Office of the Santa Clara County Superintendent of Schools * * * VACATED by Office of the Santa Clara County Superintendent of Schools (1982) PERB Decision No. 233a (PERB 0233E)

VACATED by Office of the Santa Clara County Superintendent of Schools
(1982) PERB Decision No. 233a
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
SERVICE EMPLOYEES 	INTERNATIONAL
UNION, LOCAL 715, AFL-CIO,
Charging 	Party,
v.
OFFICE 	OF 	THE 	SANTA CLARA 	COUNTY
SUPERINTENDENT 	OF 	SCHOOLS,
Respondent.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No. 	SF-C-155
INTERIM ORDER
PERB Decision No. 233
August 	12, 	1982
)
Appearances; 	Richard 	J. 	Loftus, 	Jr., Attorney 	(Littler,
Mendelson, 	Fastiff 	& Tichy) 	for 	the Office 	of 	the Santa Clara
County 	Superintendent 	of 	Schools.
Before Gluck, Chairperson; Jensen and Tovar, Members.
DECISION
The 	Office 	of 	the 	Santa 	Clara 	County 	Superintendent 	of
Schools 	(County) 	excepts 	to 	the proposed 	decision of 	an
administrative law 	judge which found ·that the·'. County violated..
subsections 	3543.5 (a),(b)and(c)of 	the Educational
Employment Relations Act. (EERA)1 by unilaterally
1
EERA 	is codified 	at Government 	Code 	sections 	3540 	et
seq. 	All 	statutory 	references 	are 	to the Government 	Code,
unless 	specified 	otherwise.
Subsections 3543.5 (a), 	(b) 	and (c) provide as follows:
It 	shall 	be 	unlawful 	for 	a public 	school
employer 	to:
•

requiring one of its employees to terminate his use of a County \
vehicle to commute between his home and work.
FACTS
Tom Lambert, the County's only vehicle service worker , 2
was assigned a pickup truck to use during the course of his
workday when he began employment with the County 13 years prior
to the filing of the charge. He was allowed to drive the truck
home at night and on weekends and permitted to use it for
personal errands during lunch periods.
According to Lambert, he was told by the County when he was
hired that if he "wanted a job as transportation manager that
there would be a vehicle go (sic) with the job." The record
does not indicate that he was ever a transportation manager.
In 1977, the County built a new garage facility and in
September of that year decided that all buses and Lambert's
truck would be parked there at the end of each workday.
(a) Impose or threaten to impose reprisals
on employees, to discriminate or threaten to
discriminate against employees, or otherwise
to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees because of their exercise of
rights guaranteed by this chapter.
(b) Deny to employee organizations rights
guaranteed to them by this chapter.
(c) Refuse or fail to meet and negotiate in
good faith with an exclusive representative.
vehicle service workers shuttle buses among different
garages and do minor repair work on these vehicles.
2
requiring 	one 	of 	its 	employees 	to 	terminate 	his 	use 	of 	a 	County,
vehicle 	to 	commute 	between 	his 	home 	and 	work.
FACTS
Tom 	Lambert, 	the 	County's 	only 	vehicle 	service 	worker,2
was 	assigned 	a 	pickup 	truck 	to 	use 	during 	the 	course 	of 	his
workday 	when 	he 	began 	employment 	with 	the 	County 	13 	years 	prior
to 	the 	filing 	of 	the 	charge. 	He 	was 	allowed 	to 	drive 	the 	truck
home 	at 	night 	and 	on 	weekends 	and 	permitted 	to 	use 	it 	for
personal 	errands 	during 	lunch 	periods.
According 	to 	Lambert, 	he 	was 	told 	by 	the 	County 	when 	he 	was
hired 	that 	if 	he 	"wanted 	a 	job 	as 	transportation manager 	that
there 	would 	be 	a 	vehicle 	go 	(sic) 	with 	the 	job." 	The 	record
does 	not 	indicate 	that 	he 	was 	ever 	a 	transportation manager.
In 	1977, 	the 	County 	built 	a 	new 	garage 	facility 	and 	in
September 	of 	that 	year 	decided 	that 	all 	buses 	and 	Lambert's
truck 	would 	be 	parked 	there 	at 	the 	end 	of 	each 	workday.
(a) 	Impose 	or 	threaten 	to 	impose 	reprisals
on 	employees, 	to 	discriminate 	or 	threaten 	to
discriminate 	against 	employees, 	or 	otherwise
to 	interfere 	with, 	restrain, 	or 	coerce
employees 	because 	of 	their 	exercise 	of
rights 	guaranteed 	by 	this 	chapter.
(b) 	Deny 	to 	employee 	organizations 	rights
guaranteed 	to 	them 	by 	this 	chapter.
(c) 	Refuse 	or 	fail 	to 	meet 	and 	negotiate 	in
good 	faith 	with 	an 	exclusive 	representative.
2vehicle	2 	service 	workers 	shuttle 	buses 	among 	different
garages 	and 	do 	minor 	repair 	work 	on 	these 	vehicles.
2

Lambert was personally informed of this decision on
September 14, 1977. Service Employees International Union,
Local 715, AFL-CIO, (Local 715) the charging party and
exclusive representative of Lambert's negotiating unit,
received notice only regarding the change affecting the buses
through the County's offer to negotiate that change.
The move to the new facility entailed certain changes in
Lambert's job duties, although the County presented no evidence
of what those changes were except that some work that he had
done previously had been reassigned to a lead mechanic.
Lambert testified that his hours were changed but did not
indicate when this change occurred or what the change consisted
Local 715 filed an unfair practice charge alleging, inter
alia, that the unilateral change in Lambert's hours and the
removal of his right to use the truck for commuting purposes
violated the County's duty to negotiate as required by
subsection 3543.5(c) . The hearing officer dismissed that
portion of the charge relating to the alleged change of hours;
Local 715 filed no timely exceptions to this ruling. 	The
hearing officer did find a violation resulting from the
County's removal of Lambert's personal use of the truck and it
is to this ruling that the County has filed the only exceptions
brought to this Board.
w
Lambert 	was 	personally 	informed 	of 	this 	decision 	on
September 	14, 	1977. 	Service 	Employees 	International 	Union,
Local 	715, 	AFL-CIO, 	(Local 	715) 	the 	charging 	party 	and
exclusive 	representative 	of 	Lambert's 	negotiating 	unit,
received 	notice 	only 	regarding 	the 	change 	affecting 	the 	buses
through 	the 	County's 	offer 	to 	negotiate 	that 	change.
The 	move 	to 	the 	new 	facility 	entailed 	certain 	changes 	in
Lambert's 	job duties, 	although 	the 	County 	presented 	no 	evidence
of 	what 	those 	changes 	were 	except 	that 	some 	work 	that 	he 	had
done 	previously 	had 	been 	reassigned 	to 	a 	lead 	mechanic.
Lambert 	testified 	that 	his 	hours 	were 	changed 	but 	did 	not
indicate 	when 	this 	change 	occurred 	or 	what 	the 	change 	consisted
of .	of.
Local 	715 	filed 	an 	unfair 	practice 	charge 	alleging, 	inter
alia, 	that 	the 	unilateral 	change 	in Lambert's 	hours 	and 	the
removal 	of 	his 	right 	to 	use 	the 	truck 	for 	commuting 	purposes
violated 	the 	County's 	duiy 	to 	negotiate 	as 	required 	by
subsection 	3543.5(c)Q 	The 	hearing 	officer 	dismissed 	that
portion 	of 	the 	charge 	relating 	to 	the 	alleged 	change 	of 	hours;
Local 	715 	filed 	no 	timely 	exceptions 	to 	this 	ruling. 	The
hearing 	officer 	did 	find 	a 	violation 	resulting 	from 	the
County's 	removal 	of 	Lambert's 	personal 	use 	of 	the 	truck 	and 	it
is 	to 	this 	ruling 	that 	the 	County 	has 	filed 	the 	only 	exceptions
brought 	to 	this 	Board.
3

The County specifically excepts to the findings that the
personal use of the truck constituted a wage for Lambert and
that such use of the truck was offered as an inducement to
Lambert to accept employment. The County further argues that
such use of the truck by Lambert was only for the County's own
convenience and that it is under no obligation to negotiate
over the terms and conditions of employment for a single
employee, but is required to negotiate only with respect to
unit employees in general.
DECISION
We find that the personal use of the truck permitted to
Lambert over a 13-year period constituted an established wage
provision applicable to the classification of vehicle service
worker .
In Anaheim Union High School District (10/28/81) PERB
Decision No. 177, the Board determined that a matter is within
the scope of mandatory negotiations where it is:
(1) logically and reasonably related to
hours, wages or an enumerated term and
condition of employment, (2) the subject is
of such concern to both management and
employees that a conflict is likely to occur
and the mediatory influence of collective
negotiations is the appropriate means of
resolving the conflict, and (3) the
employer's obligation to negotiate would not
significantly abridge his freedom to
exercise those mangerial prerogatives
(including matters of fundamental policy)
essential to the achievement of the
[agency 's] mission. (Pp. 4-5.)
The 	County
	specifically
	excepts
	to
	the
	findings
	that
	the
personal
	use
	of
	the
	truck
	constituted
	a wage
	for
	Lambert 	and
that
	such 	use
	of
	the 	truck
	was
	offered
	as
	an
	inducement
	to
Lambert
	to
	accept
	employment. 	The 	County
	further
	argues
	that
such 	use
	of
	the 	truck
	by 	Lambert 	was
	only
	for
	the 	County's
	own
convenience
	and
	that
	it
	is
	under 	no
	obligation 	to 	negotiate
over
	the
	terms
	and
	conditions 	of
	employment
	for
	a
	single
employee,
	but
	is
	required 	to 	negotiate
	only 	with
	respect
	to
unit
	employees
	in
	general.
DECISION
We
	find
	that
	the 	personal
	use
	of 	the 	truck 	permitted
	to
Lambert
	over
	a
	13-year 	period
	constituted
	an
	established
	wage
provision 	applicable 	to
	the
	classification
	of 	vehicle 	service
worker.
In
	Anaheim Union High
	School
	District
	(10/28/81)
	PERB
Decision
	No.
	177, 	the
	Board
	determined
	that
	a
	matter
	is
	within
the
	scope
	of
	mandatory
	negotiations
	where
	it
	is:
(1)
	logically
	and
	reasonably
	related 	tohours,
	wages
	or
	an 	enumerated 	term 	and
condition 	of
	employment, 	(2)
	the
	subject
	is
of
	such 	concern
	to
	both
	management 	and
employees
	that
	a
	conflict 	is 	likely 	to
	occurand
	the 	mediatory 	influence 	of
	collectivenegotiations
	is
	the 	appropriate
	means
	of
resolving 	the
	conflict,
	and 	(3)
	the
employer's 	obligation 	to 	negotiate
	would
	not
significantly
	abridge
	his
	freedom
	to
exercise
	those 	mangerial 	prerogatives(including 	matters 	of
	fundamental 	policy)
essential 	to 	the 	achievement
	of 	the
[agency's] 	mission. 	(Pp.
	4-5.)
4

The use of a County vehicle for personal use, particularly for
commuting to and from work, has a tangible dollar value to the
employee. At the minumum, it saves on the wear-and-tear of a
privately owned vehicle and may produce further economic
savings by eliminating all costs pertaining to the ownership
and use of a private vehicle. It may free the employee
specifically from certain purchases of gasoline, oil, and
maintenance costs if these are furnished by the employer-owner
of the vehicle in question. 3
In Wil-Kil (1970) 181 NLRB 749 [73 LRRM 1556], enf'd.
(7th Cir. 1971) 440 F. 2d 371 [76 LRRM 2735] , the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) found a seven-year use of company
vehicles for home-to-work commuting to be "a valuable term and
condition of employment" and ordered a return to the status quo
ante and a make-whole reimbursement. In Eagle Material
Handling of New Jersey (1976) 224 NLRB 1529 [92 LRRM 1571] , the
administrative law judge found a similar unilateral employer
action to be in violation of the National Labor Relations
Act4 and in Seafarers, Local 777 v. NLRB (1978) 603 F. 2d 862
[99 LRRM 2904] , the D.C. Circuit upheld the NLRB's finding that
There is nothing in the record to indicate what costs
Lambert would necessarily incur as a result of the loss of the
personal use of the truck or what savings in personal finances
have resulted from his past use of the truck for such purposes.
Reversed on other grounds, i.e, charging party lacked
representative status when the unilateral change occurred and
had failed to renew its demand for recognition or negotiations.
5
The 	use 	of 	a 	County 	vehicle 	for 	personal 	use, 	particularly 	for
commuting 	to 	and 	from 	work, 	has 	a 	tangible 	dollar 	value 	to 	the
employee. 	At 	the 	minumum, 	it 	saves 	on 	the 	wear-and-tear 	of 	a
privately 	owned 	vehicle 	and 	may 	produce 	further 	economic
savings 	by 	eliminating 	all 	costs 	pertaining 	to 	the 	ownership
and 	use 	of 	a 	private 	vehicle. 	It 	may 	free 	the 	employee
specifically 	from 	certain 	purchases 	of 	gasoline, 	oil, 	and
maintenance 	costs 	if 	these 	are 	furnished 	by 	the 	employer-owner
of 	the 	vehicle 	in 	question.3
In 	Wil-Kil 	(1970) 	181 	NLRB 	749 	(73 	LRRM 	1556], 	enf'd.
(7th 	Cir. 	1971) 	440 	F.2d 	371 	[76 	LRRM 	2735], 	the 	National 	Labor
Relations 	Board 	(NLRB) 	found 	a 	seven-year 	use 	of 	company
vehicles 	for 	home-to-work 	commuting 	to 	be 	"a 	valuable 	term 	and
condition 	of 	employment" 	and 	ordered 	a 	return 	to 	the 	status 	quo
ante 	and 	a 	make-whole 	reimbursement. 	In 	Eagle Material
Handling 	of 	New 	Jersey 	(1976) 	224 	NLRB 	1529 	(92 	LRRM 	1571], 	the
administrative 	law 	judge 	found 	a 	similar 	unilateral 	employer
action 	to 	be 	in 	violation 	of 	the 	National 	Labor 	Relations
Act4 	and 	in 	Seafarers, 	Local 	777 	v. 	NLRB 	(1978) 	603 	F.2d 	862
[99 	LRRM 	2904], 	the 	D.C. 	Circuit 	upheld 	the 	NLRB's 	finding 	that
There	3 	is 	nothing 	in 	the 	record 	to 	indicate 	what 	costs
Lambert 	would 	necessarily 	incur 	as 	a 	result 	of 	the 	loss 	of 	the
personal 	use 	of 	the 	truck 	or 	what 	savings 	in 	personal 	finances
have 	resulted 	from 	his 	past 	use 	of 	the 	truck 	for 	such 	purposes.
4Reversed	4 	on 	other 	grounds, 	i.e, 	charging 	party 	lacked
representative 	status 	when 	the 	unilateral 	change 	occurred 	and
had 	failed 	to 	renew 	its 	demand 	for 	recognition 	or 	negotiations.
5

the employer's unilateral imposition of a $10 take-home fee
levied on drivers who took their cabs home after work violated
its duty to negotiate.
Accepting as fact that the County found it convenient to
allow Lambert to use the car for commuting, we find nothing in
the record to support a finding that the County's freedom to
exercise those managerial prerogatives (including matters of
fundamental policy) essential to the achievement of its mission
would be significantly abridged by a requirement that it
negotiate a change in its policy. The County offered no
evidence of such necessity; the word "convenience" does not
rise to the level of necessity. 5
Nor does the fact that the County provided the truck use to
Lambert for its own convenience change the nature of the
benefit to that employee. It may be assumed that daily
starting and quitting times of work, the designation of
specific lunch periods and other personnel policies established
by the employer are also for its operational "convenience."
Yet, there is no doubt that such practices, when established
over a sufficiently lengthy period of time, may not be
unilaterally altered once an exclusive representative has been
recognized or certified without first giving notice to that
The County offered an explanation for its decision for
the first time in its post-hearing brief. Since there was no
opportunity to litigate the County's contention, the Board does
not accept it now as evidence.
the 	employer's
	unilateral
	imposition
	of
	a 	$10 	take-home
	fee
levied
	on
	drivers
	who
	took
	their
	cabs
	home
	after
	work
	violated
its
	duty
	to 	negotiate.
Accepting 	as
	fact 	that
	the
	County 	found
	it
	convenient
	to
allow
	Lambert
	to
	use
	the 	car
	for
	commuting,
	we
	find
	nothing
	in
the 	record 	to 	support
	a
	finding
	that
	the 	County's
	freedom
	to
exercise
	those 	managerial
	prerogatives
	(including 	matters
	of
fundamental
	policy)
	essential
	to
	the
	achievement
	of
	its
	mission
would 	be
	significantly
	abridged
	by 	a
	requirement
	that
	it
negotiate
	a 	change
	in
	its
	policy.
	The 	County
	offered
	no
evidence
	of
	such
	necessity1 	the
	word
	"convenience" 	does
	not
rise
	to
	the
	level of 	necessity.5
Nor
	does
	the
	fact 	that
	the
	County
	provided 	the 	truck
	use
	to
Lambert
	for
	its
	own
	convenience
	change
	the 	nature 	of 	the
benefit
	to
	that
	employee.
	It
	may
	be 	assumed
	that 	daily
starting
	and
	quitting
	times
	of
	work,
	the
	designation
	of
specific
	lunch
	periods
	and
	other 	personnel
	policies 	established
by
	the
	employer
	are
	also
	for
	its
	operational
	"convenience.
Yet, 	there
	is
	no
	doubt
	that
	such
	practices,
	when
	established
over
	a
	sufficiently
	lengthy 	period 	of 	time,
	may
	not
	be
unilaterally 	altered
	once 	an
	exclusive 	representative
	has 	been
recognized 	or
	certified
	without
	first
	giving 	notice 	to 	that
11
5The	5 	County
	offered
	an
	explanation 	for
	its
	decision 	for
the
	first
	time
	in
	its
	post-hearing 	brief.
	Since 	there
	was 	no
opportunity 	to
	litigate
	the 	County's 	contention, 	the 	Board 	does
not 	accept
	it
	now
	as 	evidence.
6

representative and providing it with the opportunity to
negotiate over proposed modifications. 6
For these reasons, it is unnecessary to find that the truck
was provided to Lambert as an inducement to accept employment.
It is sufficient that his compensation for the work he
performed did, in fact, include the personal use of the
vehicle. 7
The County provides no authority for its contention that it
need only negotiate on matters affecting all unit employees.
This argument ignores the realities of negotiations. Lambert
was the only employee in his classification. Clearly, the
wages, hours and terms and conditions of a classification may
be determined through negotiations on a specific and individual
basis. It is patently incorrect to assert that an employer is
relieved of the duty to negotiate on single-incumbent jobs.
The consequence of such a ruling would necessarily require
that, irrespective of the nature of such jobs, the incumbent
would have to accept the same wages, hours and conditions of
employment that are applicable to the unit as a whole. The
County's argument is rejected.
6NLRB v. Allied Products (6th Cir. , 1977) 	) 548 F. 2d 644
[94 LRRM 2433]; Pajaro Valley Unified School District (5/22/78)
PERB Decision No. 51.
Lambert's use or that he used the truck for personal reasons in
contravention of its policy or instructions.
representative
	and
	providing
	it
	with 	the
	opportunity
	to
negotiate
	over 	proposed
	modifications.6
For
	these 	reasons,
	it
	is
	unnecessary
	to 	find
	that
	the
	truck
was
	provided
	to
	Lambert
	as
	an
	inducement
	to
	accept
	employment.
It
	is
	sufficient
	that 	his
	compensation
	for
	the
	work 	he
performed
	did,
	in
	fact,
	include
	the
	personal
	use
	of
	the
vehicle.?
The 	County
	provides
	no
	authority
	for
	its
	contention
	that
	it
need
	only
	negotiate
	on
	matters
	affecting
	all
	unit
	employees.
This
	argument
	ignores 	the
	realities
	of
	negotiations.
	Lambert
was
	the 	only
	employee
	in
	his
	classification.
	Clearly,
	the
wages,
	hours
	and
	terms
	and
	conditions 	of
	a
	classification
	may
be
	determined 	through
	negotiations
	on.
a
	specific
	and
	individual
basis.
	It
	is
	patently 	incorrect
	to
	assert 	that
	an 	employer
	is
relieved 	of
	the 	duty
	to 	negotiate
	on
	single-incumbent 	jobs.
The
	consequence
	of
	such
	a
	ruling
	would
	necessarily 	require
that, 	irrespective
	of 	the 	nature 	of
	such
	jobs, 	the
	incumbent
would 	have
	to 	accept 	the
	same 	wages,
	hours
	and
	conditions 	of
employment
	that
	are 	applicable 	to 	the
	unit
	as
	a 	whole. 	The
County's
	argument
	is 	rejected.
6NLRB	
v. 	Allied 	Products 	(6th
	Cir.,
	1977) 	548
	F.2d
	644
[94
	LRRM
	g.433];
	PaJaro
	Vc1:~I~~Y
	Unifi~d 	School
	District
	(5/22/78)
PERB
	Decision
	No. 	51.
7The County does not claim that it was unaware of	The 	County 	does 	.not
	claim
	that
	it
	was 	unaware
	of
Lambert's 	use 	or
	that
	he 	used 	the 	truck 	for 	personal 	reasons 	in
contravention 	of
	its
	policy 	or
	instructions.
?
7

By unilaterally modifying its long-established practice of
permitting Lambert to use a County vehicle to commute to and
from work, without first notifying the exclusive representative
and offering it an opportunity to negotiate, the County
violated subsection 3543.5 (c) of the EERA by unilaterally
modifying the wages of an employee within the representation
unit. By this action it concurrently violated subsections
3543.5(a) and (b) . San Francisco Community College District
(10/12/79) PERB Decision No. 105.
REMEDY
Generally, an order reinstating the status quo ante is
appropriate in cases such as this. However, the Board notes
that Lambert testified that his hours of work had been
changed. The record does not indicate the nature or extent of
that change. Local 715 did not except to the dismissal of a
charge pertinent to this change. The County gave no evidence
as to the nature of the change in hours, nor did it attempt to
justify its action in making that change. Thus, the Board is
aware that Lambert's hours of work and his duties have somehow
been changed but cannot judge whether these changes are
impacted upon, or impact upon, his personal use of the
vehicle. We find it inappropriate to order the restoration of
Lambert's former hours and duties under the circumstances here
and, therefore, cannot determine whether an order directing the
Co
By
	unilaterally
	modifying
	its
	long-established
	practice
	of
permitting
	Lambert
	to
	use
	a County
	vehicle
	to
	commute
	to
	and
from 	work,
	without
	first
	notifying
	the
	exclusive
	representative
and
	offering
	it
	an
	opportunity 	to
	negotiate,
	the
	County
violated
	subsection
	3543.S(c)
	of 	the
	EERA
	by
	unilaterally
modifying
	the
	wages
	of
	an employee
	within
	the
	representation
unit.
	By
	this
	action
	it
	concurrently
	violated
	subsections
3543.S(a)
	and
	(b).
	San
	Francisco
	Community
	College
	District
{10/12/79)
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	105.
REMEDY
Generally,
	an
	order
	reinstating
	the
	status
	quo
	ante
	is
appropriate 	in
	cases
	such
	as
	this.
	However,
	the
	Board
	notes
that
	Lambert
	testified
	that 	his
	hours
	of
	work 	had 	been
changed.
	The
	record
	does
	not
	indicate
	the 	nature
	or
	extent
	o.f
that
	change. 	Local
	715
	did 	not 	except 	to 	the
	dismissal
	of.a
charge
	pertinent
	to
	this
	change.
	The 	County 	gave 	no
	evidence
as 	to 	the 	nature 	of 	the
	change
	in
	hours,
	nor
	did
	it
	attempt 	to
justify 	its
	action 	in
	making
	that
	change. 	Thus,
	the
	Board
	is
aware
	that
	Lambert's 	hours
	of
	work 	and
	his 	duties
	have 	somehow
been 	changed
	but 	cannot 	judge 	whether
	these
	changes
	are
impacted 	upon, 	or 	impact 	upon,
	his 	personal
	use
	of 	the
vehicle.
	We
	find
	it
	inappropriate 	to 	order 	the
	restoration 	of
Lambert's 	former 	hours 	and
	duties
	under 	the 	circumstances 	here
and,
	therefore,
	cannot 	determine 	whether 	an
	order 	directing
	the
8

County to reinstate Lambert's vehicle usage would be in the
best interests of effectuating the Act's purposes.
Nevertheless, Lambert is at least entitled to compensation
for the loss of his personal use of the vehicle from the date
of the County's unilateral act and for his prospective future
use of the vehicle until such time, if any, that the parties
negotiate a new wage for Lambert's classification.
Therefore, the Board directs the parties to attempt to
reach settlement as to the manner by which Lambert will be
reimbursed for the loss of that portion of his wages and the
amount of such reimbursement. The Board will retain
jurisdiction to review the settlement reached and to
incorporate such settlement, if approved, in its final order.
In the event that the parties cannot reach settlement within 90
days from the issuance of this Decision, either party may so
notify the Board, which will then issue such final Order as it
deems appropriate.
The Board will not at this time require posting of this
Decision and Order so that settlement discussions may proceed
in the most favorable climate.
INTERIM ORDER
Upon the foregoing facts, conclusions of law and the entire
record in this case, it is determined that the Office of the
Santa Clara County Superintendent of Schools (County) violated
subsections 3543.5(a) , (b) and (c) of the Educational
Employment Relations Act (EERA) by unilaterally changing the
County 	to 	reinstate 	Lambert's 	vehicle 	usage 	would 	be 	in 	the
best 	interests 	of 	effectuating 	the Act's 	purposes.
Nevertheless, 	Lambert 	is 	at 	least 	entitled 	to 	compensation
for 	the 	loss 	of 	his 	personal 	use 	of 	the 	vehicle 	from 	the 	date
of 	the 	County's 	unilateral 	act 	and 	for 	his 	prospective 	future
use 	of 	the 	vehicle 	until 	such 	time, 	if 	any, 	that 	the 	parties
negotiate 	a 	new 	wage 	for 	Lambert's 	classification.
Therefore, 	the 	Board 	directs 	the 	parties 	to 	attempt 	to
reach 	settlement 	as 	to 	the 	manner 	by 	which 	Lambert 	will 	be
reimbursed 	for 	the 	loss 	of 	that 	portion 	of 	his 	wages 	and 	the
amount 	of 	such 	reimbursement. 	The 	Board 	will 	retain
jurisdiction 	to 	review 	the 	settlement 	reached 	and 	to
incorporate 	such 	settlement, 	if 	approved, 	in 	its 	final 	order.
In 	the 	event 	that 	the 	parties 	cannot 	reach 	settlement 	within 	90
days 	from 	~he 	issuance 	of 	this 	Decision, 	either 	party may 	so
notify 	the 	Board, 	which 	will 	then 	issue 	such 	final 	Order 	as 	it
deems 	appropriate.
The 	Board 	will 	not 	at 	this 	time 	require 	posting 	of 	this
Decision 	and 	Order 	so 	that 	settlement 	discussions 	may 	proceed
in 	the 	most 	favorable 	climate.
INTERIM ORDER
Upon 	the 	foregoing 	facts, 	conclusions 	of 	law 	and 	the 	entire
record 	in 	this 	case, 	it 	is 	determined 	that 	the 	Office 	of 	the
Santa 	Clara 	County 	Superintendent 	of 	Schools 	(County) 	violated
subsections 	3543.S(a), 	(b) 	and 	(c) 	of 	the 	Educational
Employment 	Relations 	Act 	(EERA) 	by 	unilaterally 	changing 	the
9

wages of an employee, Tom Lambert, by revoking his use of a
County vehicle to commute to and from work. It is hereby
ORDERED that the County shall:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
(1) Failing to meet and negotiate in good faith with
Service Employees International Union, Local 715, AFL-CIO
(Local 715) ;
) Denying Local 715 the right to represent its
members and,
(3) Interfering with the right of employees to select
an exclusive representative for the purpose of meeting and
negotiating in good faith;
All by unilaterally changing the wages of an employee,
Tom Lambert, namely, his use of a County vehicle to commute to
and from work and by refusing to meet and negotiate in good
faith on matters within the scope of representation,
specifically, on the wages of said Tom Lambert.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE PURPOSES OF THE EERA:
Meet with representatives of Local 715 for the
purposes of attempting to reach settlement as to the manner by
which Tom Lambert shall be compensated for the loss of the use
of a County vehicle to commute to and from work and the amount
of such compensation. Such settlement, if reached, shall be
reduced to writing, signed by the parties, and filed with this
Board.
10
wages
	of
	an 	employee,
	Tom
	Lambert,
	by
	revoking
	his
	use
	of
	a
County
	vehicle 	to
	commute
	to
	and 	from 	work.
	It
	is
	hereby
ORDERED
	that
	the
	County
	shall:
A.
	CEASE
	AND
	DESIST
	FROM:
(1)
	Failing 	to
	meet 	and
	negotiate 	in
	good
	faith
	with
Service
	Employees
	International
	Union,
	Local
	715,
	AFL-CIO
(Local
	715);
(2) 	Denying
	Local
	715
	the
	right
	to
	represent
	its
members
	and,
(3)
	Interfering
	with
	the
	right
	of
	employees
	to
	select
an
	exclusive
	representative
	for 	the 	purpose
	of
	meeting
	and
negotiating
	in
	good
	faith;
All
	by
	unilaterally
	changing
	the
	wages
	of
	an
	employee,
Tom
	Lambert, 	namely,
	his
	use
	of
	a 	County
	vehicle 	to
	commute
	to
and 	from 	work 	and 	by
	refusing
	to
	~eet
	and
	negotiate 	in
	good
faith
	on
	matters 	within 	the
	scope
	of
	representation,
specifically,
	on
	the
	wages
	of 	said
	Tom
	Lambert.
B.
	TAKE 	THE
	FOLLOWING
	AFFIRMATIVE
	ACTION 	DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE
	THE
	PURPOSES
	OF
	THE.EERA:
Meet
	with
	representatives 	of
	Local
	715
	for 	the
purposes 	of 	attempting 	to
	reach
	settlement 	as 	to 	the
	manner 	by
which
	Tom
	Lambert
	shall
	be 	compensated
	for 	the 	loss
	of 	the
	use
of
	a 	County
	vehicle 	to
	commute
	to
	and 	from 	work 	and
	the
	amount
of
	such 	compensation. 	Such
	settlement,
	if
	reached,
	shall
	be
reduced
	to 	writing, 	signed
	by
	the
	parties,
	and
	filed 	with 	this
Board.
10

C. 	The Board itself retains jurisdiction of this case for
the purpose of reviewing the settlement, if any, reached by the
parties and incorporating said settlement in the Board's final
Order or for including in its final Order such relief the Board
deems appropriate if either party shall notify this Board no
earlier than ninety (90) calendar days following the service of this
Decision that the parties have been unable to reach a
settlement.
Virgil w. Jensen, Member
Irene Tovar , Member
11
c. 	The 	Board 	itself 	retains 	jurisdiction of 	this 	case 	for
the 	purpose 	of 	reviewing 	the 	settlement, 	if 	any, 	reached 	by 	the
parties 	and 	incorporating 	said 	settleme~t 	in 	the 	Bo ard's 	final ·
Ordet 	or . for 	including 	in 	its 	final . Order 	such 	relief 	the 	Board
deems 	a pp ropriate 	if 	either 	party 	sh a ll 	notify 	this 	Board 	no
earli er 	t han 	n i nety 	(90) 	c ale n dar 	dais 	fol l owin g 	t he 	s er vi c e 	of 	th i s
peci s ion 	t h at 	the 	p arties 	have 	been 	unable 	to 	reach 	a
settlement.
By: Harry Gluck, Chairperson 	Vi rs(y.fw. 	J¢risen, 	Mem b er
Ir~e 	Tovar, 	Member
By:/ "'Hari?y ' Gluc k ~ Cha i rperson
11