Baldwin Park Unified School District (Neilman) (PERB 0092E)

STATE OF 	CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
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STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
HARVEY ARNOLD 	NEILMAN,
Charging 	Party,
v.
BALDWIN 	PARK 	UNIFIED
SCHOOL 	DISTRICT,
Respondent.
Case 	No. 	LA-CE-367-78/79
PERB 	Decision 	No. 	92
April 	4, 	1979
Appearances: 	Harvey 	Arnold 	Neilman 	In 	Pro 	Per; 	Jerry 	D.
Holland, 	Superintendent 	for 	Baldwin 	Park 	Unified 	School
District.
Before Gluck, Chairperson; Gonzales, Member. 1.l
DECISION
The 	charging 	party, 	Neilman, 	is 	a 	teacher 	employed 	by 	the
Baldwin 	Park 	Unified 	School 	District 	(hereafter 	District) 	at
its 	North 	Park 	High 	School. 	In 	June 	1978, 	he 	filed 	a 	grievance
with 	the 	principal 	of 	North 	Park 	High 	School 	based 	on 	an
alleged 	violation 	of 	the 	negotiated 	agreement 	between 	the
District 	and 	the 	Baldwin 	Park 	Employees 	Association, 	the
exclusive 	representative 	the 	unit 	in 	which 	is
The 	principal 	responded 	to 	the 	grievance 	in 	July 	stating 	t
Neilman 	"had 	no 	grievance." 	Later, 	in 	the 	same 	month, 	Neilman
ta 	meeti 	on 	his 	grievance 	wi 	Distr 	t 	rsonnel
Before 	Gluck, 	Chairperson; 	Gonzales, 	Member
DECISION
lBoard 	Member 	Moore 	did 	not 	participate 	in 	this 	decision.
HARVEY ARNOLD NEILMAN,
Charging Party, 	Case No. LA-CE-367-78/79
v . 	PERB Decision No. 92
BALDWIN PARK UNIFIED
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 	April 4, 1979
Respondent.
Appearances: Harvey Arnold Neilman In Pro Per; Jerry D.
Holland, Superintendent for Baldwin Park Unified School
District.
The charging party, Neilman, is a teacher employed by the
Baldwin Park Unified School District (hereafter District) at
its North Park High School. In June 1978, he filed a grievance
with the principal of North Park High School based on an
alleged violation of the negotiated agreement between the
District and the Baldwin Park Employees Association, the
exclusive representative of the unit in which he is employed.
The principal responded to the grievance in July stating that
Neilman "had no grievance. " Later, in the same month, Neilman
sought a meeting on his grievance with the District personnel
1Board Member Moore did not participate in this decision.

officer,
	but 	again 	received
	a
	written
	response
	to
	the
	effect
that
	he
	"had
	no
	legal
	grievance."
	On
	the
	following
	day,
	he
received
	another 	response
	from
	a
	source
	unidentified
	in 	the
charge,
	which
	stated 	that
	he
	"had
	no
	grievance."
	The
	charging
party
	asserts 	that
	he
	was
	denied
	his
	right
	to
	pursue
	his
grievance
	and
	that
	he 	and
	other
	North 	Park
	High
	School
	teachers
were
	being
	discriminated 	against
	by
	being
	required 	to 	teach
	six
subjects
	in
	each
	teaching
	period,
	whereas
	teachers
	at
	other
District
	high
	schools
	were
	only
	required 	to
	teach
	one
	subject
per
	period.
	Apparently,
	this
	complaint
	was
	the
	subject 	of 	the
grievance
	originally 	filed.
	The
	charge
	alleges
	a
	violation
	of
section
	3543.S(a)
	of 	the 	Educational
	Employment
	Relations
	Act
(hereafter
	EERA)
.2	
The
	hearing
	officer
	dismissed 	the 	charge
without
	a
	hearing, 	finding
	that
	the 	charge
	was
	"deficient
because
	it
	fails
	to 	allege
	which
	right
	guaranteed
	by
	the
	EERA
was
	infringed
	upon 	by
	respondent."
DISCUSSION	DISCUSSION
Rule
	326153	
of 	the 	Public
	Employment
	Relations
	Board
(hereafter
	Board
	or
	PERB)
	reads 	in
	pertinent 	part:
(a) The charge shall be in writing, signed
by the party or its agent and contain the
following information:
(4) The sections of the Government
Code alleged to have been violated.
22The
	Educat nal 1 	Employment
	Relations
	Act
	is 	codified
	at
Government 	Code
	sections
	3540
	et
	seq.
3california Administrative 	Code,
	title
	8, 	section 	32615.
2
officer, but again received a written response to the effect
that he "had no legal grievance. " On the following day, he
received another response from a source unidentified in the
charge, which stated that he "had no grievance. " The charging
party asserts that he was denied his right to pursue his
grievance and that he and other North Park High School teachers
were being discriminated against by being required to teach six
subjects in each teaching period, whereas teachers at other
District high schools were only required to teach one subject
per period. Apparently, this complaint was the subject of the
grievance originally filed. The charge alleges a violation of
section 3543.5 (a) of the Educational Employment Relations Act
(hereafter EERA) . 2 The hearing officer dismissed the charge
without a hearing, finding that the charge was "deficient
because it fails to allege which right guaranteed by the EERA
was infringed upon by respondent. "
Rule 326153 of the Public Employment Relations Board
(hereafter Board or PERB) reads in pertinent part:
The Educatio 	Employment Relations Act is codified at
Government Code sections 3540 et seq.
3california Administrative Code, title 8, section 32615.
2

Section
	3543.5(a)4	
of
	the
	EERA
	prohibits
	an 	employer 	from
engaging
	in
	conduct
	which
	violates 	rights
	granted 	to
	employees
by
	the
	Act.
	This
	section
	does
	not
	spell
	out 	those
	rights;
other 	sections 	of
	the
	EERA
	do.
	It
	is
	quite
	probable
	that
	the
intent
	of
	rule
	32615,
	namely
	the
	identification
	of
	the
	specific
section
	in
	which
	the
	right 	is
	defined
	and
	granted,
	escaped
	Mr.
Neilman.
	He
	is
	not
	a
	professional
	advocate
	and
	there
	is
	no
indication 	that
	he
	possesses
	any
	technical 	sophistication 	in
labor
	representation.
	In
	citing
	section
	3543.5(a)
	he
undoubtedly
	believed
	he
	was
	complying
	with
	our
	filing
requirements.
The
	hearing
	officer
	did
	grant
	Neilman
	leave
	to
	amend
	his
charge.
	Neilman
	elected, 	instead,
	to
	appeal 	the
	dismissal.
Under
	these 	circumstances
	it
	is
	appropriate 	for 	the
	Board
	to
search
	the
	facts 	alleged 	in
	his
	charge
	to
	determine 	whether 	any
right
	under
	the
	EERA
	has
	apparently
	been
	violated.5
4Government
	Code
	section
	3543.5(a)
	states:
It
	shall
	be
	unlawful 	for
	a
	public
	school
	employer
	to:
(a) 	Impose
	or
	threaten 	to
	impose
	reprisals
on
	employees,
	to 	discriminate
	or
	threaten 	to
discriminate 	against
	employees, 	or 	otherwise
to
	interfere
	with,
	restrain,
	or 	coerceemployees 	because 	of
	their 	exercise
rights
	guaranteed
	by
	this 	chapter.
5The 	form
	required
	by
	PERB
	to
	be
	filed
	in 	unfair 	practcases 	instructs
	the 	charging 	party 	as 	lows:
Provide
	a
	clear
	and
	concise 	statement 	of 	theconduct
	a
	to 	constitute
	an
	unfair
practice, 	including,
	where 	known,
	the 	timeand
	place 	of 	each 	instance 	of 	respondent's
conduct, 	and 	the
	name 	and
	capacity 	of 	each
person 	involved. 	This 	must 	be 	a
	statement
of 	the 	facts 	that 	support 	your 	claim 	and 	not
conclusions 	of 	law. 3
Section 3543.5 (a) 4 of the EERA prohibits an employer from
engaging in conduct which violates rights granted to employees
by the Act. This section does not spell out those rights;
other sections of the EERA do. It is quite probable that the
intent of rule 32615, namely the identification of the specific
section in which the right is defined and granted, escaped Mr.
Neilman. He is not a professional advocate and there is no
indication that he possesses any technical sophistication in
labor representation. 	In citing section 3543.5 (a) he
undoubtedly believed he was complying with our filing
requirements.
The hearing officer did grant Neilman leave to amend his
charge. Neilman elected, instead, to appeal the dismissal.
Under these circumstances it is appropriate for the Board to
search the facts alleged in his charge to determine whether any
right under the EERA has apparently been violated. 5
4Government Code section 3543.5 (a) states:
It shall be unlawful for a public school employer to:
(a) Impose or threaten to impose reprisals
on employees, to discriminate or threaten to
discriminate against employees, or otherwise
to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees because of their exercise of
rights guaranteed by this chapter.
The form required by PERB to be filed in unfair practice
cases instructs the charging party as follows:
Provide a clear and concise statement of the
conduct alleged to constitute an unfair
practice, including, where known, the time
and place of each instance of respondent's
conduct, and the name and capacity of each
person involved. This must be a statement
of the facts that support your claim and not
conclusions of law.

The
	charge 	informs
	us
	that
	Neilman
	filed
	a
	grievance 	to
	which
the
	District's
	response
	was
	that
	the
	facts 	stated
	therein 	did
not
	constitute
	a
	legal
	grievance.
	There
	is
	no
	indication
	that
the
	District
	disputed
	Neilman's
	right
	to
	file
	a
	grievance.
	We
interpret
	the
	District's
	response 	as
	a
	denial 	of
	the
	grievance
for 	the 	reason
	that
	it
	failed
	to
	state
	facts 	constituting
	a
violation
	of
	the
	collective
	agreement
	on 	which
	the 	grievance
was
	predicated.
	Whether
	this
	response
	was
	accurate
	or
justified
	is
	a
	matter 	for 	the 	grievance 	procedure
	itself,
assuming
	appeal
	steps
	are
	therein
	provided.
	It
	is
	not
	a
	matter
for
	this
	Board
	to 	consider
	through
	an
	unfair
	practice
	charge.
As
	the 	hearing
	officer
	indicated,
	PERB
	is
	prohibited
	from
enforcing 	negotiated
	agreements
	unless 	the
	facts
	alleged
constitute
	an
	independent
	violation
	of 	the
	EERA.6	
Similarly,
the 	assignments 	given
	Neilman 	and
	other
	North 	Park
	teachers,
even
	if
	"discriminatory," 	are
	not 	demonstrably
	or
	inferentially
6Government 	Code
	section
	3541.S(b)
	states:
The
	initial
	determination 	as 	to
	whether
	the
charges 	of 	unfair 	practices 	are
	justified,
and,
	if
	so,
	what 	remedy
	is
	necessary 	to
effectuate
	the 	purposes 	of
	this
	chapter,
shall
	be 	a
	matter 	within 	exclusive
jurisdiction
	of 	the 	board. 	Procedures
investigating, 	hearing,
	and
	deciding 	these
cases
	shall
	be
	devised
	and 	promulgated
	by
the 	board
	and
	shall
	include
	all
	of 	the
following:
(b) 	The 	board
	shall
	not 	have
	authori 	to
enforce 	agreements 	between 	the 	parties,
	and
shall 	not 	issue
	a
	complaint 	on 	any 	charge
based 	on
	alleged 	violation 	of 	such 	an
agreement 	that
	would 	not 	also 	constitute
	an
unfair 	practice 	charge 	under 	this 	chapter.
4
The charge informs us that Neilman filed a grievance to which
the District's response was that the facts stated therein did
not constitute a legal grievance. 	There is no indication that
the District disputed Neilman's right to file a grievance. 	We
interpret the District's response as a denial of the grievance
for the reason that it failed to state facts constituting a
violation of the collective agreement on which the grievance
was predicated. Whether this response was accurate or
justified is a matter for the grievance procedure itself,
assuming appeal steps are therein provided. It is not a matter
for this Board to consider through an unfair practice charge.
As the hearing officer indicated, PERB is prohibited from
enforcing negotiated agreements unless the facts alleged
constitute an independent violation of the EERA. 6 Similarly,
the assignments given Neilman and other North Park teachers,
even if "discriminatory, " are not demonstrably or inferentially
6Government Code section 3541.5 (b) states:
The initial determination as to whether the
charges of unfair practices are justified,
and, if so, what remedy is necessary to
effectuate the purposes of this chapter,
shall be a matter within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the board. Procedures for
investigating, hearing, and deciding these
cases shall be devised and promulgated by
the board and shall include all of the
following :
(b) The board shall not have authority to
enforce agreements between the parties, and
shall not issue a complaint on any charge
based on alleged violation of such an
agreement that would not also constitute an
unfair practice charge under this chapter.

related
	to
	the
	exercise
	by
	the
	teachers 	of
	any
	rights
	granted
by
	the
	EERA.
	For
	"discriminatory"
	conduct
	to
	support
	an
	unfair
practice
	charge,
	there
	must
	be 	a
	relationship
	between
	the
exercise
	of
	employees'
	rights
	and
	the 	employer's 	conduct.7
The
	facts
	in
	this
	case
	do
	not
	establish 	that
	any
	relationship
existed
	between
	the 	employer's
	response
	to
	the 	grievance
	and
the
	exercise
	by
	Neilman
	of
	any
	rights
	granted
	to
	him 	by
	the
EERA.
For
	the 	reasons
	stated,
	the 	unfair
	practice
	charge
	is
dismissed.
	To
	the
	extent 	that
	the 	hearing
	officer's
	proposed
decision 	considers 	the 	foregoing 	reasoning
	and
	is 	consistent
therewith,
	it
	is
	affirmed.
	In
	all
	other 	respects
	it
	is
expressly
	set
	aside.
7Government 	Code
	section
	3543.S{a),
	ante,
	at
	fn.
	3.
ORDER
By:
	farry
	G~u~k,
	Chairperson
	Raymond
	J.
	Gonzales, 	Member
5
ORDER
On
	the 	foregoing
	decision
	and
	the
	entire
	record 	in
	this
case 	the
	unfair 	practice
	charge
	filed
	before 	the 	Public
Employment
	Relations
	Board 	by 	Harvey 	Arnold
	Neilrnan
	against
	the
Baldwin 	Park
	Unified 	School
	District 	is
	hereby 	dismissed.
By: Harry Gluck, Chairperson 	Raymond J. Gonzales, Member
related to the exercise by the teachers of any rights granted
by the EERA. For "discriminatory" conduct to support an unfair
practice charge, there must be a relationship between the
exercise of employees' rights and the employer's conduct. 7
The facts in this case do not establish that any relationship
existed between the employer's response to the grievance and
the exercise by Neilman of any rights granted to him by the
EERA.
For the reasons stated, the unfair practice charge is
dismissed. 	To the extent that the hearing officer's proposed
decision considers the foregoing reasoning and is consistent
therewith, it is affirmed. In all other respects it is
expressly set aside.
7 Government Code section 3543.5 (a) , ante, at fn. 3.
On the foregoing decision and the entire record in this
case the unfair practice charge filed before the Public
Employment Relations Board by Harvey Arnold Neilman against the
Baldwin Park Unified School District is hereby dismissed.
5

PUBLIC
	EMPLOYMENT
	RELATIONS
	BOARD
OF
	THE
	STATE
	OF
	CALIFORNIA
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
____________________ )
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
HARVEY ARNOLD
	NEILMAN,
Charging
	Party,
v.
BALDWIN	
PARK 	UNIFIED
SCHOOL
	DISTRICT,
Respondent.
Case	Case
	No.	No.
	LA-CE-367-78/79	LA-CE-367-78/79
NOTICE	NOTICE
	OF	OF
	DISMISSAL	DISMISSALWITH	WITH
	LEAVE	LEAVE 	TO	TO
	AMEND	AMEND
NOTICE
	IS
	HEREBY
	GIVEN
	that
	the
	above-entitled 	unfair
practice
	charge
	is
	dismissed
	with
	leave 	to
	amend \
within
	twenty
(20)
	calendar
	days
	following
	service 	of
	this
	Notice.
	The
dismis:c,al
	is
	based
	on
	the 	following 	grounds:
The
	charge,
	as
	detailed
	in
	its
	a~tachm2nts,
	alleges 	that
respondenc
	violated
	se<'.tion
	3543.S(a)
	of
	the
	Educational
Employment 	R,:>lations
	Act
	(hereafter
	EERA) 1
in
	two
	ways.
First,
	it
	is
	alleged
	that
	the 	respondent 	denied 	cha:·ging
	party
his 	contractual 	right
	to
	present
	a
	grievance
	relating 	to
	the
number
	of
	subjects
	he 	was
	required 	to 	teach 	in
	each
	period.
Second,
	it
	is 	alleged 	that
	respondent
	is 	discriminating 	against
teachers
	at
	charging
	party's
	school 	because 	they 	are 	required
to 	teach
	more
	subjects 	in
	a
	single 	period 	than 	are 	teachers 	at
other 	of 	respondent's 	schools.
1
Government Code sec. 3540 et seq.	Government 	Code
	sec.
	3540
	et
	seq.
HARVEY ARNOLD NEILMAN,
Charging Party,
v .
BALDWIN PARK UNIFIED
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Respondent.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled unfair
practice charge is dismissed with leave to amend within twenty
(20) calendar days following service of this Notice. The
dismissal is based on the following grounds:
The charge, as detailed in its attachments, alleges that
respondent violated section 3543.5 (a) of the Educational
Employment Relations Act (hereafter EERA) * in two ways.
First, it is alleged that the respondent denied charging party
his contractual right to present a grievance relating to the
number of subjects he was required to teach in each period.
Second, it is alleged that respondent is discriminating against
teachers at charging party's school because they are required
to teach more subjects in a single period than are teachers at
other of respondent's schools.

Section
	3543.S(a)
	provides
	that
	it
	shall
	be
	unlawful 	for
	a
public
	school
	employer
	to:
(a)
	Impose
	or
	threaten
	to
	impose
	reprisals
on
	employees,
	to
	discriminate
	or
	threaten
	to
discriminate 	against
	employees, 	or
	otherwise
to
	interfere
	with,
	restrain,
	or
	coerce
employees
	because
	of
	their
	exercise 	of
rights
	guaranteed	
by	
this
	chapter.
(Emphasis
	added.)
Thus,
	in 	order
	for 	the
	public
	school
	employer
	to
	be 	found
to
	have 	committed
	an
	unfair
	practice
	charge
	under
	section
3543.S(a),
	its
	conduct
	must 	be	
related
	to
	some
	right
	which
	is
guaranteed 	to
	employees
	by
	the
	EERA. 	The
	charge.
is 	deficient
because
	it
	fails
	:::o
	allege
	which
	right
	guaranteed'
by
	the
	EERA
was
	infringed
	upon 	by
	respo~dent.
	The
	following
	discussion
	may
be	
of 	as 	istance
	in 	determining
	what
	kinds
	of
	rights
	are
	and
are
	not 	guaranteed 	by	
the
	EERA.
A.
	The
	Yi:ERA
	does
	not 	guarantee
	employPes 	hte
	right
	to
enforce 	the 	provisions 	of 	the
	written
	agreement 	through
	an
unfair 	practice
	proceeding.
Section
	3541.S(b)
	states:
The
	board 	sha 	not
	have
	authority
	to
enforce 	agreements 	between
	the
	parties,	
and
sha 	not
	issue
	a
	complaint
	on
	any
	charge
s 	on
	all
	violation 	of
	such 	an
agreement
	that
	wou
	not
	also 	constitute
	an
unfair 	practice
	under
	this 	chapter.
Thus,
	there
	must 	be
	independent 	grounds 	for
	findi 	that
	an
unfair 	practice
	has
	occurr 	ot
	r
	than
	that 	there
	was 	a
violation 	of
	a
	written 	agreement.
	As
	explained 	below, 	the
charge
	fails
	to 	establish 	that 	there
	was 	any
	right 	guaranteed
by 	the
	EERA
	which 	was
	allegedly 	infringed
	upon 	by
	the 	District.
sent 	a
	violation 	of 	a
	ri
	t
	specifically 	guaranteed 	by 	the
Section 3543.5 (a) provides that it shall be unlawful for a
public school employer to:
(a) Impose or threaten to impose reprisals
on employees, to discriminate or threaten to
discriminate against employees, or otherwise
to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees because of their exercise of
rights guaranteed by this chapter.
(Emphasis added. )
Thus, in order for the public school employer to be found
to have committed an unfair practice charge under section
3543.5 (a), its conduct must be related to some right which is
guaranteed to employees by the EERA. The charge. is deficient
because it fails to allege which right guaranteed by the EERA
was infringed upon by respondent. The following discussion may
of assistance in determining what kinds of rights are and
are not guaranteed by the EERA.
A. 	The EERA does not guarantee employees the rig 	to
enforce the provisions of the written agreement through an
unfair practice proceeding.
Section 3541.5 (b) states:
The board shall not have authority to
enforce agreements between the parties, and
shall not issue a complaint on any charge
based on alleged violation of such an
agreement that would not also constitute an
unfair practice under this chapter.
Thus, there must be independent grounds for finding that an
unfair practice has occurred other than that there was a
violation of a written agreement. As explained below, the
charge fails to establish that there was any right guaranteed
by the EERA which was allegedly infringed upon by the District.
Absent a violation of a right specifically guaranteed by the

EERA,
	enforcement
	of
	a
	written
	agreement
	ls
	left
	to 	binding
arbitration,
	where
	there
	is
	such
	a
	provision
	in
	the
agreement,
2
or 	to 	the
	courts.
B. 	The
	EERA
	establishes
	a
	right	
of	
employees
	to
	file
grievances
	with 	the
	public
	school
	employer,
	but
	it
	does
	net
impose
	upon
	the
	employer
	an
	obligation
	to 	process 	or
	consider
or
	adjust
	them.
The
	only
	provision 	of
	the	
EERA	
specifically 	relating
	to
	the
right 	of
	employees
	to
	file
	grievances
	is
	the
	second
	paragraph
of
	section
	3543,
	which
	state5:
Any
	employee
	may
	at
	any
	time
	presentgrievances 	to
	his
	employer,
	and
	have 	such
grievances
	adjusted,
	without 	the
intervention
	of
	th2
	exclusive
representative,
	as 	long 	as
	the 	adjustment
	is
reached
	prior
	to
	arbitration
	pu~suant
	to
Sections 	3548.5, 	3548.6, 	3548.J
	and
	3548.8
and
	the 	adjustment
	is
	not
	inconsistent
	with
the
	terms
	of
	a
	written
	agreement
	then 	in
effect;
	provided
	that
	the
	public
	school
employer
	shall
	not 	agree 	to
	a
	resolution 	of
the	
grievance
	until
	the
	exclusive
representative
	has
	received
	a
	copy
	of 	the
grievance
	and
	the 	proposed
	resolution
	and
has 	been
	given 	the 	opportunity 	to
	file
	a
response.
While
	this
	paragraph 	does
	grant
	employees
	the
	right
	to
	file
grievances 	with 	the 	employer,
	it
	does 	not
	necessarily
	impose 	an
obligation
	upon
	the 	public 	school
	employer
	to 	process 	or
consider
	or
	adjust
	them.
	The
	entire
	paragraph
	must	
be	
read 	in
the 	context 	of 	the	
intent 	of 	the 	Legislature 	in 	including
	it
	as
part 	of 	the
	EERA.
	In 	the 	absence 	of 	specific 	legislative
2	2The
	legislative
	scheme 	provides 	for 	specific 	enforcement
of 	arbitration 	provisions 	(See 	Cal. 	Civ. 	Proc. 	Section 	1281and 	1281.2) 	outside 	of 	the 	provisions 	of 	the 	EERA.
EERA, enforcement of a written agreement is left to binding
arbitration, where there is such a provision in the
agreement ," or to the courts.
B. The EERA establishes a right of employees to file
grievances with the public school employer, but it does not
impose upon the employer an obligation to process or consider
or adjust them.
The only provision of the EERA specifically relating to the
right of employees to file grievances is the second paragraph
of section 3543, which states:
Any employee may at any time present
grievances to his employer, and have such
grievances adjusted, without the
intervention of the exclusive
representative, as long as the adjustment is
reached prior to arbitration pursuant to
Sections 3548.5, 3548.6, 3548.7 and 3548.8
and the adjustment is not inconsistent with
the terms of a written agreement then in
effect; provided that the public school
employer shall not agree to a resolution of
the grievance until the exclusive
representative has received a copy of the
grievance and the proposed resolution and
has been given the opportunity to file a
response.
While this paragraph does grant employees the right to file
grievances with the employer, it does not necessarily impose an
obligation upon the public school employer to process or
consider or adjust them. The entire paragraph must be read in
the context of the intent of the Legislature in including it as
part of the EERA. 	In the absence of specific legislative
The legislative scheme provides for specific enforcement
of arbitration provisions (See Cal. Civ. Proc. Section 1281
and 1281.2) outside of the provisions of the EERA.

history,
	the
	intent
	of
	the
	Legislature
	must 	be
	ascertained
	by
examining
	a
	similar 	provision
	contained 	in 	the
	Labor
	Management
Relations
	Act, 	as
	amended
	(hereafter
	LMRA),
	an
	act
	passed
	by
Congress
	to
	govern 	employer-employee
	relations
	in 	the
	private
sec
tor.
3
Section
	9(a)
	of
	the
	LMRA
	states~
Representatives 	designated
	or
	selected 	for
the 	purposes
	of
	collective
	bargaining
	by
	the
majority 	of
	the
	employees
	in
	a
	unitappropriate
	for
	such 	purp<;ses, 	sha
11
	be
	the
exclusive
	representatives
	of
	all
	the
employees
	in
	such
	unit
	for 	the 	purposes
	of
collective
	bargaining
	in
	respect 	to
	rates
	of
pay,
	wages,
	hours
	of
	employment,
	or
	other
conditions 	of
	employment:
	Provid
	, 	'I'h
1
at
any
	individual
	employee
	or
	a-3..E_~up
	of--
employees
	shall
	have
	the
	right 	at
	anv
	time
to 	present 	grievances 	to
	their
	emplover
	and
to
	hav0
	such
	grievances 	adjusted,
	without
the
	intervention	
of	
the 	bargaining
!epresentative,	
as	
long	
as	
the 	adjustment
	is
not
	inconsistent
	with 	the
	terms
	of
	a
collective-bargaining 	contract
	or
	agreement
then 	in
	effect:
	Provided
	further,
	That
	the
bargaining
	representative
	has 	been
	given
opportunity 	to
	be
	present
	at
	such
adjustment.
	(Emphasi.s
	added.)
The
	language
	of 	the 	second
	paragraph
	of 	section
	3543
	of
	the
EERA
	and	
the 	rscored 	portion 	of 	section
	9(a)
	of 	the
	LMRA
are
	so
	s
	it
	must
	concluded
	that
	the
	islature
inte 	to 	accomplish 	the
	same
	purpose 	in 	enacting
	that
3see
	29
	u.s.c.
	sec.
	151
	et
	seq.In
	Los 	Anq_eles
	Unified 	School
	District. 	(11/24/76)
	EERB
Decision
	No.
	5, 	the
	PERB,
	citing 	Fire 	Fighters'
	Union
	v. 	City
of 	Valleio
	(1974) 	12
	Cal.
	3d 	608, 	615-616
	stated:
	"While
	we
are 	not
	bound
	by 	NLRB
	decisions
	we
	will 	take 	cognizance 	ofthem, 	ere 	appropriate.
	Where
	provisions 	of 	California
	and
federal 	legislation 	are 	parallel, 	the 	California 	courts
	have
sanctioned 	the 	use 	of 	federal 	statutes
	and
	decisions 	arisingthereunder, 	to 	aid 	in 	interpreting 	the 	identical 	or 	analogous
California 	is 	tion."
history, the intent of the Legislature must be ascertained by
examining a similar provision contained in the Labor Management
Relations Act, as amended (hereafter LMRA) , an act passed by
Congress to govern employer-employee relations in the private
sector .
Section 9 (a) of the LMRA states:
Representatives designated or selected for
the purposes of collective bargaining by the
majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment: Provided, That
any individual employee or a group of
employees shall have the right at any time
to present grievances to their employer and
to have such grievances adjusted, without
the intervention of the bargaining
representative, as long as the adjustment is
not inconsistent with the terms of a
collective-bargaining contract or agreement
then in effect: Provided further , That the
bargaining representative has been given
opportunity to be present at such
adjustment . 	(Emphasis added. )
The language of the second paragraph of section 3543 of the
EERA and the underscored portion of section 9 (a) of the LMRA
are so similar, it must be concluded that the Legislature
intended to accomplish the same purpose in enacting that
3see 29 U.S.C. sec. 151 et seq.
In Los Angeles Unified School District (11/24/76) EERB
Decision No. 5, the PERB, citing Fire Fighters' Union v. City
of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal. 3d 608, 615-616 stated: 	"while we
are not bound by NLRB decisions we will take cognizance of
them, where appropriate. Where provisions of California and
federal legislation are parallel, the California courts have
sanctioned the use of federal statutes and decisions arising
thereunder, to aid in interpreting the identical or analogous
California legislation."
4

portion
	of 	the
	EERA
	as
	the
	Congress
	did 	in 	enacting
	section
9
(a)
•	
In
	Emporium
	Capwell
	Co.
	v.	
wt,_,~o
	(197 5)
	420	
u. s. 	50
[88
	LRRM
	2660,
	2665],
	the
	United
	States
	Supreme
	Court
	analyzed
the 	Congressional
	intent
	behind
	section 	9(a):
Respondent
	clearly
	misapprehends
	the
	nature
of
	the
	"right"
	conferred
	by
	this 	section.
The
	intendment
	of
	the
	proviso
	is
	to 	permit
employees
	to
	present
	grievances
	and
	to
authorize
	the
	employer
	to
	entertain
	them
without
	opening
	itself
	to
	liability
	for
dealing
	directly
	with
	employees
	inderogation 	of
	the 	duty 	to 	bargain
	only 	with
the
	exclusive 	bargaining
	representativ~,
	a
violation
	of 	section
	8(a)
(5).
	H.R. 	Rep.
	No.
245
	80th 	Cong.,
	1st 	Sess.,
	p.
	7
	(1947);,H.R.
Rep.
	No.
	510,
	80th
	Cong.
	1st 	Sess.,
	p.
	4~
(1947)
	(Conference
	Comm.) 	The
	Act
	nowhere
protects 	this 	"right"
	by
	making
	it
	an
	unfairlabor
	practice
	for
	an
	employer
	to 	refuse 	to
entertain
	such
	a
	presentation,
	nor 	can
	it
	be
read 	to
	authorize
	resort
	to
	economic
coercion.
	This
	matter
	is 	fully
	explicatedin
	Black-Clawson
	Co.
	v.
	Machinists,
	313
	F.2d
179,
	52
	LRRM
	2038
	(CA2
	1962).
	See
	also
Republic
	Steel
	v.
	Maddox, 	379
	U.S. 	650,
	58
LRRM
	2193	
(1965).
As
	noted
	in 	the
	above
	quotation,
	the
	U.S.
	Supreme
	Court
approved
	the
	analysis
	oft
	Court
	of
	ls
	in
	Black-Clawson
Co.
	v.
	Machinists, 	supra,
	(2d
	Cir.
	1962)
	313	
F.2a	
179	
f52	
LRRM
2038, 	2042],
	which
	stated,
	in
	part:
Prior 	to 	the 	adoption 	of 	this
	proviso 	in
section 	9(a),
	the
	employer
	had
	cause 	to 	fear
that 	his 	processing 	of
	an
	individual'sgrievance 	without 	consulting 	the 	bargaining
representative
	would 	be 	an
	unfair 	labor
practice; 	section
	9(a)
	made
	the 	union 	theexc 	sive 	representative 	of 	the 	employees 	in
the 	bargaining 	unit,
	and
	section
	B(a) (5)
made 	a
	refusal 	to 	bargain 	with 	the 	exclusive
representative
	an
	unfair 	labor 	practice.
The
	proviso
	was
	apparently 	designed 	to
safeguard 	from 	charges 	of 	violation 	of 	the
portion of the EERA as the Congress did in enacting section
9 (a) . In Emporium Capwell Co. v. WACO (1975) 420 U.S. 50
[88 LRRM 2660, 2665], the United States Supreme Court analyzed
the Congressional intent behind section 9 (a) :
Respondent clearly misapprehends the nature
of the "right" conferred by this section.
The intendment of the proviso is to permit
employees to present grievances and to
authorize the employer to entertain them
without opening itself to liability for
dealing directly with employees in
derogation of the duty to bargain only with
the exclusive bargaining representative, a
violation of section 8 (a) (5). H. R. Rep. No.
245 80th Cong., Ist Sess . , p. 7 (1947) ; H. R.
Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong. Ist Sess . , p. 46
(1947) (Conference Comm. ) The Act nowhere
protects this "right" by making it an unfair
labor practice for an employer to refuse to
entertain such a presentation, nor can it be
read to authorize resort to economic
coercion. 	This matter is fully explicated
in Black-Clawson Co. v. Machinists, 313 F. 2d
179, 52 LRRM 2038 (CA2 1962) . 	See also
Republic Steel v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 58
LRRM 2193 (1965) .
As noted in the above quotation, the U. S. Supreme Court
approved the analysis of the Court of Appeals in Black-Clawson
Co. v. Machinists, supra, (2d Cir. 1962) 313 F. 2d 179 152 LRRM
2038, 2042], which stated, in part:
Prior to the adoption of this proviso in
section 9 (a) , the employer had cause to fear
that his processing of an individual's
grievance without consulting the bargaining
representative would be an unfair labor
practice; section 9 (a) made the union the
exclusive representative of the employees in
the bargaining unit, and section 8 (a) (5)
made a refusal to bargain with the exclusive
representative an unfair labor practice.
The proviso was apparently designed to
safeguard from charges of violation of the

act 	the 	employer 	who 	voluntarily 	processed
employee 	grievances 	at 	the 	behest 	of 	the
individual 	employee, 	and 	to 	reduce 	what 	many
had 	deemed 	the 	unlimited 	power 	of 	the 	union
to 	control 	the 	processing 	of 	grievances.
Thus, 	it 	is 	concluded 	that 	section 	3543 	merely 	restricts
the 	right 	of 	the 	exclusive 	representative 	to 	interfere 	with 	an
individual 	employee's 	grievance 	(prior 	to 	the 	arbitration
stage) 	rather 	than 	imposing 	an 	obligation 	upon 	the 	public
school 	employer 	to 	process 	or 	consider 	or 	adjust 	the 	grievance.
Nevertheless, 	it 	should 	be 	noted 	that 	since 	there 	is 	a
right 	to 	file 	a 	grievance, 	it 	would 	be 	unlawful 	for 	a 	public
school 	employer 	to 	impose 	or 	threaten 	to 	impose 	r'epr isa ls 	on
employees, 	to 	discriminate 	or 	threaten 	to 	discriminate 	against
them, 	or 	otherwise 	to 	interfere 	with, 	restrai~ 	or 	coerce 	them
merely 	for 	filing 	grievances. 	However, 	the 	charge 	does 	not
a 	t 	the 	District 	interfered 	with 	the 	right 	to 	file 	the
grievance 	or 	otherwise 	imposed 	or 	threatened 	reprisals,
discrimination, 	restraint 	or 	coercion 	against 	charging 	party
because 	he 	filed 	the 	grievance. 	The 	charge 	only 	alleges 	that
the 	District 	not 	process 	it. 	As 	previously 	explained, 	it
had 	no 	obligation 	to 	do 	so.
C. 	The 	right 	to 	participate 	in 	the 	activities 	of 	an
~ployee 	organization 	does 	not 	in 	and 	of 	itself 	encompass 	the
right 	of 	an 	individual 	employee 	to 	have 	a 	grievance 	processe~
or 	considered 	or 	adjusted.
The 	first 	sentence 	of 	section 	3543 	states:
Public 	school 	employees 	shall 	have 	the 	right
to 	form, 	join, 	and 	participate 	in 	the
activities 	of 	employee 	organizations 	of
act the employer who voluntarily processed
employee grievances at the behest of the
individual employee, and to reduce what many
had deemed the unlimited power of the union
to control the processing of grievances.
Thus, it is concluded that section 3543 merely restricts
the right of the exclusive representative to interfere with an
individual employee's grievance (prior to the arbitration
stage) rather than imposing an obligation upon the public
school employer to process or consider or adjust the grievance.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that since there is a
right to file a grievance, it would be unlawful for a public
school employer to impose or threaten to impose reprisals on
employees, to discriminate or threaten to discriminate against
them, or otherwise to interfere with, restrain or coerce them
merely for filing grievances. However, the charge does not
allege that the District interfered with the right to file the
grievance or otherwise imposed or threatened reprisals,
discrimination, restraint or coercion against charging party
because he filed the grievance. The charge only alleges that
the District would not process it. As previously explained, it
had no obligation to do so.
C. 	The right to participate in the activities of an
employee organization does not in and of itself encompass the
right of an individual employee to have a grievance processed
or considered or adjusted.
The first sentence of section 3543 states:
Public school employees shall have the right
to form, join, and participate in the
activities of employee organizations of

their
	own
	choosing
	for 	the
	purpose
	of
representation
	on
	all
	matters 	of
employer-employee
	r_elations.
It
	might
	be
	argued
	that 	this
	language
	is
	a
	basis
	for
creating
	a
	statutory 	right 	of
	employees
	to
	have
	a
	grievance
processed, 	considered
	and
	adjusted.
	The
	theory
	would 	be
	that
an
	individual
	who
	seeks
	to
	adjust
	a
	grievance
	based
	on
	an
alleged
	violation
	of
	a
	written
	agreement
	would
	in
	effect
	be
"participating
	in 	the
	activities
	of
	an
	employee
	organization"
by	
attempting
	to
	enforce
	contractual
	provisions
	which 	would
benefit
	other
	employees
	as 	well 	as
	himself.
	This
	argument
	is
not
	persuasive.
The
	intent
	in
	this
	portion 	of
	the
	EERA
	is
	to 	preclude
	the
public
	school
	emplover
	from
	interfering
	with 	the
	relationship
between 	the
	individual
	employee 	and
	the
	employee
	organization
of	
his
	choice.
	In
	addition 	to
	forming
	an
	organization 	or
joining
	one,
	an
	employee
	may 	do
	such
	things 	as:
	seek
	office
	in
the 	organization,
	vote 	in
	its
	elections,
	go
	to 	organization
picnics,
	issue 	newslettf::rs,
	etc.
	It
	simply
	would
	not 	be
reasonable 	to
	interpret
	the 	phrase
	"participate
	in 	the
activities 	of 	e organizati
organization~" 	to
	mean
	tan
individual
	employee
	statutory right under the EERA to	a
	statutory 	right
	r 	t 	EERA	
to
have
	a
	grievance 	processed 	or 	considered 	or
	adjusted.	
A
grievance 	procedure
	is
	one
	of
	the 	mandatory
	subjects 	of
ations between a public school employer a	
iations
	between
	a
	public 	school
	and 	an
	exclusive
representative.
4
This
	means
	that 	the 	establishment 	of
	a
4See section 3543.2.	4see 	section 	3543.2.
their own choosing for the purpose of
representation on all matters of
employer-employee relations.
It might be argued that this language is a basis for
creating a statutory right of employees to have a grievance
processed, considered and adjusted. The theory would be that
an individual who seeks to adjust a grievance based on an
alleged violation of a written agreement would in effect be
"participating in the activities of an employee organization"
by attempting to enforce contractual provisions which would
benefit other employees as well as himself. This argument is
not persuasive.
The intent in this portion of the EERA is to preclude the
public school employer from interfering with the relationship
between the individual employee and the employee organization
of his choice. In addition to forming an organization or
joining one, an employee may do such things as: seek office in
the organization, vote in its elections, go to organization
picnics, issue newsletters, etc. It simply would not be
reasonable to interpret the phrase "participate in the
activities of employe 	ons" to mean that an
individual employee has a s
have a grievance processed or considered or adjusted. A
grievance procedure is one of the mandatory subjects of
negoti 	nd an exclusive
representative . 	This means that the establishment of a

grievance
	procedure
	is
	something
	which
	is
	not
	required 	unless
agreed 	to
	by
	the
	parties
	during
	negotiations.
	Thus,
	the
	right
to
	have
	a
	grievance
	processed, 	considered
	and
	adjusted,
	if
	any,
arises
	from
	the
	written
	agreement
	rather
	than
	from
	the 	phrase
"participate
	in
	the
	activities
	of
	employee
	organizations."
8
D.
	Reprisals, 	discrimination, 	interference,
	restraint
	and
coercion 	are 	prohibited
	if
	they
	are
	imposed
	or
	threatened
because
	of
	employees'
	participation
	in
	organizational
activities
	generally.
Although
	the
	right
	to
	have
	a
	grievance 	proce~sed,
considered
	and
	adjusted
	is
	not
	specifically
	guarahteed
	by
	the
EERA,
	the
	right
	to
	participate
	genera
	yin
	organizational
activities
	is ect
rotected
	from
	actions 	of
	a
	public
	school
employer
	which
	are 	intended 	to
	inhibit
	the
	exercise 	of
	that
ri
	t.
	Thus,
	charging
	party
	could
	state
	a
	prima
	facie
	case 	by
alleging 	that
	the 	reason 	the
	District
	failed
	to 	process
	his
grievance
	was
	that
	the
	District
	desired 	to 	take
	punitive
measures
	against
	him
	because
	it
	was
	dissatisfied
	with
	his
organizational
	activities
	in 	general.
	What
	this
	means
	is 	that
the
	District
	would
	not 	have
	handled ance
grievance 	in
alleged
	manner
	but 	for 	charging
	party's 	activities
	in
organizational 	~atters 	(either
	on
	behalf
	or
	against
	an 	employee
organization).
	Charging 	ha
rty
	has 	not 	alleged 	this
	kind
	of
motivation 	in 	his 	unfair 	practice 	charge.
	The
	matter 	is
	being
dismissed 	with 	leave 	to
	amend
	in 	accordance 	with 	is 	legal
theory, 	if 	there 	are 	facts 	to 	support 	such 	an
	allegation.
grievance procedure is something which is not required unless
agreed to by the parties during negotiations. Thus, the right
to have a grievance processed, considered and adjusted, if any,
arises from the written agreement rather than from the phrase
"participate in the activities of employee organizations."
D. Reprisals, discrimination, interference, restraint and
coercion are prohibited if they are imposed or threatened
because of employees' participation in organizational
activities generally.
Although the right to have a grievance processed,
considered and adjusted is not specifically guaranteed by the
EERA, the right to participate generally in organizational
activities is prot 	ed from actions of a public school
employer which are intended to inhibit the exercise of that
right. Thus, charging party could state a prima facie case by
alleging that the reason the District failed to process his
grievance was that the District desired to take punitive
measures against him because it was dissatisfied with his
organizational activities in general. What this means is that
the District would not have handled the griev 	in the
alleged manner but for charging party's activities in
organizational matters (either on behalf or against an employee
organization). Charging party 	s not alleged this kind of
motivation in his unfair practice charge. 	The matter is being
dismissed with leave to amend in accordance with this legal
theory, if there are facts to support such an allegation.
8

Any
	amended
	charge
	must
	allege
	specific 	facts
	which
	would
support
	a
	conclusion
	that
	the
	District
	intended
	to 	take
reprisals
	or
	discriminate 	agai~st
	charging
	party.
	It
	will
	be
insufficient
	if
	charging
	party
	merely
	alleges 	that
	the
	District
refused
	to 	process
	his
	grievance
	because
	of
	his 	organizational
activities
	generally
	without
	specific 	facts 	indicating
	what
organizational
	activities
	he
	engaged
	in.
E.
	Charging
	party
	may
	not,
	as
	an
	individual,
	file
	an
	unfair
practice
	charge
	on
	behalf 	of
	the
	other 	teachers
	at
	his
	school.
The
	second
	allegation
	of
	the 	charge
	relating.to
discrimination 	against
	the
	teachers
	at
	charging
	party's
	school
is 	deficient
	for
	all
	the 	reasons
	outlined
	abov~.
	In
	additi0n,
however,
	charging
	party
	does
	not
	have
	standL.g 	as
	an
	individual
teacher 	to
	file
	an
	unfair
	practice
	charge
	on
	behalf 	of 	the
ot 	r r
	teachers.
	In 	order 	to
	file
	a
	charge
	on
	behalf 	of 	the
ot er t	
teachers,
	it
	would 	be
	necessary 	for
	each
	affected
	eacher
to
	be
	named
	as
	a
	charging
	party,
	or 	for 	the
	exclusive
representative
	to
	file
	the 	charge
	naming
	itself
	as 	charging
party.
	In 	the
	altern-0tive,
	assuming
	a
	prima
	facie
	case
	is
stated,
	each
	teacher
	may
	file
	a
	charge
	alleging
	a
	violation 	of
hi
is 	individual
	ri 	ts
	under 	the
	EERA.
I
This 	action 	is
	taken 	pursuant 	to 	section
	32630(a)	
of	
title
8	
of
	the
	California 	Administrative
	Code,
	formerly
	section
35007(a).
If
	charging 	party 	chooses 	to
	amend,
	the
	amended
	charge
	must
be
	filed 	at 	the
	Los 	Angeles 	Regional 	Office 	of 	the
	PERB
	within
Any amended charge must allege specific facts which would
support a conclusion that the District intended to take
reprisals or discriminate against charging party. It will be
insufficient if charging party merely alleges that the District
refused to process his grievance because of his organizational
activities generally without specific facts indicating what
organizational activities he engaged in.
E. Charging party may not, as an individual, file an unfair
practice charge on behalf of the other teachers at his school.
The second allegation of the charge relating to
discrimination against the teachers at charging party's school
is deficient for all the reasons outlined above. In addition,
however, charging party does not have standing as an individual
teacher to file an unfair practice charge on behalf of the
othe teachers. 	In order to file a charge on behalf of the
oth 	eachers, it would be necessary for each affected teacher
to be named as a charging party, or for the exclusive
representative to file the charge naming itself as charging
party. In the alternative, assuming a prima facie case is
stated, each teacher may file a charge alleging a violation of
s individual rights under the EERA.
This action is taken pursuant to section 32630 (a) of title
8 of the California Administrative Code, formerly section
35007 (a) .
If charging party chooses to amend, the amended charge must
be filed at the Los Angeles Regional Office of the PERB within

twenty 	(20) 	calendar 	days 	following 	service 	of 	this 	Notice.
(Section 	32630(b).) 	Such 	amendment 	must 	be 	actually 	received
before 	the 	close 	of 	business 	(5:00 	p.m.) 	on 	Sept.11.~78 	in 	order
to 	be 	timely 	filed. 	(Section 	32135.)
If 	charging 	party 	chooses 	not 	to 	amend 	the 	charge, 	he 	may
obtain 	review 	of 	the 	dismissal 	by 	filing 	an 	appeal 	to 	the 	Board
itself 	within 	twenty 	(20) 	calendar 	days 	following 	service 	of
this 	Notice. 	(Section 	32630 (b).) 	Such 	appeal 	must 	be 	actually
received 	by 	the 	Executive 	Assistant 	to 	the 	Board 	before 	the
close 	of 	business 	(5:00 	p.m.) 	on 	Sept.11, 	1978 	iri 	order 	to 	be
timely 	filed. 	(Section 	32135.) 	Such 	appeal 	must' be 	in
writing, 	must 	be 	signed 	by 	charging 	party 	or 	his 	agent, 	and
must 	contain 	the 	facts 	and 	arguments 	upon 	which 	the 	appeal 	is
based. 	(Section 	32630(b} .) 	The 	appeal 	must 	be 	accompanied 	by
proof 	of 	service 	upon 	all 	parties. 	(Section 	32630 (b).)
Dated: 	August 22, 1978 	WILLIAM P. SMITH
General Counsel
BYA
David Schlossberg
Hearing Officer
August 22, 	1978
10
WILLIAM 	P. 	SMITH
Gen/JelA
\
By..:
Da Vi d 	SC~~--·~..-----
Hea rlngO ff icer
twenty (20) calendar days following service of this Notice.
(Section 32630 (b) . ) Such amendment must be actually received
before the close of business (5:00 p.m. ) on Sept. 11, 1978 in order
to be timely filed. (Section 32135.)
If charging party chooses not to amend the charge, he may
obtain review of the dismissal by filing an appeal to the Board
itself within twenty (20) calendar days following service of
this Notice. (Section 32630 (b) . ) Such appeal must be actually
received by the Executive Assistant to the Board before the
close of business (5:00 p.m.) on Sept.11, 1978 in order to be
timely filed. (Section 32135.) Such appeal must be in
writing, must be signed by charging party or his agent, and
must contain the facts and arguments upon which the appeal is
based. 	(Section 32630 (b) . ) 	The appeal must be accompanied by
proof of service upon all parties. (Section 32630 (b) .)
Dated :
10

PROOF
OF
	SERVICE
BY
MAIL
-
	c.c.P.
	1013a
____________
_
______
------------------------------------
____________________________
____
	____________________
_
Harvey hT.tOld Neilrmn
Jerry
D.
	Holland,
	Superintendent
Ba.loon Park
Unified
School
District
__ 	_________
_
__ 	____________
Alicia C. 	Jin:::nez
;pa.&
IMP_.,_-,--
(Signa.turef/ 	{)
PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL - C. C.P. 1013a
I
	declare
	that
	I
	am
employed
	in
	the
	county
of
_l.o_s_lill._._g~e_l_es
I
	am
over
	the
	age
of eighteen
years,
	and
not
	a
	party to the within
entitled
	cause;
my
business
	address
	is
	3550
Wilshire Blvd.,
	Suite
1708, 	Los
Angeles	
CA	
90010
On
--=A=ugus==-ot"--=2=2:..i.,--=l"'-9.:...78:,;.·
	, 	I
	served
	the attached
NaITCE
OF
DISMISSAL
1uTH
IEAVE
1D
AMEND,
	etc.
	on
	the
by
placing
a	
true
	copy
thereof
	enclosed
	in
a
	sealed
envelope
with postage thereon
	fully prepaid,
	in
	the
United
	States
Mail,
	at
	1.o=s__._An"'"""'~~e=l-e=s
addressed as follows:
I
	declare
under penalty of 	erjury that
	the foregoing
	is
	true
and
	correct.
	and
that this declaration
was executed on
	A~J-lV..-~~t
..........
2-2_,,__]~9~7_8,__
at	
los
	__
Ange__,,"--l_es
	,
	California.
Alicia C. Jimenez
(Type or print name)	Type or print name) 	(Signature)
I declare that I am employed in the county of Los Angeles
I am over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to the within entitled cause;
my business address is 3550 Wilshire Blud. , Suite 1708, Los Angeles CA 90010
On 	August 22 1978 	I served the attached
NOTICE OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, etc. on the
by placing a true copy
thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the
United States Mail, at 	Los Angeles
addressed as follows:
Harvey Arnold Neilman
Jerry. D. Holland, Superintendent
Baldwin Park Unified School District
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct, and
that this declaration was executed on August 22, 1978
at 	Los Angeles 	California.