People v. Newson CA4/1

CourtListener 9999773CalctappJul 11, 2024

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Filed 3/18/24 P. v. Newson CA4/1
Review denied 7/10/24; reposted with Supreme Court order and statement
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D082242

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. FSB1303213)

ERIC VAN NEWSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Michael A. Smith, Judge. (Retired judge of the San Bernardino
Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal.
Const.) Reversed in part, affirmed in all other respects, and remanded with
directions.
George L. Schraer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Steve Oetting and Kristen Ramirez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.

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Eric Van Newson appeals from a jury verdict finding him guilty of two
counts of assault with a firearm upon a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 245,
subd. (d)(1); counts 3 & 4) and one count of firearm possession by a felon
(id., § 29800, subd. (a); count 5). The jury also found true various special
allegations, including that the assaults were committed to benefit a criminal
street gang. (Id., § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B).) Newson primarily contends the
trial court reversibly erred in denying his motion under Batson v. Kentucky
(1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson) and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258
(Wheeler), which challenged the prosecutor’s peremptory strike of a Black
juror. In the alternative, he argues postjudgment changes to section 186.22
and relevant sentencing provisions require remand.
We conclude the trial court did not err in denying the Batson/Wheeler
motion, as the trial court corroborated the same body language concerns
raised by the prosecutor and that finding is due great deference. We also
accept the People’s concession that the gang enhancement findings must be
vacated and the matter remanded for retrial of the gang enhancements.
Whether or not the People elect to retry the gang enhancement allegations,
Newson is entitled to full resentencing on remand. We thus reverse in part,
affirm in all other respects, and remand with directions.
I.
In 2013, two shooters, including Newson, exchanged gunfire with two
San Bernardino police officers, one of whom was shot. Newson’s first trial on
the resultant charges ended in a mistrial due to jury deadlock. In a 2019
retrial, the jury hung on two counts of attempted murder of a peace officer,
found Newson guilty of the remaining counts, and found true several special
allegations. Thereafter, the court sentenced Newson to a total state prison
term of 43 years and 4 months.

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II.
A.
First, Newson argues the trial court erroneously denied his
Batson/Wheeler motion. We disagree.
1.
Newson is Black. So was at least one potential juror for the retrial,
Juror No. 22.
During voir dire, Juror No. 22 disclosed she was a “premium customer
service [agent]” for a major airline and had “[a]lways” worked in customer
service. Juror No. 22 also said she “was on [a reality court show] for not
paying back a loan to [her] mom.” Juror No. 22 agreed with the prosecutor
that she (1) “[w]ould [not] hesitate” to convict if “the case was proven beyond
a reasonable doubt” and (2) would not hold the prosecutor to any higher
standard. When asked if she worked well in groups, she responded, “Oh, yes,
totally.”
Later in voir dire, the court disclosed “the two officers involved in this
incident are [W]hite” while “Newson is [Black].” The court asked if all the
jurors would agree that “who might be wrong or might be right in any case”
would “depend[ ] on the facts.” Juror No. 22 expressly agreed. The court
then asked if (1) anyone would “immediately have a reaction who must be
right or who must be wrong” in such a circumstance, and (2) everyone could
“look at the facts and evidence” to determine “what happened in this case and
this case only.” No juror responded verbally to either question.
The People used their sixth peremptory challenge to strike Juror No. 22
without ever passing on the jury as empaneled. Newson’s counsel objected
under Batson/Wheeler.

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The court invited the prosecutor to respond to the motion. He “kicked”
Juror No. 22 for two reasons. First, “her body language indicated to [him]
that she didn’t like [him] or defense counsel,” although he “couldn’t figure out
exactly why.” “[M]ore importantly,” he had “tried this case once before and it
hung 11 to 1.” Thus, he was “trying to screen . . . for anybody that might be
willing to dig in their heels and not work with the other jurors.” The
prosecutor noted he “ask[s] all the jurors if they work well in groups,” and he
was concerned that Juror No. 22 had “brought a case against her own mom”
on a reality court show. Based on his personal experience with a district
attorney who went on the same reality court show, he thought “individuals
that are willing to bring their problems onto TV nationally” could be “overly
headstrong” and “hang a jury up and not listen to other people.”
Newson’s counsel did not “quite understand the reasoning of” the
second point, although he also acknowledged knowing the district attorney in
question. He did not expressly respond to the prosecutor’s body language
concern.
The court stated, as to the reality court show justification: “[T]hat
[district attorney], I think, exhibits personality traits that either side would
excuse from a jury, . . . so there might be something to that.” The court then
“note[d] there were times, particularly whenever there was a question about
race, in particular, when I was asking the questions about [W]hite police
officers, [B]lack individuals, [Juror No. 22] did, kind of, frown and looked
uncomfortable with the questions. So I noted that[ ] kind of[ ] body
language[ ] as well. The [reality court show] thing, maybe, causes one to
think, maybe, a little bit out of the mainstream.” The trial court then stated
it was “satisfied . . . that the stated reasons demonstrate that the excusal was
not on the basis of race.”

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The trial court further noted that it presided over the first trial, in
which, after the jury hung, one or two Black jurors “expressed the view that
they would be unlikely to convict a young [B]lack male of an offense against
[W]hite police officers.” The court unequivocally stated that to exclude Black
jurors for that reason would be unconstitutional. But the court found “the
stated reason, particularly body language, which I noted on at least one or
two occasions, demonstrates to me that the excusal was not made on the
basis of race.”
2.
To use peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors based on a
protected ground like race “violates a defendant’s right[s] to trial by a jury
drawn from a representative cross-section of the community” and equal
protection. (People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 801.) To exclude even
one potential juror on such a basis is structural error mandating reversal.
(People v. Silas (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1057, 1068.)
A Batson/Wheeler motion contesting a peremptory challenge comprises
three steps. Throughout, “the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial
motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.”
(Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 768.) First, the movant must make a
prima facie showing of “discriminatory purpose.” (People v. Gutierrez (2017)
2 Cal.5th 1150, 1158 (Gutierrez).) If the court finds that showing adequate,
the burden shifts to the strike proponent to provide a race-neutral and case-
specific explanation. (People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 714-717
(Fuentes).) A reason is “deemed race neutral” “[u]nless a discriminatory
intent is inherent.” (Hernandez v. New York (1991) 500 U.S. 352, 360.)
Finally, if a race-neutral reason is offered, “the trial court must decide
whether the movant has proven purposeful discrimination.” (Gutierrez,

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supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1158.) This step “focuses on the subjective genuineness
of the reason, not the objective reasonableness.” (Ibid.)
We presume peremptory challenges are used constitutionally. (People
v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 652.) And, as the trial court is best situated to
assess the nonverbal components of voir dire, including the credibility of the
jurors and the prosecutor, we generally “accord great deference to the trial
court’s ruling that a particular reason is genuine” (Fuentes, supra, 54 Cal.3d
at pp. 720-721) and review the trial court’s determination for substantial
evidence (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1159). Such deference may be
undue, however, where the trial court fails to make “a sincere and reasoned
attempt to evaluate each stated reason as applied to the challenged juror.”
(People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 385-386 (Silva).)
3.
Here, by inviting the prosecutor to justify his peremptory challenge, the
trial court impliedly found a prima facie showing of discrimination; thus, the
first step is “moot, and the only question remaining is whether the individual
justifications were adequate.” (People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 135.)
We agree with Newson that the circumstances of this case—including
the races of the officers, Juror No. 22, and Newson and the prior jury hanging
along racial lines—heighten the importance of closely scrutinizing the
possibility the peremptory challenge was improperly based on race. (People
v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 78 (Hardy).) However, we also find it important
that, as Newson conceded during oral argument, the prosecutor never “stated
that the first trial ended in a hung jury because [Black] jurors were the ones
that did not vote to convict” and he “wanted to avoid” that outcome “a second
time.” Further, the record demonstrates the trial court’s awareness of and

6
sensitivity to these concerns in deciding Newson’s motion. (People v. Holmes,
McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 761.)
Bearing these principles in mind and reviewing, but not reweighing,
the plausibility of the prosecutor’s stated reasons in view of the entire record
(People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 621 (Lenix)), we conclude the trial
court did not err in denying Newson’s Batson/Wheeler motion.
a.
Newson claims the prosecutor’s body-language reason is invalid, as:
the court upheld the challenge based on different body language than that
observed by the prosecutor; the prosecutor did not explain why Juror No. 22’s
body language indicated bias, given she appeared to dislike both sides
equally; and neither the court nor the prosecutor questioned Juror No. 22
about her body language. We disagree.
Most importantly, we are unconvinced by Newson’s argument the trial
court impermissibly relied on different body language than the prosecutor in
finding this reason genuinely race neutral. It is foundational that both trial
and reviewing courts “must examine only those reasons actually expressed”
by the prosecutor in analyzing the authenticity of a peremptory challenge’s
race neutrality. (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal. 5th at p. 1167.) As to issues of
demeanor, however, our Supreme Court has recognized that “the court may
not have observed every gesture, expression[,] or interaction relied upon by
the prosecutor,” given its “different vantage point” and the possibility it “may
have, for example, been looking at another panelist or making a note when
the described behavior occurred.” (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 625.) Thus,
so long as the court is “satisfied that the specifics offered by the prosecutor
are consistent with the answers it heard and the overall behavior of the
panelist,” and the record “reflect[s] the trial court’s determination on this

7
point,” deference is due on review, as “[i]t is the trial court which is best able
to place jurors’ answers in context and draw meaning from all circumstances,
including matters not discernable from the cold record.” (Id. at pp. 625-626.)
Here, in assessing the prosecutor’s demeanor justification, the trial
court said it “noted that[ ] kind of[ ] body language[ ] as well.” The People are
thus correct that the trial court’s observations corroborated, rather than
improperly replaced, the prosecutor’s stated demeanor concern. Observing
frowning and discomfort when relevant subject matter is referenced is
consistent with Juror No. 22 looking like she disliked both sides. As the
People argue, both behaviors can demonstrate a general “[h]ostility toward
. . . the proceedings.” Although interracial dynamics may be an issue “more
likely to be . . . pressing . . . among [Black people],” as Newson asserts,
striking a juror who appears uncomfortable with a central issue in the case is
not per se discriminatory. (E.g., People v. Martin (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 378,
384-385 [striking juror uncomfortable with trial due to personal values
arising from religion not discriminatory].) Thus, the prosecutor’s concern was
not, as Newson argues, “bogus on its face.”
Further, despite Newson’s contrary claims, the court’s and the
prosecutor’s demeanor observations were not “vague.” Even when a
prosecutor’s demeanor-based justification is vague or inadequate, however,
the trial court can nonetheless affirm its race neutrality either by probing the
reason or placing on the record its own observations, to which the prosecutor
acquiesces. (People v. Allen (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 542, 552-553 & fn. 8.)
Here, the court placed its corroborating observations on the record, and the
prosecutor tacitly accepted them. We thus agree with the People that the
authorities Newson cites, for his proposition that a freestanding body

8
language rationale lacking a description of that body language is inadequate,
are inapposite.
As to Newson’s other claims, bias against one side is not the sole
allowable demeanor-based justification. It is permissible to strike a juror for
his or her perceived discomfort with the proceedings or a relevant issue.
(People v. Zimmerman (1984) 36 Cal.3d 154, 161 [peremptory challenges to
jurors with reservations about death penalty valid].) Nor was further
questioning of Juror No. 22 required. The prosecutor had already questioned
her at some length, and direct questions by the prosecutor or the court about
her body language risked offense, which would only further support a strike.
(Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 275, fn. 16.) Particularly where, as here,
defense counsel did not dispute the accuracy or genuineness of the
prosecutor’s demeanor observations in the trial court, such concerns can be
legitimate race-neutral grounds for excusal. (People v. Baker (2021)
10 Cal.5th 1044, 1078-1079.)
Accordingly, we conclude substantial evidence supported the trial
court’s determination that the prosecutor’s demeanor-based reason for
striking Juror No. 22 was genuinely race neutral. To the extent Newson
argues the trial court erred as a matter of law, we disagree.
b.
As to the prosecutor’s second justification—that Juror No. 22’s
appearance on a reality court show signaled she may be headstrong and
unwilling to listen to and work well with others, risking a hung jury—we are
not convinced, as Newson claims, that the trial court relied on a different
reason than the prosecutor’s. The court’s acknowledgment there “might be
something” to the prosecutor’s concerns appears to accept the offered
rationale.

9
Nonetheless, on this record, we agree with Newson that the trial court
had a duty to further probe this justification. The prosecutor’s concern about
Juror No. 22 not working well with or listening to others was directly
contradicted by her claims that she “totally” works well with others, would
not hesitate to convict if the evidence so warranted, and had spent her life
working in customer service. “[M]ore is required of the trial court” “[w]hen
the prosecutor’s stated reasons are either unsupported by the record,
inherently implausible, or both.” (Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 386.)
Although the prosecutor erred in saying Juror No. 22 initiated the suit
that led to her appearance on the reality court show, that seemingly sincere
error does not per se render the reason pretextual. (Hardy, supra, 5 Cal.5th
at p. 79.) Even as a defendant on the show, Juror No. 22 nonetheless was
willing to air her problems on national television, which was the crux of the
prosecutor’s concern. The “entire rationale” accordingly does not “fall[ ]” due
to this error. And, despite Newson’s claim to the contrary, a prosecutor is
entitled to rely on personal experience in exercising peremptory challenges;
to believe a person who appears on a such a show may share undesirable
characteristics with a person known to have appeared on the same show is
not inherently implausible. We decline to address Newson’s unsupported
speculations as to inferences one can draw from Juror No. 22’s appearance on
the show.
In sum, we conclude the trial court failed to ascertain adequately the
credibility of this reason. Given the evidence contradicting the prosecutor’s
justification, this reason is suspect, but not, as Newson argues, necessarily
discriminatory.

10
c.
Evaluating both the prosecutor’s stated reasons holistically, we
conclude the court did not err in denying Newson’s motion. (People v. Smith
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134, 1157-1158 (Smith).)
Although the “positing of multiple reasons, some of which, upon
examination, prove implausible or unsupported by the facts, can in some
circumstances fatally impair the prosecutor’s credibility,” we conclude that is
not so here. (Smith, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 1157-1158.) “[A]t least one of the
two . . . principal justifications for the strike . . . withstand[s] closer scrutiny.”
(Foster v. Chatman (2016) 578 U.S. 488, 508.)
Here, as Newson acknowledges, the trial court did not simply make a
“global finding that the reasons appear sufficient.” (Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th
at p. 386.) The court assessed the reasons individually and combined, and,
importantly, provided its own corroborating observations as to Juror No. 22’s
body language. Ultimately, “[w]hen a trial judge validates a prosecutor’s
challenge based on the prospective juror’s demeanor, and makes clear that
such demeanor is the primary reason for validating the challenge, then it is
difficult to imagine any circumstance under which an appellate court would
second-guess that judgment.” (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 634 (conc. opn.
of Moreno, J.).) We conclude great deference is due to the court’s
determination that Juror No. 22’s potentially problematic demeanor was a
significant and genuinely race-neutral reason to strike her. Although we find
troubling the court’s failure to push back on the prosecutor’s reality court
show justification, we determine those shortcomings do not overcome the
near unassailability of the demeanor finding on review. We accordingly
conclude the court did not err in denying Newson’s Batson/Wheeler motion.

11
B.
Newson also contends the gang enhancements imposed under
section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(B), must be reversed because of
(1) retroactive amendments to section 186.22 and (2) the lack of substantial
evidence in the record that Newson committed the offenses with “the specific
intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members.”
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) Newson has withdrawn his claim that remand is
further required under section 1109.
The People concede the retroactivity of the amendments to
section 186.22 and the need to vacate the gang enhancement findings and
remand the matter for retrial on the enhancements, given the shortcomings
of the evidence presented at trial under the amended statute. We accept the
People’s concession. (People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 669 (Sek).)
Unlike the court in Sek, however, we must also assess whether retrial would
violate double jeopardy, given Newson’s additional claim that the record
evidence was insufficient to prove a violation of the statute at the time of
trial. (Ibid.)
Having (1) examined the entire record “in the light most favorable to
the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—
evidence that is reasonable, credible[,] and of solid value—such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt” and (2) “presume[d] in support of the judgment the existence of every
fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence” (People v. Kraft
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053), we conclude substantial evidence supported the
element of intent in the gang enhancements as originally tried.
Here, the People elicited testimony from a gang expert that Newson
was an “active associate” of the California Garden Crips (CGC) and a member

12
of a different Crip “set.” He was riding in a car owned by a documented CGC
member with two suspected CGC members and another active associate of
CGC. The expert testified that acts of violence by gang members and
associates benefit a gang by sending a message to rival gangs and instilling
fear in the community. Newson shooting at officers not only benefited CGC
in this manner but also permitted two likely CGC members to escape
apprehension by the officers.
The jury was instructed on the showing required to establish the intent
element. The jury was also instructed on how to use circumstantial evidence
for this issue. Newson’s counsel questioned the sufficiency of the evidence of
intent in closing, but the jury nonetheless found the allegation true.
On this record, we conclude a reasonable jury could have found beyond
a reasonable doubt Newson shot at the officers with the intent to “promote,
further, or assist in criminal conduct by” CGC members. (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)(1).) We are not persuaded by Newson’s contrary arguments. In
particular, Newson is incorrect that a defendant’s intentional commission of
the charged offense with known gang members cannot support the intent
element. (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 68.) Because we conclude
substantial evidence underpins the jury’s intent finding, the People may seek
retrial of the gang enhancements on remand.
As this disposition requires reversal of Newson’s sentence and
resentencing in accordance with current law, we need not resolve Newson’s
additional independent arguments as to the need to remand for resentencing.
(Sek, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 670.) Even were that not the case, however,
we lack the requisite level of confidence that the trial court would have
imposed the same upper-term sentence had the aggravating factors been put

13
to the jury, and we would thus remand for full resentencing regardless.
(See People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459, 465-469.)
III.
We vacate the jury’s findings on the gang enhancements and reverse
that portion of the judgment. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.
We remand this matter to the trial court, where the People shall have
60 days from the date of the remittitur to file an election to retry Newson on
the reversed gang enhancements. (Pen. Code § 1382, subd. (a)(2).) Following
retrial, or if the People elect not to retry Newson on the enhancements, the
trial court shall fully resentence Newson in accordance with current law,
including, without limitation, Penal Code section 1170 and, should Newson
file an appropriate motion to strike one or more enhancements, section 1385.
Thereafter, the trial court shall amend the abstract of judgment to reflect the
new sentence, including the additional six days of presentence custody credits
agreed to by the parties, and send a certified copy of the amended abstract to
the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

KELETY, J.

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Filed 7/10/24

Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One - No. D082242

S284695

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
En Banc
________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ERIC VAN NEWSON, Defendant and Appellant.
________________________________________________________________________

The petition for review is denied.

Kruger, J., was absent and did not participate.

(See Concurring Statement by Justice Liu)

___________/s/____________
Chief Justice

1
PEOPLE v. NEWSON
S284695

Concurring Statement by Justice Liu

Although I vote to deny review in this case, I note that
the issue concerning the prosecutor’s strike of Prospective
Juror No. 22 (Juror No. 22), a Black woman, provides yet
another illustration of why the Legislature believed it
necessary to enact Assembly Bill No. 3070 (Reg. Sess. 2019–
2020) to overhaul the legal framework for eliminating racial
discrimination in jury selection. (See Stats. 2020, ch. 318, § 2,
adding Code Civ. Proc., § 231.7; People v. Nadey (2024) __
Cal.5th __, __ [2024 WL 3016945, p. *56] (Nadey) [prosecutor
struck several Black women jurors for reasons presumptively
invalid under Code Civ. Proc., § 231.7].)
The prosecutor here gave two reasons for striking Juror
No. 22 in the second trial (after an initial mistrial) of
defendant Eric Van Newson, a Black man charged with
assaulting two White police officers with an illegally possessed
firearm. The prosecutor first said, “[T]he primary reason I
kicked her were both — her body language indicated to me
that she didn’t like me or defense counsel. I couldn’t figure out
exactly why.” The prosecutor then said, “But more
importantly, I tried this case once before and it hung 11 to 1.
Just one juror, on the most important count, Officer Hysen. So
I’m trying to screen potential jurors for anybody that might be
willing to dig in their heels and not work with the other jurors.
[¶] What I got as feedback for the last-hanged jury, the last
trial — I ask all the jurors if they work well in groups. My

1
PEOPLE v. NEWSON
Liu, J., concurring statement upon denial of review

concern for Juror 22, she was on Judge Judy, and she said she
brought a case against her own mom regarding some type of
loan. That, to me, indicated someone, based on my experience
that I mentioned with 22, with a [district attorney] that we had
in our office, who also went on Judge Judy, and that individual
was hard to work with. [¶] From watching Judge Judy,
individuals that are willing to bring their problems onto TV
nationally over an issue, much less with their mother, that’s
someone that could also hang a jury up and not listen to other
people. It seems like headstrong character —overly
headstrong for that situation. I want to avoid that. That was
the reason that I kicked her.”
In evaluating these stated reasons, the trial court said:
“I did note there were times, particularly whenever there was a
question about race, in particular, when I was asking the
questions about white police officers, black individuals, she
did, kind of, frown and looked uncomfortable with the
questions. So I noted that, kind of, body language, as well.
The Judge Judy thing, maybe, causes one to think, maybe, a
little bit out of the mainstream.
“So I’m satisfied, at this point, that the stated reasons
demonstrate that the excusal was not on the basis of race. I
would note, however, number one, I was the trial judge the
first time this case was tried, so I’m aware of the situation that
[the prosecutor] is referring to, where there was one or possibly
two possible jurors who happened to be African American, who
afterward, perhaps, expressed the view that they would be
unlikely to convict a young black male of an offense against
white police officers.

2
PEOPLE v. NEWSON
Liu, J., concurring statement upon denial of review

“That is not a basis to exclude black individuals from this
panel, either male or female. There would have to be
something specific about the individual that would justify an
excusal based upon a non-race basis. If the only basis of
exercising a peremptory challenge is, well, last time we tried
this, we had an African American juror who wouldn’t convict
an African American male, so I’m going to exclude African
Americans, no, you can’t do that. That would be precluded by
Batson-Wheeler.
“It would have to be something specific about that juror.
So, I think, that should be clear. But in this case, with regards
to [Juror No. 22], I’m satisfied that the stated reason,
particularly body language, which I noted on at least one or
two occasions, demonstrates to me that the excusal was not
made on the basis of race. So at this time, the Batson-Wheeler
motion is denied, obviously, without prejudice to renew it if
there is something else that occurs.” (See Batson v. Kentucky
(1986) 476 U.S. 79; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258.)
As to the demeanor-based reason, the trial court did not
confirm the prosecutor’s observation that “her body language
indicated to me that she didn’t like me or defense counsel.”
Instead, the trial court offered its own, different observation of
Juror No. 22’s demeanor: “I did note there were times,
particularly whenever there was a question about race, in
particular, when I was asking the questions about white police
officers, black individuals, she did, kind of, frown and looked
uncomfortable with the questions.” The trial court did not
explain how its own observation corroborated the prosecutor’s.
The Court of Appeal, citing our case law, bridged this gap by
explaining that “the trial court’s observations corroborated,
rather than improperly replaced, the prosecutor’s stated

3
PEOPLE v. NEWSON
Liu, J., concurring statement upon denial of review

demeanor concern. Observing frowning and discomfort when
relevant subject matter is referenced is consistent with Juror
No. 22 looking like she disliked both sides. As the People
argue, both behaviors can demonstrate a general ‘[h]ostility
toward . . . the proceedings.’ ”
This analysis, though supported by precedent, leaves
much to be desired. To be sure, both the body language
reported by the prosecutor and the demeanor observed by the
trial court “can demonstrate a general ‘hostility toward . . . the
proceedings.’ ” (Italics added.) But they can also be unrelated:
Juror No. 22’s apparent discomfort with the subject matter of
the case did not necessarily have anything to do with her
dislike of both counsel, and the prosecutor identified only the
latter, not the former, as a concern. Importantly, the
prosecutor himself, after stating that the juror’s demeanor
indicated she didn’t like either counsel, did not suggest the
reason was that she had general hostility toward the
proceedings. Rather, he said, “I couldn’t figure out exactly
why.”
Consider how this demeanor-based reason would fare
under the new legal framework enacted after Newson’s second
trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 231.7.) The Legislature has declared
that counsel’s observation that a “prospective juror exhibited
either a lack of rapport or problematic attitude, body language,
or demeanor” has “historically been associated with improper
discrimination in jury selection” and is “presumptively invalid”
as a reason for exercising a peremptory strike “unless the trial
court is able to confirm that the asserted behavior occurred,
based on the court’s own observations or the observations of
counsel for the objecting party.” (Id., subd. (g)(1)(B), (2).)
“Even with that confirmation, the counsel offering the reason

4
PEOPLE v. NEWSON
Liu, J., concurring statement upon denial of review

shall explain why the asserted demeanor, behavior, or manner
in which the prospective juror answered questions matters to
the case to be tried.” (Id., subd. (g)(2).) A trial court “shall
consider only the reasons actually given and shall not
speculate on, or assume the existence of, other possible
justifications for the use of the peremptory challenge.” (Id.,
subd. (d)(1).) “The reviewing court shall consider only reasons
actually given . . . and shall not speculate as to or consider
reasons that were not given . . . .” (Id., subd. (j).)
These standards were not met by the prosecutor, who
gave a presumptively invalid demeanor-based reason; by the
trial court, which did not confirm that the asserted behavior
occurred based on its own or defense counsel’s observations,
and instead relied on its own, different observation of Juror
No. 22’s demeanor; or by the Court of Appeal, which speculated
that the juror harbored general hostility to the proceedings
when the prosecutor himself said “I couldn’t figure out exactly
why” the juror appeared to indicate dislike of both counsel.
Further, it bears noting that the reason offered by the
trial court would fare no better than the prosecutor’s demeanor
concern under the new legal framework. The trial court said
Juror No. 22 “looked uncomfortable” when asked “questions
about white police officers, black individuals.” Although the
Court of Appeal characterized this discomfort as
demonstrating hostility toward the proceedings, the new
framework teaches that trial courts must be careful to probe
such vague characterizations when evaluating whether “an
objectively reasonable person would view race . . . as a factor in
the use of the peremptory challenge. . . .” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 231.7, subd. (d)(1).) Among other things, trial courts should
consider “[w]hether a reason might be disproportionately

5
PEOPLE v. NEWSON
Liu, J., concurring statement upon denial of review

associated with a race. . . .” (Id., subd. (d)(3)(E).) Perceived
“discomfort” with questions about race — particularly
questions about policing and race — may serve as a proxy for
race. (Id., subd. (e)(1) [peremptory challenge based on a
prospective juror expressing “a distrust of or having a negative
experience with law enforcement or the criminal legal system”
is presumptively invalid]; see, e.g., People v. Miles (2020) 9
Cal.5th 513, 614 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.) [a prosecutorial practice
of striking jurors based on their views of the O.J. Simpson case
would result in disproportionate removal of Black jurors]; see
also People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1055 (conc. opn. of
Evans, J.) [noting generally the impact of racial disparities in
policing].)
Turning to the prosecutor’s second reason, the record
indicates that Juror No. 22, when asked if she had ever been a
party to a lawsuit, said, “I was on Judge Judy for not paying
back a loan to my mom.” The prosecutor mentioned the juror’s
appearance on Judge Judy as an indication that she might be
“hard to work with” and “overly headstrong,” and “could . . .
hang a jury up and not listen to other people.” But in
describing this concern, the prosecutor said, “[S]he was on
Judge Judy, and she said she brought a case against her own
mom regarding some type of loan” (italics added), which is not
true, before going on to say Juror No. 22 was “willing to bring
[her] problems onto TV nationally over an issue, much less
with [her] mother,” which is true.
I agree with the Court of Appeal that the trial court was
obliged to inquire further because Juror No. 22’s other voir dire
answers indicated she would work well with others, and
especially because her employment as a premium customer
service agent for a national airline seems inconsistent with the

6
PEOPLE v. NEWSON
Liu, J., concurring statement upon denial of review

characterization of her as an “overly headstrong” person who
might be “hard to work with” and might “not listen to other
people.”
Moreover, I would not excuse the prosecutor’s assertion
that Juror No. 22 initiated the suit that led to her appearance
on Judge Judy as a “seemingly sincere error.” This assumes
the answer to the very issue at the heart of the Batson inquiry:
whether the prosecutor’s stated reason was sincere or
pretextual. Frankly, I tend to agree with the trial court that
“[t]he Judge Judy thing, maybe, causes one to think, maybe, a
little bit out of the mainstream” and “there might be something
to that.” But the prosecutor’s misstatement — especially
coming after his observation that a prior jury had hung 11 to 1
(the trial court attributed the holdout to a Black juror) —
should have raised suspicion that the prosecutor viewed Juror
No. 22 through a racialized lens and apparently heard what he
wanted to hear in her voir dire testimony, even though
contrary to the record. (See Henderson v. Thompson (Wn.
2022) 518 P.3d 1011, 1023 [counsel “characterized Henderson
as ‘combative’ and ‘confrontational.’ These terms evoke the
harmful stereotype of an ‘angry BLACK woman.’ ”], citing Jones
& Norwood, Aggressive Encounters & White Fragility:
Deconstructing the Trope of the Angry Black Woman (2017) 102
Iowa L.Rev. 2017, 2049; Bannai, Challenged X 3: The Stories of
Women of Color Who Teach Legal Writing (2014) 29 Berkeley J.
Gender L. & Just. 275, 280 [quoting one professor as saying,
“There’s a bias against strong black women. There’s a
stereotype of the angry black woman, and media have
perpetuated that stereotype. ‘She’s strong and better not cross
her, difficult to get along with,’ a ‘my way or the highway’
mentality, irrational . . . and impossible to control.”].) Given

7
PEOPLE v. NEWSON
Liu, J., concurring statement upon denial of review

these circumstances, the prosecutor’s second “reason is
suspect,” and “the trial court failed to ascertain adequately the
credibility of this reason.”
Thus, we are left with only the prosecutor’s demeanor-
based reason, and as explained above, I would not describe the
trial court’s “demeanor finding” as one of “near
unassailability.” Reasonable minds may differ on whether the
credibility of one out of two stated reasons, under these
circumstances, is sufficient to satisfy the standards in our case
law. (See People v. Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134, 1157–1158.)
But the larger point is that the entirety of the record and the
circumstances here — including the prosecutor’s statement of
reasons, the trial court’s ruling, and the Court of Appeal’s
opinion, though legally supportable — do not inspire great
confidence that Juror No. 22 was in fact removed without
regard to her race.
The Legislature has found that “the existing procedure
for determining whether a peremptory challenge was exercised
on the basis of a legally impermissible reason has failed to
eliminate that discrimination” (Stats. 2020, ch. 318, § 1,
subd. (b)), and it has “put into place an effective procedure for
eliminating the unfair exclusion of potential jurors based on
race” among other categories (id., § 1, subd. (a)). In all
likelihood, the issue here would have a different outcome if
evaluated under the new standards, which again suggests “the
Legislature may wish to consider whether to make the reforms
of section 231.7 retroactive to cases pending on appeal.”
(Nadey, supra, __ Cal.5th at p. __ [2024 WL 3016945, at p. *57]
(dis. opn. of Liu, J.); cf. Stats. 2022, ch. 739, § 1 [amending the
California Racial Justice Act of 2020 to apply retroactively “to
ensure justice for all”].)

8
PEOPLE v. NEWSON
Liu, J., concurring statement upon denial of review

Finally, despite the rejection of his equal protection
claim, Newson may have an avenue for relief under the
California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (RJA), which was
designed to uproot racial bias in the criminal justice system
and applies retroactively. (Stats. 2022, ch. 739; Stats. 2020,
ch. 317, § 2, subd. (c) [observing that “the legal standards for
preventing racial bias in jury selection are ineffective” and that
“ ‘requiring a showing of purposeful discrimination sets a high
standard that is difficult to prove in any context’ ”].) Proof of
discrimination under the RJA does not require the showing of
intent required under equal protection doctrine, and it is
possible that Newson has a valid RJA claim in light of the
totality of circumstances here.

LIU, J.
I Concur:
EVANS, J.

9

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