Service Employees International Union, Local 99 (Kimmett) (PERB 0106E)

STATE
	OF
	CALIFORNIA
DECISION
	OF
	THE
PUBLIC
	EMPLOYMENT
	RELATIONS
	BOARD
JULES KIMMETT,
Charging
	Party,
	APPELLANT,
v.
SERVICE
	EMPLOYEES
	INTERNATIONAL
UNION,
	LOCAL
	99,
Respondent,
In
	The 	Los
	Angeles
	Community
	College
District.
Case
	No.
	LA-C0-27
LA-CO-31
LA-CO-32
LA-CO-33LA-CO-34
PERB
	Decision
	No.
	106
October 	19,
	1979
Appearances:	
Jules
	Kimmett,
	in
	pro 	per; 	Willie
	Griffin,
Secretary-Treasurer 	for 	Service
	Employees
	International
	Union,
Local 	99.
Before:
	Gluck,
	Chairperson; 	Gonzales,
	Member.l
DECISION
In
	this
	case,
	,Jules
	Kimmett
	(hereafter
	charging
	party)
appeals 	the 	attached 	hearing
	officer's
	recommended
	decision
dismissing 	several 	unfair 	practice
	charges
	filed
	against
Service
	Employees
	International
	Union, 	Local
	99
	(hereafter
SEIU). 	For
	the 	reasons
	set 	forth
	below,
	the 	Public
	Employment
Relations
	Board
	(hereafter
	PERB
	or
	Board)
	affirms
	this
dismissal.
lBoard	Board Member 	Moore
	did 	not
	participate
	in
	this 	decision.

N
SEIU
	is
	the 	exclusive
	representative
	of
	a
	maintenance
	and
operations 	unit
	at
	Los
	Angeles
	Community
	College
	District
(hereafter
	LACCD),
	of
	which
	charging
	party,
	a
	custodian
	on
	the
"C"
	or 	night
	shift
	at
	Los
	Angeles
	Valley College
	(hereafter
LAVC)
	is
	a 	member.
In
	LA-C0-27,
	filed
	August
	1,
	1977,
	charging
	party 	alleged
that
	SEIU
	violated 	section
	3543.6(b) 	of 	the 	Educational
Employment
	Relations
	Act
	(hereafter
	EERA)2 	by
	holding
	monthly
membership
	meetings
	on
	Friday
	nights
	at
	a
	time
	when
	unit
members 	who 	work
	"B" 	and
	11
C
11
	shifts
	cannot
	attend.
	This 	charge
was
	later
	amended
	to 	allege
	that
	SEIU's
	intentional
	scheduling
of
	meetings
	at 	that
	time
	was 	a
	deliberate
	attempt
	to
	deny
	those
unit
	members
	their
	"democratic
	right
	to
	participate
	fully"
	in
the 	organization.
In
	LA-C0-31,
	filed
	August
	29,
	1977,
	charging
	party 	alleged
that
	SEIU
	violated 	section 	3543.6(b)
	by
	threatening
	him
	with
reprisals
	for
	filing
	an
	unfair 	practice
	charge
	and	
by
preventing
	him 	from
	examining
	at
	his 	seat
	a
	financial 	report
which
	was
	posted
	at
	the 	meeting
	hall.
In
	LA-C0-32,
	filed
	September
	6,
	1977, 	charging 	party
alleged 	that	
SEIU	
violated 	section 	3543.6(b)	
by	
(1)
2The	
EERA
	is
	codified 	at
	Government 	Code	
section
	3540
	et
seq. 	Unless 	otherwise 	noted,	
all 	statutory 	references 	are 	tothe	
Government 	Code.
2

discriminating
	against
	"B"
	and
	"C"
	shift
	members
	by
	holding
	a
meeting
	on
	May
	11,
	1977, 	without
	posting
	or
	distributing
	any
notices,
	and 	(2)
	conducting
	an
	election
	among
	"B"
	and
	"C"
	shift
members
	to
	select
	a
	LAVC
	representative
	to
	the
	negotiating
committee
	without 	counting
	the
	ballots
	in
	front
	of 	those
members.
In
	LA-C0-33,
	filed
	September
	14,
	1977,
	charging
	party
alleged
	that
	SEIU
	violated 	section
	3543.6(b) 	by
	failing 	to
	send
a
	representative 	to
	LAVC
	to
	inform
	"C"
	night
	shift
	employees
	on
the 	progress 	of
	negotiations.
	He
	also 	alleged
	that
	three
business
	representatives
	were
	ratified 	at
	a
	meeting
	in
	which
	no
"B"
	shift
	and
	only
	one
	"C"
	shift
	employee
	participated,
	which
constituted 	"callous 	indifference" 	to
	members.
In
	LA-C0-34,
	filed
	October
	3, 	1977, 	charging
	party 	alleged
that
	SEIU
	violated 	section
	3543.6(b)
	by 	(1)
	appointing
	a 	new
secretary-treasurer 	at
	a
	meeting
	on
	May
	20, 	1977, 	in
	which 	one
"C"
	shift
	and 	no
	11
B
11
	shift
	members
	participated;
	and
	(2)
covering
	up
	SEIU's
	financial 	condition	
by	
deleting
	certain
information
	from
	the
	financial 	report
	and
	conducting
	an
internal 	audit 	for	
the 	preceding
	six
	month
	period 	instead	
of
the	
previous 	three 	years.
A
formal 	hearing
	was
	held
	on
	all
	of 	these 	charges 	before
	a
PERB
	hearing
	officer.
	At
	the 	hearing, 	the 	hearing
	officer 	in
effect
	severed
	LA-C0-31 	from
	these 	proceedings 	for
	a
	separate
hearing
	on
	the 	claim
	that
	SEIU
	threatened 	the 	charging 	party
3

with 	reprisals 	for 	his 	activities 	under 	the 	EERA.3 	With 	the
agreement 	of 	charging 	party, 	the 	hearing 	officer 	also 	held 	in
abeyance 	those 	parts 	of 	the 	charges 	involving 	SEIU's 	financial
reports 	while 	the 	charging 	party 	pursued 	other 	administrative
remedies. 	However, 	charging 	party 	has 	raised 	the 	financial
reporting 	issues 	on 	appeal, 	and 	the 	Board 	finds 	it 	appropriate
to 	dispose 	of 	them 	in 	this 	decision.
FACTS
Charging 	party 	is 	a 	custodian 	for 	LAVC, 	working 	on 	the 	"C"
shift, 	from 	10:30 	p.m. 	to 	7:00 	a.m. 	There 	is 	also 	a 	"B" 	shift
from 	2:00 	p.m. 	to 	10:30 	p.m. 	and 	an 	"A" 	shift 	earlier 	in 	the
day. 	Charging 	party 	has 	been 	an 	employee 	of 	the 	Los 	Angeles
Community College 	District 	and 	a 	member 	of 	SEIU, 	Local 	99,
since 	August 	1974.
SEIU, 	Local 	99 	was 	certified 	as 	the 	exclusive
representative 	of 	a 	maintenance 	and 	operations 	unit 	at 	Los
Angeles 	Community College 	District 	on 	May 	24, 	1977, 	following
an 	election 	conducted 	by 	PERB 	on 	May 	17, 	1977. 	SEIU, 	Local 	99
represents 	approximately 	10,500 	employees 	of 	whom 	approximately
600 	are 	employed 	by 	LACCD.
3charging 	party 	has 	filed 	several 	additional 	charges,
some 	of 	which 	contain 	allegations 	similar 	to 	those 	in
LA-C0-31. 	No 	hearing 	has 	been 	held 	on 	these 	later 	charges;
accordingly, 	the 	General 	Counsel 	shall 	consolidate 	LA-C0-31
with 	the 	remaining 	charges 	filed 	by 	charging 	party 	for 	hearing.
4

UT
SEIU
	has
	scheduled
	its
	general
	membership
	meetings
	for
	the
fourth
	Friday 	of
	each
	month
	at
	8:00
	p.m.
	for
	at 	least
	the
	past
10
	to
	12
	years.
	However,
	the
	meetings
	often
	start
	later
because
	of
	the 	preceding
	executive
	board
	meetings 	running
late.
	The
	authority 	to
	set
	the
	time
	for 	the 	meeting,
	conferred
by 	the
	organization's
	by-laws
	to
	the
	executive
	board, 	has 	long
been
	delegated 	to
	the
	general
	membership.
	Twice
	charging
	party
has
	made 	a
	motion
	to
	move
	the
	general
	meetings
	to
	Saturday
	and
twice
	the
	motion 	has 	been
	defeated.
	Of
	SEIU's
	10,500
	members,
approximately 	2,500
	work
	evenings
	and
	nights.
On
	May
	11,
	1977,
	a
	meeting
	was
	held
	to 	discuss
	upcoming
negotiations
	for 	the
	maintenance
	and
	operations 	unit
	at
	LACCD.
Charging
	party
	received 	no	
notice	
of	
this
	meeting
	and
	testified
that
	no
	announcements
	were
	posted.
On 	May
	24, 	1977,
	an
	SEIU
	agent 	conducted 	an
	election
	among
11
B
11
and
	"C"
	shift
	members
	to
	select
	an
	LAVC
	representative 	to
SEIU's
	negotiating
	team.
	After
	collecting
	the
	ballots,
	the
SEIU
	agent
	left
	without 	counting 	the
	ballots
	in 	front 	of 	the
persons
	who
	had
	just
	voted.
From
	July 	2, 	1977,
	until 	at 	least
	the 	date 	of 	the 	hearing
in
	this
	case,
	no 	SEIU
	representative 	visited
	the	
11
B
11	
and 	"C"
shift
	custodians
	at
	LAVC
	to 	report
	on
	negotiations.
	SEIU's
secretary-treasurer 	testified	
that
	SEIU	
representatives
	do
	not
regularly	
visit	
the	
"B
11	
or	
11
C
11	
shifts 	at	
any 	work
	location.
5

On
	April
	22, 	1977,
	the
	appointment
	of 	three 	business
representatives
	was
	ratified 	at
	a
	general
	membership
	meeting
attended
	by
	one
	"C"
	shift
	and 	no
	"B"
	shift
	members.
	On
	May
	20,
1977,
	the
	secretary-treasurer
	was
	ratified
	under
	the
	same
circumstances.
ISSUES
This 	case
	raises
	two
	basic 	issues
	which
	relate
	to
	all
	of
the
	unfair
	practice
	charges 	before
	us:
(1)
	Has 	SEIU
	breached
	the 	duty 	of
	fair
representation
	imposed 	on
	all
	exclusive
representatives
	by
	section
	3544.9?
(2) 	Has
	SEIU's 	conduct
	otherwise
discriminated 	against
	or
	interfered
	with
employees
	in
	violation
	of
	section
	3543.6(b}?
This 	proceeding
	also 	raises
	an
	issue 	as
	to
	the 	proper
	vehicle
for 	processing 	complaints 	about
	SEIU's
	financial 	reporting.
DISCUSSION
Duty
	of 	Fair
	Representation4
The
	EERA
	places
	on
	exclusive 	representatives
	a
	statutory
duty
	to
	fairly
	represent
	all
	employees
	in 	the 	negotiating
unit.
	Section
	3544.9
	provides:
4Although
	charging
	party
	does 	not
	specifically 	allege
that
	SEIU's 	conduct 	has 	breached
	its
	duty
	to 	represent
	fairly
all
	members
	of 	the 	maintenance
	and
	operations 	unit 	in 	violationof 	section
	3544.9,
	many
	of 	his 	charges 	allege 	that
	SEIU
	has
treated 	certain
	members
	of 	the 	negotiating 	unit 	in
	a
discriminatory 	fashion. 	This 	seems
	to 	raise
	a
	fairrepresentation 	issue, 	as 	does
	his 	appeal, 	in	
which 	he
	statesthat
	unions 	are 	"charged 	with 	representing 	each 	and
	every
6

7
employee."
	We
	find
	that
	his
	allegations 	raise
	an
	issue 	as
	to
whether 	or
	not
	SEIU
	breached
	its
	duty
	of
	fair
	representation.
The
	employee
	organization
	recognized
	or
certified
	as 	the
	exclusive
	representative
for
	the 	purpose
	of
	meeting
	and
	negotiating
shall 	fairly
	represent
	each
	and
	every
employee
	in
	the
	appropriate
	unit.
The
	Legislature,
	adopting
	a
	concept
	originally
	developed
	by
the
	United
	States
	Supreme
	Court,5	
recognized
	that
	the
	right
of
	an
	exclusive
	representative 	to
	be
	the 	only
	employee
organization
	empowered
	to 	represent
	unit
	members
	in
	their
employment
	relations
	with 	the
	public
	school
	employer6	
carries
Srn
	Steele
	v.
	Louisville
	and
	Nashville 	Railroad
	(1944)323
	U.S.
	192
	[15
	LRRM
	708], 	the
	Supreme
	Court 	decided
	that
	the
Railway
	Labor
	Act,
	45
	u.s.c.
	section
	151
	et
	seq., 	implicitly
"expresses 	the
	aim
	of
	Congress
	to
	impose 	upon
	the 	bargaining
representative
	of
	a
	craft
	or
	class
	of
	employees
	the 	duty
	toexercise
	fairly
	the
	power
	conferred
	upon
	it
	in 	behalf 	of
	all
those 	for
	whom
	it
	acts,
	without
	hostile 	discriminatioin 	against
them." 	In
	Ford
	Motor 	Co.
	v.
	Huffman
	(1953)
	354
	U.S.
	330,
	[31
LRRM
	2548],
	the
	Court
	applied
	the
	same
	principles 	to
	a
	case
arising
	under
	the 	National
	Labor
	Relations
	Act,
	29
	u.s.c. 	151
et
	seq.
	Both
	Steele
	and 	Huffman
	involved
	negotiation
situations.
	Later 	cases
	have
	developed
	a
	duty
	of
	fair
representation 	in 	contract 	administration
	and
	grievance
handling:
	Conley
	v.
	Gibson
	(1957) 	355
	U.S.
	41 	[41
	LRRM
	2089];
~umphrey
	v.
	Moore 	(1964) 	375
	U.S.
	335 	[55
	LRRM
	2031];
	Vaca
	v.
Sipes
	(1967) 	386
	U.S.
	171 	[64
	LRRM
	23691.
6section 	3543.l(a) 	provides 	in
	pertinent 	part:
...
[O]nce 	an 	employee	
organization
	is
recognized 	or
	certified
	as 	the 	exclusive
representative
	of
	an
	appropriate 	unitpursuant 	to 	section 	3544.1
	or 	3544.7,
respectively,
	only
	that
	employee
organization
	may
	represent 	that 	unit 	in
their
	employment
	relations
	with 	the 	publicschool 	employers
....
7

8
with 	it 	the 	obligation 	to 	exercise 	fairly 	the 	power 	conferred
upon 	it 	on 	behalf 	of 	all 	those 	for 	whom 	it 	acts.
The 	Board 	has 	not 	yet 	fully 	defined 	the 	parameters 	of 	the
duty 	of 	fair 	representation 	under 	section 	3544.9.7 	An
essential 	question 	in 	this 	case 	is 	what 	employee 	organization
activities 	are 	subject 	to 	the 	duty 	of 	fair 	representation.
Since 	the 	duty 	of 	fair 	representation 	stems 	from 	an
exclusive 	representative's 	status 	as 	the 	only 	employee
organization 	that 	can 	represent 	employees 	in 	their 	employment
relations, 	it 	follows 	that 	this 	duty 	applies 	in 	such
representational 	activities. 	Thus, 	an 	exclusive 	representative
clearly 	has 	a 	duty 	to 	represent 	all 	employees 	in 	the 	unit
fairly 	in meeting 	and 	negotiating, 	consulting 	on 	educational
objectives, 	and 	administering 	the 	written 	agreement. 	A
question 	exists, 	however, 	as 	to 	whether 	this 	duty 	to 	represent
employees 	fairly 	extends 	beyond 	negotiation 	and 	administration
of 	agreements 	and 	is 	applicable 	to 	activities 	which 	do 	not
directly 	involve 	the 	employer 	or 	which 	are 	strictly 	internal
union 	matters. 	For 	the 	reasons 	that 	follow, 	we 	find 	that 	only
such 	activities 	that 	have 	a 	substantial 	impact 	on 	the
relationships 	of 	unit 	members 	to 	their 	employers 	are 	subject 	to
that 	duty.
7see 	Mt. 	Diablo Unified 	School 	District 	(8/21/78) 	PERB
Decision 	No. 	68; 	Redlands 	Teachers 	Association 	(9/25/78) 	PERB
Decision 	No. 	72.
8

9
Cases
	involving 	the
	duty
	of
	fair
	representation
	under
	the
National
	Labor
	Relations
	Act
	(hereafter
	NLRA)8	
have
	generally
been
	limited 	to
	an
	exclusive
	representative's
	conduct
	in
negotiating
	and
	administering
	contracts.
	In 	Teamsters 	Local
310
	v.
	NLRB
	(D.C.Cir.
	1978)
	587
	F.2d
	1176 	[98
	LRRM
	3186],
	the
court
	noted:
As 	a
	general
	proposition,
	it
	is
	true
	that
	a
union
	only 	breaches
	its
	duty
	of
	fair
representation
	when
	it
	discriminates 	against
employees
	"in matters
	affecting
	their
employment."
	This
	is
	because
	a
	union's
	duty
of
	fair
	representation 	derives
	from
	its
status
	as
	exclusive 	bargaining
representative
	under
	section	
9 {a)
	[of
	the
NLRAJ; 	a
	union,
	therefore,
	can
	be
	held
	to
represent
	employees
	unfairly
	only
	in 	regard
to
	those
	matters
	as
	to
	which
	it
	represents
them
	at
	all--namely,
	"rates
	of pay,
	wages,
hours
	•..
,
	or 	other
	terms
	and
	conditionsof
	employment."
However,
	certain 	internal
	union
	activities
	have 	been 	found
subject 	to
	the 	duty
	of
	fair
	representation.
	In 	Retana 	v.
Elevator 	Operators
	Union
	(9th
	Cir.
	1972) 	453
	F.2d
	1018
	[79
	LRRM
8The
	NLRA
	is
	codified
	at
	29 	u.s.c.
	section
	151
	et
	seq.
While
	PERB
	is
	not
	bound	
by	
NLRB
	or 	federal 	court 	cases
interpreting
	the
	NLRA,
	it
	may
	take 	cognizance 	of 	federalprecedent 	in 	interpreting 	provisions 	of 	the
	EERA
	where
	theprovisions 	are 	similar 	to
	language
	in 	the
	NLRA.
	See,
	e.g.,
Sweetwater
	Union 	High
	School
	District
	(11/23/76)
	EERB
	Decision
No.
	4. 	While
	the
	NLRA
	contains
	no
	language
	similar 	to 	section3544.9, 	the
	rationale 	for
	that 	provision
	"lies
	imbedded
	int
federal 	precedents
	under 	the
	NLRA.
11
	Fire 	Fighters
	Union
	v.
City 	of 	Vallejo
	{1974) 	12 	.3d 	608. 	In 	E}re	
Fighters, 	the
ealifornia
	Supreme
	Court 	consideration 	of 	federalprecedents 	in
	such
	a
	situat
	on
	if
	"the
	f 	r
	1s1ons
effective 	reflect
	the
	same
	interests
	as 	those 	that
	prompted
the 	inclus
	on
	of 	the 	[statutory] 	language
•.••
"
9

10
2272],
	the
	court
	examined
	the 	disadvantages 	experienced
	by
Spanish-speaking
	union
	members
	and
	stated:
As
	a
	practical
	matter, 	intra-union
	conduct
could 	not
	be
	wholly
	excluded
	from
	the 	duty
of
	fair
	representation 	for
	..•
	internal
union
	policies
	and
	practices
	may
	have
	a
substantial
	impact
	upon
	the
	external
relationships
	of
	members
	of 	the
	unit
	to
their
	employer.
	[79
	LRRM
	at
	2276.]9
But
	the
	court
	goes
	on
	to
	say:
This
	does
	not
	mean
	...
	that
	the
	union
	will
be
	exposed
	to 	harrassing
	litigation
	by
dissident
	members
	over
	every 	arguable
decision
	made
	in 	the 	course 	of 	day-to-day
functioning 	of 	the
	union.
	Though
	the 	duty
of
	fair
	representation
	is
	broad, 	not
	all
union
	practices
	have
	a
	substantial
	impact
upon members
	rights
	in
	relation
	to
	the
negotiation
	and
	administration
	of 	the
collective
	bargaining
	agreement.
	(Ibid.)
Section
	3544.9
	contains
	no
	language
	indicating
	that
	the
Legislature
	intended
	that 	section 	to
	apply
	to
	internal
	union
activities
	that
	do
	not
	have
	a
	substantial
	impact
	on
	the
relationships
	of
	unit
	members
	to
	their
	employers.
	Therefore,
PERB
	finds 	that 	internal
	union
	activities
	that
	do
	not
	have 	such
an
	impact
	are 	not
	subject 	to
	the 	duty 	of
	fair 	representation.
Most
	of 	charging
	party's 	allegations 	involve 	just	
such
internal
	union
	activities.
	The
	choice 	of
	a
	general 	meeting
9see 	also
	Deboles
	v.
	TWA
	(3rd 	Cir.
	1977) 	552
	F.2d
	1005
[94
	LRRM	
3237], 	cert. 	den~34	
U.S.
	832 	[96
	LRRM
	2514]; 	Letter
Carriers,
	Branch 	6000 	v.
	NLRB
	(D.C.
	Cir.	
1979)	
_
	F.2d
	__
	[100
LRRM
	2346].
1.0

11
timelO 	does 	not 	by 	itself 	have 	a 	great 	impact 	on 	the 	employee
organization's 	ability 	to 	represent 	all 	unit 	members 	fairly.
Therefore, 	the 	fact 	that 	the 	meeting 	time 	of 	SEIU's 	choice 	is
difficult 	for 	"B" 	and 	"C" 	shift members 	to 	attend 	does 	not
constitute 	a 	breach 	of 	SEIU's 	duty 	of 	fair 	representation 	to
those 	unit 	members. 	Indeed, 	as 	the 	hearing 	officer 	observed,
"The 	evidence 	indicates 	that 	the 	respondent 	selected 	Friday
nights 	for 	its 	meetings 	because 	it 	is 	a 	time 	most 	convenient
for 	most 	employees." 	(Proposed 	Decision, 	p.5.)
Nor 	does 	the 	duty 	of 	fair 	representation 	include 	an
obligation 	to 	hold 	on-site 	meetings 	with 	unit 	members 	to
discuss 	the 	progress 	of 	negotiations.11 	The 	duty 	of 	fair
representation 	implies 	some 	consideration 	of 	the 	views 	of
various 	groups 	of 	employees 	and 	some 	access 	for 	communication
of 	those 	views, 	but 	there 	is 	no 	requirement 	that 	formal
procedures 	be 	establishea.12 	Charging 	party 	does 	not 	allege
that 	the 	interests 	of 	"B" 	and 	"C" 	shift members 	are 	not 	being
represented 	in 	negotiations 	with 	LACCD 	nor 	that 	these 	interests
have 	been 	excluded 	from 	consideration 	or 	treated 	in 	a
discriminatory manner.
lOcase 	No. 	LA-C0-27.
1 	No. 	33
12 	Letter 	Carriers, 	Branch 	6000 	v. 	NLRB,_ supra, 	__
F.2d 	[100 	LRRM 	2346]: 	Waiters 	Union, 	Local 	781 	v. 	Hotel
AssocTafion 	(D.C. 	Cir. 	1974) 	498 	F.2d 	998, 	1000 	[86 	LRRM 	2001].

12
For 	the 	same 	reasons, 	the 	election 	to 	select 	a
representative 	to 	the 	negotiating 	teaml3 	is 	not 	subject 	to
the 	duty 	of 	fair 	representation. 	The 	negotiating 	team 	must
represent 	all 	employees 	in 	the 	unit 	fairly, 	but 	that 	obligation
does 	not 	entail 	the 	selection 	of 	negotiators 	in 	any 	particular
manner.
Thus, 	none 	of 	charging 	party's 	allegations, 	taken
individually, 	constitutes 	conduct 	which 	has 	a 	substantial
impact 	on 	the 	relationships 	of 	"B" 	and 	"C" 	shift 	members 	to
their 	employers. 	Even 	if 	these 	allegations 	are 	viewed 	as 	an
overall 	course 	of 	conduct 	by 	SEIU, 	there 	is 	no 	evidence 	that
this 	conduct 	has 	had 	any 	impact 	on 	SEIU's 	representation 	of 	"B"
and 	"C" 	shift 	members 	in 	negotiations.
Charging 	party's 	remaining 	allegations 	refer 	to 	conduct
which 	preceeded 	SEIU's 	certification 	as 	exclusive
representative 	of 	the 	maintenance 	and 	operations 	unit 	at
LACCD: 	(l} 	The 	allegation 	in Case 	No. 	LA-C0-32 	that 	SEIU 	held
a 	meeting 	on 	May 	11, 	1977, 	without 	notice 	to 	employees; 	(2) 	the
allegation 	in 	Case 	No. 	LA-C0-33 	that 	three 	business
representatives 	were 	ratifi 	at 	a 	meeting 	on 	April 	22, 	1977
with 	litt 	tic 	tion 11 B 11 	11 C 11 shift 	"'"'"''"'"-rs; 	(3)
the 	allegation 	in 	Case 	No. 	LA-C0-34 	that 	the 	May 	20, 	77,
1 	No. 	LA-C0-32.
12

13
appointment
	of
	a 	new
	secretary-treasurer
	was 	made
	with
	little
"B"
	and
	"C"
	shift
	participation.
The
	duty
	of
	fair
	representation
	in
	section
	3544.9
	applies
only
	to
	exclusive
	representatives.
	Since 	the
	above
	actions
occurred 	before
	SEIU's
	certification,
	section
	3544.9 	does
	not
apply.
Section
	3543.6(b)
Section
	3544.9
	is
	enforceable
	under
	section
	3543.6(b)
	since
breaches
	of
	the
	duty
	of
	fair
	representation 	violate 	that
section.
	Section
	3543.6(b)
	states
	that
	it
	shall
	be
	unlawful
for
	an 	employee
	organization 	to:
Impose
	or
	threaten 	to
	impose
	reprisals
	on
employees,
	to 	discriminate
	or
	threaten
	to
discriminate 	against
	employees,
	or 	otherwise
to
	interfere
	with,
	restrain,
	or 	coerce
employees
	because
	of
	their
	exercise 	of
rights
	guaranteed
	by
	this
	chapter.
The
	language
	of 	this
	section
	is
	identical 	to 	that
	of
section
	3543.S{a) 	which
	covers
	employer
	conduct,
	and
	the
	Board
sees
	no
	reason
	to
	analyze 	those
	sections
	differently.
	Under
the
	test 	articulated
	in 	Carlsbad 	Unified
	School
	District
(1/30/79)	
PERB
	Decision
	No.
	89, 	the 	conduct
	alleged 	to
constitute
	an
	unfair 	practice
	must 	tend
	to 	or
	actually 	result
in
	some 	harm	
to
	employee
	rights 	granted
	under 	the
	EERA
	(p.
	10
and	
concurring 	opinion
	at 	p. 	21).	
By
	imposing
	a
	duty
	of 	fair
representation 	in 	section 	3544.9, 	the 	Legislature 	clearly	
gave
employees 	a
	right 	to
	be 	:represented
	fairly	
by	
their 	exclusive
13

14
representive.14	
Conduct
	breaching
	that
	duty
	therefore
	harms
an 	employee
	right,
	making
	violations
	of
	section
	3544.9
	unfair
practices
	under
	section
	3543.6(b) .15
However,
	the
	conduct
	proscribed
	by
	section
	3543.6(b)
encompasses
	more
	than
	a
	breach
	of 	the
	duty
	of
	fair
14The
	NLRA
	does
	not 	include
	a
	prov1s1on
	specifically
imposing
	a
	duty
	of
	fair
	representation
	on
	exclusive
representatives.
	However,
	the
	NLRB
	has
	found
	that
	employees'
right
	"to 	bargain
	collectively
	through
	representatives
	of
	their
own
	choosing"
	(section
	7
	of 	the
	NLRA)
	gives
	employees
	a
	"right
to
	be
	free
	from
	unfair
	or
	irrelevant
	or 	invidious 	treatment
	by
their
	exclusive 	bargaining
	agent
	in 	matters
	affecting
	their
employment."
	(Miranda
	Fuel
	Co., 	Inc.
	(1962) 	140
	NLRB
	181
	at
p.
	185 	[51
	LRRM
	1584],
	enf.
	den.
	(2d
	Cir.
	1963)
	326
	F.2d
	172
[54
	LRRM
	2715]
.)
	It
	enforcesthis
	right
	through
	NLRA
	section
8
(b)
(1)
(A), 	which
	provides, 	in
	pertinent 	part:
It
	shall
	be 	an
	unfair
	labor
	practice
	for
	a
labor 	organization
	or
	its
	agents
	--
(1)
	to
	restrain
	or 	coerce
	(A)
	employees
	inthe
	exercise 	of
	rights
	guaranteed 	in
sec
ti
on
	7.
	. 	• 	•
This 	enforcement
	was
	approved
	in
	principle
	by
	the 	United
	States
Supreme
	Court
	in	
Vaca. 	v.
	Sipes, 	supra,
	386
	U.S. 	171
	[64
	LRRM
2369] .
By
	1975,
	when
	the
	EERA
	was
	enacted, 	there
	was	
no	
dispute
that
	under
	the
	NLRA
	an
	exclusive 	representative
	which
	breached
its
	duty 	of
	fair
	representation
	committed 	an
	unfair 	labor
practice.
	By
	including 	section
	3544.9
	in 	the
	EERA,
	the
California 	Legislature
	ensured
	that
	the
	right
	of
	employees
	to
be
	fairly
	represented
	would 	be
	enforceable
	by 	PERB.
15see
	Mt.
	Diablo Unified 	School
	District,
	supra,
(8/21/78)
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	68, 	in
	which
	the
	Board 	found
	that
the
	particular 	alleged 	breach 	of 	the 	duty 	of
	fairrepresentation 	in 	the 	case, 	in
	which
	the
	employee
	organization
was
	accused 	of 	discriminating 	against 	certain 	negotiating 	unit
members
	because 	of
	their
	membership
	in 	another 	employee
organization, 	could
	constitute
	a
	violation 	of 	section 	3543.6(b).
14

15
representation,
	and
	charging
	party's
	allegations
	must
	be
examined
	to
	determine
	whether
	they
	constitute
	a
	violation
	of
that
	section 	separate
	and
	apart
	from 	any
	violation
	of
	section
3544.9.
	Other
	employee
	rights
	protected	
by	
section
	3543.6(b)
are
	set
	forth
	in
	sections
	3540
	and 	3543.
	Section
	3540
recognizes:
the
	right
	of
	public
	school
	employees
	to
	joinorganizations
	of
	their
	own
	choice,
	to
	be
represented
	by
	such
	organizations
	in
	their
professional
	and 	employment
	relations
	with
public
	school 	employers,
	to
	select
	one
employee
	organization
	as
	the 	exclusive
representative
	of 	the
	employees
	in
	an
appropriate
	unit
•.••
Section
	3543
	states:
Public 	school
	employees
	shall
	have
	the
	rightto
	form,
	join,
	and
	participate
	in 	the
activities
	of
	employee
	organizations
	of
their
	own
	choosing
	for 	the 	purpose 	of
representation
	on
	all
	matters 	of
employer-employee
	relations
•.•.
In 	the
	present 	case,
	all
	of 	charging
	party's 	allegations
relate
	to 	the
	internal
	activities
	of
	SEIU.
	Thus,
	we
	must
decide
	whether 	employees 	have 	any
	rights
	under
	sections
	3540
and
	3543
	to
	have 	an 	employee
	organization 	structured
	or
operated 	in	
any	
particular
	way.
The
	EERA
gives
	employees
	the
	right 	to 	"join
	and
	participate
in 	the
	activities
	of
	employee
	organizations
11
(sec.
	3543) 	and
employee
	organizations 	are 	prevented
	from
	interfering 	with
employees 	because 	of 	the 	exercise 	of
	their 	rights
(sec. 	3543.6(b)).
	Read
	broadly, 	these 	sections 	could 	be
15

16
construed 	as 	prohibiting 	any 	employee 	organization 	conduct
which 	would 	prevent 	or 	limit 	employee's 	participation 	in 	any 	of
its 	activities. 	The 	internal 	organization 	structure 	could 	be
scrutinized 	as 	could 	the 	conduct 	of 	elections 	for 	union
officers 	to 	ensure 	conformance 	with 	an 	idealized 	participatory
standard. 	However 	laudable 	such 	a 	result 	might 	be, 	the 	Board
finds 	such 	intervention 	in 	union 	affairs 	to 	be 	beyond 	the
legislative 	intent 	in 	enacting 	the 	EERA. 	There 	is 	nothing 	in
the 	EERA comparable 	to 	the 	Labor-Management 	Reporting 	and
Disclosure 	Act 	of 	1959,16 	which 	regulates 	certain 	internal
conduct 	of 	unions 	operating 	in 	the 	private 	sector. 	The 	EERA
does 	not 	describe 	the 	internal 	workings 	or 	structure 	of
employee 	organizations 	nor 	does 	it 	define 	the 	internal 	rights
of 	organization 	members. 	We 	cannot 	believe 	that 	by 	the 	use 	of
the 	phrase 	"participate 	in 	the 	activities 	of 	employee
organizations 	... 	for 	the 	purpose 	of 	representation 	on 	all
matters 	of 	employer-employee 	relations" 	in 	section 	3543, 	the
Legislature 	intended 	this 	Board 	to 	create 	a 	regulatory 	set 	of
standards 	governing 	the 	solely 	internal 	relationship 	between 	a
union 	and 	its 	members. 	Rather, 	we 	believe 	that 	the 	Legislature
intended 	in 	the 	EERA 	to grant 	and 	protect 	employees' 	rights 	to
1629 	u.s.c. 	section 	411 	et 	seq.
16

17
be
	represented 	in
	their
	employment
	relations
	by
	freely
	chosen
employee
	organizations.17
Thus,
	unless
	the
	internal
	activities
	of
	an 	employee
organization
	have
	such
	a
	substantial
	impact
	on
	employees'
relationship
	with
	their
	employer
	as
	to
	give
	rise
	to
	a
	duty
	of
fair
	representation,
	we
	find
	that
	public
	school
	employees
	do
not
	have 	any
	protected
	rights
	under
	the
	EERA
	in
	the
organization 	of
	their
	exclusive
	representative.
	In
	brief,
sections
	3540 	and 	3543
	do
	not
	give
	employees
	more
	rights
	in
	the
internal
	activities
	of
	an 	employee
	organization
	than 	they
	have
under
	section 	3544.9.
Since
	we
	have
	already
	found
	that
	none
	of 	the
	conduct
alleged 	to
	be
	unlawful
	by
	the 	charging
	party
	has
	a
	sufficiently
substantial
	impact
	on
	employees'
	relationship
	with
	their
employer
	as
	to
	give
	rise
	to
	the 	duty
	of
	fair
	representation,
	we
dismiss
	Case 	Nos. 	LA-C0-27,
	32,
	33,
	and
	34.
17union
	members 	may
	have
	other
	remedies
	for
	problems
involving
	internal
	union
	activities.
	The
	Labor-Management
Reporting
	and
	Disclosure
	Act
	of
	1959 	(29 	u.s.c.
	sec.
	411
	et
seq.) 	applies 	to
	"mixed
	locals"
	where
	either	
the
	local, 	the
national,
	or 	the
	international
	employee
	organization
	is
composed
	of 	both 	government 	and 	non-government 	employees.(Kennedy
	v. 	Metropolitan
	Bus
	Authority
	(1979)
	__
	F.Supp.
	__
[102
	LRRM
	2088]
.)
• 	At
	least
	some
	organizations 	representing
public
	school 	employees
	are	
mixed.
There
	may
	also
	be
	remedies
	at
	common 	law	
for
	some
	internal
membership
	questions. 	See,	
e.g.,
	I.A.M.
	v. 	Gonzales 	(1958) 	356
U.S. 	617;
	James 	v. 	Marinshi.p 	(1944)
	25
	Cal.2d
	721.
17

Financial
	Reports
Charging
	party
	has 	charged
	SEIU
	with
	violating 	section
3543.6(b)
	in
	its
	handling
	of
	its
	monthly
	financial 	report
	at
its
	monthly
	meetings.18	
Section
	3546.5
	sets
	forth
	both 	the
statutory 	financial 	disclosure
	requirements
	and
	the 	procedure
and
	remedy
	for
	an 	employee
	organization's
	failure
	to
	comply
with
	these 	requirements.
	It
	states:
Every
	recognized 	or
	certified
	employee
organization
	shall
	keep 	an
	adequate
	itemized
record 	of
	its
	financial 	transactions
	and
shall
	make
	available
	annually,
	to
	the
	board
and
	to
	the
	employees
	who
	are
	members
	of 	the
organization, 	within
	60
	days
	after
	the
	end
of
	its
	fiscal
	year,
	a
	detailed 	written
financial 	report 	thereof 	in 	the
	form
	of
	a
balance
	sheet
	and 	an
	operating 	statement,
signed
	and
	certified
	as
	to
	accuracy	
by	
its
president
	and
	treasurer,
	or 	corresponding
principal 	officers.
	In
	the 	event 	of
	failure
of
	compliance 	with
	this
	section,
	any
employee
	within 	the
	organization
	may
petition
	the
	board
	for
	an
	order
	compellingsuch
	compliance, 	or 	the
	board
	may
	issue
	such
compliance
	order
	on
	its
	motion.
At
	the
	time
	charging
	party 	filed
	his 	unfair 	practice
	charges,
PERB
	had
	not
	yet
	adopted
	any
	regulations
	implementing
lBcharging
	party's 	allegations
	are 	as 	follows:
	At
	the
July
	29, 	1977, 	meeting
	of
	SEIU, 	no
	monthly
	financial 	report
	was
posted.
	A
financial 	report
	was
	posted
	at
	the 	meeting
	of
	August
23, 	1977, 	but 	charging
	party
	was
	not 	allowed
	to
	remove
	it
	and
examine
	it
	at 	his 	seat. 	(LA-C0-31.)	
The 	September 	23, 	1977,
financial 	report 	deleted 	the
	names,
	salaries,
	and
	mileage
expenses 	of 	union
	officials. 	It
	stated 	that
	an
	audit	
would 	be
conducted 	covering 	January 	1,
	1977	
to	
June 	30, 	1977. 	Charging
party
	had
	previously 	urged
	that
	an
	audit 	covering 	1974-76 	was
necessary. 	(LA-C0-34.)
18

19
this
	section.19	
Nevertheless,
	the
	statute 	clearly 	indicates
that
	the
	appropriate
	procedure 	for
	remedying
	a
	violation
	of
section
	3546.5
	is
	not
	to
	file
	an
	unfair
	practice
	charge
	against
the
	employee
	organization,
	but
	to
	file
	a
	petition
	with
	PERB
seeking
	an
	order
	compelling 	compliance.
In
	addition,
	it
	should
	be
	noted
	that
	all
	of 	charging
party's
	complaints 	deal
	with
	monthly
	financial 	reports,
	while
section
	3546.5
	requires
	only
	an
	annual
	financial 	report.
Therefore,
	even
	if
	we
	treated
	charging
	parties'
	allegations
	as
a
	petition
	for
	a
	compliance
	order,
	we
	would
	dismiss 	the
petition
	as 	not
	alleging
	any
	basis
	for 	finding
	that
	SEIU
	has
not 	complied
	with
	EERA's
	financial 	disclosure
	requirement.
ORDER
Upon
	the 	foregoing 	Decision
	and
	the
	entire
	record 	in
	this
case, 	the 	Public
	Employment
	Relations
	Board
	ORDERS
	that
	the
unfair 	practice
	charges
	in
	Case 	Nos.
	LA-CO-27,
	32, 	33, 	and
	34
are
	hereby
	dismissed.
By: Raymond J. Gonzales, Member 	Harry Gluck, Chairperson
19on
	January 	19, 	1978,
	PERB
	filed 	sections
	32125
	and
32126
	of 	the 	California 	Administrative
	Code,
	title
	8, 	providing
a
	procedure 	for 	implementing
	section 	3546.5. 	These
	sections
were 	renumbered
	to
	32900 	and 	32910 	on
	July 	8, 	1978.
19

PUBLIC
	EMPLOYMENT
	RELATIONS
	BOARD
OF
	THE
	STATE
	OF
	CALIFORNIA
In
	the
	Matter
	of:
JULES
	KIMMETT,
Charging
	Party,
vs.
SERVICE
	EMPLOYEES
	INTERNATIONAL
UNION,
	LOCAL
	99,
Respondent.
In 	the
	Los
	Angeles
	Community
~C-0-l-l-e,...gi>-'e"---'D
....
1.=-·s
.......
tr
......
i..,.c
....
t...,_.
_
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case 	Nos. 	LA-C0-27
LA-C0-31
LA-C0-32
LA-C0-33
LA-C0-34
RECOMMENDED
	DECISION
January
	10,
	1978
)
_________
)
Appearances:	
Jules
	Kimmett~
	pro
	per; 	Willie
	Griffin,
	Secretary-
Treasurer,
	SEIU,
	Local
	99,
	for 	Service
	Employees
	International
	Union,
Local
	99.
Before
	Jeff
	Paule,
	Hearing
	Officer.
STATEMENT
	OF 	THE
	CASES
On
	July
	25, 	1977,
	Jules
	Kimmett
	(hereinafter
	"Kimmett"
	or
"charging 	party")
	filed
	an
	unfair 	practice
	charge
	(LA-C0-27)
	against
Local
	99
	of
	the 	Service
	Employees
	International
	Union
	(hereinafter
"SEIU"
	or 	"respondent")
	alleging
	a
	violation 	of
	Government 	Code
1
Section
	3543.6(b)
. 	The
	charging
	party
	contends
	that
	the 	respondent
is
	denying 	to 	the 	charging
	party 	his 	right
	to
	attend
	and
	participate
in
	union
	activities
	(see 	Sections
	3540 	and 	3543)
	because 	union meetings
1
All 	section 	references 	are 	to 	the
	Government 	Code
	unless 	otherwise
specified. 	Section 	3543.6(b) 	provides:
It
	shall
	be 	unlawful 	for
	an 	employee
	organization 	to:
Impose
	or 	threaten 	to
	impose
	reprisals
	on 	employees,
to 	discriminate 	or 	threaten 	to 	discriminate 	againstemployees, 	or 	otherwise 	to 	interfere with, 	restrain,or 	coerce 	employees 	because 	of 	their 	exercise 	of
rights 	guaranteed by
	this 	chapter.

are 	held
	on
	Friday
	nights
	at
	a
	time
	when
	Kimmett
	and
	certain
	other
employees 	work.
On
	August 	29, 	1977,
	Kimmett
	filed
	an
	unfair 	practice
	charge
(LA-CO-31)
	against
	the
	SEID
	alleging
	a
	violation
	of 	Section 	3543.6(b).
In
	this
	charge, 	the 	charging
	party
	contends
	that
	the
	President 	of
Local
	99,
	SEID,
	Joseph
	Bennett,
	threatened
	to
	impose
	reprisals
	on
Kimmett
	because
	of
	Kimmett's
	exercise 	of
	rights
	guaranteed
	by
	the
Educational
	Employment
	Relations
	Act
	(hereinafter
	"EERA"
	or
	"Act").
On
	September 	6, 	1977,
	Kimmett
	filed
	an
	unfair 	practice
	charge
(LA-CO-32)
	against
	the
	SEID
	alleging
	a
	violation
	of 	Section 	3543.6(b).
In
	this
	charge, 	the 	charging
	party
	contends
	that
	the
	SEID
	failed
	to
properly
	notify
	Kimmett
	and
	certain
	other
	members
	of
	a
	union meeting
held
	on
	May
	11, 	1977.
	Further,
	the 	charging
	party 	alleges
	that 	at
	the
meeting
	of
	May
	11, 	1977,
	the 	respondent 	did not 	discuss 	with 	the
members
	the
	status
	of 	contract 	negotiations
	which
	the 	union
was
	then
engaged
	in
	with 	the
	Los
	Angeles
	Community
	College
	District 	(hereinafter
"LAC CD") .
On
	September 	14, 	1977,
	Kimmett
	filed
	an
	unfair 	practice
	charge
(LA-CE-33)
	against
	the
	SEID
	alleging
	a
	violation
	of 	Section 	3543.6(b).
In
	this
	charge, 	the 	charging 	party
	contends
	that
	the
	SEID
	has
	failed
	to
fairly
	represent
	its
	members
	by
	not
	informing 	the 	charging
	party
	and
other
	employees
	of 	the 	progress 	of 	negotiations.
On
	October 	3, 	1977, 	Kimmett
	filed
	an
	unfair 	practice
	charge
(LA-CO-34)
	against 	the
	SEID
	alleging
	a
	violation 	of 	Section 	3543.6(b).
In
	this 	charge, 	the 	charging 	party 	alleges 	that 	the 	respondent 	conducted
an
	illegal 	election 	for 	secretary-treasurer 	of Local 	99.
-2-

A
hearing
	was
	held
	on November
	21,
	1977
	at
	the
	Los
	Angeles
	Public
Employment
	Relations
	Board
	Regional
	Office
	(hereinafter
	PERB),
formerly
	Educational
	Employment
	Relations
	Board.
	Prior
	to
	the
	start
of 	the
	hearing,
	the 	charging
	party
	filed
	four
	additional
	charges
(LA-C0-36,
	41,
	42
	and 	43)
	which were
	served
	on
	the 	respondent.
	No
disposition 	of
	these
	charges
	is
	made
	in
	this
	decision.
Also
	at
	the
	hearing, 	the
	charging
	party
was
	permitted
	to
	present
evidence
	with
	respect
	to
	Case
	No. 	LA-C0-31
	at,
	a
	later
	time.
	Therefore,
no
	disposition
	is
	made
	of
	Case 	No. 	LA-C0-31
	in
	this
	decision.
FINDINGS
	OF
	FACT
The
	charging
	party, 	Jules
	Kinnnett,
	is
	a
	custodian 	for 	the
	Los
Angeles
	Connnunity
	College
	District
	and works 	on
	the
	"C"
	shift
	(10:30
	p.m.-
7:00
	a.m.)
	at
	Los
	Angeles
	Valley 	College
	(hereinafter
	"LAVC").
Mr. 	Kinnnett
	has 	been
	an 	employee
	of the
	LACCD
	and
	a 	member
	of
	Local
	99
for
	approximately 	four 	years.
The
	respondent,
	SEIU,
	Local
	99,
	is
	the 	exclusive
	representative
of
	a
	unit
	of
	maintenance
	and
	operation
	employees
	of 	the
	LACCD.
	The
union
	represents
	10,500 	employees
	of
	which
	approximately
	600
	are
employed by
	the
	LACCD.
General
	membership
	meetings
	of
	Local
	99
	usually 	are 	held
	on
	the
fourth 	Friday 	of
	each
	month
	at
	8:00 	p.m. 	This
	practice
	has 	been
	in
effect 	for 	the
	last
	ten years.
CONCLUSIONS 	OF
	LAW
Case 	No. 	LA-C0-27
In 	this 	charge, 	the 	charging 	party 	contends
	that
	he 	has 	been
discriminated 	against 	because 	his 	rights 	to 	participate 	in 	the 	activities
of 	the 	respondent 	union 	have 	been 	denied by 	the 	officers 	of 	the 	respondent.
This 	has 	occurred, 	argues 	the 	charging 	party, 	because 	the 	union
-3-

schedules
	its
	membership
	meetings
	at
	a
	time
	when
	the 	charging
	party
is
	unable 	to
	attend.
Section
	3543.6(b)
	states
	in 	relevant
	part
	that
	it
	shall
	be
unlawful
	for
	an 	employee
	organization
	to
	discriminate
	or
	threaten
to
	discriminate 	against
	employees
	or 	otherwise
	interfere
	with
employees
	because
	of
	their
	exercise
	of
	rights
	guaranteed
	by
	this
chapter.
In
	San
	Dieguito
	Faculty Association
	v.
	San
	Dieguito
	Union 	High
School
	District,
	EERB
	Decision
	No. 	22
	(September 	2,
	1977),
	the
	PERB
analyzed 	the
	"because
	of"
	language
	contained
	in
	Section 	3543.S(a).
(This
	section
	parallels
	Section 	3543.6(b); 	the 	only
	difference
	is
that 	this 	section
	makes
	it
	an
	unfair 	practice
	for
	an 	employer
	to
	engage
in 	discriminatory 	conduct.)
In
	referring
	to
	the 	"because
	of"
	language
	contained
	in
Section 	3543.S(a), 	the
	Board
	stated 	that, 	"[i]nterference
	'because
	of'
is
	quite 	different
	from mere
	'interference
	in'.
	'Because
	of'
	connotes
purposes
	or
	intentional
	behavior;
	'interference 	in'
	connotes
interference
	with 	or without
	an
	unlawful
	intent."
The
	Board's
	analysis 	of 	Section 	3543.S(a)
	is
	applicable 	to
Section 	3543.6(b)
	since 	the
	two
	sections 	are 	nearly 	identical.
Based 	on
	the 	record herein,
	it
	is
	found
	that
	the 	respondent
	had
no
	unlawful
	intent.
Charging
	party 	offered
	no
	evidence
	that
	the 	respondent
	intentionally
scheduled union meetings
	at
	a
	time 	and
	place 	inconvenient 	to 	the
charging 	party. 	Rather, 	the 	evidence 	indicates 	that 	the 	respondent
has 	held
	its
	general
	membership 	meetings
	at 	the
	same 	time 	of 	day 	and
month
	for
	a
	longer 	period 	than 	the 	charging 	party 	has 	been
	a 	member.
-4-

Therefore, 	it 	is 	difficult 	to 	sustain 	the 	charging 	party's 	allegation
that 	the 	union 	is 	intentionally 	scheduling 	meetings 	at 	a 	time when
the 	charging 	party 	cannot 	attend.
Furthermore, 	the 	evidence 	indicates 	that 	the 	respondent
selected Friday nights 	for 	its 	meetings 	because 	it 	is 	a 	time 	most
convenient 	for 	most 	employees. 	While 	it 	is 	true 	that 	for 	those
employees 	who 	work 	late-night 	hours, 	it 	is 	difficult, 	if 	not 	impossible,
to 	attend 	union 	meetings, 	this 	fact 	in 	and 	of 	itself 	is 	insufficient
to 	sustain 	a 	Section 	3543.6(b) 	violation.
Case 	No. 	LA-C0-27 	is 	dismissed.
Case 	No. 	LA-C0-32
In 	this 	charge, 	the 	charging 	party 	alleges 	that 	there 	has 	been 	a
violation 	of 	Section 	3543.6(b) 	because 	the 	union 	failed 	to 	properly
notify 	the 	charging 	party 	of 	a 	union meeting 	on May 	11, 	1977. 	A second
allegation 	of 	this 	charge 	is 	that 	at 	the May 	11, 	1977 meeting, 	union
leaders 	did 	not 	discuss 	in 	sufficient 	detail 	the 	status 	of 	contract
negotiations 	then 	taking 	place with LACCD.
For 	the 	reasons 	expressed 	in 	Case 	No. 	LA-C0-27, 	supra, 	the 	first
allegation 	of 	this 	charge must 	be 	dismissed.
There was 	no 	evidence 	presented 	that 	the 	respondent 	intentionally
failed 	to 	provide 	the 	charging 	party with 	proper 	notice 	of 	the 	union
meeting 	held 	on May 	11, 	1977. 	Moreover, 	the 	fact 	that 	the 	charging
party 	can 	point 	to 	only 	one 	meeting where 	the 	union 	legedly 	did 	not
properly 	notify 	the 	charging 	party 	of 	a 	union 	meeting 	buttresses 	the
conclusion 	that 	no 	unlawful 	intent 	to 	discriminate 	against 	the 	charging
party 	exists 	in 	this 	case.
With 	respect 	to 	the 	second 	allegation, 	it 	is 	found 	that 	even 	if
the 	facts 	as 	stated 	in 	the 	charge 	are 	determined 	to 	be 	true, 	(see
San 	Juan 	Federation 	of 	Teachers 	v. 	San Juan 	Unified 	School 	District,
- c; -

EERB
	Decision
	No.
	12
	(March
	10,
	1977)),
	the
	charge
	does
	not
	come
within 	the
	jurisdiction
	of
	the
	PERB.
	There
	is
	nothing
	in
	the
	Act
which
	requires
	a
	union 	to 	follow
	a
	pre-determined
format
	for
	union
	meetings,
established
	by
	the
	PERB,
	in
	discussing
	with
	its
	members
	the
	status
of
	contract 	negotiations.
Case
	No. 	LA-CO-33
In
	this
	charge, 	the
	main
	contention
	is 	that
	the 	respondent
has
	not
	sent
	a
	representative 	"for
	ten
weeks"
	to 	the 	charging
	party's
work
	location,
	LAVC,
	to inform 	the 	charging
	party
	and
	other
	"C"
2
shift
	employees
	of
	the
	status
	of 	negotiations.
	The
	charging
	party
maintains
	that
	the 	respondent
	by
	not
	sending
	a
	representative
	to 	the
charging
	party's
	work
	location
	is
	not
	"fairly
	representing" 	the
	"C"
shift
	employees.
Section
	3544.9
	provides
	that:
The
	employee
	organization
	recognized
	or
certified
	as
	the 	exclusive
	representativefor
	the 	purpose
	of
	meeting
	and
	negotiating
shall 	fairly
	represent
	each 	and
	every
	employee
in
	the 	appropriate
	unit.
The
	scope
	of 	this 	section
	has
	yet 	to
	be
	determined
	by
	the
	Board.
It
	seems
	clear,
	however,
	that 	this 	section
was
	not 	intended 	to 	require
a
	union 	to
	report
	to
	its
	members
	at
	regular 	intervals
	the
	status
	of
negotiations.
While
	it
	may
	be 	argued
	that
	a
	union
	better
	serves
	and
	"represents"
its
	members 	when
	it
	reports 	regularly
	to
	its
	membership 	on
	the 	status 	of
2
This 	aspect 	of 	the 	charge 	has 	been
	amended
	several 	times. 	According
to 	charging 	party, 	over 	"30 weeks" 	have now
	elapsed 	since
	a
	union
representative
	has
	visited
	the
	"C"
	shift
	employees' 	work
	location.
-6-

negotiations, 	there
	is
	no
	violation
	of 	Section
	3544.9
	if
	it
	fails
to
	do
	so.
3
Case
	No.
	LA-C0-34
The
	main
	contention
	in 	this
	charge
	is 	that
	the
	respondent
conducted
	an
	"illegal
	and
	fraudulent"
	election
	for
	secretary-treasurer
of 	the
	SEID,
	Local
	99.
	The
	charging
	party
	contends
	that
	the
	election
of 	the
	secretary-treasurer
	was
	illegal
	because
	it
	was
	not
	ratified
by
	all
	members.
The
	election
	of
	union
	officers 	is
	found
	to
	be 	an
	internal
	affair
of 	the 	union
	and
	unless
	an
	individual
	member
	is
	able
	to
	present
evidence
	that
	the 	union
	intentionally
	conducted
	an
	allegedly
	illegal
election 	in 	order
	to
	interfere
	with 	the
	rights
	of
	particular
	members,
there
	is
	no
	basis 	for
	an
	unfair 	practice
	charge 	under 	the
	EERA.
	No
	such
evidence
	was
	presented 	in
	this
	case.
ORDER
Upon
	the 	foregoing 	findings 	of
	fact,
	conclusions 	of
	law,
	and
	the
entire
	record 	of
	this
	case,
	it
	is
	hereby 	ordered
	that
	the
	unfair 	practice
charges
	in
	Case
	Numbers
	LA-C0-27,
	32,
	33
	and
	34
	are 	dismissed.
Pursuant 	to
	Title
	8,
	California Administrative
	Code,
	Section
	35029,
this
	recommended
	decision
	shall
	become
	final
	on
	January
	23, 	1978
3No
	evidence
	was
	introduced
	that
	the 	respondent 	discussed with
all
	other
	employees
	the
	status 	of 	negotiations
	and
	intentionally
	bypassed
the 	charging 	party
	and
	other
	"C"
	shift
	employees
	at
	LAVC.
-7-

unless 	a 	party 	files 	a 	timely 	statement 	of 	exceptions. 	Any 	statement
of 	exceptions 	must 	be 	filed 	with 	the 	PERE 	in 	Sacramento 	to 	the
attention 	of 	the 	Executive 	Assistant 	to 	the 	Board 	and 	concurrently
served 	on 	the 	respondent.
Dated: 	January 	10, 	1978.
Jeff 	Paule
Hearing 	Officer
-8-