall
rights 	and 	teachers 	who have 	been
involuntarily transferred, 	effective 	as of
the 	semester 	during 	which 	such 	aide 	is 	to be
employed, 	who desires 	such work.
l(f) 	A supervising 	teacher 	shall 	not 	be
required 	to 	perform 	additional 	assignments
when he 	is 	supervising 	an 	instructional 	aide
or 	volunteer 	aide.
2(b) 	Each 	supervisory 	teacher 	shall be
provided 	with 	paid 	released 	time 	for
attendance 	at 	regularly 	scheduled
orientation 	and 	evaluation 	sessions
sponsored 	by 	a 	student 	teacher's 	college 	or
university.
2(c) 	The Board's 	agreement with 	the 	college
or 	university placing 	student 	teachers 	shall
provide 	that 	such 	college 	or 	university make
payment 	to 	the 	student 	teacher's 	supervising
teacher, 	in either 	of the 	following 	forms:
22

(1) 	Direct case 	payment of $125 	or,
(2) 	Allowance of 	ten 	(10) 	tuition 	free
semester 	credit 	hours.
It 	is 	essentially 	undisputed 	that 	the District 	refused 	to
negotiate Article 	XXV, 	maintaining 	the 	position 	that 	the
subject matter 	of 	the 	proposal 	was 	outside 	the 	scope 	of
representation.2
The 	other 	article 	which 	had 	not 	been 	negotiated 	was Article
XXVIII, 	entitled "Specialists:"
There 	shall 	be 	no 	fewer 	than 	the 	following
number 	of qualified 	specialists 	in 	each of
the 	listed 	categories:
(a) 	Elementary School
Art 	Teachers 	1 	for 	every 	3 	schools
Psychologists 	1 	for 	every 	2 	schools
Music 	Teachers 	1 	for 	every 	3 	schools
Reading 	Teachers 1 	for 	every 	school
Librarians 1 	for 	every 	schoolCounselors 1 	for 	every 	1000 	students
(b) 	Junior High School
Guidance 	Counselors 	1 	for 	every 	250 	students
Librarians 	1 	for 	every 	1000 	students
Reading 	Teachers 	1 	for 	every 	school
2In 	its 	brief 	to 	the ALJ, 	the District made 	no argument
that 	it 	had met 	its 	obligation 	under 	the Act 	to 	negotiate 	the
merits of the proposal. 	Thus, 	in his proposed decision, 	the
ALJ 	found 	that 	the District's 	refusal 	to 	so 	negotiate 	was
undisputed. 	In 	its 	exceptions, 	the District nominally 	states
an objection 	to the ALJ's 	finding 	in 	this 	regard; 	however, 	it
offers 	no 	argument 	to 	support 	or 	explain 	that 	contention.
W
	3

(c) 	Senior 	High 	School
Guidance 	Counselors 	1 	for 	every 	250 	students
Psychologists 	1 	for 	every 	2 	schools
Librarians 	1 	for 	every 	1000 	students
Reading 	Teachers 	1 	for 	every 	1000 	students
(d) 	Systemwide
Psychiatric 	Social
Workers
Nurses 	1 	for 	every 	2000 	students
While 	Article 	XXVIII 	was 	part 	of 	the 	original 	proposed
contract 	submitted 	by 	the Association, 	it 	was 	not 	made 	the
subject 	of 	specific 	discussion 	until 	the 	post-midnight 	hours 	of
a 	"marathon" 	negotiating 	session 	held 	in 	mid-September 	1977.
At 	that 	time 	the 	parties 	spent 	no 	more 	than 	a 	few minutes
discussing 	it. 	The 	District's 	negotiator 	advanced 	an 	initial
view 	that 	the 	subject 	of 	the 	proposal 	was 	not 	within 	the EERA's
scope 	of 	representation. 	The 	Association's 	negotiator
maintained, 	however, 	that 	the 	proposal 	was 	related 	to hours.
Nevertheless, 	the 	District 	continued 	to 	argue 	that 	the 	proposal
was 	outside 	of 	the 	scope 	of 	representation, 	pointing 	out 	that
the 	subject 	addressed 	by 	the 	proposal 	was 	then 	pending 	before
the 	EERB.3 The 	District 	ultimately 	took 	the 	position 	that 	it
would 	not 	negotiate 	about 	the 	proposal 	unless EERB 	determined
that 	the 	matter 	was 	within 	scope. 	The 	discussion 	concluded
3Prior 	to January 	1, 	1978, 	PERB 	was 	known 	as 	the
Educational Employment 	Relations 	Board. 	The 	name 	was 	changed
in Chapter 	1159, 	Statutes 	of 1977.
A4

when 	the 	District's 	negotiator 	suggested 	that 	the 	parties 	move
on 	to 	another 	subject.
While 	the 	record here 	is 	somewhat 	sketchy, 	it 	appears 	that
the 	nature of 	the workload 	for 	these 	specialists varies, 	as
might be expected, 	according 	to the 	classification. 	High
school counselors, 	for example, 	are 	assigned to provide
educational, 	personal and 	career 	counseling 	services 	to a 	fixed
pool of 	students. 	At 	the 	time of hearing, 	each 	full-time
counselor 	was 	assigned 	approximately 	337 	students. 	In previous
years, 	the 	number 	of 	students 	assigned 	to each 	counselor 	ranged
from 311 	to 360. 	Unrefuted 	testimony 	indicates 	that 	counselors
are 	not 	assigned 	fixed work 	hours. 	Some work 	through 	the 	lunch
hour, 	and 	it 	is 	common 	for 	counselors 	to meet with 	students 	and
parents 	in 	the 	evening. 	The 	testimony also 	indicates 	that 	as
the 	number 	of students 	assigned 	to a counselor 	increases, 	the
hours 	he or 	she must work 	also 	increases.
The 	work of 	the 	art 	teacher 	specialist 	is 	structured 	quite
differently. 	At 	the 	time 	the 	specialist proposal 	was presented
at 	the 	bargaining 	table, 	and 	continuing 	through 	the 	time 	of
hearing, 	the District 	employed 	just one 	art 	teacher 	specialist,
whose 	assignment was 	to 	act as 	a consultant 	to 	the District's
elementary 	school 	teachers. 	This 	individual held workshops 	for
the 	teachers 	in the afternoons. 	Little, 	if any, 	of his work
involved 	direct 	interaction 	with 	students.
5
5

The District 	employs 	one 	part-time music 	teacher 	to provide
music 	instruction 	for 	the 	students 	in 	its 	six 	elementary
schools. 	This 	teacher 	visits 	each 	classroom on 	a 	rotating
basis 	to conduct musical 	instruction 	for 	the 	students.
The 	District's 	elementary 	school 	librarians 	each 	provide
services 	to 	two elementary 	schools. 	The 	librarians work 	both
with 	the 	teachers 	in 	developing 	and 	locating 	teaching 	materials
and 	with 	the 	students 	directly 	in groups, 	teaching 	library
skills. 	The 	elementary 	school 	reading 	teachers 	similarly
perform dual 	functions, 	acting 	as 	consultants 	to 	the 	classroom
teachers 	and 	also working 	directly with 	certain 	students.
DISCUSSION
Article 	XXVIII 	- 	"Specialists"
In 	his proposed 	decision, 	the ALJ 	found 	that
Article XXVIII, 	dealing with 	the District's 	"specialist"
personnel, 	addressed, 	at least 	in part, 	the expressly
negotiable 	subject 	of 	hours 	and 	that 	the 	District 	had 	refused
to negotiate 	that proposal. 	He 	concluded 	on 	that 	basis 	that
the District 	had 	violated 	subsection 3543.5(c) 	of 	the EERA.
On exceptions, 	the District maintains 	that 	the ALJ erred 	in
finding 	that 	the 	proposal 	addressed 	a 	negotiable 	subject 	and
that, 	in 	any event, 	it never 	refused 	to negotiate 	about the
proposal. 	It contends, 	therefore, 	that the ALJ's finding of a
violation was 	in error.
6

The 	scope of 	representation 	is 	expressly defined 	in 	the
EERA at 	section 3543.2. 	At 	the 	time of 	the 	parties'
negotiations, 	that 	section provided 	as 	follows:
The 	scope 	of 	representation 	shall be 	limited
to matters 	relating 	to wages, 	hours of
employment, 	and 	other 	terms 	and 	conditions
of employment. 	"Terms 	and 	conditions of
employment" 	mean 	health 	and 	welfare 	benefits
as defined by Section 53200, 	leave, 	transfer
and 	reassignment policies, 	safety conditions
of employment, 	class size, 	procedures to be
used 	for 	the 	evaluation 	of employees,
organizational 	security 	pursuant 	to Section
3546, 	procedures 	for processing grievances
pursuant to Sections 3548.5, 	3548.6, 	3548.7,
and 	3548.8, 	and 	the 	layoff of probationary
certificated 	school district 	employees,
pursuant 	to Section 	44959.5 	of 	the Education
Code. 	In addition, 	the exclusive
representative 	of 	certificated 	personnel 	has
the 	right 	to consult 	on 	the 	definition of
educational objectives, 	the determination of
the content of courses 	and 	curriculum, 	and
the 	selection of 	textbooks 	to 	the 	extent
such matters 	are within 	the discretion of
the 	public 	school employer 	under 	the 	law.
All 	matters 	not 	specifically 	enumerated 	are
reserved 	to 	the 	public 	school employer 	and
may not be 	a 	subject of meeting 	and
negotiating, 	provided 	that 	nothing 	herein
may be 	construed 	to 	limit 	the 	right of 	the
public 	school employer 	to 	consult with 	any
employees 	or 	employee 	organization on 	any
matter 	outside 	the 	scope of
representation.4
In Anaheim Union High School District 	(10/28/81) 	PERB
Decision No. 	177, 	the Board recognized 	that 	section 3543.2 did
4In 1981, 	EERA 	section 	3543.2 	was 	amended, 	designating
the 	above-set-forth 	provision as 	subsection 	(a) 	and 	adding 	new
subsections 	(b) 	and 	(c). 	The 	text of the 	current 	subsection
3543.2(a) 	is 	unchanged 	from 	its prior 	form which 	was 	applicable
to 	the 	instant dispute.
77

not 	limit 	the 	scope 	of negotiations 	merely 	to 	those 	subjects
expressly 	listed 	therein; 	rather, 	the 	statute 	stated 	that
"matters 	relating 	to" 	any of 	the 	listed 	subjects 	were 	also
negotiable. 	The Board, 	after 	careful consideration, 	therefore
fashioned 	a 	test by which 	a 	subject 	not 	expressly 	listed 	in
section 	3543.2 	could 	be 	examined 	to determine 	whether 	it 	is
properly within 	the 	scope 	of 	representation 	as 	intended 	by 	the
Legislature. 	This 	test, 	set 	forth 	in Anaheim Union High School
District, 	supra, 	provides 	that a subject will be 	found within
scope 	if: 	(1) 	it 	is 	logically and 	reasonably related 	to wages,
hours 	or 	an 	enumerated 	term 	and 	condition 	of 	employment;
(2) 	the 	subject 	is of such concern 	to both management 	and
employees 	that 	conflict 	is 	likely 	to 	occur 	and 	the mediatory
influence 	of collective 	negotiations 	is 	the 	appropriate means
of 	resolving 	the conflict; 	and 	(3) 	the employer's 	obligation 	to
negotiate 	would 	not 	significantly 	abridge 	its 	freedom 	to
exercise 	those 	managerial prerogatives 	(including 	matters 	of
fundamental policy) 	essential 	to 	the 	achievement 	of 	the
District's 	mission. 	This 	test 	was 	subsequently 	affirmed 	by 	the
California Supreme 	Court 	in San Mateo 	City School District et
al. 	v. PERB 	(1983) 	33 Cal.3d 850.
-
Because 	the ALJ's 	decision 	in 	the 	instant 	case 	pre-dates
the Board's Anaheim decision, 	his 	rulings on 	the 	negotiability
of 	the 	subjects 	presented 	in Articles 	XXV and 	XXVIII 	were 	not
88

based on 	the 	test 	set 	forth 	above, 	but on 	somewhat different
criteria. 	In 	considering 	the 	rulings 	to which 	the District has
excepted, 	therefore, 	we 	cannot merely 	review the ALJ's
treatment of the 	issues; 	rather, 	we are 	required 	to decide
these matters on a de novo basis, 	guided 	by 	the 	test 	set 	forth
in Anaheim, 	supra, 	and cases decided 	thereunder.
In Article XXVIII, 	the Association proposed 	that 	the
District 	observe 	certain 	specified 	ratios 	between 	the 	number 	of
employees 	in each 	specialist classification, 	on 	the one 	hand,
and 	either 	the 	number 	of 	students 	or 	the 	number 	of 	schools 	in
the District on 	the 	other. 	It 	can 	readily be 	seen 	that 	such 	a
policy, 	if adopted, 	might produce one or 	both of 	two discrete
effects. 	First, 	it could eliminate 	the District's discretion
as 	to 	the 	number 	of employees 	it would 	have on 	its 	staff 	in
each 	specialist 	classification. 	Instead, 	the 	number 	of 	such
employees 	would 	be 	determined 	by 	application 	of 	the 	specified
ratios 	to either 	the 	number 	of 	students 	enrolled 	in 	the
District or 	the 	number of schools, 	as 	dictated 	by 	the 	terms 	of
the proposal. 	Second, 	the policy could 	act as 	a 	limitation, 	or
ceiling, 	controlling 	the 	amount 	of work 	to be performed 	by 	the
specialists. 	The District 	acknowledges 	in 	its brief 	to 	the
administrative 	law judge 	that 	both 	of 	these 	effects 	may 	be
perceived 	in 	the 	proposal:5
5This 	brief 	is 	incorporated 	by 	reference 	into 	the
District's 	exceptions brief. 	While 	the District 	itself
9

. 	. 	. 	[T]his 	DTA proposed article may be
bisected 	to include: 	(1) 	the portion of the
proposal 	that 	would determine 	the kind 	of
specialists 	to be employed, 	in what 	number
they are 	to be hired, 	and 	at 	what 	number
they shall be distributed 	to the 	various
grade levels; 	and 	(2) 	the remaining aspect
of 	the proposal that 	would 	set 	the case
and/or 	workload 	of 	counselors,
psychologists, etc.
Certainly, 	these 	two 	concepts are 	not 	inextricably linked.
Thus, 	a policy providing, 	for example, 	that no counselor be
assigned 	more 	than 	250 	students 	would 	establish a 	caseload
ceiling; 	it would not, however, 	require that the District
retain a 	fixed number of 	counselors, 	or 	even any counselors at
all. 	Since 	the District 	retains 	control over 	the 	number of
students 	to whom it will offer counseling services, 	it 	can
reduce 	the 	number 	of 	counselors 	on 	its 	staff by 	regulating 	the
number of students to 	receive 	counseling. 	Conversely, 	a
staffing 	requirement 	that 	a 	school 	carry 	one 	counselor 	for
every 	250 	students 	enrolled 	will 	not 	guarantee 	each 	counselor 	a
caseload 	ceiling, 	since 	the 	employer 	would be 	in 	compliance
with the 	staffing quotas 	if, 	in a 500 student school, 	it
assigned 	100 	students 	to 	one 	counselor 	and 	400 	to the other.
acknowledges 	that 	the Association was, 	at 	least 	in part,
proposing 	a 	caseload ceiling 	when 	it presented Article 	XXVIII,
the dissent herein would have 	us 	ignore 	this 	evidence and
refuse 	to 	recognize 	this 	common understanding of 	the parties.
In our view, 	where 	a negotiating proposal 	says X, 	but 	the
parties 	agree 	that 	their 	discussions 	proceeded 	on the 	mutual
understanding that 	it 	meant Y, 	the Board's analysis 	should 	rely
on 	that mutual 	understanding 	rather 	than on an artificial,
externally 	imposed 	interpretation.
10

The District maintains, 	however, 	that neither 	the subject
of 	staffing 	quotas 	nor 	the 	subject of 	specialist 	workload 	is
within 	the 	scope 	of 	representation. 	The ALJ 	found 	that 	the
subject of staffing 	quotas 	is 	not 	a negotiable 	subject, 	and 	the
Association 	has 	filed 	no exception 	to 	this 	finding. 	Indeed,
nowhere 	in 	the 	record 	is 	there 	an 	indication 	that 	the
Association 	ever 	advocated 	that 	that 	subject 	was 	negotiable.
The 	parties' 	dispute, 	then 	— 	and 	thus 	the 	issue 	before 	us 	—
is whether 	the workload of 	the 	specialists 	is 	negotiable. 	Upon
application of 	the Anaheim test, 	this Board 	finds 	that 	it 	is.
An employment contract, 	by definition, 	is at 	its core 	an
agreement 	to 	the 	exchange 	of 	a 	specified 	amount 	of 	labor 	for 	a
specified 	amount of compensation. 	Thus 	it 	is 	that 	section 8(d)
of 	the National Labor 	Relations Act 	(NLRA),6 	which 	sets 	forth
the 	scope 	of 	bargaining 	for 	the 	collective 	negotiation of 	such
contracts 	in 	the 	private 	sector, 	lists 	by name only 	the 	two
subjects of 	"wages" 	and 	"hours." 	Beyond 	these 	two express
terms, 	the parties, 	in negotiating 	their employment contract,
are 	directed 	simply 	to 	"other 	terms 	and 	conditions 	of
6The 	National Labor 	Relations Act 	is 	codified 	at 	29
U.S.C. 	151 et seq. 	This federal legislation, 	as 	interpreted by
the National Labor 	Relations Board 	and 	the 	federal courts,
served 	as 	an 	important 	reference 	and 	model 	for 	the 	California
Legislature 	in 	the 	drafting of 	the EERA. 	The 	provisions of 	the
NLRA may 	be 	used 	as 	guidance 	in 	interpreting 	parallel
provisions 	of 	the EERA. 	San 	Diego Teachers Association v.
Superior Court 	(1979) 	24 	Cal.3d 1; 	Fire Fighters Union v. 	City
of Vallejo 	(1974) 	12 	Cal.3d 608; 	Moreno Valley Unified School
District v. 	PERB 	(1983) 	142 Cal.App.3d 	191.
11

employment." 	The 	special 	identification of 	the 	two 	terms 	in
the NLRA 	reflects 	the 	exchange 	of 	labor 	for 	compensation 	which
is 	the 	essential 	and 	defining 	element of 	the 	employment
contract.
The 	term "wages" 	as 	it appears 	in section 8(d) 	has 	long
been 	recognized 	as 	designating 	the 	negotiability, 	not merely of
pure 	wage 	rates, 	but of any 	form or measure which may 	fairly be
found 	to 	constitute 	compensation provided 	to an 	employee 	in
consideration 	of his 	labor. 	The 	idea 	that 	any 	form of
compensation 	is negotiable 	as 	"wages" 	to 	the extent 	that 	it 	is
found 	to 	constitute 	contractual consideration was 	expressed 	by
the Seventh Circuit 	in Inland Steel Co. 	v. 	NLRB, 	170 F.2d 247
[22 LRRM 2506] 	(1948), cert, den. 	336 U.S. 960 	(1948). 	Ruling
on 	the 	negotiability of 	a pension plan, 	the Court 	stated 	that
"such 	an 	obligation 	would 	represent 	a part 	of 	the 	consideration
for services performed, 	and . 	. 	. would, 	in our view, 	be
"wages." 	(Emphasis 	added.)7
7The 	First 	Circuit 	has 	similarly 	concluded 	that 	the 	term
"wages," 	as used 	in NLRA section 8(d), 	is not meant literally,
but was 	intended 	to 	refer 	to 	the 	economic 	consideration 	to
which 	the employees 	are contractually entitled. 	Thus, 	in
W. W. 	Cross & Co. 	v. NLRB, 	health plan benefits were 	found
negotiable, 	the Court stating:
The 	word 	"wages" 	. . . 	in 	the Act must 	have
been 	intended 	to 	comprehend 	more 	than 	the
amount 	of 	renumeration 	per 	unit 	of 	time
worked. 	. . . 	At least, 	. 	. 	. 	the word
"wages" 	in 	. . . 	the Act 	embraces 	within 	its
meaning 	direct 	and 	immediate 	economic
12

Just 	as 	the 	term 	"wages" 	has 	been 	found 	to 	represent 	the
full 	panoply of economic 	benefits 	flowing 	to 	the 	employees 	as
contractual consideration, 	the 	term "hours," as 	it 	appears 	in
NLRA section 8(d), 	has been 	interpreted 	to authorize 	the
negotiability of 	the 	employees' 	basic 	contractual 	obligation 	to
perform labor. 	And, 	as 	the 	economic benefits 	to which
employees 	are 	contractually entitled may 	take 	a 	variety of
forms, 	so 	the 	work 	for 	which 	employees 	are 	contractually
obligated may be measured 	in a number of ways. 	Plainly, 	hours,
in 	its 	strict sense, 	is 	an 	incomplete 	standard 	for 	the
measurement of work. 	Equally as 	important as 	the concept of
time 	in measuring 	the 	amount 	of 	labor 	rendered 	by an 	employee
is 	the 	intensity of effort expended. 	The 	fundamental, 	and
judicially 	recognized, 	labor 	law concepts 	of 	"speedup,"
"slowdown" 	and 	"workload" 	reflect 	an 	understanding of 	the 	fact
that 	labor 	cannot 	be measured 	in hours 	alone. 	Thus, 	the 	term
"hours," 	as used 	in 	section 8(d), 	has never been restricted to
its 	literal definition, 	but 	is 	recognized 	as authorizing 	the
negotiability of 	the 	amount of 	labor, 	however quantified, 	which
benefits 	flowing 	from 	the 	employment
relationship. . . .
174 	F.2d 	875 	[24 	LRRM 2068]
(1949).
This Board 	has 	itself made 	clear 	that 	its 	interpretation of 	the
term "wages" 	is much 	the 	same 	as 	that of 	the NLRB. 	See,
Healdsburg 	Union High School District 	(1/5/84) 	PERB 	Decision
No. 	375, 	at pp. 	29-30, 	and PERB Decisions cited therein.
13

will be 	provided 	to 	the 	employer 	by 	the 	employees 	as 	their
obligation 	under 	the 	bargain. 	Under 	the 	terminology of 	the
private 	sector, 	negotiations on 	the 	amount of 	labor 	for 	which
the 	employees 	will 	be 	contractually 	obligated 	are 	said 	to
address 	the 	subject 	of 	"workload."8
The 	California courts, 	in 	the context of enforcement of 	the
labor 	relations 	program embodied 	in 	the 	Meyers-Milias-Brown
Act,9 have 	also 	found 	the 	subject 	of workload 	to 	be 	basic 	to
labor 	negotiations. 	In Fire Fighters Union v. 	City of Vallejo
(1974) 	12 Cal.3d 608 	[116 Cal.Rptr. 	507], 	the California
Supreme 	Court 	found 	that 	a 	proposal 	requiring 	that 	certain
firefighting 	functions 	be 	performed 	by 	a 	given 	number 	of
employees would, 	to 	the 	extent 	it was aimed at 	limiting
8Examples 	of 	the 	different 	forms 	which workload
negotiations may take are many. 	Thus, 	in a case bearing
notable 	similarities 	to 	the one 	before 	us, 	the NLRB 	approved
the 	negotiability of 	a proposal 	to 	increase 	the 	number 	of
employees 	assigned 	to operate 	a 	specific 	10-inch 	mill
notwithstanding 	the 	obvious 	implications 	for 	staffing 	policy.
(Timken Roller Bearing Co. 	(1946) 	70 NLRB 	500, 	reversed on
other 	grounds 	(Sixth Cir. 	1947) 	161 F.2d 949.) 	In Beacon Piece
Dyeing & Finishing Co., 	Inc. 	(1958) 	121 NLRB 953, 	the NLRB held
that 	an 	employer 	could 	not 	unilaterally 	increase 	an 	employee's
workload 	by 	assigning 	to 	him 	the 	operation 	of 	an 	additional
machine. 	Production 	rates 	and quotas 	are 	also negotiable.
(Master Slack Corp. 	(1977) 	230 NLRB 	1054.) 	In a case where 	the
amount 	of 	labor 	required 	of 	employees 	was 	measured 	both 	in
hours 	and 	in sales quotas, 	the quotas were 	held negotiable.
(Irvington Motors, 	Inc. 	(1964) 	174 NLRB 565, enforced, 	343 F.2d
759.) 	See also, 	Gallenkamp Stores Co. 	v. NLRB 	(9th Cir. 	1968)
402 F.2d 525, 	529.
9The 	Meyers-Milias-Brown Act 	is 	codified 	at 	Government
Code 	section 3500 	et 	seq.
14

employee workload, 	be negotiable. 	In 	its opinion, 	the Court
approved 	the 	holding 	of 	the 	court 	of 	appeal 	in Los Angeles
County Employees Assn. 	v. 	County of Los Angeles 	(1973) 	33
Cal.App.3d 1 	[108 Cal.Rptr. 	625]. 	In that case, 	the court held
that 	the 	scope 	of 	bargaining 	compelled 	the 	county 	to 	negotiate
a 	union 	proposal 	to 	reduce 	workload 	by 	limiting 	the 	size of 	the
caseload 	carried 	by 	social 	service eligibility workers.
Both 	the 	federal and California authorities, 	then, 	have
recognized 	that 	the 	right of 	employees 	to negotiate 	the
fundamental 	elements 	of 	their 	employment 	contracts 	- economic
compensation 	in 	exchange 	for 	labor 	- 	should 	not 	be 	limited 	by
literal 	interpretation of the 	terms 	"wages" 	and 	"hours." 	In
the context of 	the EERA, 	the 	notion 	that 	the scope of
representation 	is 	not 	limited 	by 	strictly 	literal definitions
of 	the 	listed 	subjects of negotiation 	is 	not merely 	implied, 	as
in the NLRA, but, 	a fortiori, 	is express. 	Thus, 	the first
sentence 	of 	section 	3543.2 	provides 	that 	the 	scope 	of
representation 	embraces 	"matters 	relating 	to" 	the 	enumerated
subjects. 	Early on, 	this Board 	recognized 	that 	the 	enumeration
of 	"hours" 	at section 3543.2 	embraced, 	through 	the 	"relating
to" 	language of 	the 	section, 	much more 	than 	the mere 	literal
definition of 	the 	term. 	Thus, 	in Fullerton Union High School
District 	(5/30/78) 	PERB Decision No. 	53, 	we noted that:
Negotiations 	on hours must 	include 	not 	only
the 	stated 	length of 	the workday, 	but 	the
ability of 	the 	employees 	to complete 	their
15

assigned work within 	the 	workday. 	Setting
the hours 	of 	the 	workday 	is meaningless 	if
the 	work 	can 	never 	be 	performed 	within 	those
hours.
The 	evidence 	in 	the 	instant 	case 	shows 	that, 	for 	the
District's counselors, 	work 	is 	assigned on a caseload 	basis.
Competent 	testimonial evidence 	indicates 	that 	at 	least 	some 	of
the 	counselors 	were 	never 	assigned 	a workday of 	a 	fixed,
specified 	length. 	The 	starting 	and 	ending 	times of 	the
counselors' 	workday, 	as well as lunch hours, 	were determined to
a great 	extent 	by 	each 	individual counselor. 	Similarly,
evening 	meetings 	with 	parents 	were 	held 	at 	the discretion of
the 	counselor 	on 	an 	as-needed 	basis. 	The 	testimony 	also
indicates 	that 	in previous 	years 	the 	caseload of 	counselors
varied 	from approximately 	311 	students 	to 360. 	The 	time
required 	of 	the 	counselors 	to deliver 	the 	services 	required 	of
them has 	varied 	proportionately with 	the 	number 	of 	students
assigned 	to 	them.
Where, 	as here, 	the work 	to be performed 	is 	in the nature
of casework 	— 	that 	is, 	a 	set 	of 	tasks, 	assigned 	by management,
to 	be 	performed 	on 	a 	student-by-student 	basis 	— 	the
relationship 	between 	the 	number 	of 	cases 	and 	the 	hours 	needed
to complete 	the 	work 	is 	reasonably 	and 	logically 	apparent.
Given 	a 	particular 	level 	of 	service 	established 	by management,
the 	counseling 	of 	a 	given 	number 	of 	students 	each 	day will
result 	in a workday of a certain length, 	on 	the 	average. 	If
the number of students 	to be counseled 	is 	increased, 	it 	is
16

plain that, 	absent 	a modification of 	the 	services 	to be
rendered, 	more 	time 	will be 	required to complete 	the 	job.
Indeed, 	the 	relationship between a case worker's hours 	of
employment and his 	or her 	caseload 	is 	so close 	that, 	in the
context 	of 	this 	case, 	a 	finding that 	caseload was 	not 	related
to hours 	would 	effectively negate 	the 	language 	at 	section
3543.2 that 	"matters 	relating to" 	the 	listed 	subjects, 	as well
as 	the subjects 	themselves, 	are within the scope of
representation.
The 	workload 	of 	the 	employees 	in 	the 	remaining 	specialist
classifications 	raises 	somewhat 	different 	concerns. 	We have
noted 	that 	the 	essential 	and defining 	feature 	of 	an 	employment
contract 	is 	the exchange of 	labor 	for 	compensation. 	Thus, 	we
found, 	the 	collective negotiation of such a contract, 	as
authorized both 	in 	the NLRA and 	the EERA, 	logically extends 	to
both 	the 	amount 	of 	compensation which 	the 	employer 	must pay, 	on
the 	one hand, 	and 	the 	amount 	of work which the 	employees 	will
be obligated 	to perform, 	on the 	other.
Certainly, 	work 	assignments 	are 	structured 	in a 	variety of
ways. 	Under one common model, 	the employees' 	obligation begins
and 	ends 	with 	the 	responsibility to be 	present 	at 	the 	work
place 	and 	make 	their 	labor 	available 	for 	a 	specified period of
time 	— 	typically 	the 	eight 	hours 	between 	9:00 	a.m. 	and
5:00 p.m. 	Under 	such an arrangement, 	the 	employee 	is 	entitled
to 	end 	the 	workday at 	the 	prescribed hour 	without 	regard 	to 	the
17

tasks 	which may or 	may not 	have 	been 	completed 	to 	that point.
Where 	management 	has 	structured 	the 	job 	in 	such 	a 	fashion,
workload 	will 	be 	a 	product 	simply of 	the 	time 	spent 	at work.
Thus, 	workload 	negotiations 	would 	proceed 	directly on 	the
subject of hours.
Under 	other 	models 	of 	job 	structure, 	the 	employee's 	work
obligation 	is different. 	In addition to 	the obligation to be
present 	and 	available 	to work 	for 	a prescribed 	time 	period, 	an
employee may be obligated 	to complete 	certain 	tasks, 	on a daily
basis 	or 	otherwise, 	as 	a requirement of 	the 	job. 	Where 	fixed
production 	levels 	are made 	a part of 	the 	job, 	they clearly
become 	a 	factor 	which determines 	the 	employee's 	workload. 	For
an 	assembly 	line 	worker 	who 	is 	required 	to perform 	an operation
on each object which passes by on 	the 	line, 	his or 	her 	workload
is clearly a product of both 	the 	time 	he or 	she 	spends 	at 	the
work 	station 	an---d 	the 	rate 	at which 	the 	belt brings 	the 	objects
to be dealt with.
Other 	jobs may 	be 	structured 	such 	that 	a 	fixed 	time 	period
is 	not 	a part of 	the 	employees' 	work obligation at all. 	A pure
piece-rate 	work 	assignment 	is 	the 	simplest 	example of 	such 	an
arrangement. 	In 	the 	area of professional employment, 	an
employee 	frequently 	is 	charged 	with 	the 	obligation 	to 	fulfill
certain 	specified 	duties 	according 	to professional 	standards.
Such 	a professional position may have 	attached 	to 	it 	a workday
of 	a 	nominally 	stated 	length. 	By 	this 	we mean 	that 	the
18

position may be 	described 	or 	spoken of 	in 	certain contexts 	as
having 	a particular 	workday, 	as 	from 9:00 	a.m. 	to 5:00 	p.m.,
while 	in 	practice 	the work 	time 	required of 	the 	employee 	will
be 	no 	less 	than 	that 	which 	is 	required 	to properly discharge
the 	assigned 	duties. 	The 	nominally 	stated 	length of 	the
workday 	may 	in 	practice 	serve 	as 	a minimum requirement 	of 	job
attendance, 	or 	it may have no relationship to 	the employee's
actual work 	time 	at 	all.
In 	the 	case 	before 	this Board, 	we 	have 	found 	that 	the 	job
of 	the 	counselors 	is 	structured 	upon 	a caseload 	model. 	On 	that
basis 	we 	have 	concluded 	that 	the 	number 	of cases 	assigned 	to
them 	is 	a negotiable matter. 	In 	the case of employees 	in 	the
remaining 	classifications, 	the 	record 	indicates 	that 	their 	work
assignments 	are 	structured 	quite 	differently. 	The 	District's
art 	teacher, 	for 	example, 	was 	assigned 	to provide 	consultation
services 	to 	the 	elementary 	school 	teachers 	by holding 	workshops
at 	each 	school. 	The 	District's music 	teacher 	was 	assigned 	to
visit 	each 	elementary 	classroom 	to 	provide 	instruction on 	a
rotating 	basis. 	While 	the 	District claims 	that 	these 	teacher
specialists 	were 	assigned 	specific work hours, 	there 	is 	no
evidence 	that 	the 	teachers 	were 	authorized 	to drop 	their 	work
tasks 	at 	the 	close 	of 	the 	last 	nominally 	assigned work 	hour.
Their 	assignment, 	then, 	was not 	simply 	to work 	for 	the 	stated
hours, 	but to service a certain number of 	schools, 	or classes,
as 	the case may be, 	and 	to complete 	their 	assignments. 	Thus,
19

the 	amount of work 	to be 	performed 	by 	these 	specialists 	is 	not
to 	be 	determined 	by 	the 	nominally 	stated 	length 	of 	the 	workday,
but by 	factors 	such 	as 	the 	number 	of classroom 	teachers 	to be
served 	by 	the 	art 	teacher, 	or 	the 	number 	of classes 	to be
visited 	by 	the music 	teacher. 	Because 	these 	factors 	determine
the 	specialists' 	workload, 	they are 	logically and 	reasonably
related 	to hours 	of work 	for 	purposes 	of 	the Anaheim 	test.
The 	second 	step 	of 	the Anaheim 	test 	requires 	little
elaboration. 	As we 	have noted 	above, 	the 	subject of workload
goes 	to 	the 	very core of 	the 	employment 	contract. 	As 	such, 	it
is plainly 	a 	subject of 	central 	concern 	to both management 	and
employees 	which 	may 	appropriately 	be 	resolved 	via 	the 	process
of 	collective 	negotiation.
The 	third 	step 	of 	the Anaheim test 	provides 	that,
notwithstanding 	the 	first 	two steps, 	a subject will not be
negotiable 	if 	the 	employer's 	obligation 	to negotiate 	it would
significantly 	abridge 	the 	employer's 	freedom to 	exercise 	those
managerial prerogatives 	essential 	to 	the 	achievement 	of 	its
mission.
The 	concern 	has 	been 	raised 	that 	the 	negotiability of
specialist 	workload 	(including 	counselor 	caseload) 	may
interfere 	with 	management's 	control over 	staffing 	decisions.
Certainly 	it 	is 	indisputable 	that 	a policy which 	sets workload
ceilings 	could 	have 	an 	effect 	on 	the 	District's 	staffing
decisions. 	For example, 	if, 	at a school of 1,000 students, 	a
20

counselor 	caseload 	limit 	is 	set at 	250, 	then a managerial
decision 	to guarantee 	each 	student 	a 	counselor 	will 	in 	turn
eliminate 	the District's 	ability 	to operate 	the 	school with
fewer 	than 	four counselors. 	It would not, 	however, 	abridge 	the
District's 	right 	to 	decide 	that 	all 	students will 	receive
counseling or, 	for 	that matter, 	that only some, 	or none, 	will
be 	offered 	counseling.
Acknowledging 	that 	the 	negotiation 	of 	workload 	may 	have
some staffing 	implications, 	this 	in 	itself 	is 	not 	inevitably
fatal 	to 	the 	negotiability of 	the 	subject. 	In Fire Fighters
Union v. 	City of Vallejo 	(1974) 	12 Cal.3 608, 	supra, 	the
California 	Supreme 	Court 	specifically 	considered 	the
negotiability of 	employee workload 	in 	the 	face of 	the 	city
employer's 	contention 	that 	the 	impact 	of 	workload 	negotiations
on 	the city's 	staffing 	decisions 	put 	the matter 	out of 	scope.
Although 	this 	case 	arose 	in 	the 	context of 	the Meyers-Milias-
Brown Act, 	the Court gave 	careful consideration 	to 	the 	very
managerial 	interests 	in 	operational control which we 	are
required 	to 	consider 	under Anaheim.
The 	Court's 	framing 	of 	the 	issue 	reveals 	that 	the 	parties
presented 	precisely 	the 	arguments 	now before 	us:
The 	city 	argues 	that manpower 	level 	in 	the
fire 	department 	is 	inevitably 	a matter 	of
fire 	prevention policy, 	and 	as 	such 	lies
solely 	within 	the 	province 	of management.
If 	the 	relevant 	evidence 	demonstrates 	that
the 	union's manpower 	proposal 	is 	indeed
directed 	to 	the 	question 	of maintaining 	a
21

particular 	standard 	of 	fire 	prevention
within 	the 	community, 	the 	city's 	objection
would 	be well 	taken.
The union asserts, 	however, 	that 	its current
manpower 	proposal 	is 	not 	directed 	at general
fire 	prevention 	policy, 	but 	instead 	involves
a 	matter 	of 	workload 	and 	safety 	for
employees, 	and 	accordingly 	falls 	within 	the
scope 	of 	negotiation 	and 	arbitration.
Because 	the 	tasks 	involved 	in 	fighting 	a
fire cannot be 	reduced, 	the 	union argues
that 	the 	number 	of persons 	manning 	the 	fire
truck 	or 	comprising 	the 	engine 	company 	fixes
and 	determines 	the 	amount 	of work 	each 	fire
fighter must perform. 	(Fire 	Fighter	- 	s Union,
supra, 	at p. 	619. 	Emphasis 	in the original.)
Clearly, 	the city's 	interest 	in unilateral control over
fire prevention policy 	is 	exactly 	the 	same, 	for 	our purposes,
as 	the District's 	interest 	in educational policy.
Significantly, 	then, 	the Court 	concluded 	that a negotiating
proposal 	which 	is 	in 	fact 	aimed 	at workload 	cannot be 	rejected
as 	nonnegotiable merely 	because 	it 	is 	framed 	in 	terms 	which may
have 	implications 	for 	management's 	control 	over 	staffing:
Insofar 	as 	the manning 	proposal at 	issue 	in
fact 	relates 	to 	the 	questions 	of 	employee
workload 	and 	safety, 	decisions 	under 	the
National 	Labor 	Relations Act 	fully 	support
the 	union's 	contention 	that 	the 	proposal 	is
[negotiable]. 	First 	the 	federal authorities
uniformly 	recognize 	"workload" 	issues 	as
mandatory 	subjects 	of 	bargaining 	whose
determination may 	not 	be 	reserved 	to 	the
sole discretion of the employer 	. 	. 	.
Moreover, 	a 	recent California public
employment case, 	Los Angeles Employees Assn.
Local 660 	v. 	County of Los Angeles 	(1973) 	33
Cal.App.3d 1 	[108 Cal.Rptr. 	625] , affords
additional 	support 	for 	the 	union's
position. 	In 	interpreting 	the 	scope of
22

bargaining 	language 	in 	the Meyers-Milias-
Brown Act 	- 	language 	which, 	as 	pointed 	out
earlier, 	largely parallels 	the 	scope of
negotiation 	provision 	under 	the Vallejo 	City
Charter 	- 	the Los Angeles 	County Employees
court 	held 	that 	the 	county was 	required 	to
negotiate 	with 	the 	union with 	respect 	to 	the
size 	of 	the 	caseloads 	carried 	by 	social
service eligibility workers. 	Because 	the
caseload, 	i.e., 	"workload," 	of 	the 	social
workers 	effectively 	determined 	the 	number 	of
these 	workers 	needed 	to service 	the
recipients of aid, 	bargaining 	over 	the 	size
of 	caseloads 	in Los Angeles 	County Employees
was 	in 	reality comparable 	to bargaining 	over
"manning" 	levels. 	In 	the case 	before 	us,
the 	union claims 	that 	the 	fire 	fighters,
like the Los Angeles 	social workers, 	are
essentially 	demanding 	a 	particular 	workload
but 	have 	framed 	their 	demand 	in 	terms 	of
"manning," 	that 	is 	the 	number 	of people
available 	to 	fight 	each 	fire.
We 	find 	that 	the 	principle 	of managerial control 	over
operational policy 	addressed 	by 	the 	Court 	in Fire 	Fighters
Union 	is 	precisely 	the principle 	identified 	at 	step 	three 	of
the Board's Anaheim test. 	On 	that 	basis 	we 	find 	the 	Court's
decision dispositive, 	and conclude 	that 	a proposal 	to 	limit 	the
workload 	of 	the 	District's 	specialists 	meets Anaheim's 	third
requirement 	for 	negotiability.
1It 	is 	unclear 	to 	us, 	however 	— 	as 	it 	may 	have 	been 	to 	the
District 	-- exactly how, 	in each case, 	the 	specific proposals
set 	forth 	by 	the Association 	in 	its Article 	XXVIII 	would 	act 	to
regulate 	the 	workload 	for 	each 	specialist 	classification. 	As
with 	the 	proposal addressed 	by 	the 	Court 	in Firefighters, 	the
proposal before 	us 	is drafted 	in 	terms 	which may 	suggest a
purpose 	of 	setting 	staffing 	quotas 	as 	much 	as 	workload
23

limits.10 Where, 	for 	example, 	a 	specialist's workload 	is
based on 	the 	number 	of students 	he or 	she 	sees, 	a proposal
establishing 	a 	ratio 	of 	such 	specialists 	to 	schools would 	do
little 	to establish workload 	levels, 	since 	student population
at 	a 	school may 	vary widely 	from year 	to year. 	Such 	a
proposal, 	in such a context, would, 	rather 	than setting
workload, 	set staffing patterns.
The 	ambiguity 	in 	the Association's 	specific proposals,
however, 	does 	not dispose of 	the District's obligation under
EERA 	section 3543.3 	to negotiate 	with 	the Association. 	The
District acknowledges 	in 	its brief, 	quoted above, 	that Article
XXVIII 	is 	aimed 	at 	least 	in part at workload levels, 	a 	subject
which 	we 	have 	here 	found 	negotiable. 	In Healdsburg 	Union High
Schoo
1l District 	(1/5/84) 	PERB Decision No. 	375, 	decided on
remand 	from 	the 	California Supreme 	Court, 	the Board 	explained
that 	an 	employer 	has 	the 	obligation 	to 	seek 	clarification of
ambiguous proposals 	and 	to 	inform 	the 	exclusive 	representative
of 	the reasons 	for 	its belief, 	if 	it so believes, 	that a
proposal 	is out of scope. 	In our view, 	it 	appears 	reasonably
10In Fire Fighters, 	the 	parties' 	ultimate 	dispute 	was
whether 	the city was 	obligated 	to 	submit 	the proposal 	to 	its
arbitration procedure. 	This question 	itself 	turned 	on whether
the 	proposal was within 	scope 	as 	defined 	in 	the
Meyers-Milias-Brown Act. 	The Court, 	in 	the 	face of 	the
proposal's 	ambiguous 	negotiability, 	ordered 	that 	the 	proposal
should be 	so submitted, 	taking 	the 	view 	that 	the 	development of
a 	factual 	record 	at 	such 	a proceeding would 	in all 	likelihood
remove 	the 	ambiguity.
24

likely 	that 	a 	response 	by 	the 	District 	along 	the 	lines
described 	in Healdsburg would 	have 	resulted 	in 	the 	presentation
of 	a 	new proposal 	the 	validity of 	which 	could 	be 	more 	readily
decided. 	However, 	the District gave 	no such 	response.
Instead, 	the District 	steadfastly maintained 	that 	it 	had 	no
obligation 	to negotiate 	the Association's 	proposal 	and 	that 	it
would 	not 	do 	so unless 	and 	until 	a 	contrary directive 	was
issued 	by 	this Board.
Upon 	the 	foregoing 	discussion, 	we 	conclude 	that 	the
District 	failed 	to meet 	its 	obligation 	under 	section 	3543.3 	of
the EERA to negotiate 	with 	the Association, 	and 	thus violated
subsection 3543.5(c) 	of 	the Act.
Article XXV - 	"Supervision of Teachers' 	Aides"
In paragraph 	l(c) 	of Article XXV, 	the Association proposed
a 	limitation 	on 	the 	right of 	the 	District 	to contract out
teachers' 	unit work 	to the 	teachers' 	aides. 	The District
objects 	to 	the ALJ's 	conclusion 	that 	this 	proposal 	is within
scope, 	arguing on exceptions 	that 	the proposal 	is 	an attempt 	to
negotiate 	working 	conditions 	for 	employees 	outside 	the 	unit.
In Healdsburg Union High School District 	(1/5/84) 	PERB
Decision No. 	375, 	the Board, 	in the context of a similar
proposal, 	considered 	the argument here 	raised 	by 	the District.
We were 	unpersuaded. 	As 	we did 	in 	that 	case, 	we 	conclude 	here
that 	the 	proposal 	"seeks 	only 	to preserve 	the work 	of 	existing
bargaining unit members" and, 	as such, 	relates to wages, 	hours
25

and 	enumerated 	terms 	and 	conditions 	of 	employment. 	Healdsburg,
supra, at p. 42.
In paragraph 	l(f), 	the Association proposed 	a 	limitation on
the 	right of 	the District 	to 	assign additional 	duties 	to a
teacher 	who has 	taken on 	the 	supervision 	of 	a 	teacher's 	aide.
The District 	argues 	that 	the ALJ erred 	in 	finding 	that 	such
additional assignments 	affect 	hours 	and 	that 	the matter 	is
therefore 	negotiable.
While 	there 	is 	some 	evidence 	to 	suggest 	that 	the 	presence
of 	a 	teaching 	assistant 	in 	a classroom may 	affect 	the 	hours 	of
work put 	in by 	a 	teacher, 	the 	instant proposal 	impermissibly
trespasses 	on 	the 	managerial prerogative 	to determine 	what work
is 	to be performed 	by employees. 	Unlike 	the 	article on
specialist workload, 	which 	addressed 	only 	the 	quantity of 	work
performed, 	the 	proposal here 	seeks 	to 	give 	the Association 	a
role 	in 	assigning work 	tasks. 	Such direction of 	the workforce
is 	at 	the 	core 	of 	managerial 	control.11
In paragraph 2(b), 	the Association proposed 	that 	teachers
be 	given 	release 	time 	for 	the 	purpose 	of attending 	orientation
or 	evaluation 	sessions held 	by 	a 	student 	teacher's 	college or
11We 	note 	that management's 	unilateral 	authority 	to
determine 	and 	assign 	the 	tasks 	which will be 	performed 	by 	its
employees 	is 	not 	unlimited. 	It 	applies only 	to 	those 	tasks
which 	are 	reasonably 	understood 	to be 	among 	the 	duties 	of 	the
classification 	as 	established 	by 	job description, 	past practice
or 	otherwise. 	Rio Hondo Community College District 	(12/31/82)
PERB Decision No. 	279.
26

university 	for 	the 	teacher's 	subordinate 	student 	teacher. 	The
District maintains 	on 	exceptions 	that 	the 	proposal 	is 	out of
scope.
The 	subject of 	release 	time 	for 	school employees 	was
addressed 	in Healdsburg Union High School District, 	supra. 	The
subject of hours, 	even in 	its most literal sense, 	refers 	to the
question of 	when 	employees will work 	and 	when 	they will 	not. 	A
proposal 	for 	release 	time 	simply proposes 	a 	time 	when 	employees
will not work. 	Thus, 	in Healdsburg, 	at p. 	23, we concluded
that 	release 	time 	proposals 	are 	negotiable 	because 	they
directly 	concern hours of 	employment.
In paragraph 2(c), 	the Association proposed 	that 	the
District 	should 	secure 	an 	agreement 	with 	neighboring 	colleges
which 	would 	provide 	that 	each 	college must 	pay 	a 	stipend 	to
each District 	teacher 	who 	supervises 	one of 	its 	student
teachers. 	The 	District 	argued 	before 	the ALJ 	that 	the 	proposal
would 	impermissibly 	enter 	into 	the 	relationship 	between 	the
District 	and 	third 	parties. 	The ALJ 	agreed 	with 	the 	District
that 	its 	relations 	with 	third 	parties 	lay 	outside 	the 	scope 	of
representation; 	nevertheless, 	the ALJ, 	apparently on his own
initiative, 	found 	that 	the 	proposal could be construed 	as being
primarily a wage 	demand, 	with 	the 	source 	of 	the 	wages 	being 	a
secondary concern. 	As 	such, 	he concluded 	that 	the District had
a 	negotiating 	obligation with 	respect 	to 	it.
27

In acting to, 	in effect, 	redraft paragraph 2(c) 	on his own
initiative, 	we 	find 	that 	the ALJ exceeded 	his 	authority. 	In
Healdsburg, 	supra, 	we 	explained 	that 	a negotiating party who 	is
presented 	with 	an 	ambiguous or 	unclear 	proposal has 	a duty
under 	the EERA to 	seek clarification of 	the matter. 	Until 	the
matter 	can be accurately understood, 	after 	all, 	it 	is 	logically
impossible 	to determine whether 	it 	is 	in or 	out of 	scope, 	and,
if 	in, 	whether 	it 	is agreeable or problematic. 	Here, 	however,
the proposal 	appears quite 	straightforward. 	We 	agree 	with 	the
District and 	the ALJ 	that 	the proposal, 	on 	its 	face, 	exceeds
the 	scope of 	representation. 	Because 	the proposal 	is clear, 	no
further 	analysis 	is 	required 	here. 	We 	find 	that 	the 	District
was within 	its 	rights 	to 	refuse 	to negotiate 	the proposal 	as
presented.
ORDER
Upon 	the 	foregoing 	findings of 	fact 	and 	conclusions of 	law,
it 	is 	hereby ORDERED that 	the Davis Unified School District
shall:
A. 	CEASE AND 	DESIST 	FROM:
Failing 	and 	refusing 	to meet 	and 	negotiate 	in 	good 	faith
upon 	request 	with 	the 	exclusive 	representative of 	its
certificated 	personnel with 	respect 	to 	terms 	and 	conditions 	of
employment as defined 	in Government Code 	section 3543.2, 	and
specifically with 	respect 	to 	the 	subjects 	contained 	in 	the
28

following 	portions 	of 	the 	Davis 	Teachers Association's 	1976
contract 	proposal:
1. 	Article XXVII 	to 	the 	extent 	it 	relates 	to the
caseload 	of 	non-teaching 	certificated 	personnel;
2. 	Article XXV, paragraphs l(c) 	and 2(b).
B. 	TAKE 	THE 	FOLLOWING ACTIONS 	DESIGNED TO 	EFFECTUATE 	THE
PURPOSES 	OF THE 	EDUCATIONAL 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS ACT:
1. 	Upon 	request of 	the 	exclusive 	representative of
the District's 	certificated 	employees, 	meet 	and 	negotiate 	in
good 	faith 	regarding 	the matters 	identified 	in part A of 	this
Order.
2. 	Within 	thirty-five days 	after 	the 	date 	of 	service
of 	this 	Decision, 	post copies of 	the Notice 	to Employees
attached 	as 	an 	appendix 	hereto. 	Such 	posting 	shall 	be
maintained 	for 	at 	least 	thirty 	consecutive 	workdays 	at 	the
District's 	headquarters 	office 	and 	in 	conspicuous places 	at 	the
locations 	where 	notices 	to certificated 	employees 	are
customarily posted. 	Reasonable 	steps 	shall 	be 	taken 	to ensure
that 	the Notice 	is not reduced 	in size, 	defaced, 	altered or
covered 	by 	any 	material.
3. 	Written 	notification 	of 	the 	actions 	taken 	to
comply with 	this 	Order 	shall be 	made 	to 	the 	Sacramento 	Regional
Director 	of 	the Public Employment Relations Board 	in 	accordance
with 	her 	instructions.
29

C. 	All other 	charges 	are DISMISSED.
Member 	Burt joined 	in 	this 	Decision.
Member Jaeger's 	concurrence begins 	on page 	31.
The 	concurrence 	and 	dissent 	of 	Chairperson Hesse 	and Member
Morgenstern begins on page 	33,.
30

Jaeger, 	Member, 	concurring: 	I 	find that 	counselor caseload
bears 	a 	reasonable 	and logical 	relationship to employees' 	hours
of 	employment 	and 	that Anaheim's 	test 	of 	negotiability is 	also
otherwise 	satisfied.
As 	to the proposals 	for 	specialist-school 	ratios, 	I 	find 	it
unnecessary to decide whether 	they are, 	per 	se, 	negotiable.
The 	District 	admits 	that 	these proposals 	can be 	interpreted as
concerning either 	staffing or workload. 	In either 	event, 	the
District continues, 	it will 	not negotiate; 	neither 	is within
scope. 	If 	the proposals 	for 	specialist-school 	ratios had been
determined 	to be 	efforts 	to negotiate 	pure 	staffing decisions,
the District may well have been acting within 	its 	rights. 	But,
since 	it 	concedes 	that 	the Association may have 	intended 	to
negotiate workload, 	its 	categorical 	insistence that 	the
proposals 	were 	nonnegotiable was 	improper.
By 	its 	admission, 	the District has 	violated 	its 	duty under
subsection 	3543.5(c). 	This Board has 	found that workload 	is
negotiable. 	Fullerton Union High School 	District 	(5/30/78)
PERB Decision No. 	53. 	Although 	I 	do not 	subscribe 	to certain
of 	the 	Board's 	comments 	in Fullerton which 	I 	consider mere
dicta, 	I 	agree 	that 	the 	quantum of work to be completed during
the workday, 	which in this 	case 	is 	expressed 	as 	caseload, 	has
an 	inherent 	relationship to hours 	of work. 	It 	is 	this
quantifiable 	amount 	of 	work 	that 	employees 	are 	expected 	to
perform 	during work hours 	that 	distinguishes 	workload 	proposals
31

from those 	that 	are 	essentially efforts 	to bring 	nonnegotiable
staffing 	proposals 	to 	the 	bargaining 	table.1
I 	simply 	do 	not 	understand my dissenting 	colleagues'
judgment 	that 	the Association's 	case 	is 	flawed by its 	failure
to provide 	a 	factual 	record. 	These 	are initial proposals by
the 	exclusive 	representative. 	The 	threshold question 	is
whether 	the 	subject 	itself 	is 	negotiable 	or nonnegotiable 	and 	a
test 	of 	negotiability does 	not 	depend 	on 	the 	submission of
evidence 	as 	the 	needed wad 	to 	trigger 	negotiations. 	Employees
certainly are 	not 	required 	to prove 	that 	their workday 	is 	too
long, 	or 	that 	they cannot 	complete 	their 	work within 	the
scheduled hours, 	in order 	to place an hours-proposal on the
table. 	The 	negotiability of 	wages 	does 	not 	depend on proof
that 	the 	purchasing power 	of 	the 	dollar has 	increased or been
eroded before 	management 	will 	consider 	a 	proposal 	for higher
salaries. 	Members 	Hesse 	and Morgenstern 	seem to convert 	what
may be 	the 	employees' 	arguments 	at 	the 	table 	into a test of
whether 	they are entitled to sit 	there 	in the 	first place.
1I agree 	with 	the 	majority's 	conclusion 	that 	a 	proposal
is 	not 	removed 	from scope 	simply because 	it has 	some 	staffing
implications. 	Besides, 	if management 	determines 	that 	there 	is
an 	encroachment 	into 	areas 	of 	staffing 	policy, 	the 	word NO has
-	not 	yet 	been 	stricken 	from 	the 	labor 	relations 	lexicon 	and 	may
be 	uttered 	with 	impunity by management.
32

HESSE, Chairperson, 	and MORGENSTERN, Member, concurring in
part and 	dissenting 	in part: 	We 	find we must dissent 	from 	that
portion 	of 	the 	decision 	that holds 	the 	District 	in violation 	of
Government Code 	subsection 3543.5(c) 	based 	upon 	the 	District's
refusal 	to negotiate Article XXVIII.
As 	worded by 	the 	Association 	in 	its 	initial 	bargaining
proposal, 	the Association 	sought to have
. . . 	no 	fewer 	than 	the 	following 	number 	of
qualified 	specialists 	in 	each 	of 	the 	listed
categories:
(a) 	Elementary School
Art 	Teachers 	1 	for 	every 	3 	schools
Psychologists 	1 	for 	every 	2 	schools
Music 	Teachers 	1 	for 	every 3 	schools
Reading 	Teachers 	1 	for 	every 	school
Librarians 	1 	for 	every 	school
Counselors 	1 	for 	every 	1000 	students
(b) 	Junior High School
Guidance Counselors 	1 	for 	every 	250 	students
Librarians 	1 	for 	every 	1000 	students
Reading Teachers 	1 	for 	every 	school
(c) 	Senior High School
Guidance Counselors 	1 	for 	every 	250 	students
Psychologists 	1 	for 	every 	2 	schools
Librarians 	1 	for 	every 	1000 	students
Reading 	Teachers 	1 	for 	every 	1000 	students
(d) System-Wide
Psychiatric 	Social
Workers
Nurses 	1 	for 	every 	2000 	students
The 	District 	refused 	to 	bargain 	over 	this 	proposal 	because
it believed 	it 	to be outside 	the 	scope 	of representation. 	In
his 	proposed decision, 	the ALJ 	found 	that 	some 	of 	the 	above
33

proposals 	(those worded on a 	"per-school" 	basis) 	were related
to staffing requirements and were thus out of scope, 	but that
others 	(those worded 	"per-student") 	were 	related 	to workload 	or
caseload 	demands 	and 	thus within 	scope.1
The majority holds 	that, 	whether 	the proposal 	is 	formulated
on a per-student or per-school basis, 	it could be 	interpreted
either as staffing requirements, 	or caseload requirements, 	or
both. 	Thus, 	it holds the District guilty of having failed to
bargain, 	or at least having 	failed 	to clarify the ambiguities,
on 	the entirety of Article XXVIII. 	Such 	an 	interpretation 	is
simply unsupported by 	the plain 	language of 	the 	proposal.
The words 	"no 	fewer 	than 	the 	following number 	of qualified
specialists" are not at all ambiguous. 	Rather, 	this is a
simple, 	straightforward 	formula that would set a 	floor 	for
staffing 	beneath which 	the 	District could not go.
Ignoring 	the clear 	language of 	the Association's proposals,
the majority 	launches 	a discussion on 	the difference 	between 	a
caseload ceiling 	and a 	staffing 	requirement and, 	in an effort
to demonstrate 	the 	supposed 	ambiguity of 	the Association's
proposals, 	demonstrates rather 	that 	it has lost sight of 	the
actual proposals before the Board. 	Thus, 	at page 10, 	it
explains 	that a policy providing 	that no counselor 	be 	assigned
1The 	ALJ 	relied 	on the Board's 	decision 	in Fullerton
Union High School District 	(5/30/78) 	PERB Decision No. 	53. 	The
majority 	in 	this 	case 	seems 	reluctant 	to apply Fullerton,
perhaps because 	it realizes 	it 	is 	in error.
34

more 	than 250 	students would constitute 	a permissible caseload
ceiling while 	ignoring 	the 	fact 	that 	the proposals 	at 	issue
here 	are 	not worded 	so as 	to 	limit 	the 	number 	of 	students
assigned to the specialists. 	To the contrary, 	the
Association's 	demands clearly state 	that 	"there 	shall be 	no
fewer 	than" 	one counselor 	for 	every 	1000 	elementary school
students. 	The majority appears to recognize this because, 	at
p. 10, it states:
Conversely a 	staffing 	requirement 	that 	a
school carry one 	counselor 	for 	every 250
students 	enrolling 	will not guarantee 	each
counselor 	a 	caseload 	ceiling 	. . . .
Thus, 	the majority's own analysis demonstrates that the
plain words 	of 	the 	proposals 	actually before us place 	those
proposals 	beyond 	that which 	the majority 	itself 	considers 	to 	be
legitimate areas of negotiability. 	But then, 	remarkably, 	the
majority 	turns 	around 	and decides 	the proposals 	still could
somehow be 	interpreted as 	relating 	to workload, 	which 	it 	finds
is necessarily related to hours. 	Thus, 	management is required
to clarify 	the 	clear 	and/or 	negotiate 	the 	nonnegotiable.
Even more disturbing 	is the majority's 	unwillingness 	to
rely on 	the 	factual record 	that was made by the parties 	in 	this
case. 	By 	its admission 	that the record 	is 	"somewhat sketchy,"
the majority would have 	us believe 	that 	there is 	some 	ambiguity
surrounding 	the critical 	testimony 	regarding 	the 	relationship
between 	the counselors' 	hours and 	the number 	of 	students
assigned. 	Further, 	the majority's 	decision repeatedly asserts
35

that 	the 	increase 	in the number 	of assigned students
correspondingly results in an increase 	in hours. 	However, 	even
if 	the proposal were 	stated 	in terms of 	the number 	of 	students
assigned, 	the record is not ambiguous, 	and the evidence 	is
exactly contrary 	to the majority's 	finding. 	The only counselor
to testify, 	Paul Ochs, 	not only stated that his hours were
basically 	the same whether 	he had 311 or 	337 	students assigned
but also said 	that the average amount of 	time he 	spends with
each student per year has varied from 20 minutes 	to 7 	hours.
Obviously, 	if 	the amount of 	time 	expended doing counseling work
with each 	student varies so widely, 	it 	is 	illogical even 	to
suggest any correlation between 	the 	number 	of 	students 	assigned
and the actual hours of work required unless 	there 	is 	some
evidence, 	or at least an assertion, 	that the District imposed
some sort of per-case time requirement, 	or 	in some other way
(through discipline or 	the counselor's evaluations) 	mandated a
specified 	level of work per case. 	But evidence as to 	the
District's time requirement was supplied by Ochs, 	the
Association's witness and a counselor 	for 	nine years:
I heard 	. 	. 	. 	the director of pupil services
said last week to the counselors, 	just, 	all
you can do is what you, 	you know, 	don't, 	you
know, 	all you can do is just put 	in a day's
work, 	don't worry about what you can't do.
Furthermore, 	there 	is absolutely no evidence here that the
District 	tried 	in any way to 	impose 	longer 	hours, 	a speed-up,
or 	any increased effort or work on these employees. 	Competent
evidence was given 	that 	the District did not require
36

specialists 	(in this case, 	only testimony relating to
counselors was given) 	to work any longer 	than they ever 	had, 	no
matter what 	the caseload was. 	A fair 	reading of 	the
testimonial evidence plainly reveals 	that, 	while the number 	of
students 	assigned may affect 	the 	type 	or 	quality of 	services 	a
counselor provides, 	it does not affect the number of hours that
the District requires a counselor 	to work. 	The 	type of
counseling 	services 	students 	receive 	and 	the quality of 	those
services are 	important matters, 	and 	the concern 	that 	the
Association and 	its members demonstrate 	is admirable. 	This
notwithstanding, 	these matters are not mandatory subjects of
bargaining 	under 	EERA, 	and we categorically reject 	the
majority's 	contrary 	finding.
This 	factual 	inaccuracy 	is 	emphasized 	because 	the
connection between counselor 	caseload 	and hours 	of work 	or 	any
other 	negotiable 	subject 	is essential 	to satisfying 	the 	first
prong of 	the 	Anaheim test.
Unlike the National Labor Relations Act 	(NLRA), 	EERA limits
the scope of negotiations 	to matters 	related to wages, 	hours
and certain 	other 	enumerated 	terms 	and conditions 	of
employment. 	Workload is not such an enumerated 	item and, 	thus,
is negotiable only if it is related to such an item. 	Thus, 	the
fact 	that cases 	that 	find workload 	(whether 	in 	some generic
sense, 	or 	in the specifics of a given situation) 	to be
negotiable 	as 	a 	term and condition 	of employment 	under 	the NLRA
can be found, 	does not dictate 	the 	same 	result under 	the more
restricted 	terms 	of EERA.
37

The Association and 	the majority argue 	that workload 	is
related to hours 	but, 	as 	the majority decision 	itself attempts
to point out, 	workload is not easily definable. 	It may relate
to different things in different situations. 	Thus, 	it is
impossible 	to determine whether 	workload 	in any given 	situation
is 	in 	fact related to hours without 	accurately addressing 	the
facts 	in 	the case at hand.
As 	to 	the cases cited under 	the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act,
that law has 	a 	scope of 	representation 	that
shall 	include all matters 	relating 	to
employment 	conditions 	and 	employer-employee
relations, 	including but not limited to
wages, 	hours and other 	terms and conditions
of employment.
Clearly, 	the 	fact that a matter 	is negotiable under 	this most
broad 	scope 	is 	again not 	indicative 	that we 	should 	reach 	the
same 	result 	under 	EERA as 	the majority 	implies 	in citing Fire
Fighters Union v. 	City of Vallejo. 	There 	is another 	essential
point 	in 	the Fire Fighters Union v. 	City of Vallejo case 	that
the majority misses. 	In that case, 	the court found that, 	by
reducing 	the number 	of fire 	fighters available 	to 	fight 	a 	fire,
management 	automatically 	increased 	the 	workload 	because 	it
could not reduce 	the amount of work 	to be done on a 	fire. 	The
exact opposite 	is 	true in this case. 	The Association's witness
clearly and directly points out 	that 	the 	amount of work 	to be
done 	in any counseling 	situation can be 	and 	is 	adjusted by 	the
counselor 	himself 	or 	herself, 	and he 	testified 	that management
has directed 	them to do exactly that. 	Thus, 	the 	facts are
38

totally different 	from those 	in Fire Fighters Union v. 	City of
Vallejo.
Further, 	the majority asserts 	that a 	restriction on the
number 	of 	students 	assigned 	to 	each 	counselor 	would 	not
adversely 	impact management's 	ability 	to manage 	because
management may choose 	to not assign some or 	all of 	its 	students
to a counselor. 	But the majority fails 	to point out that
management, 	if it must adhere to a student to counselor 	ratio,
is 	effectively deprived of another 	option, 	that of simply
reducing 	the 	amount of counseling 	each 	student 	receives 	and,
therefore, 	having all 	(or more) 	students counseled, 	but
counseled less. 	It 	is entirely 	improper 	for 	this Board to
require 	negotiations 	on how much 	counseling 	each 	student 	should
receive. 	Yet, 	this is precisely what the majority decision
would do.
It must also be noted that 	the majority decision contains 	a
lengthy digression on 	the broad definition of wages 	that has
evolved under 	federal law. 	Unfortunately, 	we find 	that
digression 	irrelevant to any 	facts 	or 	to any 	issues 	raised 	by
the parties 	in this case. 	The majority's discussion of the
broad 	and complex question of workload may be 	somewhat more
related 	to the 	issues 	found here, 	but the result 	is 	totally
inconsistent with 	the 	issues as 	they are 	framed by 	this case.
The majority discusses speed-up, 	piecework, 	rate of work,
professional 	standards and 	something 	it calls 	the 	amount of
work which employees are obligated 	to perform. 	Despite 	50
39

years of NLRA history, 	the precedents 	there on these matters
are 	few and mostly 	related 	to unilateral changes 	not alleged
here. 	We 	should not consider 	such 	issues 	in 	the abstract. 	Can
speed-up be 	said 	to occur 	when we have no 	knowledge 	of 	the
previous work 	level and no 	illegal 	change 	is 	charged? 	Can we
make 	findings 	on 	the nature 	and extent of 	the work 	(or 	conduct
of work) 	in the virtual vacuum 	(or 	the 	"somewhat sketchy"
record) 	found here?
It may well be that 	in some circumstances work 	is so
organized 	that 	workload or 	caseload 	demands 	necessarily 	relate
to hours of work or other 	enumerated 	items. 	Similarly, 	the
Board may 	find 	that 	unilateral 	changes 	in workload or 	caseload
in a given 	situation directly 	impact on hours and/or 	other
enumerated subjects. 	In such situations, 	after weighing 	the
facts, 	we can then determine 	if these matters are within scope
by 	the 	application of 	the 	second and 	third prongs 	of 	the
Anaheim test. 	In accord 	is the decision of the Pennsylvania
Supreme 	Court 	in Joint Bargaining Committee of 	the 	Penn. 	Social
Service U., 	et al. 	v. 	Penn. 	Labor Relations Board 	(12/29/83)
449 F.2d 96, 	15 PPER para. 	15017. 	That case held squarely that
the Commonwealth was not required 	to 	bargain about 	social
workers' 	caseload, 	as it was 	a matter of 	inherent managerial
policy. 	Only 	if the record 	shows a 	relationship between
caseload and wages, 	hours or 	working conditions could caseload
be negotiable.
40

Since 	the facts 	in this case do not 	support 	such 	a showing,
we must disassociate 	ourselves 	from any highly 	speculative 	and
injudicious conclusions. 	The one counselor 	who 	testified 	in
this case presented no evidence 	that workload or 	caseload
relates 	to 	the hours of a single 	specialist or 	to any other
enumerated subject. 	As 	nine years or more of these
circumstances produced no evidence, 	the Board would do better
to judge 	the 	facts at hand than opt 	for 	a potentiality that may
never 	evolve.
Finally, 	Member 	Jaeger 	faults 	the dissent 	for 	requiring 	the
Association to 	prove 	adverse 	impact on hours 	of 	employment
before 	it may place an hours proposal on the 	table. 	Not so.
Our argument, 	simply put, 	is that there must be some facts or
logic 	other 	than a mere 	assertion by 	the Association 	to
demonstrate 	that 	a proposal 	is 	in fact related to an enumerated
item. 	Here, 	the Association and the majority say the
"caseload" demands are related to hours, 	but the facts in the
case, 	which 	they continue to scrupulously avoid discussing,
contradict 	them.
41

APPENDIX
NOTICE 	TO 	EMPLOYEES
POSTED 	BY 	ORDER OF 	THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of 	the 	State 	of 	California
After 	a hearing 	in Unfair 	Practice Case Nos. 	S-CE-103 	and
S-CE-104, 	Davis Teachers Association v. 	Davis Joint Unified
School District, 	in which both parties participated, 	it has
been 	found 	that 	the 	District 	violated 	Government 	Code
subsection 3543.5(c) 	when 	it 	refused 	to negotiate with 	the
Davis Teachers Association 	regarding 	certain portions 	of 	the
Association's 	1976 	contract proposal.
As a result of 	this conduct, 	we, 	the District, 	have been
ordered 	to post 	this Notice 	and 	will 	abide 	by 	the 	following.
We 	will:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST 	FROM:
Failing 	and 	refusing 	to meet 	and 	negotiate 	in 	good 	faith,
upon 	request, 	with 	the 	exclusive 	representative of 	its
certificated 	personnel with 	respect 	to 	terms 	and 	conditions 	of
employment 	within 	the 	scope 	of 	representation 	as 	defined 	at
Government 	Code 	section 	3543.2.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS 	DESIGNED TO EFFECTUATE 	THE
PURPOSES 	OF 	THE 	EDUCATIONAL 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	ACT:
Upon 	its 	request, 	meet 	and 	negotiate 	in good 	faith 	with 	the
exclusive 	representative 	of 	our 	certificated 	employees
regarding 	the 	matters 	found 	to 	be 	negotiable 	in 	the
above-entitled 	case.
Dated: 	DAVIS 	JOINT 	UNIFIED
SCHOOL 	DISTRICT
By: Authorized 	Representative
THIS 	IS 	AN 	OFFICIAL 	NOTICE. 	IT MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR THIRTY
(30) 	CONSECUTIVE WORKDAYS 	FROM THE DATE 	OF POSTING AND MUST NOT
BE REDUCED IN SIZE, 	DEFACED, 	ALTERED OR COVERED WITH ANY OTHER
MATERIAL.
~
	~